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ABSTRACT 
The problem of designing appropriate solvency regulations is addressed with respect 
to the U. K. life assurance industry using various theoretical and methodological 
techniques. These alternative approaches to the measurement of insurer solvency 
are explored in order to provide a framework for assessing regulations. Reviews of 
the current insurance regulatory environment as well as an extensive statistical and 
economic analysis of the life assurance industry provide a practical backdrop to 
subsequent model building. 
Building on these reviews, a `Monte-Carlo' simulation model of an insurer portfolio 
is constructed to demonstrate additional considerations relevant to solvency 
regulation. The hypothetical insurance company is assumed to maximise the 
expected utility of `ultimate surplus', which is taken as an indicator of end-of-period 
wealth. Five asset classes are used and liabilities are assumed fixed. The simulated 
run-off performance of the portfolio is evaluated in terms of the probability of 
insolvency demonstrating a `U' shaped relationship between the risk preference of 
the insurer and the insolvency probability. 
Implications for the design of regulatory constraints are also assessed with respect to 
the simulations. In particular, the contrast between ex ante and ex post measures of 
insurer solvency are highlighted with the conclusion taken that current regulations 
might gain further insight into the underlying solvency performance of insurance 
companies if they were to use ex ante solvency measures. This subsequent policy 
prescription is qualified by two factors: first, that the value of simulations and 
forecasting as an ex ante measure of performance is only as good as the models used 
to forecast ex ante; and second, that any proposed regulatory shift must be assessed 
within a cost-benefit analysis. Overall, the simulation analysis suggests that current 
regulations provide an incomplete picture of the solvency performance of the U. K. 
life assurance industry. 
DECLARATIONS 
I, Benjamin R. Gully, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me 
and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. 
Date. b. /. O. I/R bSignature of candidate. 
V. ýMý 
. 
I was admitted as a research student in September 1996 and as a candidate for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in September 1996; the higher study for which this is a record 
was carried out in the University of St. Andrews, Scotland (U. K. ) between 1996 and 
1999. 
DateZ(. 
/. ý? /U P Signature of candidate. 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and 
Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. 
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis for application for that 
higher degree. 
-Z6 /05100 Cho -C. 
TL4ýd 
Date 
.............. 
Signature of supervisor..... .............. 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews, I understand that I am giving 
permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the 
University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work 
not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be published, 
and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or 
research worker. 
Date1L/ü /. P. Ü Signature of candidate.. ,... 
ý, 
ý . 1 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................... 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................... 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................... 
Chapter 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 
Background: The Rationale for Regulation 
Definitions and Objectives 
Structure of Thesis 
2. THE LEGAL & ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES 
AFFECTING THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
Why Regulate? 
The Historical Development of Insurance Legislation 
The European Influence on U. K. Insurance Regulation 
The Current Regulatory Environment 
Insurance Industry Self-Regulation 
Summary 
X1 
xlv 
xvii 
19 
32 
V 
3. EVALUATING INSURANCE COMPANY SOLVENCY: 
'CLASSICAL' INSURANCE SOLVENCY THEORY......... 85 
Introduction 
Quantifying Solvency 
Formal Definitions 
Calculating the Solvency Position of an 
Insurance Company 
Summary 
4. EVALUATING INSURANCE COMPANY SOLVENCY: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES .......................................... 123 
Introduction 
An Alternative Approach to `Classical' Insurer 
Solvency Theory 
Foundations of Asset/Liability Management (ALM) 
Financial Economics and Portfolio Selection 
Simulation Techniques 
Additional Theoretical Considerations 
Insolvency Prediction: Models of Financial Distress 
Summary 
5. MODELLING INSURANCE COMPANY DECISIONS: 
PORTFOLIO BALANCE, EXPECTED UTILITY AND 
REGULATION ...................................................................... 173 
Introduction 
The Standard Portfolio Selection Problem 
A General Portfolio Model of a Life Insurer 
VI 
Utility Theory and Portfolio Selection 
Incorporating Insurer Solvency Regulations 
Solvency Regulations in Terms of Insurance 
Leverage 
Summary 
6. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE 
INDUSTRY ............................................................................ 
206 
Introduction 
Market/Industry Structure 
Life Assurance 
Market Size 
Basic Life Assurance Products 
Overseas and Domestic Markets for Life Assurance 
The Number and Size Distribution of Insurers 
Entry into the U. K. Life Assurance Industry 
Summary 
7. THE CONDUCT OF THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE 
INDUSTRY ............................................................................ 
255 
Introduction 
Price-Setting Objectives and the Function of the Actuary 
Marketing Objectives 
Portfolio Objectives 
Vii 
Acquisitions and Merger Objectives 
Summary 
8. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE 
INDUSTRY ............................................................................ 
285 
Introduction 
Life Assurance Performance: a Microeconomic 
Perspective 
Life Assurance Performance: a Macroeconomic 
Perspective 
Summary 
9. FIRM-LEVEL STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE 
RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM THE U. K. 
LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY .......................................... 
312 
Introduction 
Theoretical and Methodological Background 
Brief Literature Review 
Research Design 
Results and Discussion 
Summary 
10. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS IN 
THE MODELLING OF A LIFE INSURER'S 
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES ................................................ 347 
Introduction 
Asset Class Selection 
The Wilkie Model of Stochastic Investment Returns 
vii' 
The Variance/Covariance Matrix of Returns 
Discussion of the Wilkie Model 
Liabilities 
Summary 
11. LIFE INSURER RISK PREFERENCE AND 
SOLVENCY: A SIMULATION APPROACH ...................... 384 
Introduction 
The Insurer Optimisation Problem 
The Ultimate Surplus Simulation Algorithm 
Ultimate Surplus Simulation Output Data 
Discussion of Results 
Summary 
12. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................... 429 
Public Policy Perspectives 
Regulatory Objectives 
The Performance of the Current Regulatory Environment 
Considerations in the Measurement of Solvency 
A Simulation Perspective 
Ex ante Solvency Measurement 
Further Remarks 
ix 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................ 
448 
APPENDIX I LEGAL MEASUREMENTS OF INSURER SOLVENCY... 449 
APPENDIX 2 DATA ON THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY..... 451 
APPENDIX 3 SIMULATION OUTPUT FOR STOCHASTIC ASSET 
RETURNS .............................................................................. 455 
APPENDIX 4 OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS AND SOLVENCY 
SIMULATION OUTPUT ...................................................... 460 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 
466 
X 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure Page 
2.1. The Measurement of Solvency in the EEA ....................................... 56 
2.2. The Regulatory Hierarchy ................................................................. 75 
3.1. Solvency: The Regulator's View ...................................................... 95 
3.2. The Insurance Process ....................................................................... 100 
4.1. The "Cascade" Structure of the 1986 Wilkie Model ......................... 146 
4.2. The Risk-Based Capital (RBC) System ............................................. 170 
5.1. Mean-Standard Deviation Portfolio Frontier (Risky Assets Only)... 179 
5.2. Typical Risk Averse Utility Function (A), with Resulting 
Indifference Map in (B) ........................................................ 187 
5.3. Portfolio Selection and Expected Utility ........................................... 190 
5.4. The Probability of Insolvency ............................................................ 195 
5.5. Portfolio Selection within a Regulatory Setting ................................ 196 
5.6. The Envelope Frontier and the Insolvency Constraint ...................... 203 
6.1. Long-Term and general Insurance Written Premiums ....................... 210 
6.2. New Ordinary Life Business in the U. K., 1986-1996 ....................... 219 
6.3. New Yearly Premiums for Individual Long-Term 
Business in the U. K ............................................................... 226 
6.4. The Proportion of New Yearly Linked-Life Business ....................... 230 
6.5. Foreign-Controlled Insurers' Share of the U. K. Life Market............ 235 
6.6. Authorised U. K. and Foreign Insurers ............................................... 242 
6.7. A Lorenz Curve Relationship Between New Business and the 
Number of Insurers (1992) .................................................... 247 
X1 
7.1. Long-Term Insurance Funds (£m) .................................................... 
272 
7.2. Breakdown of Long-Term Business Investment Holdings for 
Non-Linked and Linked Funds (%) ....................................... 278 
7.3. Long-Term Business Investment Income 1986-1996 ........................ 280 
8.1. Inter-Firm Profitability of Life Insurers in 1997 ................................ 291 
8.2. Breakdown of benefits Paid on U. K. Ordinary Life Assurance 
1986-1996 .............................................................................. 
296 
8.3. Total Employment in the Insurance Sector ........................................ 304 
8.4. Earnings of U. K. Financial Institutions 1996 .................................... 309 
10.1. Simulated Inflation Rates ................................................................... 356 
10.2. Simulated Dividend Index for Ordinary Shares ................................. 358 
10.3. Simulated Dividend Yields ................................................................ 359 
10.4. Simulated Equity Price Index ............................................................ 360 
10.5. Simulated Yields on (Irredeemable) Fixed Interest Securities.......... 361 
10.6. Simulated Short-Term Interest Rates ................................................. 363 
10.7. Simulated Yields on a Given Property Portfolio ............................... 365 
10.8. Simulated Property Price Income Index ............................................ 366 
10.9. Simulated Property Price Index ......................................................... 367 
10.10. Simulated Real Returns on Index-Linked Government Securities.... 368 
10.11. The Efficient Frontier Using the 
1995 Wilkie Model (Nominal Returns) ................................ 375 
10.12. The Efficient Frontier Using the 
1995 Wilkie Model (Real Returns) ....................................... 376 
11.1. Optimal Portfolios .............................................................................. 407 
11.2. Expected Return and Standard Deviation of Ultimate Surplus......... 414 
X11 
11.3. The Probability of Insolvency and Regulation .................................. 
417 
11.4. Margins of Solvency .......................................................................... 
425 
12.1. Ex ante and Ex Post Regulation of Solvency ..................................... 
439 
X111 
TABLES 
Table Page 
3.1. Finite-time Ruin Probabilities: Numerical Approximations .............. 115 
4.1. Risk Classes Present in Assets and Liabilities ................................... 143 
4.2. Hardy's Simulation of Insolvency and Relative Insolvency .............. 148 
4.3. Safety-First Rules Used to Define the Size of Downside Risk.......... 153 
4.4. Interested Parties in Solvency Surveillance ....................................... 159 
4.5. Sample of Risk-Based Capital Charges for Selected 
Asset Categories ..................................................................... 169 
5.1. Variables and Definitions .................................................................. 180 
6.1. Premium Income from U. K. Ordinary Life Assurance as a 
Percentage of Personal Disposable Income 1984-1996......... 215 
6.2. Historical U. K. Life Business ............................................................ 216 
6.3. New Ordinary Life Business in the U. K., 1986-1995 ....................... 218 
6.4. Share of the Global Economy ............................................................ 232 
6.5. Ten Largest Insurance Markets in 1995 ............................................. 233 
6.6. Insurance Density in the Ten Largest Insurance Markets 
1993 & 1995 .......................................................................... 234 
6.7. Market Share of Total Overseas Net Premium Income by 
Country of Origin, 1986-1996 ............................................... 236 
6.8. E. U. Long-Term Insurance Net Premium Income by Country.......... 237 
6.9. Overseas Life Net Premium Income- Percentage of Total 
Company Premium Income, 1992-1996 ................................ 239 
6.10. Authorised Insurers ............................................................................ 242 
xiv 
6.11. Number of Insurers Authorised for Each Class of Insurance 
Business ................................................................................. 
243 
6.12. Asset holdings in other Insurance Companies- 
Evidence from the Largest Insurers in the UK (1998)........ 245 
6.13 Concentration Ratios of the Leading 10 Long-Term 
Life Assurance Companies in 1996 ....................................... 249 
6.14 Entry to the U. K. Life Assurance Industry ........................................ 253 
7.1. Expectation of Life at Birth According to Death Rates 
Assumed for 1994,2001 and 2031 ........................................ 259 
7.2. Insurance Company Variation in Monthly Premium Rates for 
Low Cost With Profits Endowments 1998 ............................ 261 
7.3. Long Term Expenditure ..................................................................... 263 
7.4. New Long-Term Business by Distribution Channel .......................... 
266 
7.5. Insurance Companies' Asset Holdings as a Percentage (%) of 
Total Assets ............................................................................ 274 
7.6. Insurance Companies' Net Investment (£m), 1994-1996 .................. 276 
7.7. Takeovers and Mergers in the U. K. Life Assurance 
Industry for 1996/97 .............................................................. 282 
8.1. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Proprietary Life Insurers' 
Profitability in 1997 ............................................................... 289 
8.2. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Proprietary Life Insurers' 
Profit Growth Between 1996 and 1997 ................................. 290 
8.3. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Mutual Life Insurers' 
`Profitability' in 1997 ............................................................ 291 
8.4. Top 15 With-Profit Endowment Maturity Values, 1998 ................... 293 
8.5.1998 Bonus Declarations for Top 12 Life Companies ...................... 294 
8.6. Breakdown of Benefits for Different Product Lines in 1996 ............. 297 
xv 
8.7. Managed Fund Performance for largest Insurers ............................... 299 
8.8. Variation in Life Fund Performance .................................................. 
300 
8.9. Number of Insurance Regulatory Interventions 1990-1996 .............. 303 
8.10. Rights Issues by Insurers ................................................................... 
305 
8.11. Net Investments by Financial Institution as a Percentage of 
Total Net Investments 1987-1996 .......................................... 
306 
8.12. U. K. Current Account, 1993-1995 ..................................................... 
308 
8.13. Overseas Earnings of U. K. Financial Institutions (£m), 1986-1996.. 310 
9.1. Regression Results .............................................................................. 329 
9.2. Findings on Size, Death, Managerial Expenses, and 
Performance in the U. K. Life Assurance Industry ................. 329 
9.3. Results with SIZEAGE ...................................................................... 331 
9.4. Instrumental variable Regression Results .......................................... 340 
9.5. Results of the Hausman Exogeneity Test for the Variable SIZE1997.341 
10.1. Rates of Nominal Return (%) by Asset Class for Various Terms..... 371 
10.2. Rates of Real Return (%) by Asset Class for Various Terms............ 372 
10.3. The Variance/Covariance Matrix for Nominal Returns (25 years) ... 373 
10.4. The Variance/Covariance Matrix for Real Returns (25 years) ......... 374 
10.5. Initial Conditions ............................................................................... 377 
11.1. Expected Returns and the Variance Covariance Matrix (25 years).. 401 
11.2. Optimal Portfolios .............................................................................. 405 
11.3. Generating a Simulation of Ultimate Surplus .................................... 409 
11.4. Simulation Results for Ultimate Surplus & Insolvency Prediction 
(25 years) ............................................................................... 
412 
XVI 
11.5. Extract from @RISK Convergence Reports ....................................... 413 
11.6. Sensitivity Results for Ultimate Surplus by Asset Class ................... 421 
11.7. The Probability of Insolvency (%) and Actuarial Portfolio 
Holdings 
............................................................ 
426 
xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author would like to express his thanks to the following, for their support, 
useful comments and understanding during the drafting of this thesis: 
  to Professor Gavin, C. Reid of the Department of Economics, University of St. 
Andrews, in his capacity as first supervisor; 
  to Professor James, A. Brander of the Faculty of Commerce & Business 
Administration, University of British Columbia (UBC), for the support he has 
provided in respect of my position and research as visiting scholar at UBC; 
  to Dr. M. M. A. La Manna and Dr. G. S. Shea (both University of St. Andrews) 
for further supervision involvement; 
  to the Economic and Social Research Council (E. S. R. C. ) who have funded this 
research full-time; 
  to the Scottish Economic Society who have financed the collection of insurance 
company accounts through the `Small Claims Award'; 
  and finally to my parents (Richard and Gini), Craig, Mathew, and Ali. 
xviii 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background: The Rationale for Regulation 
There are two principal motivations for the regulation of life assurance, or more 
generally financial services, in the U. K. First, there is the problem of information 
asymmetry, and second there is the problem of systemic risk. These two factors 
form the foundation of a public interest theory of insurance regulation, where 
government imposes regulation to correct a perceived market failure for the benefit 
of the public. ' Moreover, information asymmetry and risk bearing are also the twin 
pillars of agency analysis (see Laffont and Tirole (1993)). 
1.0.1 Information Asymmetry 
Consider in greater detail the nature of the market imperfection that pertains to life 
assurance. The market for insurance is characterised by asymmetric information, 
which makes it difficult for policyholders to assess the risks and returns associated 
with the insurance policy. This problem is especially applicable to life assurance, 
where the expected returns extend many years into the future. 
1A comprehensive list of the various sources of market failure and their relationship to regulation 
can be found in Breyer (1981). Note that the traditional examples of market failure motivating 
regulation are natural monopoly (Baumol 1977, Waterson 1988), imperfect information (Akerlof 
1970, Shapiro 1983, and Milgrom and Roberts 1986), and the provision of public goods (Fisher and 
Peterson 1976). 
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There are two types of information asymmetry relevant to this. First, there is the 
complexity of contract argument where the nature of the contract between the 
insurer and the policyholder may be difficult to understand, both in respect of the 
objectives of the plan, and in relation to the charges and investment decisions. Life 
assurance contracts are long-term in nature with policy terms frequently in excess of 
10 years. In theory, in order to compare contracts across insurance companies, it 
would be necessary for prospective policyholders to compare alternative cashflow 
profiles associated with different insurers and this, for the most part, is not within 
the capabilities of policyholders. Thus, regulation of information disclosure is one 
solution to this information asymmetry, whereby the information disclosed assists 
the policyholder in forming less biased judgements. 
The second information asymmetry relates more specifically to the assessment of 
insurance company solvency. This problem is compounded for long-term contracts 
where the expected return is contingent on the solvency (and conduct) of the 
insurance company long after the contract has been effected. Moreover, the value to 
the policyholder of that solvency will increase over time, as the policyholder's 
financial stake in the insurance company rises. Most policyholders are poorly 
placed to assess the solvency of an insurance company: most policyholders do not 
have the expertise to form a judgement on financial solidity, or the resources to 
acquire the necessary information. Thus, there is some market efficiency in 
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ensuring that a regulator acts as a collector and monitor of information to ensure 
adequate safeguards for policyholders. 
In the absence of adequate regulation, policyholders may make decisions that are 
unlikely to be in their best interest, and these decisions may not only have a negative 
impact individually, but may also have wider implications for the market as a 
whole. The resulting feedback to insurance companies may encourage and 
stimulate poor market practice rather than provide competition on the basis of 
efficiency. 
1.0.2 Systemic Risk 
The second principal motivation for the regulation of life assurance is systemic risk. 
The operation of a modern, market economy sees financial institutions make 
operational decisions, particularly in respect of investments, without direct 
government control. The systemic risk argument rests on the proposition that a 
stable financial system provides a favourable environment for efficient resource 
allocation and therefore promotes economic growth. Moreover, the need to promote 
stability in the financial system is based on the notion that the failure of a financial 
institution may, through `contagion' effects, undermine the stability and public 
confidence in the financial sector as a whole. This argument is frequently cited as 
motivation for the regulation of banks because of their payment function. However, 
the application of this argument to insurance is also relevant because of the central 
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role that insurance companies play in risk management, which facilitates the smooth 
functioning of the economy helping individuals and businesses to plan many years 
into the future. The facilitation of inter-generation transfers may also be adversely 
affected through the collapse of insurance companies. Thus, the cost of increasing 
uncertainty, associated with a lack of confidence in the insurance industry, may 
result in a systemic risk. 
In order to evaluate the level of systemic risk, there are a number of minimum 
standards that are formalised to regulate solvency of institutions selling financial 
products or services. These regulations aim to minimise the risk of policyholder 
loss and also ensure that in the event of insurance company insolvency, there are a 
number of safeguards in place in order to ensure public confidence. Hence, 
solvency regulation is motivated here out of a public interest theory of regulation. 
1.0.3 Alternative Theories of Regulating Life Assurance 
While the public interest or normative theory of regulation is greatly persuasive, it is 
important to note that there exist a number of alternative theories of regulating life 
assurance. These theories are primarily `positive' in nature and are justified on the 
grounds that public interest theories of regulation ignore the fact that regulators have 
objectives that may not coincide with those objectives assumed by normative theory 
(typically, the maximisation of a welfare index (Baron 1989)). Positive theories 
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emphasise the roles of different interest groups within the politics of regulation 
(Olson 1965, Moe 1980, and Becker 1985). 
Consider one such group of positive theories that together forms the `capture' theory 
of regulation. The proposition here is that regulation is primarily motivated by the 
desire of a grouping, either political or industrial, to attain a position of power or 
influence. That is, the cartel or capture theory of regulation holds the view that 
organised interest groups dominate the outcomes of regulatory decisions (see Stigler 
(1971), Posner (1974), and Peltzman (1976)). Thus, life assurance regulation may 
in fact be motivated as a direct consequence of lobbying. While the ultimate 
influence of interest groups on regulation is unclear, there is no doubt that lobbying 
does occur and that this is significant. For example, there are many debates relating 
to the legislative changes currently taking place within the regulation of the 
financial services industry. One such debate relates the extent to which consumers 
should be held explicitly accountable for effecting a financial contract. The 
financial services industry is currently lobbying to have an explicit reference in the 
statute to this consumer responsibility. Although, the outcome of this lobbying is 
unclear, the significance of this effort is clear and hence the capture theory of 
regulation is an important contribution. Note that a significant volume of literature 
has attempted to test interest-group theories of regulation (for examples see 
Bernstein (1955), Caves (1962), Friedlaender (1969), and Stigler (1971)). 
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Another theory of regulation that might be relevant to life assurance regulation is 
the more general economic theory of regulation (Downs 1957). This theory regards 
regulation as an economic good, subject to the laws of supply and demand. 
Regulation is supplied by those in a position to do so if the demand for it, in a 
currency acceptable to the regulator, is sufficient. The 1986 Financial Services Act 
may be analysed in an economic theory context. Prior to the introduction of the 
Act, there had been widely publicised cases of investor losses and this resulted in 
public demand for heightened investor protection to prevent future losses. Thus, the 
1986 Financial Services Act can be seen as a response, in part, to the demands of the 
public. While regulatory theories of demand and supply will be material to an 
understanding of regulating life assurance, alternative theories of regulation, 
especially public interest theories, are likely to be more relevant. 2 
1.1 Definitions and Objectives 
"An insurer is solvent if it has sufficient assets to meet its liabilities, " (Taylor and 
Buchanan 1988,49). However, there is much ambiguity associated with this 
definition. One of the recurring themes in the measurement and regulation of 
insurer solvency concerns the complexity associated with a workable definition of 
solvency. As the eminent actuary, Teivo Pentikäinen, points out: 
We should appreciate the fact that the solvency position [of an 
insurer] is affected by nearly all the economical activities and decision 
making processes of an insurer... If understood in this broad sense, the 
solvency issue may have a tendency of spreading out to embrace just about 
2 The net outcome will probably be a function of all the alternative theories of regulation. 
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nearly everything. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the considerations in 
order to confine it reasonably under the title "solvency" and to be content 
with only making references to many of the relevant factors. (Pentikäinen 
1988,1) 
It is a matter of fact that providing a workable definition of solvency is often fraught 
with complications. However, insurance companies are in the business of assuming 
risk (and hence variability) and solvency is therefore seen to depend critically on 
three factors: time, risk, and probability. The relative importance of each of these 
factors is explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
Given the ambiguity surrounding a workable definition of solvency, it is natural to 
ask whether regulators are asking the `right' questions in respect of insurance 
company performance and solvency. Related to this question, is the following: 
given an appropriate theory of insurer solvency, what types of questions should a 
regulator be asking? Moreover, are current regulations taking into account the 
relevant considerations of time, risk and probability in attempting to provide a 
workable definition of solvency? Here lies the central objective: to expand upon the 
various approaches to analysing solvency by developing a `Monte-Carlo' simulation 
portfolio model of an insurance company to demonstrate some additional 
considerations that might be deemed relevant to the solvency regulation of life 
assurance in the U. K. 
A hypothetical life assurance company is constructed and assumed to maximise the 
expected utility of end-of-period wealth, assuming a set of 5 asset classes and a 
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fixed liability. The run-off performance of the resulting `optimal portfolios' are 
then evaluated in terms of their probability of insolvency with associated 
implications for the design of regulatory constraints being assessed. In particular, 
the contrast between ex ante and ex post measures of insurer solvency are 
highlighted with the conclusion taken that current regulations might gain further 
insight into the underlying solvency performance of insurance companies if they 
were to quantify insurer risk preference and use this within an ex-ante measure of 
insurer solvency. Thus, an attempt is made to demonstrate that there are a number 
of additional factors to consider with respect to the design of solvency regulations. 
However, any subsequent policy prescriptions must be qualified within a cost- 
benefit analysis of regulatory shift. 
In order to provide a sound institutional background, part of the analysis reviews the 
current regulatory constraints in the U. K., while another part has focused on 
providing a full account of the main statistical and economic features of the U. K. 
life assurance industry. Much of this work is based on personal, professional 
experience in the life assurance industry, which involved the completion of exams 
towards the insurance industry's Financial Planning Certificate. 
Note here that the term life assurance and the term life insurance are used 
interchangeably, although there is an historical explanation for these terms. 
Assurance is an earlier term used before the end of the sixteenth century. Its general 
application is retained in the titles and policy names of many long-established 
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companies (such as the Legal & General Assurance Society Limited). By contrast, 
the term insurance was first made reference to in relation to fire, but soon became 
adopted equally with assurance. The term assurance is primarily related to life 
business, rather than general insurance such as motor and property. The use of the 
term assurance is retained in the U. K. unlike other countries such as the United 
States (see Jones-Lee (1976) for discussion), where insurance is used exclusively. 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
The nature of insurance company solvency is such that this subject matter is 
interdisciplinary. Insurer solvency has its traditions in the workings of actuarial 
science. However, more recently, the application of insurance to financial 
economics, particularly portfolio theory, has provided a fruitful avenue of research 
and introduced a further dimension to analysis. Moreover, there has been 
substantial cross-fertilisation between academic disciplines in terms of the use of 
simulation techniques. As a consequence, the structure and content of this thesis 
reflects the interdisciplinary nature of insurer solvency. Research is also 
complimented with an industrial organisation approach to the study of the life 
assurance industry in the U. K. 
In the chapter that follows, a survey of the current legal and administrative 
environment in which insurance companies operate is presented. The history of 
insurance legislation dates back to the eighteenth century. The institutional 
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structure of insurance regulation demonstrates that much of the insurance 
regulations have been brought about in a reactive, rather than proactive way. The 
recent changes to financial services regulation are also presented with a discussion 
of the new financial services regulatory hierarchy. The results show that the 
regulatory objectives are geared towards minimising insolvency probability subject 
to a resource constraint. 
Chapter 3 provides a survey of the actuarial literature governing insurance solvency. 
The `classical' approach to insurer solvency emphasises liabilities and introduces 
the application of simulation techniques to the subject matter. This risk-theoretic 
approach to insurer solvency is based around `ruin theory', a formal framework for 
evaluating insurer insolvency probability. Moreover, the formal basis for the 
current solvency regulations in the European Union is presented; this demonstrates 
that the current regulations have limited theoretical grounding. 
Chapter 4 introduces the financial approach to insurer solvency. The developments 
within financial economics are outlined within an asset-liability management 
framework. As such, the crossover influences between actuarial science and 
financial economics are highlighted especially within the use of actuarial portfolio 
models. The immunization strategy (Redington 1952) is developed formally in 
conjunction with portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959). Applied research on solvency 
comes in the guise of `financial distress' models and a review of this literature is 
provided. The expressed aim of this applied research is insolvency prediction. 
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Chapter 5 extends the portfolio analysis of insurer solvency begun in Chapter 4, by 
illustrating the portfolio approach to the study of life assurance. The results of 
portfolio balance are established within a risk/return framework and the algebra of 
efficient portfolios is developed. An operating point on the efficient frontier is 
selected according to an expected utility maximisation rule; the insurer selects an 
operating point where its marginal rate of substitution is equal to the objective trade- 
off between risk and return. In addition, a solvency constraint is constructed 
formally within the risk/return framework. This constraint is shown to divide the 
efficient frontier into two operating regions: permissible strategies and non- 
permissible strategies. Thus, the expected utility maximisation rule is constrained to 
fall within the permissible set of operating strategies. 
Having provided a review of the many alternative approaches to the study of insurer 
solvency, attention then turns in Chapter 6 to illustrating the structural 
characteristics of the U. K. life assurance industry. This chapter demonstrates the 
variety of life assurance markets as well as the variable size and distribution of firms 
operating in the industry. Chapter 6 represents the first chapter of three chapters, 
where Chapter 7 details industrial conduct and Chapter 8 presents industrial 
performance. This work uses the structure, conduct, performance paradigm (SCP) 
as a format for discussion in order to provide a case study of the life assurance 
industry. Evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that insurance companies have 
objectives other than purely maximising rate of return; in particular, the objectives 
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reflect the ownership structure of the insurer. In terms of industrial performance, 
there is evidence to suggest that the distribution of profitability is concentrated 
about the industry average. 
Chapter 9 attempts to formalise some of the statistical relationships between firm- 
level industry structure and performance. The methodological complexities 
associated with industrial structure-performance econometric models are substantial. 
However, this chapter attempts to provide some preliminary evidence. A database 
on 103 insurance companies operating in the U. K. life assurance industry was 
constructed and results demonstrate that firm size and the intensity of managerial 
expenses has a significantly negative influence upon profitability and solvency. 
This chapter brings to a close the industrial organization perspective on the life 
assurance industry. Such work provides a useful practical grounding upon which to 
develop subsequent `Monte-Carlo' simulations. 
Chapter 10 and 11 develop a portfolio simulation model of an U. K. life insurer. Use 
is made of the stochastic investment model by Wilkie (1995) to simulate the returns 
of 5 asset classes: cash, equities, property, fixed-interest government securities and 
index-linked government securities. The stochastic model of asset returns is used to 
construct a simulation model of insurer solvency ('ultimate surplus'). Results 
demonstrate the central role of risk preference, and specifically a `U' shaped 
relationship between risk tolerance and insolvency probability. The results also 
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show that current solvency regulations need to be firm specific as well as needing to 
take greater account of the dynamic nature of insurer solvency. 
Chapter 12 provides some conclusions and follows up on the simulation results of 
the previous chapter. In particular, Chapter 12 considers the regulatory questions 
that need to be asked in respect of solvency measurement. The simulations 
demonstrate that quantifying risk preference is a central regulatory requirement for 
measuring insurer solvency. Moreover, emphasis is placed upon the distinction 
between ex post and ex ante measures of insurer solvency, arguing that much of the 
current regulations use ex post measures that ignore crucial aspects of insurer 
solvency, namely time and probability. The value of simulations and forecasting as 
a means of developing ex ante regulatory constraints is discussed and qualified by 
the fact that ex ante regulations are only as good as the models used to forecast ex 
ante. Suggestions for future research are also outlined. 
Providing a workable definition of solvency, and hence the design of regulatory 
constraints, is no easy task. While the alternative approaches of actuarial science 
and financial economics have been reconciled to an extent, much of the current 
regulations still in force today provide a statistical measurement of solvency, and 
therefore have a very limited theoretical grounding. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGAL & ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES 
AFFECTING 
THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY 
2.0 Introduction 
Financial services regulation in general and life assurance regulation in particular 
have been the focus of regulatory change in recent years. Indeed, the 
establishment of a single U. K. financial regulator, in the form of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), has transformed the current regulatory framework 
within which the life assurance industry operates. At this time, regulatory 
structures and constraints have not yet been finalised. However, the legislative 
process will culminate in the presenting to parliament of the Financial Services 
and Markets Bill in 2000, next year. Although much can be said about these 
legal and administrative changes, many of the underlying principles governing 
life assurance regulation remain, and as a consequence discussion now turns to 
addressing these principles. 
Any evaluation of regulation must include a detailed description of the current 
regulatory environment, reflecting the legal and administrative constraints 
imposed upon the U. K. life assurance industry. This review must form part of 
the background to any theoretical and empirical modelling. The types of 
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regulatory constraints imposed on insurers are many and varied, and this contrast 
exists across all types of insurance markets, both domestic and international. 
The intensity of these constraints, in terms of the level of intervention, also 
varies and in many cases is product specific. Finsinger and Pauly (1986), in their 
cross-national study of insurance regulation, identify six broad constraints that 
are often imposed upon insurance companies: 
(1) Regulations which specify the character of the insurance contract [i. e. 
controls on risk classification]; 
(2) Regulations that place lower limits on the amount or composition of 
reserves against losses; 
(3) Regulations which set maximum and/or minimum prices; 
(4) Regulations covering the treatment of applicants for insurance whom 
insurers may be unwilling to cover at their current posted prices; 
(5) Regulations controlling the entry of new firms [other than solvency 
regulations, such as sales conduct guidelines]; and 
(6) Regulations associated with the presence of public enterprises in the 
market (Finsinger and Pauly 1986,6). 
The history of insurance regulation in the U. K. is quite distinct when compared 
with our European counter-parts, although many of the recent legislative 
developments have been designed to `harmonise' some of these differences. The 
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insurance industry has experienced relatively little direct government 
intervention. Perhaps this result comes as no surprise if we accept the traditional 
view of the insurance industry as being competitive. However, while 
competition has been encouraged in order to derive efficiency gains and market 
discipline, the risk of insolvency has lead to the introduction of a number of 
regulatory constraints. These constraints consist of restrictions on `margins of 
solvency' and reserve requirements in the form of a device called the Guarantee 
Fund. In addition to these explicit constraints, there are a number of further 
restrictions governing `codes of practice' in respect of marketing practices and 
more general managerial conduct. 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the main legislative and 
administrative features governing life assurance in the U. K. Section 2.1 
develops the main economic motivations for regulation (as introduced in the 
previous chapter). Section 2.2 then presents a brief history of the development 
of regulations in the U. K. and then, in section 2.3, the legislative changes 
brought about by the European Union are presented. Section 2.4 defines the 
current regulatory environment, while also emphasising the ongoing legislative 
changes that are taking place until 2000. By contrast, section 2.5 outlines the 
industry's own `self-regulation'. A summary is given in section 2.6. 
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2.1 Why Regulate? 
In order to understand the motivation for solvency constraints, reserve 
requirements, and conduct guidelines, it is useful to analyse the basic life 
assurance contract. In its simplest form, the life insurer agrees to pay back a 
certain sum (the sum assured) on the occurrence of the policyholder's death in 
return for a policyholder commitment to pay a regular premium to the insurance 
company. As illustrated in Chapter 1, there are two principal market failures 
governing the motivation for financial services regulation: systemic risk and 
asymmetric information. These two `failures' are discussed in the context of the 
insurance contract. 
Solvency and reserve regulation aims to protect the financial solidity of the life- 
contract, and to reduce the externality that results from the adverse incentives for 
risk taking. In respect of the financial soundness of the insurer, there is clearly 
an information asymmetry. The performance of an insurance contract will 
depend upon the financial strength of the company and the retail customer is 
unlikely to have the expertise to judge the financial position, or the resources, to 
obtain the relevant information and advice. Solvency and reserve regulation 
aims to ensure a minimum standard amongst insurance companies, which in turn 
keeps the risk of complete market collapse in check. ' 
'Market collapse is defined in the `market for lemons' sense (Akerlof 1971). 
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Consider next the issue of incentives. The adverse incentives come from the 
insurer and the policyholder: from the policyholder in the form of the moral 
hazard problem, and from the insurer in the form of premiums being set too low 
in the drive to compete, so as to not reflect the expected value of the loss. 
A further issue to consider with respect to incentives and agency issues is the 
effect solvency regulations have on the incentives of management. As there are 
other regulations to protect the investments of policyholders, the solvency 
regulations clearly have a further function in addition to just measuring and 
regulating insurer solvency. The solvency constraints ensure that management 
and owners are subject to incentives that align their self-interests with the 
financial well being of the insurance company. How do the regulations do this? 
Through reputation effects is the answer. Assuming that managers are risk- 
averse, the damaging reputation effects resonating from the failure of the insurer 
will be such that there will be a strong incentive for managers to maintain 
adequate solvency margins. In sum, in the event that an insurer runs into 
difficulty - as defined by the relevant regulation and solvency measure - it is the 
reputation ramifications that serve as a constraint on the conduct of management. 
Furthermore, the complexity of contracts adds to the uncertainty faced by the 
policyholder in that there may be difficulty in understanding the details of the 
contract, for example in respect of policy charges. The adverse incentives, 
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coupled with this lack of transparency inherent within the insurance contract, 
demonstrate that the asymmetric information problem is pervasive. As a 
consequence, this market failure provides an additional motivation for solvency 
regulation, as well as justification for some conduct guidelines in respect of the 
marketing of products. 
Solvency constraints may come in the form of minimum capital requirements, 
reserve controls, as well as accounting procedures. The determination of 
explicit levels of solvency constraints is no easy task and for the most part this 
has been left to arbitrary rules since the costs and benefits of additional reserves 
is not easily estimated. 2 The main solvency regulation in the U. K. comes in the 
form of `margins of solvency'. These margins are basically a minimum excess 
of assets over liabilities. 
The Guarantee Fund is another form of solvency regulation and forms part of the 
minimum margin. This fund, "... is an industry-wide arrangement to pay all or 
almost all of the losses of an insolvent firm, " (Finsinger and Pauly 1986,15). 
The scheme has the advantage that it provides almost complete protection to 
consumers. In addition, the fund provides an incentive for the industry to self- 
regulate as every company has a direct interest in the financial well being of 
other companies. Any given firm does not want other firms to engage in riskier 
2 There is also the obvious ambiguity that arises in defining accounting conventions, since most of 
the constraints require an agreed standard for comparison. 
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projects because it may be called on to finance the guarantee fund if the riskier 
project of its competitors fails. 3 
In addition to formal solvency constraints, there are a number of regulatory rules 
governing the conduct of insurance companies, as set out in the regulator's 
handbook. These rules aim to ensure a code of practice that is designed to limit 
misconduct and serve as a basis for the enforcement of consumer protection. 
Thus, the presence of these regulations, together with the solvency constraints, 
aims to ensure adequate confidence in the life assurance industry, while also 
ensuring adequate consumer protection in the event that the solvency regulations 
fail. 
2.2 The Historical Development of Insurance Legislation 
Today, legislation relevant to the insurance industry dates back to the eighteenth 
century. One of the most significant conclusions that may be drawn from the 
history of insurance legislation in the U. K. is that statutes were frequently 
motivated as a direct response to some form of financial difficulty experienced in 
the industry; that is, regulatory change was reactive rather than proactive. This 
section aims to illustrate these points and to provide a useful historical context in 
3 Note that the Guarantee Fund may also establish a moral hazard problem since any losses will 
be covered in the event of insolvency. 
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explaining many of the principles underpinning insurance regulation and 
solvency measurement today. 
The historical development of insurance legislation may be divided into 
insurance specific legislation and more general company legislation. Much of 
the early regulations governing life assurance were typically company controls 
covering company reporting and limited liability. However, there were 
insurance specific cases for regulation; for example, one of the earliest examples 
of insurance legislation came as a result of insurance gambling. The rapid 
growth of the insurance industry in the eighteenth century was due, in part, to the 
rise of insurance gambling (Cockerall and Green 1976). This occurred in spite 
of some of the legal restrictions imposed on the insurance industry (especially 
the Bubble Act of 1720, which operated until 1824 and which had encouraged 
Lloyds of London to grow and dominate the marine insurance market by 
effectively sheltering Lloyds from competition). Gambling may be contrasted 
with insurance in the following sense. An insurance contract is a contract: 
For the payment of a sum of money, or some corresponding 
benefit, to become due on the happening of an uncertain event of a 
character adverse to the likely interest of a person effecting the insurance. 
(Houseman and Davies 1994,345) 
Therefore, the crucial difference between insurance and gambling is that where a 
person makes a bet, the hope is that he/she will make a profit; but where a person 
obtains insurance, he or she seeks to cover a potential loss. 
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Insurance gambling was allowed to take place since there were no laws at the 
time establishing the principle of insurable interest. Under the common law of 
England the courts could enforce a wager on the duration of a human life. Thus, 
insurance companies did not refuse the issue of policies to individuals who had 
no interest in the lives being `assured'. Such a situation generated a spate of 
speculative activity. As a consequence, the Life Assurance Act of 1774 found 
that insurance taken out on lives or other events, in which there was no insurable 
interest, involved `undesirable' gambling: 
Whereas it bath been found by experience that the making of 
insurances on lives or other events where the assured shall have no 
interest bath introduced a mischievous kind of gambling. (Life Assurance 
Act 1774, s. 4 [1]) 
The Life Assurance Act (1774) is still in force today and establishes the nature of 
insurable interest within an insurance contract. Contrary to the name of the Act, 
it applies to most other types of insurance. 
While the size of the insurance market grew during the eighteenth century, the 
number of life offices also experienced growth. One of the most noteworthy life 
offices to come into being was The Equitable Life Assurance Society, which was 
largely acknowledged for its pioneering use of mortality tables in the calculation 
of insurance premiums (Cockerall and Green 1976). Many of the other life 
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offices that emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century specialised in life 
and fire underwriting; for example, the West Middlesex Assurance Company 
which was established in 1836. However, many of these newly formed life 
offices failed after exposure of frauds and profligacy. The highly speculative 
nature of these organizations made companies very sensitive to changes in 
premium income and claims. In addition, the problem was made worse since 
there existed no formal solvency requirements for insurance companies and 
hence exposure of fraudulent activities was only brought about after a company's 
cash flow failed (Cockerall and Green 1976). As a consequence of these 
problems, a number of select committee reports were initiated with the response 
of government being to introduce a succession of companies acts; for example, 
the Select Committee Report of 1841 was followed up with the introduction of 
the Companies Act 1844. In addition, the 1862 Companies Act introduced 
limited liability, with the aim of enhancing professional interest in the insurance 
industry (see Cockerall and Green (1976)). 
While the changes to company law provided a useful foundation for insurance 
regulation, the legislation was still not very effective in stemming the tide of 
failing life assurance companies. The explanation for this was clear: the 
introduction of the company legislation was set against a background of a 
general laissez-faire attitude in the nineteenth century. Thus, while the acts 
attempted to control for some of the more fraudulent activities there was little in 
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the way of controls over the solvency of insurance companies: many companies 
were still heavily undercapitalised. A surge in claims and/or policy surrenders 
therefore left a company vulnerable and indeed many life offices were unable to 
meet their current liabilities. This was indeed the case with the Albert Life 
Assurance Company and the European Assurance Society, both of which failed 
in 1869 and typified the state of affairs in the insurance industry (Cockerall and 
Green 1976). Furthermore, the reliance on the market mechanism saw many 
amalgamations and take-overs as companies attempted to build on their market 
position. Small, local life offices were frequently the targets for proprietary life 
companies, in their search for greater premium income and profit. Yet many of 
the amalgamations took place when the party taken over was technically 
insolvent and hence the expansion frequently proved highly damaging. 
The circumstances that prevailed in the insurance industry during the mid- 
nineteenth century lead to the enactment of the Life Assurance Companies Act of 
1870, which introduced some formal controls on company capital. The Act 
required that any `person' intending to set up a life assurance company was to 
deposit £20,000 with the Accountant General for security (Franklin and 
Woodhead 1980). This was the main constraint imposed on the establishment of 
a new insurance company. Also stipulated within the Act was a standard layout 
for revenue accounts and balance sheets, highlighting the need to isolate the 
funds attributable to life business, and for these life funds to be independently 
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valued at least once every five years. Furthermore, given the recent surge in 
amalgamations and take-overs at that time, the Act laid down conditions for 
future amalgamations. With regard to the threat of insolvency, the courts were 
empowered with the right to `wind up' insolvent companies on petition of either 
a policyholder (in the case of a mutual company or proprietary company) or 
shareholder (in the case of a proprietary company). Thus, regulatory review was 
introduced formally in the form of solvency surveillance. 
The 1870 Life Assurance Companies Act was not a total success and there were 
still some insurance company failures that took place towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. However, probably the single 
most important feature of the Act was the introduction of the principle of 
`Freedom with Disclosure' which can be seen as one of the major principles 
upon which regulation in this industry has been based. `Freedom with 
disclosure' is the idea that the regulator should require companies to reveal as 
much information as necessary to enable itself and other interested parties to be 
able to assess the financial position of a given company. How successful this 
has been in practice is open to many debates, but it nevertheless introduced an 
important principle for regulatory control. 
In order to appreciate the legislative changes of the early twentieth century, it is 
worth examining some of the market conditions for insurance in the last half of 
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the nineteenth century. By the 1850s the market for insurance, especially life 
assurance, had become fiercely competitive and many additional developments 
were taking place within the insurance market as a whole. The introduction of 
new insurance products, not covered in the legislation, reintroduced significant 
financial distress to the insurance industry. These new forms of insurance 
business included railway accident, sickness, financial guarantee, burglary, and 
employers' liability. 4 Also, there was the innovation of industrial assurance, 
which targeted low-income groups who were attracted to the introduction of new 
weekly premiums rather than the established annual premium contracts. The 
forerunner to endowment policies was introduced in the form of bond investment 
business in 1837, and by the turn of this century a new class of general insurance 
was introduced in the form of motor insurance. Thus, the number of insurance 
products available on the insurance market rapidly increased, seeing expansion 
especially into general lines of insurance. 
As already noted, another marked change within the insurance industry 
concerned the rise in aggressive marketing and the increase in take-overs and 
amalgamations. The result was the formation of large composite companies. 
Note that there were also changes in the taxation of insurance: life assurance 
premiums were deductible against income tax and hence this encouraged sales. 
The expansion of markets overseas, through the territories, provided another 
4 The nature of the risks associated with these new classes of business was often unique and as a 
result underwriting practices reflected this fact. 
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source of growth and indeed these markets offered little or no competition to the 
established British companies. Thus, there were many structural changes within 
the insurance market and these presented new challenges to the established 
legislation; it became only a matter of time before the regulations governing 
insurance would need to be changed. 
In 1909, the Assurance Companies Act came into force, with the purpose of 
applying the terms and conditions set out in the 1870 Life Assurance Companies 
Act to all other classes of insurance (with the exception of marine and motor 
insurance, where legislation was designed specifically for these lines of 
insurance). Separate accounts were to be kept for each class of business for 
which the company was authorised, but specific assets were not yet required to 
be earmarked (Houseman and Davies 1994). Lloyd's and other associations of 
underwriters were excluded from the main provisions of the Act; however, they 
were required to make deposits with the Board of Trade and to submit periodic 
returns to the Board. 
After the introduction of the 1909 Act, a number of insolvencies continued to 
occur where the cause of failure lay in other classes of business. The two world 
wars interrupted some of the insurance legislative changes, although powers 
were granted to the Board to investigate weak companies and, if necessary, to 
petition for a company to be closed down. It was not until 1946 when the next 
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major piece of legislation was introduced in the form of the 1946 Insurance 
Companies Act. The Act had the expressed aim of extending and strengthening 
the powers of the Board of Trade and introduced explicitly, for the first time, the 
so-called `margins of solvency'. General and ordinary long-term businesses 
were differentiated in terms of the rules governing these margins of solvency. 
For general business, solvency margins were defined as being £50,000 or one- 
tenth of the general premium income of the preceding year (whichever was the 
greater). In the case of ordinary long-term business the margin of solvency was 
set at £50,000 irrespective of the size of premium income. The minimum paid 
up share capital was set at £50,000. 
The margins of solvency, as defined above, were of little significance to 
insurance companies. As a consequence, they represented very little restriction 
on the entry of new, inexperienced and poorly managed companies. Insolvencies 
therefore still occurred. The problems still associated with the insurance 
industry were illustrated in the motor insurance market where there were nine 
insurance company failures in the period 1965-67 (for example the failure of the 
Fire, Auto & Marine in 1965). This again saw an immediate response from 
government in the form of the 1967 Companies Act, which sought to strengthen 
the Board of Trade further, providing the Board with all the powers necessary to 
`supervise' insurance fully (Houseman and Davies 1994). This included the 
right to refuse authorisation and the power to request information from 
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companies, including accounts and supporting data in respect of claims 
settlements. 
In spite of these additional changes to the statute book, one of the most 
spectacular cases of insolvency in recent years occurred in 1971 with the failure 
of Vehicle and General, a motor insurance company. The Vehicle and General 
case brought about much of the legislative changes to insurance regulation in the 
1970s. For these reasons the history of Vehicle and General will be expanded 
upon further (see Beale (1972)). In 1961, Vehicle and General started with the 
minimum capital of £50,000, and enjoyed rapid growth to the point where it 
accounted for around 10 percent of the private motor insurance market. 
While premium income remained high over most of the 1960s this was only 
explained through the movement from a relatively low-risk portfolio of policies 
to a relatively high-risk portfolio of policies. Then in 1968 the industry tariff 
system was abandoned and as a result fierce price competition was generated 
with the result that Vehicle and General's expanding premium income ceased 
and it was no longer able to mask its financial position through expanding 
premium income with the result that it was declared insolvent in 1971. 
The failure of the Board of Trade to stop the insolvency of Vehicle and General 
was blamed on a number of factors. Aside from the allegations of negligence 
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and incompetence on the part of the Board, there were two factors considered to 
be important. First the inadequacy of supervision. The Board relied on the 
submission of accurate and up-to-date information by insurance companies. This 
was restricted anyway by the usual lags in information production, but was 
exacerbated through the introduction of computerised systems, which introduced 
a number of transitional problems. Second, there was the claims experience of 
the `at-risk' policies, which was far worse than anticipated. Reserves were 
simply unable to meet the claims due to poor rating/reserving, and this problem 
was therefore made worse through the inadequacy of supervision. 
The consequences of the Vehicle and General crash were profound and, as noted, 
this resulted in further legislation. The 1973 Insurance Companies Amendment 
Act attempted to increase the efficiency in the production of information to the 
Board of Trade and to address new products, particularly unit-linked policies. 
Within the Board, the Act provided the Board with more powers of intervention. 
The need for sound and prudent management was also emphasised with 
increased staff numbers used to assess information submitted to the Board. Also, 
it should be noted that the 1975 Policyholder's Protection Act and the 1977 
Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act can be seen as a response, in part, to the 
Vehicle and General insolvency. 
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In 1974, there were seven life assurance companies that experienced financial 
hardship. Five of these were taken over by other insurance companies, the other 
two, London Indemnity and General and Nation Life, were eventually rescued by 
a consortium of other life companies. As a result of these changes, London 
Indemnity and General policyholders had to forgo all surrender values of policies 
and also accept a 10 percent reduction in maturity values. Nation Life 
policyholders had to receive nominal payments of 76.5 pence in the pound- this 
was however spread over many years and therefore the real payments were far 
less (Houseman and Davies 1994). The failure of these companies was due to 
the default of its investments, which were concentrated heavily within the 
property market. 
Experience had demonstrated the vulnerability of investors funds to company 
instability, even with the implementation of a rescue plan. As a result, the 1975 
Policyholders Protection Act established the protection of policyholders and 
others who had been or may have been affected as a consequence of the inability 
of U. K. authorised insurance companies to meet their liabilities. With this aim 
the Act set up the `Policyholders Protection Board' comprising of members from 
the industry and public, for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing the 
provisions of the Act. The Policyholders Protection Act ensured that private 
policyholders of insurance companies in liquidation would normally be granted 
90 percent of the benefits promised under their policies (for example in the case 
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of long-term policies). In the case of compulsory insurance (for example motor 
insurance) policyholders would be guaranteed 100 percent of the guaranteed 
benefit (Policyholder's Protection Act 1975, s. 6 and s. 7). In the case of a 
company being declared insolvent, the Policyholders Protection Board attempted 
to find a buyer subject to the constraint that policyholders should receive benefits 
of an amount at least as great as those outlined above. If there were no buyers on 
these terms, the Board would then pay out the agreed benefits. Thus, the 
Policyholders Protection Board served as means of indemnifying policyholders 
against insurance company failure. 
In order to fulfil its objectives, the Policyholders Protection Board was 
authorised to impose a levy on the insurance industry in order to finance any 
rescue plan. These levies could be imposed on intermediaries (brokers who have 
channelled business to insurance companies), or on insurance companies. 
Insurance companies would be levied on a pro-rata basis. Levies were also 
imposed separately, with respect to general and long-term business 
(Policyholders Protection Act 1975, s. 21). Note that just prior to the 
Policyholders Protection Act, there became a formal requirement for each 
insurance company to retain an `appointed actuary', an individual to monitor the 
solvency of the company at all times. 5 
5 This enshrined into law what had already been common practice within the life assurance 
industry. 
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After the introduction of the Policyholders Protection Act, there were to follow 
almost immediately three more cases of company failure. One company, 
Lifeguard, stopped taking new business, though after a capital injection 
continued trading with restrictions imposed on its activities. The other two 
insurance companies that faced difficulty had their ownership eventually 
transferred (under the supervision of the Board), and this resulted in benefits 
being paid to the policyholders that were in excess of those minimum terms 
stated in the Act. The levy to cover these actions was set at one quarter of one 
percent of long-term business premium income for the year (Finsinger and Pauly 
1986). 
The financial distress outlined above was a consequence of the sale of new, 
unconventional business in the form of guaranteed income bonds. Under 
guaranteed income bonds, a lump sum was paid by the policyholder and in 
exchange he or she would get an annual guaranteed return. After the term of the 
contract expired, the initial sum would be returned. At the time the contracts 
were established, insurance companies were agreeing to very high surrender 
values (from 95 percent of the sum invested). Alongside this fact, increasing 
rates of returns were also being offered in a competitive drive for business. This 
generated a spate of surrenders in order to effect new policies and thereby gain 
from these increasing rates of return. As gilts were used to `match' the liability 
of the bonds, the performance of bonds became a critical determinant of 
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solvency. Moreover, at that time the value of gilts had experienced an extreme 
fall (because interest rates had risen) and companies faced the disastrous 
situation that, after commission had been paid, the value of its gilts was actually 
less than the 95 percent surrender value. The company was therefore running at 
a loss: a situation that was obviously unsustainable. 
While 1975 Policyholders Protection Act was designed to include insurance 
intermediaries, the role and importance of these intermediaries was addressed in 
greater detail by the provisions laid out in the 1977 Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act. The Act had the objective of requiring the registration of all 
persons classed as an insurance `broker' and introduced the regulation of 
broker's `professional standards'. The Act established the Insurance Brokers' 
Registration Council. Insurance brokers were required under the Act to register 
on the `Insurance Brokers' Register' which included information such as the 
broker's professional qualifications and training. The register had the expressed 
purpose of promoting professionalism and expertise in the selling of insurance 
products. Along with controls on conduct there were also professional 
indemnity requirements. Thus, the Act can be seen as an attempt to raise the 
professional standing of insurance brokers through the promotion of a system of 
self-regulation. 
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While much can be said about the provisions of the 1977 Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act, it has been criticised on the grounds that it only covered those 
persons who choose to call themselves a broker. As many sellers of insurance 
did not refer to themselves as a `broker', the Act left a significant amount of 
insurance intermediaries unregulated. This state of affairs was to remain 
unchecked until the implementation of the 1986 Financial Services Act. 
In summary, the history of U. K. insurance regulation illustrates that many 
legislative changes have been reactive rather than proactive, with regulations 
being frequently introduced in response to a financial upheaval within the 
insurance industry. More recently, the European influence has introduced 
legislative change that is more proactive in respect of the single market and this 
serves as the point of departure for discussion in the next section. 
2.3 The European Influence on U. K. Insurance Regulation 
One of the motivating factors behind the introduction of insurance legislation 
over the past 25 years, has been the need to comply with European directives that 
had the expressed aim of `harmonising' legislation throughout the member 
states. After the U. K. joined the European Economic Community (the precursor 
to the European Union), the first non-life and life directives in 1973 and 1979 
respectively, required the U. K. to amend or introduce requirements governing a 
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whole range of insurance regulations (notably authorisation and reporting 
standards). These directives and their influence on domestic legislative change 
are explored here in greater detail. 
The influence of the European directives is seen within the solvency regulations 
as set out in the 1974 Insurance Companies Act. In 1974, the Insurance 
Companies Act defined very simplistic measures of solvency. The solvency 
margins for general insurance are given in section 4 of the Act and are also given 
in Appendix 1. These general insurance solvency margins were a function of the 
size of the insurance company, as measured by its total premium income. In 
contrast to the general insurance regulations, the solvency requirement for a 
company engaged in long-term business was to remain at a margin of £50,000 
regardless of premium income. 
Solvency regulations for general business were to become more complex with 
the introduction of the 1977 Solvency Regulations, which introduced a more 
complicated means of assessing solvency based on past premiums or past claims 
experience. This resulted in larger margins being required for general insurance 
business. 
It was not until 1981 Insurance Companies Act that more complicated margins 
of solvency were introduced for long-term business. These changes were a direct 
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response to European directives, which required a new definition of solvency 
margin and were defined in the 1979 First Life (Co-ordination) Directive. The 
relevant directives for life assurance up until the current legislative changes 
introduced last year include: the Council Directive (79/267/EEC) First Life Co- 
ordination Directive; the Council Directive (90/619/EEC) Second Life Co- 
ordination Directive; and, the Council Directive (92/96/EEC) Third Life Co- 
ordination Directive. 
The 1979 Council Directive was one of the first directives to influence 
government legislation, with a view to co-ordinating EEC laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the business of life assurance. The content 
of this directive focused on the rules of authorisation, the control of solvency 
margins, and the rules governing the calculations in accounts and statements. 
Solvency margins were defined using two methods (`Calculation 1' and 
`Calculation 2') both of which took into account of the size of mathematical 
reserves and the capital at risk, (see Article 19 of the Directive). These 
calculations formed the basis of subsequent solvency calculations used today. 
In addition to the above changes, the Guarantee Fund and the Minimum 
Guarantee Fund were introduced in Article 20 of the Directive. As noted in the 
previous section, the Guarantee Fund is an industry wide arrangement to pay all, 
or almost all of the losses of insolvent insurers; where what can be recovered 
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from the assets of an insolvent firm is recovered, and any shortfall between 
recoveries and claims is distributed on a `pro-rata' basis throughout the rest of 
the insurance industry. The Minimum Guarantee Fund sets a minimum on the 
Guarantee Fund contribution made by each company. These contributions from 
insurance companies are called on if, and when insolvency occurs. 
The measurement and regulation of solvency in the European Economic Area is 
set out in Figure 2.1 below. This illustrates the relative sizes of Guarantee Fund 
and the Required Margin of Solvency. 
Figure 2.1. The Measurement of Solvency in the EEA 
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Source. Dickinson, G. M. 1997. Some Issues in Risk-Based Capital. The Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance 22: 76-85. 
Notes. (a) GF stands for Guarantee Fund. 
(b) RMS stands for Required Margin of Solvency. 
(c) MS stands for observed Margin of Solvency. 
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In line with the objective of harmonising laws and regulations and developing 
the single market, the subsequent directives of 1990 and 1992 respectively, 
extended the First Life Co-ordination Directive. These directives included the 
establishment of standardised accounting and actuarial procedures, and the 
extension of solvency constraints to new financial instruments that have evolved 
over the last 15 years. Further regulations on insurance conduct (for example 
marketing) were also introduced, as well as regulations to promote the 
standardisation of the tax treatment of life assurance across the community. 
In line with the directives governing the regulation of life assurance, there have 
also been similar directives for non-life insurance business. These directives, 
like their life counterparts, include `co-ordination' objectives aimed at 
harmonising non-life insurance administration and law. Note that while most 
general insurance comes under these `non-life' directives, other classes of 
insurance (for example, motor insurance) have their own set of directives. Also, 
the Third Life Directive led to a number of further regulatory changes; for 
example, the 1996 Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 
were motivated in part by the directive. Thus, the life directives have had a 
profound influence upon insurance regulations in the U. K. In particular, these 
legislative changes have built on the `freedom with disclosure' principle. 
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2.4 The Current Regulatory Environment 
As noted in the introduction, there has been substantial change recently in the 
structure of U. K. financial services. For this reason, much of the insurance 
regulations, relating in particular to the regulatory hierarchy, have yet to be 
finalised. Indeed, the formal legislative development will come next year in the 
form of the 2000 Financial Services and Markets Bill, which aims to transform 
the nature of financial services regulation through the use of a newly established 
single regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). As a result of these 
changes, a review of the current regulatory framework will be given and this will 
be supplemented with details on the main regulatory changes, currently being 
considered. 
The prudential regulation of insurance covers three main areas: constraint on 
actions, requirements for disclosure, and provisions of protection for 
policyholders in the event of company insolvency. The constraint on action is 
addressed in the 1982 Insurance Companies Act, while the disclosure legislation 
is dealt with in the 1996 Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) 
Regulations. As noted in the previous section, policyholder protection is 
addressed in law by the 1975 Policyholders Protection Act. The 1986 Financial 
Services Act (soon to be replaced by the 2000 Financial Services and Markets 
Act) governs the regulation of sales and marketing of financial services. 
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2.4.1 The 1982 Insurance Companies Act 
The persistent inadequacies of previous legislation saw the imposition of greater 
control over the insurance industry in the form of the 1982 Insurance Companies 
Act (ICA). This act primarily consolidated previous legislation, in particular the 
Insurance Companies Acts of 1974 and 1981.6 The ICA contains a large number 
of provisions concerning the following areas: the authorisation of insurers, the 
use of accounting procedures, the definition of solvency margins, the conduct of 
insurance business, and the role of government and its associated powers of 
intervention. Following the terms of the Act, any new insurer, or any existing 
insurer wishing to transact a new class of insurance business, must be authorised 
by the relevant government department. Up until recently, this department was 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). However, the FSA has now been 
given responsibility, with the Insurance Directorate being transferred from the 
DTI to the new Director of Insurance and Friendly Societies at the FSA. 
The details of the ICA are as follows. The ICA sets out the conditions that must 
be satisfied in order for an insurance company to be authorised to conduct 
insurance business in the U. K. 7 The authorisation of a new insurance company 
requires the detailed submission of proposals which must include, "... the manner 
6 The 1982 Insurance Companies Act has been amended significantly, for example the recent 
amendments set out in the Insurance Companies (Amendment) Regulations 1994 (SI1994/3132). 
Note that within these conditions is the automatic authorisation of insurance companies 
previously authorized under the 1974 Insurance Companies Act. 
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in which a company proposes to carry on business such as financial forecasts and 
other information as may be required, " (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 5 (1)). 
In addition, it must be demonstrated that the proposed insurer exhibits "... 
integrity and skill, ... 
fit controllers, ... and sound and prudent management, 
" 
(Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 5 (4)). Authorisation, once granted, may then 
be withdrawn under certain conditions; for example, in the event that a company 
fails to demonstrate that its conduct has been `sound and prudent'. While having 
authorisation withdrawn is theoretically possible, this is very unlikely in practice. 
Far more likely is that the regulator will require the company to implement a 
plan to rectify any given problem. 
In order to facilitate the process of monitoring and enforcement set out within the 
ICA, insurance companies are required to submit annual accounts and balance 
sheets for each class of insurance, together with any additional information 
requested by the regulator. 8 If the insurer is not trading for profit (as in the case 
of a `mutual'), then it must submit a revenue and expenditure account. The 
format and contents of these informational requests are laid out in the relevant 
statutory instrument, (the detail of which will be illustrated in section 2.4.2). 9 
In addition to the annual accounts and balance sheets, the ICA requires 
companies that are engaged in long-term business to appoint an actuary as 
8 For the definitions of each class of long-term and general insurance see Appendix 1. 
9 That is, the Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 1996. 
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`actuary to the company'. This builds on the previous developments associated 
with the use of a company actuary. The appointed actuary is required to produce 
actuarial investigations, and then submit these reports to the regulator for the 
purpose of allowing the regulator to analyse the financial condition of the 
company in respect of its long-term business. 
A substantial portion of the ICA is set aside to authorise restrictions that are 
placed on the financial resources of insurance companies. Fundamental to the 
Act is the distinction between long-term and general insurance business, and in 
particular the separation of assets and liabilities in relation to the two classes of 
business (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 28). Restrictions are also placed on 
the use of long term business assets, in that these assets must be used only to 
support long-term business (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 29). This 
therefore rules out cross-subsidisation between general and long-term businesses. 
Also, the Act stipulates a minimum proportion of the surplus fund (those funds 
in excess of calculated liabilities) to be allocated to eligible policyholders 
(Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 30). 
There are a number of other constraints specified in the 1982 Insurance 
Companies Act worth considering. Assets are constrained in `form and 
situation' (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 35). That is, assets must be held in 
denominations of the same currency so that they match the currency in which the 
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liabilities of the company are denominated, or required to meet. 10 Also, a 
company is required to secure its liabilities with assets of an appropriate, "... 
safety, yield and marketability having regard to different classes of business, " 
(Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 35B). Furthermore, a company must also 
ensure that the aggregate of premiums paid into a policy and income derived will 
be sufficient on, "... reasonable actuarial assumptions, " to meet all commitments 
arising in relation to the contract (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 35B1 (b)). 
Central to the Act are the `margins of solvency' and these are set out in the 
relevant statutory instrument and are based on the E. E. A. standards illustrated in 
Figure 2.1- see section 2.4.1 (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 32). U. K. 
margins of solvency must be applied separately to long-term and general 
business and, where an insurance company has business overseas, to that portion 
of the business derived in the U. K. (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 34). Note 
the importance of valuation procedures here. The solvency position of a 
company is highly sensitive to the accounting and actuarial assumptions made. 
Given this sensitivity, rules governing accounting and actuarial conventions are 
also provided. 
In the event that a company fails to achieve the set margins of solvency, the 
regulator has the power to impose further conditions. First, a company in 
'o The advent of the Euro has important implications for asset/liability matching in respect of the 
number of assets that can be used in `matching' if and when the U. K. joins the currency. 
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financial difficulty would be required to submit a short-term financial scheme 
containing modifications designed to rectify the current financial problems. 
Second, the proposal is then scrutinised by the regulator, which in turn makes its 
own judgement and recommendations (which may include modifications to the 
company's original proposal). Finally, the modifications are agreed upon by the 
regulator, and then must be implemented in full by the company. If after due 
course the company still fails to meet the required margins then authorisation 
may be withdrawn as a last resort. 
Another aspect of the 1982 Insurance Companies Act is that it sets out the 
powers of intervention vested in the regulator and the conditions under which 
these powers may be exercised. These powers include the right to prevent 
insurance companies from obtaining new premium income, in order to ensure 
that companies produce the necessary information for regulatory review. 
Restrictions may also be imposed on the company's investments, such as 
restrictions on the custody of assets and restrictions on the disposal of assets 
(Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 40 & s. 40A). These powers are backed up by 
a `Residual Power' section that provides the regulator with the power to 
intervene in almost any way for the purpose of protecting policyholders or 
potential policyholders. 
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Procedures are also put in place for the `winding-up' of insurance companies as 
well as procedures that require any individual who is responsible for the actions 
of the company (a managing director, chief executive or any other `controller') to 
be approved by the regulator (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 59). This 
provision is used to enforce the regulatory objective that requires that 
management of insurance companies should be `sound and prudent'. 
The final main role of the 1982 Insurance Companies Act is in respect of the 
regulation of insurance company conduct. These provisions include the 
following: controls on insurance adverts, restrictions on contractual statements, 
restrictions on the behaviour of insurance intermediaries, and the establishment 
of a `cooling off period, during which an individual who has signed a long-term 
contract can withdraw from the contract and receive a refund in full. Note that it 
is also a requirement that the regulator prepare a report on the insurance industry 
in respect of the main provisions of the Act. 
2.4.2 The Statutory Instruments 
The 1982 Insurance Companies Act sets out the general requirements for 
regulating authorised insurance companies in law. However, the technical 
details of these requirements are set out in the relevant statutory instruments. 
This has the advantage that changes in technical definitions, as a result of say an 
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E. U. directive, only requires the amendment of the statutory instrument and not 
the statute itself. 
The relevant statutory instruments effected by the 1982 Insurance Companies 
Act are: first, the 1994 Insurance Companies Regulations, which provides the 
detailed provisions of the 1982 Insurance Companies Act; and second, the 
Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 1996, which 
specify the format of the data, submitted under the annual reporting to the 
regulator. 
Within the 1994 Insurance Companies Regulations are the calculations for the 
margins of solvency. The calculations are a function of mathematical reserves 
and capital at risk (Insurance Company Regulations 1994, Reg. 17). They are 
approximately the same as those used in the previous 1981 Insurance Companies 
Regulations, with the exception that the margins are applied to two more 
categories of long-term business- collective and social insurance. Calculations 
are also provided for the Guarantee Fund and the Minimum Guarantee Fund. 
The guarantee fund is set equal to one-third of the relevant margin of solvency 
(Insurance Company Regulations 1994, Reg. 21), see Figure 12.1. 
As mentioned in previous sections, crucial to the calculation of the margins of 
solvency is the way in which assets and liabilities are treated. The valuation of 
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assets (Insurance Company Regulations 1994, Part VIII) and the determination 
of liabilities (Insurance Company Regulations 1994, Part IX) are therefore set 
out in greater detail within the 1994 Insurance Companies Regulations. 
In order to reduce the risk of insolvency, it is necessary to ensure that the assets 
of a company are adequately diversified, and thus not overly reliant upon the 
performance of a few asset classes. To ensure that insurance companies engage 
in this strategy, there is a specific constraint placed on the valuation of assets. 
Assets of a certain type are restricted in terms of the extent to which they may 
count towards total assets. Limits are set in the regulations on the proportion of 
funds that are allowed to count towards total assets (Insurance Company 
Regulations 1994, Reg. 57). Any excesses over and above these limits are not 
counted in the valuation of assets. There is therefore an incentive for a company 
to spread its investments across a number of asset classes. ' 
The long-term business of an insurance company also has restrictions placed on 
the rate of interest used, when calculating future income streams in solvency 
assessments. This is designed to remove the incentive to maintain solvency by 
simply assuming high rates of interest in the future (Insurance Company 
Regulations 1994, Reg. 23). Interest rates may be constrained in general terms 
or may be constrained by an explicit rate that has regard to the current interest 
rate levels and the respective risk involved. 
I' Whether this constraint is binding in practice is open to debate. 
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Further technical information set out in the 1994 Insurance Company 
Regulations includes restrictions on currency `matching'. Where a company's 
liabilities are denominated in another currency and this value is in excess of 5 
percent of total liabilities there are further constraints to consider. In the event 
that foreign denominated liabilities account for more than 5 percent of total 
liabilities, the company is required to hold sufficient assets in the same currency 
to cover at least 80 percent of this liability (Insurance Company Regulations 
1994, Reg. 27). Details of the controls on the conduct of insurance companies 
and insurance intermediaries are set out as well within this statutory instrument. 
While much has been said about the constraints on the actions of insurance 
companies, the legislation requiring disclosure derive largely from the 1996 
Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations. These regulations 
require the annual reporting of a variety of data covering all aspects of insurance 
company performance. The form and content of this data reported to the 
regulator is also given within these regulations. This information may be broken 
down into a number of different categories, or `schedules' and these are given for 
completeness in Appendix 1. 
In keeping with the provisions of the relevant Acts of Parliament, a distinction is 
made between long-term and general insurance business. Together with the 
standard company requirements of providing balance sheets and profit and loss 
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accounts for each financial year, is the need to demonstrate the actual and 
required margin of solvency for the purpose of demonstrating the solvency of the 
insurer. This information must be contrasted against the provisions of the more 
general Companies Act that attempts to demonstrate the true profitability 
position of a company so that policyholders and shareholders can judge its 
worth. 
As a supplement to the summary accounts mentioned above, the `additional 
information' forms also provide a significant source of information. These 
forms are required for long term and general insurance business. For general 
insurance a revenue account must be prepared for each accounting class. Also, 
information regarding premiums, claims and expenses, analysed by accounting 
class, risk group, and geographical area is also required. With respect to long- 
term business, the additional information relating to the revenue account 
includes details of premium income, expenses, assets and new business. These 
statements must also be calculated for linked and non-linked contracts 
subtotalled along business lines; for example, life assurance business, general 
annuity business, or pension business. 
From the perspective of an outside observer wanting to evaluate the 
competitiveness/associated risk of insurance companies and their respective 
product lines, the extent to which this can be done is limited. Clearly, the 
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statement of solvency provides an indicator of insolvency risk (though, as will be 
argued in subsequent chapters, there is some ambiguity associated with the 
definition of insolvency risk), as one is able to compare `required margin' with 
`actual margin'. The balance sheet breakdown and subsequent `additional 
information' also provides an indication of the overall exposure of the company 
investment portfolio. In addition, the revenue account gives an indicator of the 
claims portfolio with totals provided on policy claims relating to deaths. 
Other information in the 1996 Insurance Company Regulations includes the 
following. Audited statements must be produced by the director to show that 
appropriate systems of control are in place and that certain guidelines have been 
followed in running the business and preparing the disclosure material. Also, as 
the appointed actuary may be an employee of the company, a statement of his or 
her remuneration from and, if applicable, his or her shareholdings in, the 
company is required. 
While the accounts and statements provide some insight, the required 
information is restricted in that the information is aggregated; for example, 
equity shares are only broken down into `listed' or `unlisted'. This aggregation 
obviously limits the extent to which the regulator can examine individual 
contracts, and assess the risk associated with a given contract or the 
competitiveness of the associated premium charged. Such limitations are an 
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important consideration within any evaluation of regulation and, as subsequent 
chapters will attempt to demonstrate, efficient insurer solvency regulation might 
therefore prefer to ask alternative questions to those currently being asked. 
Note that as part of the overall prudential regulation framework, there are other 
areas of additional legislation that is relevant for some lines of insurance 
business. Pension legislation and the associated tax legislation imposes certain 
requirements in the form of restrictions on the types of benefit that a policy can 
provide if it is to benefit from tax exemption. Also, certain annual disclosure 
requirements to existing policyholders are required (for example, the disclosure 
of the current value of the pension). Tax legislation also influences product 
designs in other areas; for example, investment policies qualify for some tax 
exemption so long as premiums are paid at least annually and the term of the 
contract is at least 10 years. Finally, it should be noted that the 1975 
Policyholders Protection Act provides `insurance' for policyholders in the event 
that control and disclosure fail (though a consumer protection review is currently 
being undertaken by the FSA). 
2.4.3 The Regulation of the Sales and Marketing of Financial Services 
While the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act 1977 brought insurance companies and their intermediaries 
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under much greater supervision, the combined effect of the two Acts still left 
many providers of financial services products and advice with relatively little 
supervision. Also, the control of conduct within insurance companies was such 
that it still left open the potential for significant problems (especially in relation 
to the poor selling of insurance products). Also there were few regulations 
relating to dealings with the investing public, and as a result of a number of 
serious frauds (which involved the loss of significant amounts of investors' 
funds) there existed significant public awareness in respect of these regulatory 
shortcomings. 
The regulatory environment up until the introduction of the 1986 Financial 
Services Act, was seen as largely inadequate to deal with the considerable 
changes that had taken place within the financial services sector. Prior to the 
Act, the regulatory system had been based around the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act of 1939 and 1958. However, this was seen as an inadequate 
arrangement given the rapid changes that had taken place within the financial 
services sector since the late 1950s (and indeed the number of financial 
difficulties experienced during the 1970s and early 1980s). This lead to calls for 
a regulatory overhaul and greater investor protection. Against this background 
of concern within the general public, Professor J. Gower was appointed by the 
government in 1981 to undertake a review of investor protection. His terms of 
reference included the following: first, to consider the statutory protection 
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required for private and business investors in securities and other property; 
second, to consider the need for statutory control of dealers in securities, 
investment consultants and managers; and, third, to advise on the need for new 
legislation (The Gower Report 1985). 
The interim report by Professor Gower in 1982 included life assurance business 
within the scope of `securities' and therefore within its terms of reference. The 
full report was completed and published in two parts (January 1984 & March 
1985). The report proposed a new act, which would provide for basic policy, 
and have overall surveillance and regulation of investment business undertaken 
by the government or a new agency. After consultation the report's 
recommendations were implemented through the passing of the 1986 Financial 
Services Act. Some of the sections of the Act were effected almost immediately, 
while the majority of the provisions were brought into force on the 29th April 
1988. 
The 1986 Financial Services Act introduced a substantial body of law, regulating 
`investment business' carried out by firms, companies or individuals in the U. K., 
or from a `permanent place of business' in the U. K. (Financial Services Act 
1986). Most of the detailed rules governing the sale and marketing of financial 
services are not specified in the Act, but fall within the rule books of the 
regulatory bodies established under the Act. It is important to emphasise that the 
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regulatory framework and associated rulebooks have been the focus of recent 
regulatory review within the newly established Financial Services Authority. 
The 1986 Financial Services Act defined investment business, and through this 
definition, the range of investments that are to be regulated. The relevancy of the 
Act for life assurance is that the Act governs those long-term products that have 
an `investment element'; for example, endowment policies are regulated under 
the Act because the premium for the contract is used to build up an investment 
fund to pay for a mortgage. Products that do not have an investment element, are 
products such as term assurance contracts. 12 
While many of the regulations set up under the 1986 Financial Services Act will 
be replaced by the 2000 Financial Services and Markets Bill, many of the 
principles introduced in 1986 will remain. For example, requirements are set out 
for persons involved in investment business to be either `authorised' or `exempt' 
before they can carry out investment business (Financial Services Act 1986, Ch. 
III, s. 3). 13 Insurance companies authorised under the Insurance Companies Act 
1982 were automatically authorised to conduct long-term business under section 
22 of the Act. Also, the aim of providing an all-encompassing rulebook of 
12 Note also that general insurance, such as buildings and contents insurance and motor insurance 
is therefore not covered by the 1986 Financial Services Act. 
13 The use of the term `person' is meant to cover any individual, partnership or company 
conducting regulated investment business. 
73 
general principles governing market conduct are to be built upon and 
standardised across the entire financial services industry in the new legislation. 
Consider next the formal regulatory structure governing financial services in the 
U. K. This too has been the focus of recent change in 1998 and 1999. The 1986 
Financial Services Act established a complex regulatory structure with the 
expressed purpose of supervising the implementation and enforcement of the 
terms of the Act. Up until recently, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was given 
many of the powers by the Act, but was allowed to delegate these powers to one 
or more designated agencies (most of these agencies will remain under the 2000 
Financial Services and Markets Bill). Most of the powers were delegated to the 
Securities and Investment Board (SIB), which has now been replaced by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). This regulator has the power to oversee the 
1986 Act and to recognise regulatory institutions covering all aspects of financial 
service provision. The regulatory hierarchy is given below in Figure 2.2. 
The regulatory hierarchy consists of the FSA, which in turn oversees four 
different types of institutions: 3 Recognised Self-Recognised Organisations 
(SROs); 9 Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs); 6 Recognised Investment 
Exchanges (RIEs); and 2 Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs). The SROs and 
the RPBs are the relevant bodies when addressing the insurance sector. 
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Figure 2.2. The Regulatory Hierarchy 
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Approximately 6,250 firms regulated by the 3 SROs carry out most of the 
investment business. An SRO is a body which, once recognised by the FSA, has 
the power to authorise firms to conduct investment business in the U. K. and 
now, under the Investment Services Directive, throughout the European 
Economic Area, (FSA 1999). Professional bodies, such as solicitor and 
accountants, may also be engaged in the sale of financial products such as long- 
term insurance, though this involvement may be minor. As a consequence these 
firms may conduct investment business following `certification' by their 
recognised professional body (RPB), which then regulates both their main 
activity (e. g. as a solicitor or accountant) and their investment business. Just 
fewer than 16,000 firms are authorised in this way (FSA 1999). In overseeing 
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these firms' conduct of investment business, the RPBs have similar 
responsibilities to that of the SROs. 
Note that in addition to the power to supervise all forms of investment business, 
the FSA is also responsible for authorising insurance companies under the terms 
of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 (through the Director of Insurance and 
Friendly Societies). Insurance companies then gain automatic authorisation 
under the terms of the 1986 Financial Services Act. Most companies have 
accepted the authority of the Personal Investment Authority (PIA). The PIA is a 
recently formed SRO recognised by the Securities and Investment Board (the 
precursor of the FSA) to take over the responsibilities of two older regulatory 
bodies, the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) 
and the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association 
(FIMBRA), together with the retail aspects of the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation (IMRO). This is a direct response to the perceived need 
for a single regulatory body, responsible for the retail investment sector. 
As noted there is an attempt, with the recent changes to financial service 
regulation, to develop all encompassing principles for financial supervision in 
the U. K. For this reason, it is worth noting the statutory objectives of the FSA. 
The draft legislation gives the FSA four objectives: first, to maintain confidence 
in the financial system; second, to promote public understanding of the financial 
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system (improving the so-called `financial literacy' of individuals); third, to 
protect consumers, (while also bearing in mind their own responsibility to inform 
themselves and to take responsibility for their decisions); and fourth, to reduce 
the extent to which regulated businesses are used for the purposes of financial 
crime (FSA 1999). Thus, many of the original aims of the 1986 Financial 
Services Act are embedded within the new regulatory framework. However, 
there are notable improvements relating to the streamlining of the regulatory 
structure and the consistency in rules across the entire financial services industry. 
Previously, there had been some variation in the regulatory rulebooks, for 
example, across the different SROs and RPBs. This lead to great ambiguity 
associated with definitions of financial crime, and also uncertainty in terms of 
the lines of responsibility within the regulatory hierarchy. 
Note also that there has been the suggestion that the FSA's objectives might be 
in conflict. Certainly in relation to the degree of consumer protection there is the 
potential for conflict. The extent to which consumer responsibility is enshrined 
into law is the source of many debates, with companies wanting explicit 
reference to consumer responsibility within the draft legislation and consumer 
groups opposing this move. Note in addition, that there is a review of consumer 
protection being undertaken, which is also the source of some conflict. 
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Thus, the regulation of the sales and marketing of investment products has seen 
substantial regulatory attention over the past 15 years. Indeed, there is a move to 
include other products within the new financial services regulatory framework, 
most notably mortgages. 
2.5 Insurance Industry Self-Regulation 
While formal insurance regulations cover a number of aspects of insurance 
company operation, it is evident that the extent of intervention in the U. K. 
insurance industry is still quite limited; for example, there are no explicit 
controls on premiums or controls on risk classification. Premiums and risk are 
only indirectly managed through solvency regulation. This regulatory intensity is 
to be contrasted with other countries, for example France and Germany, where 
regulations are more interventionist in nature. More emphasis has therefore been 
placed in the U. K. upon self-regulation as opposed to direct government control 
of company conduct. 
2.5.1 Industry Trade Associations 
Besides the formal regulatory structure there is the industry trade association in 
the shape of the Association of British Insurers (ABI), which provides an 
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additional source of regulation. 14 The ABI was set up out of the British 
Insurance Association (formed in 1917 as a trade association open to all U. K. 
transacting companies which were from British or Commonwealth countries) 
and various Life Offices' Associations (including the Life Offices' Association 
(founded 1899) and the Scottish Life Offices' Association (founded 1841)). 
The ABI is a trade association for insurance companies that together represent 
virtually the entire insurance industry. One advantage of the ABI is in its ability 
to provide self-help to insurers on regulatory matters; for example, the 
association has a media studio for the provision of training courses designed to 
meet the requirements of recent legislation on training and competence. The 
Association also heavily promotes a voluntary code of practice. 
Other services provided by the ABI includes protection against fraud through the 
use of information registers (for example the `theft register'), which are available 
to all members in their attempt to minimise illegal claims. There is also a code 
of practice to assist members on the legal requirements of insurance selling 
practices. The ABI Statement of Recognised Accounting Practice guides the 
construction of Companies Act accounts and balance sheets. Thus, the 
association provides a useful resource to its members. In addition, the ABI 
14 The ABI does not have any statutory powers, although it does participate in the annual 
regulatory review process. 
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exists to represent the interests of its members to government, civil servants and 
regulatory bodies such as the PIA. 
While the ABI has been useful in providing support for its members, its ability to 
enforce regulatory agreements has been heavily restricted by the fact that 
membership is voluntary. The benefit conferred to members is relatively small 
and therefore there exists very little in the way of effective sanctions that can be 
used to enforce association rules. A further point to note is that rules imposed 
upon members frequently yields a competitive disadvantage when compared to 
insurers who were outside of the given agreement. There is therefore a tendency 
for members to renege on agreements within a voluntary membership 
organisation, or else face a potential loss of business. 
To illustrate the above point, an example concerns the introduction, by the then 
Life Offices Association, of controls on commission rates set by its members as 
part of its `Statement of Long Term Insurance Practice' which aimed to remove 
commissions as the influencing factor in selling life assurance. These controls 
were bypassed by non-members and newly formed life offices who specialised in 
linked life policies (where a benefit is linked to the performance of an 
investment fund) and who offered better commission rates as part of an 
`aggressive marketing' campaign. The association members began to renege on 
the commission agreement in order to match the higher rates of commission 
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being offered by competitors outside of the agreement. Thus, this eventually 
lead to the collapse of the agreement (Finsinger and Pauly 1986). 
Additional evidence of insurance industry self-regulation comes from a number 
of other sources. While there is significant self-regulation of insurance 
companies, the area that has perhaps seen greater self-regulation is that of 
insurance intermediaries. 
The Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 established a register of brokers 
with the aim of maintaining professional standards. More recently, the insurance 
industry in an attempt to meet the need for professionalism in insurance selling 
advice has introduced industry standard qualifications through the Chartered 
Insurance Institute. 
The Chartered Insurance Institute provides a range of professional qualifications, 
the main one being that of the Financial Planning Certificate. Once passed, 
fellows of the Institute are required to adhere to a code of conduct that stands 
alongside the requirements of the 1986 Financial Services Act. Given the 
sizeable amount of work that is required to gain the Financial Planning 
Certificate and the fact that the certificate is an effective entrance requirement to 
the insurance industry, the Institute has significant powers of influence though 
the sanction of withdrawing institute fellowship. 
81 
2.5.2 The Role of Ombudsmen 
Although the FSA is reviewing the complaint procedure, it is worth considering 
the several voluntary (and some mandatory) Ombudsman schemes used to 
resolve disputes. The terms of reference and the scope of coverage vary 
considerably. There are three main schemes worth noting and these are the PIA 
Ombudsman (PIAO), the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (IOB) and the Personal 
Insurance Arbitration Service (PIAS). 
The PIAO covers all life assurance with an investment element, but only 
investigates complaints once all internal company procedures have been 
exhausted. The PIAO has both voluntary and mandatory jurisdiction. Mandatory 
jurisdiction relates to businesses regulated by the PIA, while the voluntary 
jurisdiction applies to products not regulated by the PIA (that is, those products 
without and investment element such as Personal Health Insurance). The IOB 
was established in 1982. The IOB deals specifically with complaints about the 
marketing or administration of an individual policy. Most life cases are, 
however, dealt with by the PIAO leaving non-life to the IOB. There has been 
some confusion in the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman schemes, though this too 
is being addressed in the current regulatory review. Finally, the PIAS was 
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established by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and it has similar scope to 
the IOB in that it deals only with complaints by policyholders in the U. K., and 
only after the company in question's internal complaint procedure has been 
exhausted without satisfaction. Thus, the Ombudsman schemes offer a degree of 
consumer redress and hence another channel through which to keep insurance 
companies in check. There are, however, a number of overlaps across the 
various schemes that have proven problematic and this has helped motivate the 
new regulatory review concerning consumer protection. 
2.6 Summary 
Much of the history of legislative changes to life assurance regulation can be 
seen to have occurred as a direct response to some form of financial difficulty 
experienced in the industry. More recently, changes have also been brought 
about to regulations as a result of European directives with the objective of 
harmonising laws governing insurance across member states. 
The current regulatory environment for insurance companies consists of 
restrictions on company actions, information disclosure and policyholder 
protection. These constraints are deemed necessary in order to control for the 
market failure that is the information asymmetry that exists between the 
policyholder and the insurance company. 
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The new legislative proposals attempt to `streamline' the regulatory framework 
and clarify the overriding principles governing financial service regulation. 
These changes represent a significant regime shift and the ramifications for the 
life assurance industry are bound to continue for many years. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVALUATING INSURANCE COMPANY SOLVENCY: 
`CLASSICAL' INSURANCE SOLVENCY THEORY 
3.0 Introduction 
Assessing insurance company solvency is a complicated matter and as a 
consequence this subject has been the focus for a variety of academic disciplines. 
Solvency theory has its foundations in the work of actuaries and risk theory. 
Traditional research emphasises the liability-side of the balance sheet. This 
work is established within a framework of minimising the insolvency, or `ruin' 
probability. The objective is to provide a workable definition of insurer solvency 
with a view to writing this definition into legislation. A variety of statistical 
methods have been adopted in evaluating the insolvency probability for a given 
insurance company, and in turn defining the appropriate solvency margin that 
would need to be imposed by a regulator. This work forms the basis of a body of 
literature that has come to be known as `classical' insurance solvency theory. 
This work is to be contrasted against the more general approach of financial 
economics (and more recent actuarial research) which addresses the role of 
asset/liability management. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 expand upon the 
definitions and concepts introduced above. Section 3.3 develops some of the 
`classical' methods used to evaluate insurer solvency, leading to some general 
implications for life assurance regulation in Section 3.4. 
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3.1 Quantifying Solvency 
As introduced above, the theory of insurance company solvency is made up of 
two strands: classical insurance solvency theory, and financial or market theory 
of insurer solvency. The former strand of literature is concerned with actuarial 
risk theory. This was developed initially by European actuaries and has been 
expressed in an extensive and mathematically advanced literature. Solvency is 
considered within the context of a complex mathematically closed model, which 
crucially ignores the role of the market process. By contrast, the financial view 
of insurer solvency was developed primarily in the United States over the last 
thirty years and rests on the view that economic markets are rational and 
efficient. While there has been significant overlap between the actuarial and 
financial approach in recent years, there has been a tradition of limited cross- 
fertilisation and as a result the discussion proceeds by addressing the classical 
approach in isolation. Subsequent chapters will develop the financial view and 
indeed establish some important linkages between these two traditions. 
3.1.1 The General Solvency Problem 
The `Classical' research agenda emphasises those variables that should be 
monitored in order to minimise, or control for the ruin probability. The 
probability of ruin lI'(. ) is synonymous with the probability of insolvency, where 
ý'(. ) = prob{Z, < 0} and ZZ is the amount of free reserves at the end of a given 
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period. Ruin theory considers in particular the relationship between the 
premiums charged and the risk insured, and is discussed in greater detail in 
Section 3.3. 
In addition, having established the group of variables to be assessed, the classical 
research agenda involves specifying the appropriate regulatory response in terms 
of a required solvency margin. The `classical' literature develops both an 
empirical and theoretical perspective on the various sources of risk that can 
jeopardise the solvency of an insurance company, and thereby establishes a 
quantitative framework within which to build a workable definition of solvency. 
The relevant risk categories that have received attention are underwriting risk, 
inflation risk and investment risk. The latter case of investment risk has received 
less attention than its counterparts. ' Moreover, theory has focused on the role of 
underwriting risk for this has been the traditional work of actuarial science. 
One of the fundamental difficulties associated with modelling insurer solvency is 
that there is no absolute criterion for defining solvency. There are a number of 
elementary definitions available; for example, the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines a business as being solvent if it is capable of meeting all pecuniary 
liabilities. While at first sight this seems a reasonable assumption to make about 
solvency, closer inspection reveals the fact that it is never possible to guarantee 
solvency of this kind. Instead, it is necessary to make certain assumptions about 
1 Most of the work has been centred on the claims process, and much of the earlier work on 
investment risk has been within financial economics. 
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liabilities and assets in order to arrive at a workable definition of solvency. 
Indeed Benjamin (1977) reviews this very issue and distils the problem into the 
following question: how can an adequate solvency margin be defined so that a 
workable legal definition can follow? The various considerations affecting this 
fundamental problem form the basis for discussion. 
One of the first points to note is that the concept of solvency applies equally to 
many forms of business other than insurance. However, unlike many other 
forms of business, insurance companies are subject to explicit solvency 
regulations in the form of reserve requirements. 2 Why is this? What makes 
insurance companies distinct from other companies and hence makes solvency a 
key regulatory issue is the fact that insurers are by definition in the business of 
buying risk (variability). At a given time, an insurer's liabilities are only 
partially known as they often extend many years into the future and are subject to 
a great list of uncertainties. These uncertainties have implications for a workable 
definition of solvency and the appropriate legal specification of the regulations. 
First and foremost, given the nature of an insurer's assets and liabilities, insurer 
solvency has to be seen as a probabilistic concept. As Kastelijn and 
Remmerswaal (1986) notes, the probabilistic nature of solvency is a result of two 
important factors: time and risk. 
Z There exist bankruptcy laws for business in general, but not specific reserve requirements. 
88 
3.1.2 Time 
The time consideration depends on how the future is viewed and in particular 
how to construct a workable definition of solvency while also accounting for 
future business. The assumption of future business is central to the performance 
of any solvency definition; future income streams, for example, have the ability 
to support current performance. This leads to the following questions: to what 
extent should future business support current operations and in particular, if the 
future is to be taken into account, what is the relevant time horizon? There are 
no definitive answers to these questions. However, there have been a number of 
alternative strategies put forward in order to simplify the problem (Pentikäinen 
1988). 
The time factor has been addressed by making assumptions specific to the use of 
future business. First, there are those actuarial methods of solvency that are 
essentially static and that use balance sheet data. 3 Second, there are those 
actuarial techniques that attempt to model the future and make solvency a more 
`dynamic' measure of performance. Related to this assessment is the distinction 
between methods on a going concern versus methods based on a break-up (or 
liquidation) basis. Going concern methods take account of future business, 
while in the case of break-up methods, solvency is considered under the 
assumption of no new business. Each method has arguments for and against (for 
discussions see Beard, et al. 1984). The problem faced by both methods is the 
3 This work involves the calculation and analysis of financial ratios from accounting statements. 
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choice of the appropriate time horizon; for the break-up case, this will usually be 
the expected time that it will take to run off the existing business. By contrast, 
the going concern case is less clear. Regulators will usually expect a time 
horizon of between one and two years as sufficient (to enable regulators to react), 
while management may want a longer term view, especially in the case of life 
assurance where its liabilities extend many years into the future. 
4 Indeed, these 
two groups, regulators and management, may provide a useful perspective on the 
problem of defining solvency (Pentikäinen 1988). 
While much can be said about the alternative distinctions that can be made 
regarding the solvency/time considerations, it is important to emphasise that no 
clear method can be deemed as superior. Evidently some account of the future is 
important in any final analysis, yet important insights may also be derived from 
examining issues within a break-up setting. In reality, the selection usually 
comes down to the degree of complexity associated with a given definition. 
3.1.3 Risks 
In addition to the time consideration, what are the risks that should be considered 
when defining solvency? Ultimately, there are many different factors that may 
affect the solvency position of insurers and which make up the economic 
activities and decision-making of insurance companies. The key is to develop 
4 The problem is that simply assuming a long enough time horizon may enhance solvency though 
greater income streams. 
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an analysis of those variables that seem reasonable in a discussion of insurer 
solvency. 
In respect of the relevant risks, there are many differences between the various 
actuarial investigations (see Pentikäinen 1988 for a review). The traditional 
approach of the actuarial literature has been to consider only risks associated 
with liabilities, especially the risk of claims fluctuations. This approach has 
been justified on the grounds that it is the nature of the liabilities (claims) that 
makes an insurer distinct from other non-insurance business (where there are no 
explicit solvency constraints). In calculating liabilities, the following aspects 
have been extensively considered: claims fluctuation; dependency on the 
composition of the insurance portfolio; inflation; reinsurance; catastrophes; 
expenses; and, bonuses and profit sharing, particularly relevant to life assurance, 
(see Beard, et al. (1984)). 
The growing importance of investments to insurer solidity in recent years has 
highlighted the importance of risk factors affecting the insurer's assets. 
However, given the predominance of liabilities in the actuarial literature only 
limited attention has been paid to fluctuation in investment values. 
There are further factors that are considered important to the discussion of 
solvency. Other types of risks might include policy option risks (for example, 
the risk of policy surrenders) and `solidarity' risks (Beard, Pentikäinen and 
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Pesonen 1984). 5 A further factor to note is that any prescription vis-ä-vis a 
solvency constraint will be based upon the relevant calculations of assets and 
liabilities. Therefore, the solvency constraints that are defined are dependent 
upon the method of valuation for assets and liabilities. An example in life 
assurance is that of the adequacy of reserves. Here the size of technical reserves 
can differ significantly depending on the method of reserving employed 
(Pentikäinen 1988). 
Thus, the interplay of many risk factors is a source of complication when 
attempting to define solvency. The difficulty lies in the fact that many factors 
are not quantifiable and even when they are quantifiable there may be ambiguity 
associated with the resulting measure of insurer solvency. 
3.1.3 Insolvency Probability 
Having addressed the roles of time and risk, a further assumption must be made 
regarding insolvency probability. In particular, what is an acceptable level of 
insolvency probability? Any answer is fraught with difficulty as an `acceptable' 
level of insolvency basically comes down to an arbitrary decision although: 
The choice of the insolvency probability is ... more an 
illustration 
of the arbitrariness of the situation than the sole cause of it. (Kastelijn 
and Remmerswaal 1986,15) 
5 Solidarity risks are those risks that bring about a difference between the true actuarial premium 
and the actual premium charged. The actual premium charged may be calculated without having 
knowledge of all the relevant risk factors. An efficient insurance operation would therefore try to 
minimise the discrepancy between the true actuarial premium and the actual premium charged. 
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The interaction of time and risk with insolvency probability predicted by a given 
solvency measure is important to stress. If, for example, more risks are 
considered, or a longer time horizon is used, the probability of insolvency will 
necessarily increase. These interactions must be carefully evaluated and 
accounted for in full, before proceeding on towards any acceptance of a workable 
definition of solvency. Consideration now turns to reviewing some of the 
classical literature in its attempt to provide a workable definition of solvency. 
3.2 Formal Definitions 
Having reviewed the background to the insurer solvency problem, what solutions 
exist to the basic question posed by Benjamin (1977) regarding a practical legal 
definition of solvency? Before proceeding to some practical examples of legally 
defined solvency margins, it is useful to consider a theoretical framework from 
which to view this problem in greater detail. Following Pentikäinen (1988), the 
development of the economic position of an insurer maybe expressed in terms of 
an equation or basic algorithm related to year t as follows: 
(3.1) B, +Ir =X, +C, +D, +AU, 
Where B is the premium income, I is the net return on investments, 6 Xis the 
claims paid, C expenses, D dividends (and bonuses) and AU, = Ut - U, _, , 
the 
6 This is calculated in monetary units and not as a percentage. 
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change (+/-) of the solvency margin U. Equation 3.1 is an algorithm because it 
is AU, that generates a sequence, given an initial condition for U0. 
The basic algorithm given in Equation 3.1 is the foundation for model building 
and simulation work within insurer solvency research. Now, U is the indicator 
of interest with respect to the insurance company and may be obtained as the 
difference between assets (A) and liabilities (L) such that: 
(3.2) U=A-L 
While assumptions need to be made regarding the way in which assets and 
liabilities are valued, this will not be explored in any greater detail at this stage. 
Instead, it will be assumed that assets are valued according to an acceptable 
standard (for example market value) and liabilities are estimated using sound 
actuarial practices (Beard, Pentikäinen and Pesonen 1984). 
It is sufficient to say that the claims variable, X,, has been the focus for research 
in the actuarial field. Given that a formal expression for an insurance company 
is presented, it is now possible to ask the question: what is solvency? 
Pentikäinen (1969) attempts to develop a definition of solvency by examining 
the perspectives of two groups of interested parties: company management and 
regulators. The interests of management was argued by Pentikäinen (1969) as 
being centred on the promotion of company development within a profit 
maximisation setting, while the regulators were seen as being interested in the 
promotion of policyholder protection. Moreover this latter requirement, namely 
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to ensure that claimants and policyholders have secured benefits, was seen by 
Pentikäinen as a basis of a legal definition of solvency. 
Consider first the regulator's perspective. The regulator in the U. K. is 
accustomed to screening the solvency position of insurers annually. If a given 
company is allowed to continue to trade then it may be assumed that the 
regulator is confident that the insurer will be solvent up until the next review. 7 
The regulator's confidence is still subject to random change and is therefore a 
matter of probability and statistical significance. The ideas may be expressed in 
terms of a diagram, see Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.1. Solvency: The Regulator's View 
Source: Pentikainen, T. 1988. On the Solvency of Insurers. In J. D. Cummins and R. A. Derrig, 
ed., Classical Insurance Solvency Theory. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
' There are two points to note here. First, the time interval for regulatory review is crucial, since 
the longer the interval the greater the uncertainty associated with any regulator prediction, and the 
greater the lag in regulator response to any adverse change. Second, if the company fails the 
regulatory review, then there will be a number of likely remedial actions before full shutdown is 
effected. 
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Qý TWO- M 
Following Pentikäinen (1988) and with reference of Figure 3.1, U is typically 
modelled as a random walk with its path bounded by the Umax and Umin curves, 
which together delineate the confidence region for prediction. U' stands for the 
initial solvency margin at time t=0, when the last regulatory review occurred. 
The progress of the solvency margin until the next review may be seen by the 
dotted line (as an example) and is subject to fluctuation (and uncertainty about 
this fluctuation). One of the central problems is to define the confidence bounds 
[Umin(T), Umax(T)] inside which U can be expected to fluctuate at the next 
review t=T, given a level of statistical probability. 8 The difference between the 
lower limit Umin(T) and the mean flow, E(U(T)) may serve as measure of 
variation (see bold portion of line). 
Solvency constraints are satisfied if the solvency margin, U, is at least equal to 
some legal minimum. This legal minimum is to be determined and is set such 
that the lower limit of the company solvency projection Umin(T) should not be 
negative by a given `survival probability' equal to (1-c), where s is an example 
of the so-called `ruin' probability 'I'(. ). It is the ruin probability that has been 
paid significant attention within a variety of scenarios in actuarial research. 
The issues of time, risk and insolvency probability are evident once more. The 
choice of the interval [0, T] must be decided upon. As Beard, et al. (1984) note, 
the fact that regulatory review occurs at discrete intervals allows for violation of 
the solvency constraint within these intervals. Continuous review, although 
8A 95 percent level of probability would therefore mean that 95 times out of 100, the path of the 
indicator U would be expected to fall within the U,,, ax and U,,,;,, limits. 
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practically near impossible, would seem to be warranted if this risk is to be 
eliminated completely. However, in practice review frequency will be resource 
constrained and the European Union convention is one year (Atchinson 1997, 
80). Note that the choice of T will have an effect on the solvency constraint: the 
greater the interval the greater the solvency margin, in order to maintain 
confidence over the greater period of time. 
The ruin probability TO must be decided upon by the regulator (Pentikäinen 
1988,5). This too will affect the relevant solvency constraint imposed upon 
insurers. Also, note that the going-concern versus break-up debate may be 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The picture set out is that of a going-concern. 
Business is carried out during the interval [0,71, yet fluctuations in U are caused 
by the settlement of claims and other commitments established in a time before 
this period, as well as due to events occurring within it. In the case of wind-up at 
t=T new business is stopped and existing business is wound up, liabilities paid as 
they fall due using assets as appropriate. The break-up process is, however, 
subject to `run-off risks. These risks are associated with deviations in payments 
to liabilities from that expected (this applies also to the liquidation of assets). 9 
To account for such risks the confidence interval lower bound would need to be 
extended further. 
While much may be said about solvency from the perspective of the regulator, it 
is important to note that solvency is a vital element of insurance management 
9A notable deviation may be brought about by, for example, an inflation shock that may make 
previous assessments of assets and liabilities undervalued. 
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and may therefore be seen as part of a business strategy (Pentikäinen 1969). 
There may be many differences between the perspective of the regulator and that 
of management and this is reflected in, among other things, the time horizon T. 
While the regulator may consider a horizon of 1 to 2 years, management strategy 
may demand a horizon that stretches many more years into the future. Thus, the 
role of solvency as part of a business strategy is distinct from the considerations 
of the regulator: solvency from the management perspective must be balanced 
along with the need for expansion, and rewards to investors. 
It is clear that the considerations of the regulator and management help to clarify 
some of the issues relating to a workable definition of solvency. Some of the 
proposed solutions to the practical problem of defining solvency are addressed in 
the next section and provide a useful overview of the work undertaken in this 
field. Later, a brief introduction to the formal developments of `ruin' theory will 
also be developed. 
3.3 Calculating the Solvency Position of an Insurance Company 
Having outlined the numerous factors to consider when defining solvency, what 
practical solutions exist in providing a workable definition of solvency 
performance? There are a number of alternative solutions proposed in the 
literature. Most of these proposals are the result of national actuarial working 
parties. Two such organisations that have played an important role are the 
Finnish Solvency Working Party (FWP) and the British Solvency Working Party 
(BWP) (Kastelijn and Remmerswaal 1986). Examples of the FWP work can be 
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seen in Beard, et al. (1984), while examples of both the FWP and BWP maybe 
seen in Kastelijn and Remmerswaal (1986). These working parties explore 
solvency issues using the basic simulation algorithm and analysing those risks 
that are deemed most appropriate to the analysis. Some of results developed are 
explored further here, and in addition some of the research that helped to form 
the current regulatory framework within the European Union is illustrated. 
The solvency outcome, however that may be defined, is the result of numerous 
factors. Some of these factors have been mentioned. In order to evaluate the 
variety of risks that may jeopardise the solvency of insurers, use is made of the 
so-called `insurance process'. The insurance process reflects the variety of 
observations and experiences associated with solvency management in practice 
and these are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the general framework for formal model building, what 
Pentikäinen (1988) refers to as The Insurance Process (Pentikäinen 1988,11). 
The Insurance Process provides a means of identifying the possible sources of 
uncertainty facing the insurance company, which in turn may affect its solvency 
position. The flow of insurance business depends on many variables. All known 
and unknown endogenous and exogenous factors form `nature'. Endogenous 
factors include the size and form of the insurance portfolio, the rating policy, 
reinsurance, and the business strategy. By contrast, exogenous factors may 
include the investment market, inflation, and regulatory shift. Nature is not 
strictly known. However, indicators of the state of nature may be disclosed 
(usually with a time lag) and may therefore be used in subsequent model 
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construction. Indeed, using this data source together with existing theory on the 
insurance process and assuming a given set of endogenous factors, it may then be 
possible to go forward and develop a model of the insurance company and its 
solvency position. 
Figure 3.2. The Insurance Process 
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Source: Pentikäinen, T. 1988. On the Solvency of Insurers. In J. D. Cummins and R. A. Derrig, 
ed., Classical Insurance Solvency Theory. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
As Pentikäinen (1988) illustrates, uncertainties are associated with the procedure 
described above. These uncertainties fall into three main groups: model error, 
parameter error and stochastic error. Even if the first two error sources are 
corrected for, it is impossible to eliminate the third error source. The importance 
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of these error sources will depend on their resulting impact on the solvency 
position of the insurer. The possible sources of stochastic error include 
uncertainty from claims, asset values, inflation, and expenses. 
Many approaches are adopted in order to evaluate explicitly the solvency 
position of the insurer. These methods may be divided into three main groups: 
ratio methods, methods based explicitly on risk theory, and comprehensive 
model methods. Each method will be addressed respectively in turn. 
3.3.1 Ratio Methods 
The use of financial ratios to define the solvency position of an insurance 
company has little theoretical explanation; that is, ratio methods are not based 
explicitly on risk theory. The ratio methods are used to infer something about 
the performance of the insurance company. Much of the work in this area has 
been developed on the basis of a variety of European studies (Kastelijn and 
Remmerswaal 1986). This research attempts to derive an explicit solvency 
margin, assuming only a small probability that surplus will be negative (the 
probability of insolvency/ruin). While some methods are based on the analysis 
of just one ratio, other methods consider multiple indicators. To illustrate the 
features of the ratio method, use is made of the research that underpins the 
current insurance regulations in the U. K. 
The basis for the solvency margins implemented within the European Union is 
taken from the work of Campagne (1961). Campagne's working party 
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established a number of empirical results and the work has been one of the most 
widely cited examples of ratio methodology. Given that this study (and its 
counterpart for non-life business) has had a profound impact on the nature of 
solvency regulations in Europe, it is instructive to consider this work in greater 
detail. 
Following Kastelijn and Remmerswaal (1986), Campagne considers three 
possible ratios for expressing the minimum solvency margin: first, as a 
percentage of the insured capital; second, as a percentage of the risk capital; and 
third, as a percentage of the mathematical reserves. After discussion, Campagne 
opts for the last ratio, a solvency margin as a percentage of mathematical 
reserves. This is justified on a number of grounds, the most noteworthy being 
that of the definition problems associated with the first two measures and the fact 
that mathematical reserves are one of the most important quantities when 
considering the total investments of life assurance companies. 
Having elected the relevant measure, Campagne makes a number of 
assumptions. First, he expresses a company's loss, L per year as a percentage of 
mathematical reserve, V. 10 The ratio L/V is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed for different years and for different companies. On this 
basis parameters for the L/V distribution may then be estimated by empirical 
inspection. Free reserves, U as a percentage of V must be such that the 
10 Profit is synonymous with a negative loss. 
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probability of a loss exceeding the reserve in a given year must be less than or 
equal to a small probability c (that is T(. ), the probability of ruin), that is: 
(3.3) probýVL 
Data was collected on 10 Dutch companies for the years 1926-1945. In the 
original article Campagne (1961) assumes that the ratio L/V is distributed 
according to the Pearsonian distribution. The frequency function fj1y(L/V) was 
estimated, with the minimum solvency margin being obtained as that fraction 
(L/V*) of the mathematical reserve, such that: 
(3.4) jfL, v)(L/V)d(L/V)=s 
(LIV) 
Campagne estimates the solvency margin for 1 to 5 years and 10 years such that 
Equation 3.4 is satisfied. The result was intuitive: the longer the time period 
considered (given s), the greater the required margin. Campagne selected a 
probability of c=5 percent which translates to a necessary margin of 4 percent. 
The significance of this result may be seen in the regulations under the relevant 
statutory instrument. Under the 1994 Insurance Company Regulations, the 
definition of UK solvency margins for life and annuity business is that "... there 
shall be a sum equal to 4 per cent of mathematical reserves, "(Insurance Company 
Regulations 1994, Reg. 18, s. 19). " 
11A similar treatment is given for non-life insurance solvency margins. 
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While the ramifications of Campagne's work are considerable, the methodology 
employed has come under growing criticism. Indeed, much debate has centred 
over whether Campagne's work has actuarial foundations, or whether it is merely 
the result of an empirical study (for discussion see Byrnes (1986), De Wit (1980) 
and Miron (1983)). Also, Kastelijn and Remmerswaal (1986) argue that far from 
resolving the definitional problem associated with the term solvency, the work of 
Campagne (1961) actually added to the ambiguity. They also criticised the 
choice of e, arguing that c was arbitrarily selected and was governed by the 
choice of sample (the choice of the companies). Hardie et al. (1984) also 
criticised the Campagne study on the grounds that it was too old to be useful and 
that the independently, identically distributed assumption was not very realistic 
given the data. They argued that the solvency positions of insurance companies 
were likely to move in tandem due to underlying factors (for example, the state 
of the macro-economy). 
Also emphasised by Hardie et al. (1984) is the role of `implicit' margins. 
Implicit margins are common in life assurance and come in the form of 
conservative estimates over and above the true actuarial estimates of mortality, 
interest and expenses. It is argued that excessive `explicit' margins may have a 
detrimental impact on `implicit' margins and given that `implicit' margins are 
unobservable there may then be unpredictable effects upon the resulting solvency 
position of the insurance company. Moreover, the fact that implicit margins are 
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present in life assurance may be an argument to reduce the extent of explicit 
solvency regulation! 12 
Aside from the specific criticisms of Campagne's study there are a number of 
comments that may be made about the ratio method in particular. This method is 
basically a straightforward statistical analysis with minimum account of theory, 
be it risk theory or indeed any other theory. One difficulty is that the use of 
observed outcomes is the result of the interplay of many factors operating within 
the insurance process (both known and unknown). It is difficult to separate the 
total effect according to various risk categories, even if they are known (such as 
investment risks, underwriting risks, and exposure to inadequate safety loading 
within the premium). Thus, for the purposes of policy prescription and 
forecasting the usefulness of such a study is evidently limited. 13 In order to 
make greater use of the data and be able to disentangle the roles of the relevant 
risk factors, any empirical analysis needs to be supplemented by theoretical 
modelling. The data may then be used to test the usefulness of the model. The 
initial development of formal models of insurer solvency was based explicitly on 
risk theory. 14 This work is illustrated in the next section and is the result, in part, 
of the research by both the Finnish Working Party and the British Working Party. 
12 The only problem with this is the fact that it may be very difficult to obtain the necessary data 
on implicit margins. Precision estimates are necessary in order to ensure adequate regulation. 
13 Moreover, the account of market processes in determining the market-clearing premium is not 
present at all within the classical insurance theory. 
1' It should be noted that analysis of ratios may be extended into a discriminate analysis using a 
number of different ratios. This has provided a means of classifying companies into those that 
need investigation and those that do not. This area of work falls under the financial distress 
literature, developed in recent years within the United States (see Chapter 4). 
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3.3.2 Methods based on Risk Theory: Claims Fluctuations 
This section considers only one type of risk: the risk of fluctuations in aggregate 
claims. This is the traditional domain of risk theory (see Beard, et al. (1984)). In 
its simplest form, models are used in order to derive explicit solutions for the 
solvency margin, given an acceptable level of insolvency probability. 
Methods based on claims fluctuations concentrate on the following 
simplification of the basic algorithm in Equation 3.1: 
(3.5) AU, = B, -X, 
Expenses and other variables of the basic algorithm in Equation 3.1 are not 
normally considered, so that the model usually consists of three main elements: 
the initial reserve U0; the aggregate claim amount, XX (which will depend on the 
time interval considered); and the premium income B1 including the risk loading, 
where B, may be decomposed into a safety loaded risk premium P2, and an 
expense loading such that: 
(3.6) B, = P2, + c,. B, 
Where cr is an expense-loading coefficient and P,, is defined as follows: 
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(3.7) P= [1 + A, JE[X1 ] 
Where A, is a safety-loading coefficient. 15 The safety loading and expenses may 
be sources of fluctuation in the premium income Bt, since changing actuarial 
assumptions may affect income. Note that Equation 3.5 will tend towards a 
converged limit if, on average, premiums are proportional to the expected value 
of the liability. 16 
In order to describe claims fluctuations and underwriting risks, use is made of a 
Claims Process Model (for full discussion see Beard, et al. (1984)). This model 
is made up of two components: the claim number process (i. e. the claim 
frequency) and the individual claim amounts. Following Taylor and Buchanan 
(1988), these two components may be developed formally as follows. First, 
assume that coverage of the risk is provided for the time interval [0j]. Further, 
let Nt be a random variable representing the number of claims occurring in the 
time interval. Also, let X11, ... 
XNI denote the individual sizes of the N, claims. 
Then the aggregate claims amount for the interval [0, t], given by X, is defined as 
follows: 
N, 
(3.8) X, =1X; 
i=I 
15 A safety-loading coefficient is an implicit solvency margin. The greater the coefficient, the 
larger the assumed margin. 
16 Premiums are proportional to, rather than equal to the expected value of the liability because of 
the existence of implicit margins of solvency (including profit). 
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To define the claims process in full, it is necessary to specify the distributions for 
N1 and X. Consider first the variable N,. There are many alternative 
distributions that can be considered here. One common distribution assumed is 
that of the Poisson distribution, where N, -Po (A), where ?, is the parameter of the 
probability distribution and should not be confused with the safety loading 
coefficient in Equation 3.7 above. Under the Poisson assumption the probability 
of a given number of claims is generated as follows: 
(3.9) prob{N1 = n} = and 
n! 
(3.10) E[N, ]_2t 
The Poisson parameter X may be interpreted as the expected number of claims 
per time unit. 17 With respect to the individual claim amounts X,, it is standard to 
assume that the amounts of the N, claims occurring in the interval [0, t] are 
independently, identically distributed with distribution function F(. ). Let G(., t) 
denote the distribution function of the aggregate claims amount XX, and this is 
referred to as the compound Poisson distribution (cPD). Following Kastelijn and 
Remmerswaal (1986), Equations 3.8 and 3.9 yield the following cPD: 
(3.11) G(x, t) =l e-ß`[(2t)' l j! ]F1*(x) 
j=0 
17 Poisson distributions are considered acceptable for a sufficiently small collection of risks 
considered over a sufficiently short time interval. 
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Where F *() is the j-fold self-convolution of the distribution function F(. ). The 
choice of F(. ) is open to many options. The selection depends on the nature of 
the risks concerned and the nature of the distribution moments required. 
As noted by Kastelijn and Remmerswaal (1986), the usefulness of the cPD can 
be improved by allowing the Poisson parameter to vary stochastically according 
to some structure function. This results in the mixed-compound Poisson 
distribution. It is not necessary to define explicitly the size distribution and/or 
the structure function, but only to know their lowest three/four moments (in 
addition to the Poisson parameter, A). Thus, returning to Equation 3.5 it is clear 
that a complex analytical structure can be specified for the claims process Xt and 
that this can be used to evaluate the solvency performance of the indicator 
function, U, given premium income, B,. 
Many additional features have been built into the basic claims process. For 
example, the claims experience might be subject to considerable variation in the 
form of a cycle. There are periodic variations in claims frequencies experienced 
by insurance companies and hence this will be reflected in insurer profit/loss. 
Even though these periodic variations are irregular, they are typically referred to 
as "cycles" (Beard, Pentikäinen and Pesonen 1984,185). Underwriting cycles 
may occur and manifest themselves as an error in the predicted risk premium P1 
= E[XXJ, where the error is APt: 
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(3.12) A/ = 
P, 
- E[X, 
The error, AP, yields profit or loss depending on the state of the cycle. The 
problem is that there is a time lag between the moment at which the error occurs 
and the moment at which the error is detected and any adjustment can be made. '8 
Hence, during this period an insurer may accrue profit or loss and this may be 
revealed as a cycle in the loss ratio X/B and a fluctuation in the solvency margin 
U, but only with a time lag. ' 9 
3.3.3 The Relationship Between Premiums, Claims and Solvency: 
Ruin Theory 
While much can be said about the claims process itself, its specific application to 
classical insurance solvency theory comes in the form of ruin theory (Beard, 
Pentikäinen and Pesonen 1984,55). Ruin theory was initiated by Lundberg 
(1909) and was developed further by Cramer (1930,1955) and has continued to 
expand since the time of these works. The theory of ruin considers an insurance 
fund subject to premium income and claims outflow. The probability that at 
some stage the insurance fund is exhausted is considered, at which point the 
insurer may be deemed to be insolvent, or 'ruined'. The dependency of the 
solvency position upon risk selection and rating policy is expanded upon within 
this field of research. A more rigorous description of the ruin problem may be 
18 This assumes that it is possible to alter the premiums charged. Many contracts specify fixed 
premiums for the entire term of the policy. 
19 In addition to the long-term variation in exposure levels, there may be other factors influencing 
the size of premium error including trends, catastrophes, run-off errors, and so forth. 
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given as follows (see Taylor and Buchanan (1988)). Let the premium, per unit of 
time, net of expenses be c such that: 
(3.13) c=(1+i). Aa, 
Where 27 is the safety margin (including profit), A is the Poisson parameter, and 
al is the average claim size. Consider now the time interval [0, t], where an 
insurer starts the interval with `free' reserves, w. The amount of free reserves at 
the end of the interval will be given by Z, where: 
(3.14) Z, =w+ct-X, 
Where X, is defined by the aggregate claims process (such as that process given 
in Equation 3.11). Zt is a stochastic process for t>O and is referred to as a 
surplus process, which tracks the progress of the insurer's free reserves, w. 
The case of ruin, or insolvency occurs at time t if there is shift to the state Z<<O. 
Conversely, survival over the entire period occurs if ZS>O for all s E[0, t]. Let 
qi(w, t) denote the probability of survival to time t, given free reserves, w. Then: 
(3.15) tb(w, t) = prob{ZS >0 for 0: 5 s <_ t: Zo = w} 
Now, let Y(wt) represent the probability of ruin before time t, given that an 
insurer starts with an initial free reserve of w. Then: 
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(3.16) `P(w, t)=1-O(w, t) 
A solution to q$() may be explicitly derived using a particular integro-differential 
equation (see Taylor, et al. 1988). There are, however, approximations to the 
probability of ruin that may be employed. These approximations depend on two 
specific assumptions: first, the length of the time horizon considered (usually 
whether it is finite or infinite); and second, the frequency of screening (whether 
this is continuous or discrete time checking). It is possible under discrete-time 
checking for an insurer to pass through the state Z<< 0, without being detected so 
long as ZZ>O, where ZZ is the time of the next inspection and c>t (Taylor and 
Buchanan 1988,63). As a consequence the probability of ruin may need to be 
altered. 
The starting point for a ruin approximation is to assume an infinite time horizon 
with continuous checking. These assumptions are made because the solutions 
become analytically tractable. Usually the time-scale considered is chosen in 
such a way to scale the Poisson parameter, A to unity. Under these conditions, 
one of the best known approximations to the infinite-time ruin probability (see 
Taylor (1976), Taylor and Buchanan (1988), and Teugels (1982)) is given by: 
(3.17) k'(w) exp{- Rw} 
Moreover, the so-called Lundberg inequality states that: 
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(3.18) T(w) 5 exp{- Rw} 
Where R is called the adjustment coefficient and R>O. The approximation given 
above has an intuitive explanation. Recall that w is the initial free reserve. As 
the ability of the insurer to adjust free reserves increases in response to changes 
in the insurance process, the probability of ruin falls. R depends on many of the 
factors mentioned in previous sections, especially the rate at which an insurer 
can revise its premium in light of its recent claims experience (as specified by 
the claim size distribution F(. )). It might therefore be possible to hypothesise 
that R may be low for life insurers due to contractual obligations specifying fixed 
premiums. 
The adjustment coefficient, R may itself be approximated. Taylor (1975) 
provides an approximation based explicitly on the moments of the claim size 
distribution function. In particular: 
(3.18) R= R(i7, a2, a3, a4), and Rn > 0, Ra2 <0 
Where an is the nth moment about the origin of the individual claim size 
distribution; that is: 
W 
(3.19) a =f x"dF(x) 
0 
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Taylor (1975) scales a1=1 and develops the following results. First, the ruin 
probability decreases (R increases) as percentage profit margin, r7 increases. The 
term r7 may also be interpreted as a safety margin. Second, the most important 
shape parameter of the claim size distribution is the variance and the relationship 
with the variance is that the longer-tailed distributions generally carry the greater 
exposure to ruin (a measure of downside risk (see Chapter 4)). The final remark 
to be made here is that if premiums contain no profit margin, ruin is certain. 
Note here that the implication for supervision is that the regulator should 
examine the breakdown of the gross premium. However, this information is not 
submitted within the annual company returns. 20 
The illustration provided by Taylor and Buchanan (1988) demonstrates the 
techniques applied in the field of classical insurer solvency theory. Note that 
examples of recent work using a variety of claims distributions include Croux 
and Veravebeke (1990); Dufresne and Gerber (1993); Gerber (1992); Embrechts 
and Veravebeke (1982); and, Embrechts and Wouters (1990). From the above 
analysis of Taylor and Buchanan (1988), it is possible to proceed on and derive 
explicit expressions for the minimum solvency margin Umin given an assumed 
level of acceptable ruin probability (Kastelijn and Remmerswaal 1986,50-69). 
While much has been said about the infinite time/continuous checking case, it is 
important to consider the work that has been developed on the other possible 
20 In theory, authorities such as the FSA have the statutory power to obtain any necessary 
information. In practice this power is rarely exercised due to the complexity of `process'. 
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variants (that is, finite time/continuous checking, finite time/discrete checking, 
and infinite time/discrete checking). For examples of each case see Beard et al. 
(1984). The mathematics becomes increasingly complex as one departs from the 
infinite time/continuous checking case. However, as a means of circumventing 
these difficulties, estimates of finite ruin probabilities and their convergence to 
infinite ruin probabilities have been used. An example is provided by Seal 
(1972) and is illustrated in Taylor et al. (1988) under the Poisson assumption for 
the claims distribution function (with a mean of 1 claim per unit time, and 
2=0.1). The results are reproduced in Table 3.1 below: 
Table 3.1. Finite-time Ruin Probabilities: Numerical Approximations 
Time Horizon, t 
50 
100 
200 
400 
800 
1000 
2000 
00 
Finite ruin probability for initial free 
reserve=33 
0.001 
0.006 
0.019 
0.033 
0.043 
0.044 
0.045 
0.045 
Finite ruin probability for initial free 
reserve=44 
0.000 
0.001 
0.004 
0.010 
0.015 
0.016 
0.017 
0.017 
Source: Taylor and Buchanan 1988. The Management of Solvency. In J. D. Cummins and R. A. 
Derrig ed., Classical Insurance Solvency Theory. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
According to Taylor and Buchanan (1988) values of free reserve w were selected 
in order to produce infinite ruin probabilities that were not too small or too large. 
They summarise the findings of this work: 
First, the amount of the initial free reserves required to reduce 
infinite time ruin probability to a moderate level is only 30 or 40 times 
the average size of a single claim; second, with initial free reserves at this 
sort of level, the finite-time ruin probability attains essentially its infinite- 
time value over the period required to produce, on average, 1000 claims. 
(Taylor and Buchanan 1988,72) 
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As Taylor and Buchanan (1988) note, the amount of capital required for the first 
point above would be minute. Hence, if small reserves are consistent with a low 
`classical' ruin probability, then the fact that insolvencies still occur suggests that 
insurer insolvency might be due to factors out with the normal consideration of 
risk theory. This is not that surprising given the variety of other considerations 
and risks outlined in Section 3.1. 
Moreover, solvency research over the last 15 years has developed these other 
considerations in addition to research in the financial economics arena. The role 
of these other factors and in particular the operation of the entire basic algorithm 
in Equation 3.1 is introduced in the next section and falls under the heading of 
`comprehensive models' of insurer solvency. 
Note, as an example of an explicit solvency constraint based on risk theory, the 
work of Pentikäinen (1988). As far back as 1952 Pentikäinen helped to persuade 
the Finnish government to accept the risk theoretic approach in designing 
insurance company regulations. The formula used for the statutory minimum 
solvency margin was given by: 
(3.20) Um; 
n = aP +b 
PM 
Where the first term covers the random fluctuations in basic probabilities and the 
second term covers the random fluctuations of claims (U is the required margin, 
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P is net premium income and M is the maximum net retention for a single 
claim). 
3.3.4 Methods Based on Comprehensive Models 
The previous section considered methods that focused primarily on the effects of 
claims fluctuations [Xt] upon the solvency position of insurers. Comprehensive 
models are the more common approach to solvency modelling in recent years 
and, as mentioned, address alternative sources of risk and their associated 
interaction. Before proceeding to some examples of this research it is useful to 
consider the main difficulties associated with comprehensive model 
construction. Recall the basic algorithm: 
(3.20) B1 + I1 = X, + C1 + D, + AU, 
Much of the literature has concentrated on just one of the above factors and 
detailed the effect of this variable on solvency, in isolation from the other 
variables. As Pentikäinen (1988) notes, a major problem arises in bringing 
together these sub-models into a fully interacting model, which accounts for all 
these factors simultaneously (the so-called `great convolution' (Pentikäinen 
1988,25). Thus, the objective of comprehensive models is therefore to develop 
a model that attempts to address all these difficulties in order to evaluate the 
overall solvency position of the insurer. 
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There are a number of `comprehensive' approaches used in the literature. 
Usually a choice is made between an analytical calculation of ruin probabilities 
employing risk theory (and estimating the variation ranges, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1), or an operational approach using simulation techniques. Due to the 
complexities involved in deriving a fully analytical solution, simulation is 
usually relied upon to provide meaningful results. The simulation of claims, 
inflation, the rate of interest, and so forth may easily be incorporated into the 
basic algorithm to analyse the effects upon U, the solvency margin. This 
methodology can be used to provide a framework for setting an explicit 
constraint. 
Whatever the choice of technique, the objective is to construct an overall model 
of insurer solvency (Pentikäinen 1988,29). Remembering that insurer solvency 
is by definition a probabilistic concept the next problem is to determine the joint 
distributions of the variables contained within the basic algorithm (Kastelijn and 
Remmerswaal 1986). As discussed, the variables may be affected by nature 
simultaneously, and are also likely to be mutually dependent. This dependency 
must be modelled in any estimation procedure otherwise the estimation of the 
risks will be biased downward (Kastelijn and Remmerswaal 1986). A 
correlation matrix must therefore be constructed in order to model the `great 
convolution' and derive meaningful results for the specification of the insurer's 
solvency margin. Estimating the full correlation matrix of the model is 
complicated by the fact that it is difficult to isolate movements between specific 
factors. There are, however, a number of ways around this and use will now be 
made of the work by the Finnish Working Party (FWP) to illustrate the 
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`comprehensive' approach to solvency assessment; for technical detail see 
Kastelijn Remmerswaal (1986), 85-98. 
The Finnish solvency study had two primary objectives (Byrne 1986): first, to 
safeguard the interests of the insurance consumers; and, second to provide 
guarantees for the long-term continuation of the operation of an insurance 
company. In constructing their model, the FWP define a `standard insurer' that 
represents an insurer of average size and quality in the sample considered. The 
FWP conduct sensitivity analysis of the parameters (one by one or in 
combination with each other), to determine the relative importance of factors; for 
example, how the size of the portfolio affects the solvency indicators (Beard, 
Pentikäinen and Pesonon 1984). This analysis was then used to construct an 
estimate of the correlation matrix and hence calibrate the overall performance of 
the comprehensive model, evaluating the associated solvency outcome. 
Subsequent analysis addresses model applicability and also the extent of the 
three sources of error, mentioned earlier in this section. 
A simplified specification for the solvency margin of a going-concern insurance 
company at time T, arrived at by the FWP, can be given in the following form 
(Pentikäinen 1988,42): 
(3.21) Umin = aB +b 6X +c+d+ eA + f6A 
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Where the coefficient, a, is a risk loading on premium income B to reflect the 
risk associated with business cycles or adverse trends. The next term bcx is a 
term to account for the fluctuation in claims and is the ordinary mixed compound 
Poisson fluctuation (0x is the standard deviation to be calculated for each 
company). The c term is a margin included for very small companies and the d 
term is another margin to represent the case where an exceptional risk of 
catastrophe is imminent. Similar to the representation of the liabilities, the asset 
side of the balance sheet has two components to reflect its size and variation. 
Thus, the last two terms represent the asset risks, where A stands for the total 
amount of assets. Note that the term 6A has a portfolio risk (standard deviation) 
interpretation and is therefore specified for each insurer (portfolio). 
The above solvency measurement in Equation 3.21 represents a `short-cut' 
method to the great convolution problem. This is therefore an unrefined rule that 
takes into account the main features of insurance companies in order to provide a 
means of solvency classification. 
3.4 Summary 
The need to consider the insurer solvency position is crucial: 
If the payments by the insurance companies are not ensured, then 
there is no real purpose in insuring, " (Kastelijn and Remmerswaal 1986, 
117). 
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The variety of considerations that need to be accounted for are many and varied 
and as a consequence there is much ambiguity associated with legal definitions 
and the process of regulating insurance company solvency. 
With regard to the three main approaches outlined in section 3.3, each approach 
has its own merits and drawbacks. Methods based on financial ratios have only a 
pragmatic justification. The solvency position of an insurer is defined in terms 
of a straightforward statistical analysis of some observed data on the insurance 
process; for example claim data. In contrast, methods based on risk theory focus 
on claims variation [XI]. This theory emphasises the factors that affect liabilities; 
for example the effect of expenses and inflation. Assets are not explicitly 
considered and in addition mutual interdependencies are not accounted for. 
Methods based on comprehensive models attempt to incorporate both the 
liabilities and assets, extending the traditional domain of risk theory. Ultimately 
the objective is to develop a full model that accounts for all the various 
interconnections between the many factors affecting the solvency position of the 
insurer. The basic algorithm may be used as a starting point. For each of the 
variables a sub-model is built, with the interdependencies accounted for in full. 
Each of the three approaches to the analysis of insurer solvency varies in terms 
of the risks that they consider, the time dimension involved, the data required, 
and the associated complexity. However, there is one very important caveat to 
all the work outlined above, which serves as the point of departure for discussion 
in the next chapter. One of the central results to come from classical theory is 
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that the establishment of suitable premium rates lies at the heart of the solvency 
of insurers. Yet this conclusion must be checked by the fact that market 
considerations are not present within this analysis. Moreover, there is little 
grounding in economic theory in understanding the decision-making process of 
the company, and the functioning of the industry as a whole. Recent work, both 
in actuarial science and financial economic analysis, has attempted to build on 
economic principles while combining this with the simulation methodology 
outlined above. Attention now turns to addressing these contributions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EVALUATING INSURANCE COMPANY SOLVENCY: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
4.0 Introduction 
Insurance provides a central role in ensuring the smooth functioning of the 
economy. Insurance companies provide a financial product (a contingent claim 
on their assets, like a bond) which is set in competition with other financial 
products. The composition of the insurer's assets and liabilities, rather than 
being determined exclusively by the actuary, are the outcome of many factors 
relating to risk and return, which in turn are determined endogenously by the 
wider economic context. 
The previous chapter illustrated the traditional, actuarial view of insurance 
evaluating the solvency performance of the insurer in terms of a purely risk- 
theoretic approach, emphasising in particular the role liabilities. Recall that 
`classical' models of insurer solvency assume that the level of capital is 
determined exogenously. Based on this assumption, the analysis then proceeds 
by attempting to determine the probability that this level of capital will be 
sufficient to meet the insurer's liabilities. This analysis, while mathematically 
complex, largely ignores many important features of the insurance process. 
Insurance is a financial business like any other and as such the industry can be 
analysed using many of the tools of economic theory. As a consequence, 
traditional insurance company analysis may be supplemented and enhanced by 
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various contributions from economics, such as those from the field of financial 
economics. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 4.1 will review briefly the 
shortcomings of the `classical' actuarial approach and this will serve as the point 
of departure for discussion. Section 4.2 will introduce the main themes of the 
theoretical developments, these fall largely under the inclusive heading of 
Asset/Liability Management (ALM), see Smink and van der Meer (1997), and 
discussion commences by reviewing the foundations of ALM. Discussion 
proceeds in Section 4.3 by demonstrating some of the contributions made by 
portfolio theory in its application to insurance. Section 4.4 elaborates on 
simulation techniques as a methodology for evaluating insurer solvency. Section 
4.5 reviews some of the other applications of financial economics to the study of 
insurers, while Section 4.6 addresses the various techniques employed in the 
early warning/prediction of insurer insolvency emphasising current empirical 
techniques. Finally, Section 4.7 provides a summary of the main developments 
within this chapter. 
4.1 An Alternative Approach to `Classical' Insurer Solvency Theory 
There are three concerns associated with the traditional risk-theoretic approach, 
which may be addressed more fully using economic theory. First, although 
`classical' solvency theory provides a rigorous account of the underwriting 
portfolio, its account of the investment portfolio (and its attendant risks) is less 
than satisfactory. Moreover, the interaction between the underwriting and 
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investment portfolio, central to understanding the insurer, receives limited 
assessment. The second problem associated with traditional analysis is that the 
interaction of the firm with the wider economic environment (within which the 
insurer must compete and `survive') is not addressed; that is, the models are 
closed in nature. The final issue, concerns the way in which solvency is 
calculated. The traditional literature views solvency in a rather static sense, 
ignoring the very dynamic nature of solvency. 
The three shortcomings outlined above have received differing degrees of 
attention within the literature (see Laurant (1998)). Recent contributions to the 
study of insurer solvency have been many and varied. In stark contrast to earlier 
work, insurer solvency now finds its application in many areas of economics. 
For the purposes of discussion it is useful to breakdown these developments into 
theoretical and applied analysis. 
Theoretical analysis relates to asset/liability management (ALM) and combines 
the tools of utility theory, investment analysis, and simulation in order to model 
the performance of an insurance company as a stochastic process; for example, 
the an insurer's net cashflow can be analysed by combining a sound theoretical 
grounding with simulation techniques. ' Simulation techniques define the 
insurance company in terms of its output (the underwriting of policyholders). 
The net cashflow of an insurance company S is modelled as a stochastic process. 
The indicator S is simulated from time t=0 to time t=T, where T is the time 
1 Cash inflows include premiums, investment income, and capital contributions. Cash outflows 
include loss payments, expenses and taxes. 
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horizon of the simulation period. Thus, the present market value of S at time t=0 
yields a measurement of the insurer's solvency position, where S>O (S<O) is 
taken to mean that the insurer is solvent (insolvent). As Kahane, Tapiero, and 
Jacque (1988) point out, in perfect markets this definition of solvency is the 
same as the requirement that the market value of assets exceeds the market value 
of liabilities. Thus, the economic or financial approach places the firm in the 
context of an economy in general, and financial markets in particular. 
Note that in theory, a simulation can be carried out for each insurance company, 
factoring in firm-specific effects (such as the composition of the underwriting 
and investment portfolios). The solvency indicator Si may then be evaluated for 
insurance company i (i=1... n), where n is the number of insurance companies. 
Any solvency requirements from the perspective of the regulator will be 
contingent on the value S; and hence, as a consequence, there will be firm- 
specific capital constraints. 
The applied developments also enrich the analysis of solvency. The applied 
literature concerns itself with insolvency prediction in the guise of `financial 
distress models'. One of the main points to come out of this literature is the fact 
that standardised capital standards for solvency constraints ignore the firm 
specific nature of risks. Thus, only a capital standard that takes account of the 
idiosyncratic nature of insurer will be useful in the prediction/early warning of 
insolvency. For example, as illustrated shortly, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has taken up these issues in the United States, 
with the use of the Risk Based Capital (RBC) model of solvency assessment. 
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Discussion now turns to addressing these theoretical and applied developments 
in full. As a starting point for analysis, a review of the foundations of ALM is 
presented within the next section. 
4.2 Foundations of Asset/Liability Management (ALM) 
The insurance process (see Figure 3.2) is subject to underwriting risks and 
investment risks and some of these risks are mutually dependent. Moreover, it is 
the exploration of the investment risk and its interaction with underwriting risk 
that remains the point of departure for ALM, since the isolated risks associated 
with the liabilities of an insurance company (particularly a life insurer) have been 
explored extensively. Thus, the problem of defining insurer solvency can be 
viewed in terms of an ALM problem. These techniques build on the analysis of 
investment risk and are designed to include also the liability structure of a 
company. 
In order to understand the interaction of the underwriting and investment 
portfolio, a theory is required to model the company as an institution and the 
investment risk that it faces, given the company's liability. Both actuaries and 
financial economists have been involved in the development of asset allocation 
techniques for many years now. Two of the most frequently used techniques in 
the analysis of investment risk are immunization theory (Redington 1952) and 
mean-variance analysis (Markowitz 1952,1959). Both techniques will be 
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addressed in turn with the discussion of actuarial techniques being based largely 
around the work of Ong (1995: Chapter 2). 
4.2.1 Actuarial Investment Principles 
This analysis of investment risk within actuarial science dates back over a 
century. As Ong (1995) notes, early investment analysis established a number of 
actuarial investment principles centred on a minimum risk strategy that, "... 
considered adverse fluctuations in asset values to be the primary risk to life 
funds, " (Ong 1995,20). 
By contrast, Pegler (1948) argued for a strategy of maximising expected return 
(Ong 1995). The contrast between this principle and the earlier investment 
analysis served as a source of debate up until the ALM principle of 
immunization which stated that assets, "... should be matched to liabilities, " 
(Ong 1995,21). This argument built on the then recent work of Redington 
(1952) that suggested the matching of assets and liabilities and presented one of 
the first formal accounts of ALM through the introduction of the principle of 
immunization. The theory proposes a method of equating the `duration' of 
assets with the `duration' of liabilities. 2 The theory of immunization has had a 
major influence on the methods adopted by actuaries in their assessment 
(valuation) of insurer solvency. Moreover, the influence of immunization can be 
seen within the current regulations as authorised under the 1982 Insurance 
2 Duration refers to the interest-rate sensitivity of the asset/liability valuations at various points on 
the yield curve. 
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Companies Act (Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 18). As a consequence, it is 
instructive to develop the formal analysis. 
Following Ong (1995) let L, be the outflow of liabilities (claims plus expenses 
minus premiums) for year t and let A, be the asset returns (interest plus maturing 
investments) for year t. VL and VA are defined as the present value of liability 
outflows and asset returns respectively at the rate of interest S Assume that VL = 
VA. Furthermore, assume that the interest rate changes by a small quantity, c 
such that the new rate of interest is equal to (&+e). The associated changes in the 
liability outflows and asset returns mean that their present values are revised to 
VL' and VA' respectively. In order to evaluate the net effect upon the valuation 
(as measured by the surplus) from this small change in the interest rate, an 
approximation to the amount of surplus may be derived with reference Taylor's 
expansion, viz. 
-zz- (4.1) V' -Vi 
(VA-VL)+s d(VdBVL 
+ 2! 
d (d82 VL)+... 
The aim of immunization is to ensure that the net change is zero and hence that 
there is no profit or loss incurred as a result of this interest rate change. With 
reference to Equation 4.1, it is clear that in order for there to be a zero surplus, 
all terms composed of c need themselves to be zero. This is achieved when the 
insurance fund is matched perfectly and every liability outflow is matched by an 
asset return of equal magnitude and timing (Ong 1995). 
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If 6 is sufficiently small such that only the first three terms of the Taylor 
expansion are considered, then immunization is achieved formally so long as: 
(4.2) 
d(VA-VL)=0, 
and 
dz (VA - V` >0 d8 d82 
The above equations mean that immunization is satisfied when: (1), the 
discounted mean term of the asset returns and liability outflow are equal; and (2), 
the spread of the value of asset proceeds about the mean term is greater than that 
of the liability outflow (Ong 1995,22). The insulation of valuations from 
interest rate movements has obvious benefits in terms of an ALM strategy of 
eliminating risk. However, as Dardis and Huynh (1996) note, this theory has 
serious limitations; the most noteworthy limitation being that immunization 
insulates the insurance fund against profits as well as losses and as a 
consequence it makes no allowance for anticipated changes (expectations), 
trading risk and return. Also, they note that in practice immunization would 
require near continuous re-balancing. The real cost of this in terms of 
transaction costs makes such a strategy impractical. 
While the relative merits and limitations of Redington's theory are open to many 
debates, the significance of this contribution to ALM cannot be overstated: 
immunization provides a useful standard against which to assess alternative 
investment strategies. In terms of the risk profile of different investment 
strategies, the immunization strategy therefore constructs a position 
corresponding to that of minimum risk. 
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4.3 Financial Economics and Portfolio Selection 
In the same year as Redington's work on immunization, Markowitz (1952,1959) 
introduced the idea of asset allocation within a risk-return framework. 
Markowitz noted that a reduction in portfolio risk, as measured by the standard 
deviation of return 6, could only be achieved, without any reduction in return, 
through diversification into assets whose returns would be uncorrelated 
(Markowitz 1952). Also introduced by Markowitz, was the set of portfolios 
referred to as the efficient frontier. This frontier is a curve connecting the risk- 
return combinations of assets that produce the highest return for each level of 
risk. The portfolio selected from this set of efficient portfolios is referred to as 
the optimal portfolio. 
The ideas of Markowitz (1952,1959) can be developed further assuming an 
economy with uncertainty and a single time period. The utility function of an 
individual may be expressed as follows: 
(4.3) U= U(E(. ), 6) 
Where utility, U depends on the expected return E(. ) and risk, a. Note that 
restrictions on the preferences of the individual can be expressed to yield risk 
aversion as follows: 
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(4.4) 
au>0, 
and 
°U<0 
aE(. ) 0a 
To determine the composition of the efficient portfolios, a problem of quadratic 
programming must be solved. 3 If n assets are assumed with respective expected 
return E(RS), and a variance aý(R), the Markowitz problem may be restated as: 
(4.5) min c72(Rp) =l Ix; xj cov(R;, Rj) 
Ij 
s. t. E(R p) _ x; 
E(R; ) 
with y x; =1, and x; >_ 0 `d i 
The advantage of the Markowitz approach is that it has intuitively appealing 
features; specifically it suggests that diversification pays. It also has the 
advantage that only the two lowest moments of the return distributions rather 
than the entire distribution need be calculated. Note that an extensive analytical 
portfolio analysis is developed in Chapter 5. 
Tobin (1958) established another useful property associated with the efficient 
frontier; namely that of the Separability Theorem. Tobin introduced the 
existence of a risk-free asset in addition to a set of risky assets. He demonstrated 
that the optimal portfolio for a mean-variance investor would be a linear function 
3 Note that Outreville (1986) studies the impact of regulations by quantifying the displacement in 
the efficient frontiers brought about by a regulatory shift. 
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of the risk-free asset and an efficient portfolio of risky assets that is the same for 
all mean-variance investors. 
To develop Tobin's (1958) Separability Theorem, one divides the analysis into 
two stages: first, the derivation of the mutually optimal portfolio of risky assets 
is required; and second, the relevant combination of the optimal portfolio of 
risky assets and the risk-free asset is then to be determined, reflecting the 
preferences of the investor. The Separability Theorem refines the ideas of 
Markowitz (1952,1959) and also underpins the later Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964, and Lintner 1965). 
The methods of Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952,1959) required the 
calculation of all the covariance terms of asset returns; for n assets, the number 
of estimates required would be equal to (n2+ n)12. The computational limitations 
at the time of Markowitz and Tobin were such that these approaches (even with 
the contribution made by the Separability Theorem) could only be applied to a 
small number of asset classes. Such a constraint upon the analysis of investment 
risk required the portfolio analysis to be simplified further and this was indeed 
the case with the CAPM, developed simultaneously by Sharpe (1963,1964), and 
Treynor (1961), while Mossin (1966), Lintner (1965,1968), and Black (1972) 
made further developments. 
The basic proposition of the CAPM model is that equilibrium rates of return on 
all risky assets are a function of their covariance with the market portfolio. This 
relationship builds on the formal development of Sharpe (1963) that 
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demonstrated that the returns on securities are related through a common index, 
I. For the case of n securities, the return on security j, may be represented 
through the following relationship: 
(4.6) Rj =a, +ß, 1 +s,, for j =1,..., n 
Here, the parameters of aj and ßj are parameters to be estimated and e is a 
random error term with zero mean. Sharpe (1963) argues that the index, I 
represents a common influence on securities (such as national output). 
Moreover, the CAPM model assumes that this index is the market portfolio. 
Sharpe therefore reduces the number of estimates used by Markowitz (1952, 
1959) and Tobin (1958) assuming that: 
(4.7) 1= an+l + en+l 
Where a+r is a parameter and 8+i is a random variable with mean zero. Thus, 
this new relationship reduces the estimates of the full covariance matrix to a 
diagonal matrix, with the number of estimates equal to (3n+2). The performance 
of this model is similar to that of the Markowitz model (Jarrow and Madan 
1997). 
Consider further the CAPM, and in particular the market portfolio. Market 
equilibrium requires that all asset prices must adjust until all assets are held by 
investors; that is excess demand equals zero. Thus, the market portfolio is 
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defined as a portfolio that consists of all marketable assets held in proportion to 
their value weights. 4 The CAPM relates the expected return on security j to the 
return on the risk free asset, Rf, and the return on the market portfolio Rm, defined 
in terms of the security market line, viz. 
(4.8) E(RS) = Rj + 
[E(Rm) 
-Rf11 
m 
Empirically, the return on a security is a linear function of the market return plus 
a random error term, e, which is independent, viz. 
(4.9) Rj = aj + ßj Rn, + e1 
The above relationship can also be defined in terms of risk: total risk of any 
individual asset can be partitioned into two parts- systematic risk, which is a 
measure of how the asset covaries with the economy (the market), and 
unsystematic risk, which is independent of the economy (market). 
It is worth noting that there are significant problems associated with testing the 
CAPM including the fact that the market portfolio is not observable and that the 
market betas are potentially unstable (Huang and Litzenberger 1989). The 
market portfolio includes assets, such as human capital and other forms of 
nontraded assets, whose returns are virtually unobservable. As a result, 
4 The proportion of each asset in the market portfolio is equal to the ratio of the individual asset 
market value, to the market value of all assets 
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empirical work using CAPM employs proxies of the market portfolio. However, 
these proxies are frequently less than satisfactory as they exclude many assets 
relevant to the market portfolio (Huang and Litzenberger 1989). In addition, 
note that Stiglitz (1989) argued that the mutual fund separation theorem has false 
implications, including that all investors hold widely diversified portfolios and 
that a company's debt to equity ratio or dividend policy is inconsequential. 
Stiglitz (1989) concludes that, "... the major use of the mutual funds theorems 
has been a cautionary one, " (Stiglitz 1989,353). 
4.3.1 Incorporating Liabilities 
The portfolio analysis outlined above emphasises as objects of choice the mean 
and variance of returns. How does this analysis fit within the analysis of an 
insurance company and the search for an adequate measure of solvency? The 
earlier research in mean-variance analysis concentrated almost exclusively on 
asset funds. This clearly is of limited application to the insurance fund, where 
the liability structure is of equal importance. However, mean-variance analysis 
that incorporates institutional liabilities has provided a useful benchmark from 
which to develop theories of solvency. There are two strands of developments 
worth emphasising. The first development comes from within financial 
economics and concerns the portfolio analysis of financial institutions, such as 
banks and insurance companies. The second development, concerns actuarial 
portfolio selection models that employ the tools of portfolio theory to analyse 
various ALM strategies. While the financial literature provides a useful 
application of mean-variance theory, it is the actuarial literature that provides 
136 
some of the more valuable contributions to this analysis. Discussion now 
proceeds by addressing the financial institution literature, followed by a 
discussion of the actuarial portfolio models. 
One notable aspect of the banking literature that has been applied to mean- 
variance analysis is in the area of capital adequacy. In particular, the mean- 
variance approach has been used to analyse the effects of bank capital regulation 
on the asset and bankruptcy risk of utility maximising banks (for examples of 
this work see Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and 
Keeley and Furlong (1990)). The literature claims that more stringent capital 
regulation will increase asset risk (through constraints on portfolio balance) and 
can therefore increase bankruptcy risk. 5 For example, Kim and Santomero 
(1988) demonstrate, using a mean-variance analysis, that the use of simple 
capital ratios in regulating banks is an ineffective way to bound the insolvency 
risk of banks. The use of ratio constraints was also challenged earlier in the 
work of Koehn and Santomero (1980). The crucial point here is that the analysis 
treats the liability simply as a negative asset in order to include it into the 
portfolio selection problem. 
The application of the portfolio selection problem to insurer solvency was 
established through the work of Hammond, Shapiro and Shilling (1978) who 
also modelled assets and liabilities within the risk/return framework. Hammond, 
et al. (1978) note that: 
5 Keeley and Furlong (1990) have challenged this claim. 
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Any attempt to analyze insurer investment and underwriting 
interaction is greatly complicated by the fact that it is extremely difficult 
to generate accurate estimates of investment returns associated with each 
line of insurance. (Hammond, Shapiro and Shilling 1978,379) 
They propose a number of techniques to resolve this problem and indeed the 
portfolio approach to insurance was developed further through a number of other 
insurance portfolio optimisation models, see Kahane & Nye (1975), Cummins 
and Nye (1981), and Outrville (1986). For recent developments in this field see 
Grossman and Zhou (1996). These models are used to generate mean-variance 
efficient frontiers. Given these calculated frontiers, it is then possible to 
determine the operating point on the frontier with reference to a pre-assigned 
insurer decision rule. 
While portfolio theory provides the apparatus to derive the efficient frontier, the 
selection of an operating point along this frontier requires an additional piece of 
theory. This additional theory models the operating decisions of an insurance 
company. Two decision rules frequently used result from ruin theory and 
expected utility theory. Cummins and Nye (1981) use a portfolio setting to 
evaluate these decision rules and conclude that these two decision rules generally 
lead to different operating strategies (Cummins and Nye 1981,429). For an 
account of these decision rules and in particular the role of utility theory, see 
Chapter 5. 
Consider next the actuarial portfolio selection models. This area has seen a 
plentiful supply of research, incorporating many different features of the 
insurance fund. The works of Wise (1984,1987) and Wilkie (1985) have 
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provided an influencial analytical framework from within which to address 
issues of asset/liability management (ALM). As Ong (1995) notes, the aim of 
this work has been to find a more rigorous analytical framework from within 
which to view ALM strategies, particularly matching strategies. 
Wise (1984) and Wilkie (1985) examine the portfolio selection problem with a 
view to establishing an allocation of assets that best meets specified liabilities. 
Emphasis is placed upon the performance of the insurer net cashflow (referred to 
as `ultimate surplus') at some specified point in time (Sherris 1992,87). 
Ultimate surplus is taken as the main indicator function for the performance of 
the insurance fund. It is defined as the difference between the accumulated asset 
cash flows and the accumulated liability cash flows at a fixed time horizon, 
which is taken as the date for the final liability cash flow; that is: 
n 
(4.11) S=A wjRj -L 
; _l 
Where A stands for the accumulated asset cash inflows, wj is the portfolio weight 
for asset j with return Rj and L represents the accumulated liability outflow. 
The cash flows are assumed to be stochastic and hence so too are the values of 
ultimate surplus, S. 
Wise (1984) matches the liabilities by minimising the variance of ultimate 
surplus for a mean ultimate surplus of zero. Wilkie (1985) demonstrated how to 
incorporate the Wise approach into a mean-variance efficient portfolio 
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framework. Wise (1987) replies to this development by showing how this more 
general framework developed by Wilkie related to his matching portfolio. 
There are a number of points to note with respect to these developments. First, 
the portfolio selection problems (similar to the work of Cummins and Nye 
(1981)) define liabilities in terms of a negative asset. As such they require the 
means, variances, and covariances of each `asset' to be estimated. Second, 
Wilkie (1985) generalises the portfolio selection problem to include the price of 
the portfolio; thus, Wilkie describes efficient portfolios in the context of a three- 
dimensional space, mean, variance and price. 6 The price is an attempt to take 
into account dynamic issues relating to the trade-off between current and future 
surplus. Finally, Wilkie (1985) attempts to build in a solvency constraint, 
defining solvency in terms of non-negative ultimate surplus, which ensures that 
the liabilities are met. Wilkie assumes that the investor wishes to have a 
particularly small probability of insolvency, viz. 
(4.12) prob(S < 0): 5 a 
Where a stands for a correspondingly small level of probability and S is 
ultimate surplus. Wilkie delineates those portfolios that pass the solvency 
criteria using numerical techniques. 
6 Wilkie (1985) demonstrates that the matching portfolios established by Wise (1984), were not 
in general mean-variance efficient. 
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A further contribution comes from the work of Sherris (1992) who demonstrated 
how the Wise-Wilkie approach could be fitted into a more general utility 
maximisation framework. Sherris removes the price dimension, but still treats 
liabilities as a negative asset. The decision rule adopted by Sherris (1992) was as 
follows: 
(4.13) Max. E[U(S)] 
Where the explicit functional form U() is to be selected depending on the risk 
characteristics of the investor (Booth and Ong 1994). 
7 Sherris (1992) 
demonstrates that the general utility maximisation framework can be used to 
address multi-period considerations and can also be used to incorporate risk 
preference explicitly into the analysis (for example of the multi-period case, see 
Booth and Ong 1994, and Booth, Chadburn and Ong, 1997). 
It is evident that the techniques of portfolio selection have found considerable 
application in the field of modelling insurer decision-making. This analysis 
provides an invaluable framework upon which to develop further analysis. Note 
that this work is explored more fully within the theoretical developments given 
in subsequent chapters. However, it should be emphasised that this analytical 
approach has practical limitations, such as in its ability to deal with dynamic 
issues. Accounting for these complexities requires the use of an additional 
technique, namely simulation methodology. 
7 Sherris (1992) uses a negative exponential utility function. 
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4.4 Simulation Techniques 
One of the recurring themes throughout this research concerns the difficulty 
surrounding a workable definition of solvency. It has been shown in previous 
sections of this chapter that there are many theoretical perspectives from which 
to view the operations of an insurance company. However, such techniques 
necessitate restrictive assumptions in order to derive a fully analytical solution. 
One way to improve on this realism, is to employ a very powerful technique that 
uses computers to `simulate' the problem in hand, namely solvency. Simulation 
techniques define outcomes in terms of probabilistic statements, defining 
variables in terms of underlying probability distributions. Such an approach has 
great practical application, although there are still many issues to be resolved. In 
order to explore this work in greater detail, it is worth reviewing some of the 
salient features of this methodology within the cash-flow example. 
4.4.1 Developing a Stochastic Model of Solvency 
Using the `cash-flow' framework, the financial strength of an insurance company 
can be simulated in terms of projected cash inflows and outflows. In this case, 
the occurrence of an insolvency event may be defined as, "... the state which 
exists when cash inflows are no longer adequate to meet the required outflows 
for liabilities, " (Coutts and Devitt 1988, l). 8 Since the future stream of inflows 
8 Note that this definition applies equally well to different lines of insurance, be it general or life 
business. 
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and outflows is uncertain, a stochastic model of these cashflows is therefore 
required. 
The variability associated with the cashflow problem lends itself neatly to the use 
of simulation techniques. Note that Coutts and Devitt (1988) show that the 
uncertainty associated with assets and liabilities will vary for different lines of 
insurance. As a consequence, any operational research will need to take account 
of these insurance-line specific uncertainties, see Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1. Risk Classes Present in Assets and Liabilities 
Liabilities Assets 
Life assurance 
Non profit business Relatively predictable in both Mainly predictable in time and 
time and amount. amount. 
With profit business Timing relatively predictable, Some uncertainty in respect of 
amount uncertain. time and amount. 
Unit linked business Timing relatively predictable, Predominantly uncertain in 
amount highly uncertain, but respect of time and amount for 
linked to assets. guarantees. 
Pension business Timing uncertain, amount highly Significant proportions uncertain 
uncertain. in respect of time and amount. 
General insurance Timing and amount highly Significant proportions uncertain 
uncertain. in respect of time and amount. 
Source: S. M. Coutts and R. Devitt. 1988. In J. D. Cummins and R. A. Derrig ed., Financial 
Models of Insurance Solvency. London: Kluwer Academic. Publishers. 
Table 4.1 illustrates the risk profile present within the insurer's underwriting 
portfolio and therefore this will have implications for the investment portfolio. 
The risk/return characteristics vary across insurance products and this will be 
reflected in the investment strategy associated with these respective insurance 
funds. 
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Since solvency is concerned with the ability of an insurer to meet its liabilities, it 
must therefore involve an assessment of the cash-inflows and cash-outflows, 
while also examining the interaction between these two flows. Rather than 
looking at the company's financial strength at a point in time, the simulation 
approach therefore makes projections about the company's financial condition. 
In order to simulate the performance of an insurer, a stochastic model of an 
insurer's assets and liabilities needs to be constructed, thereby enabling a 
probability density function to be built up around the main indicator function, 
surplus. Such work needs to address a number of considerations. First, the 
probability distribution of future claims will need to be specified and this will 
depend on the insurance line; for example, in the case of conventional life 
assurance business this distribution function will be defined around the mortality 
table, with the claim quantities being relatively predictable (see Table 4.1). 
A second consideration in simulation modelling is with respect to the asset 
portfolio. The composition of the opening asset portfolio needs to be defined; 
that is, the relevant proportions of securities that make up the asset portfolio 
needs to be specified. The main attributes of the asset classes also need to be 
defined. 9 
Another consideration with regard to the simulation algorithm concerns the 
specification of the set of investment decision rules (investment, disinvestment 
9 For example, in the case of equities, the investment type, market values, valuation date, yields 
and dividend rate would all need to be specified. 
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and reinvestment), which in turn will be contingent upon a model for predicting 
the income and capital values of the assets. These latter considerations with 
respect to the simulation of the asset portfolio may be addressed with reference 
to the Wilkie Investment Model (Wilkie 1986). This model has had a profound 
influence upon the U. K. insurance solvency literature. 
The projected rates of inflation, equity prices, dividend indexes and gilt yields 
are all simulated in Wilkie's stochastic investment model which is considered by 
Professor Wilkie as, "... the minimum model that might be used to describe the 
total investments of a life office or pension fund, " (Wilkie 1986,341). Wilkie 
emphasises the long term, arguing that the actuary's time horizon extends many 
years into the future: 
It is ... 
desirable for him [the actuary] to have a stochastic model 
to describe the way in which appropriate investment variables have 
moved over the long term, without being too concerned with the very 
short term fluctuations. (Wilkie, 1986,341-342) 
Given that a life insurer has liabilities that are made up of life contracts operating 
many years into the future, this would seem an appropriate starting point from 
which to view investment risk. 10 
Wilkie (1986) calibrates a stochastic model of four variables using data from 
1919 to 1982: the Retail Prices Index; an index of share dividends; the dividend 
yield on these same share indices; and the yield on Consols. 11 The Wilkie model 
may be summarised by means of a diagram, see Figure 4.2 (Wilkie 1986,346). 
10 A full account of solvency would also require some account of the short-term risk associated 
with investments (e. g. the risk (and effect) from a stock market crash). 
1 For a formal account of the `revised' Wilkie model (Wilkie 1995) see Chapter 10. 
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Figure 4.1. The "Cascade" Structure of the 1986 Wilkie Model 
ReW' Tow Index 
s Yield 
haIirüls Consov 
Source: Wilkie, A. D. 1986. A Stochastic Investment Model for Actuarial Use. Transactions of 
the Faculty ofActuaries 39: 341-373. 
Figure 4.1 represents a `chronological process' rather than a causal development; 
the model excludes a full multivariate structure (a possible drawback of the 
model). The four variables are illustrated and the role of the inflation index can 
be seen as central to the operation of the Wilkie model. One problem associated 
with this model concerns the inflation index. Under the assumptions of Wilkie, 
the probability of negative inflation is non-zero. While in theory negative 
inflation is possible, the likelihood in the U. K. is such that some papers have 
censored the lower tail of the inflation index distribution; for example, Hardy 
(1994) limits negative inflation to no less than -5 percent. 
Having defined a model of stochastic investment returns, it is then possible to 
simulate the effects of different investment strategies. This model, in 
conjunction with a stochastic model of insurance claims, may be used to build a 
comprehensive model of solvency, the risk associated with the asset portfolio 
being therefore generated by the Wilkie model. 
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As already noted, a significant volume of literature has evolved around 
simulation techniques. Research into insurer solvency and ALM may be divided 
into two main strands. The first strand covers work in the U. K. that has tended 
to concentrate on methods used to test solvency, the so-called `dynamic solvency 
testing procedures' (Hardy 1993,1994). This work has been based largely on the 
stochastic investment model of Wilkie (1986). 12 
By contrast, the second strand of simulation research has been developed in the 
U. S. and this approach emphasises the idea that ALM can be seen as a strategy in 
asset/liability surplus management (ASLM). This work focuses on the U. S. 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) risk based capital 
standards, which requires certain minimum surplus amounts to be maintained 
against specific classes of risk (Hepokoski, 1994). ASLM might, for example, 
ask the following question: how sustainable are these surplus amounts given 
different investment strategies undertaken by the insurer? 13 
In terms of the specific application of simulation techniques to life assurance 
solvency see the following: Waters (1988), Ross (1989), Brender (1988) Hardy 
(1993 & 1996), Pentikäinen & Pesonen (1988). For a review of some of the 
methods employed see Muir & Squires (1996) and Brender & Claire (1994). See 
also Chadburn (1996) for an evaluation of solvency constraints within the life 
assurance industry. Throughout this work, simulation analysis is centred on a 
12 Wilkie has updated and expanded upon his earlier work (Wilkie 1995). 
13 The risk-based capital approach is developed in Section 4.6. 
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basic cash flow model of insurer surplus. One example of the application of 
simulation methods to life assurance is by examining the effects of different 
investment and bonus strategies on the solvency position of a with-profit insurer 
(Ross 1989; Hardy 1993,1994 and 1996). This work illustrates the realism that 
can be incorporated into the analysis and the variance in future performance. 
Hardy (1996) considers 3 different insolvency measures and analyses different 
investment strategies (e. g. high and low equity) and different bonus strategies 
(e. g. high reversionary bonuses) as compared with a `base' office. 14 For each 
specified scenario, the effect upon solvency is considered, in particular the 
insolvency probability, "... that the value of the guaranteed liabilities at the 
statutory minimum value exceeds the market value of the assets at some year- 
end, " (Hardy 1996,1018). Some of the results reported by Hardy are given in 
Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2. Hardy's Simulation of Insolvency and Relative Insolvency 
Office Relative Relative Low Relative 
Insolvency Insolvency Payout Insolvency 
(1) (2) (3) (1), (2), or (3) 
Base 5.9 3.9 4.6 8.3 
High equity 14.3 9.4 9.4 18.4 
Low equity 0.1 7.2 19.8 20.2 
High Reversionary 24.8 19.1 7.4 30.8 
bonus 
Source: Hardy, M. R. 1996. Simulating the Relative Solvency of Life Insurers. British Actuarial 
Journal 2(4): 1003-1019. 
One of the crucial developments to come from this area of research is in relation 
to defining solvency. The use of simulation techniques has lead to more 
14 The `base' office is the yardstick against which to measure alternative scenarios. It usually 
exhibits those `expected' characteristics of a life office. 
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elaborate measures of solvency being constructed. The main approach is to 
consider the performance of the asset/liability ratio. However, alternative 
approaches have been developed and indeed the work of Hardy (1996) 
introduces the notion of `relative insolvency', where insolvency is said to occur 
when the performance of a particular life office moves out of line with the 
performance of the industry as a whole. In relation to Table 4.2, the relative 
insolvency measure, (1) is concerned with those insurers being declared 
technically insolvent, while measure (2) is concerned with the case in which the 
life office has fallen significantly out of line with the industry. 
The results demonstrate that, "... the variant [various] offices are vulnerable to 
different extents to the three relative insolvency tests, " (Hardy 1996,1019). The 
sensitivity of the solvency position to the proportion invested in equities is 
understandable, the higher equity offices being more vulnerable to insolvency. 
This is a very important point since it is in the nature of many U. K. life offices to 
invest significantly in equities (see Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, the second relative insolvency measure is useful for measuring the 
risk deviation from the industry as a result of different marketing strategies, for 
example the introduction of a new product. Thus, new and alternative 
approaches to the recurring problem of defining solvency have been created by 
the simulation approach. 
I 
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4.4.2 Stochastic vs. Deterministic 
One of the debates within the literature concerns the use of deterministic and 
stochastic scenarios in the testing of solvency. Hardy (1993) argues that there 
are three approaches from which to view the solvency of an insurance company. 
The first approach is the static `snapshot' approach that uses actuarial valuations 
of assets and liabilities. The second approach is the deterministic projected 
model office approach that tests the projected assets and liabilities of an office 
using a number of deterministic scenarios. 15 The third solvency approach 
mentioned by Hardy is the stochastic model office approach where the assets and 
liabilities of an office are projected using stochastic simulation of future 
performance. 
The stochastic and deterministic approaches fall under the heading of `dynamic 
scenario solvency testing'. In the deterministic case, the researcher determines 
the scenarios, while in the stochastic case the scenarios are generated by Monte- 
Carlo simulation. The main difference between the two approaches is that in the 
case of stochastic analysis, it is assumed that each stochastically generated 
scenario is equally likely, while no such assumption is usually made about 
individual or relative probabilities of the scenarios within deterministic analysis. 
Stochastic solvency testing has a simple pass/fail criterion. A life office is 
referred to as insolvent if its estimated insolvency risk a is greater than some 
is This method is adopted in life offices valuations, and is sometimes referred to as `worst-case 
scenario testing'. 
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predetermined value e, that is, a>s. If a sufficient number of simulations are 
performed an estimate of the insolvency risk is derived. 
By contrast, the deterministic approach is more subjective in nature. If 
deterministic scenarios are not equally probable then, as a consequence, it is 
likely that the projected insolvency will be given less `weight' in the researcher's 
assessment than projected insolvency under a more probable scenario. Here lies 
the problem: developing the relative probabilities of different scenarios and 
implicitly ranking these scenarios is likely to be subjective for the deterministic 
approach. 
In an attempt to gain a greater insight into the relative merits of the two 
techniques, Hardy (1993,1994), presents a formal comparison of the stochastic 
and deterministic approaches. The stated aim was to, "... compare the quality of 
information available from a set of stochastic simulations with a traditional 
deterministic sensitivity test approach, " (Hardy 1994,131). The main 
conclusion was that a deterministic scenario, "... fails to distinguish relatively 
safely set-up offices from highly risky offices, " (Hardy 1994,49). 
The use of deterministic scenarios to test solvency is commonly referred to as 
`stress testing'. By contrast, the use of stochastic modelling is an example of 
`value-at-risk' modelling -a commonly used risk management technique in the 
analysis of banking institutions (Heffernan 1996). It is important to be clear on 
these concepts. The main purpose of both stress testing and value-at-risk 
modelling is to ascertain the effect of adverse events on a financial institution. 
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However, for a given structure of asset and liability portfolios a value-at-risk 
model determines a probability of losing a particular amount of capital, without 
necessarily defining the events that will give rise to the loss (as in the case of the 
deterministic stress testing). In insurance and pension-fund risk management, 
the terminology "stochastic investment modelling", rather than "value-at-risk 
modelling", is often used. For a discussion of this approach and the relationship 
with stress testing see Alexander (1996) and Matten (1996). 
4.4.3 Insolvency as an Example of Downside Risk 
The discussion of insolvency throughout is to view it in terms of a probabilistic 
outcome. Assume any one of the basic measures of solvency, such as surplus 
(S), or the asset/liability (A/L) ratio. These measures may be defined in terms of 
a probability, where the probability of insolvency is equal to the probability of 
negative surplus, or the probability that the A/L ratio is less than unity, 
respectively. Such measures are examples of downside risk: 
The risk measured in relation to the incidence and often the 
intensity of unfavourable outcomes, the definition of an unfavourable 
outcome being based on some criteria. (Ong 1995,32) 
Note that where there are no explicit liabilities incorporated into the analysis (as 
with the original asset fund models), the use of `safety-first' rules can be helpful 
in determining the size of downside risk. Thus, the analysis would consider the 
likelihood of an asset fund underperforming a pre-specified, threshold level of 
performance, x*. Ong (1995) illustrates the use of three safety-first rules, see 
Table 4.3 below. 
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Table 4.3. Safety-First Rules Used to Define the Size of Downside Risk 
NAME SAFETY-FIRST RULE 
Roy's Criterion Minimise {prob(x<_x*)} 
Katoaka's Criterion Maximise {x*}, s. t. prob(x<_x*)<_a 
Telser's Criterion Maximise {E(x)}, s. t. prob (x<_x*)<_a 
Source: Ong, A. S. K. 1995. Asset Allocation Decision Models in Life Insurance. Ph. D. Thesis, 
City University. 
Table 4.3 illustrates the different max/min problems used to evaluate downside 
risk. Roy's criterion minimises the probability that an indicator x falls below the 
threshold level x*, where x* is to be determined. By contrast, Katoaka's 
criterion maximises the threshold level x* subject to the probability that (x*) is 
less than or equal to a (where a is to be determined). Telser's criterion 
minimises the expected value of the indicator x, subject to the same constraint as 
Katoaka. For a discussion of the relative merits of the measures in Table 4.3 and 
downside risk in general see Tse, et al. (1993). 
4.5 Additional Theoretical Considerations 
A number of contributions have been made as a result of applying other aspects 
of economic theory to insurance. One such case is in the application of the 
theory of optimal capital structure. 
From the works of Modigliani and Miller (1958), it is known that - in the 
absence of taxes and bankruptcy risk- the value of the firm is invariant to its 
capital structure, and the leverage level (i. e. gearing) is therefore irrelevant to 
value. However, in spite of this argument, it is argued by many that there exist 
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strong reasons to be interested in an optimal capital structure of an insurance 
company. As Doherty (1988) notes: 
The simultaneity of operating and financing decisions for 
insurance firms raises questions about the relevance of standard capital 
structure results. (Doherty 1988,267) 
Doherty points out that the application of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
theorem to insurance is restricted by the existence of a number of features that 
single out insurance in particular and financial intermediaries in general. 
Doherty (1988) agues that: 
Unlike non-financial firms, the insurance firms' "debt" 
instruments are not traded on the conventional capital markets but on the 
insurance product market. Consequently, it is necessary to impose the 
same restrictions on the insurance product market as upon the capital 
market. To apply M and M to insurance, we must assume perfect product 
markets as well as perfect capital markets. (Doherty 1988,267) 
Doherty (1988) uses an options pricing model to investigate the impact of the 
insurance product market on capital structure. He contends that, in a perfect 
market, the optimal solution is for the insurer to be totally debt financed. 
However, Doherty also demonstrates that the introduction of market 
imperfections (such as the risk of adverse selection, Akerlof (1970)) may 
invalidate the zero capital approach. 
The cost of equity capital is another consideration with respect to the analysis of 
financially distressed proprietary life insurance companies. The cost of capital 
is the cost to the firm of providing an acceptable return in order to obtain one 
pound's worth of capital over a given period of time; it is the discount rate used 
in the net present value (NPV) analysis of new projects. 
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In the absence of taxes and under the assumption of perfect markets, this cost 
must be equal to the required rate of return of the market plus the economic rate 
of depreciation. That is, to satisfy investors the cost of capital must be consistent 
with the returns investors expect from holding the firm's securities. Investors 
value securities on the basis of expected cash flows and risk and demand a 
higher return on securities that carry higher risks. However, crucially in a 
distressed situation a company runs out of cash and as a consequence it cannot 
service its financial obligations. 
Note that there are many alternative approaches to the costs of capital - for 
discussion, see Lusztig, Morck, and Schwab (1997). Lusztig, et al. argue that the 
cost of capital is a notoriously difficult concept to measure in practice. Factors 
relevant here include: the difficulty in making forward-looking assessments; and 
second, the sensitivity of assessments to arbitrary accounting assumptions. 
What are the implications of financial distress for an insurance company in 
financial difficulties? If an insurance company displays financial distress the 
opportunities for an insurance company to raise additional equity capital is 
constrained because cash flow ceases. As a result, at the margin of insolvency 
the cost of capital in such circumstances becomes unbounded to reflect the risk 
facing potential suppliers of capital. 
The risk - generated by the heightened insolvency risk - associated with the 
supply of additional equity capital is such that the expected return required by 
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investors is too great to meet by available cash flows. In sum, the cost of capital 
is so high that the probability of deriving a positive NPV cash flow - and hence 
benefits from a residual gain that adds to the overall value of the firm - tends 
towards zero. 
In addition to the capital structure perspective, it should be noted that another 
area of economic theory that has been applied to insurance is that of agency 
theory. Solvency management highlights the potential for conflicts between 
different interested parties. These interested parties may include policyholders, 
insurers, regulators, shareholders, reinsurers, and investors. 
The interactions and motivations of the interested parties mentioned above may 
be evaluated within an agency framework of principal and agent. Agency 
relationships might include the following: the insurer (agent) and the regulator 
(principal); and, the insurer (principal) and the policyholder (agent). 
The agency theoretical framework highlights the important roles of information 
asymmetries, adverse selection, moral hazard, signalling, unseen actions, 
monitoring, and incentives. Note that the agency perspective of solvency is a 
crucial consideration in the context of designing optimal regulatory structures 
engaged in solvency surveillance (Baron 1989). 
Another important area of consideration that is developed within the agency 
framework is corporate governance (for discussions see Mayer (1996)). 
Corporate governance concentrates on the relationship (and the divergence in 
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incentives) between investors (the principals) and the managers (the agents). In 
particular, corporate governance concentrates on, "... the ways of bringing the 
interests of the two parties into line and ensuring that firms are run for the 
benefit of investors, " (Mayer 1996,4). Mayer (1996) examines the interplay 
between corporate governance, competition and performance. With respect to 
investors, such as non-banking financial institutions (for example, pension funds 
and life assurance firms), Mayer makes the following point: 
Despite the high proportion of institution holdings, there is the 
widely held view that institutions [non-banking institutions] fail to 
monitor managers. The problem is said to lie in the dispersed nature of 
the shareholdings. While in aggregate institutions hold a large fraction of 
corporate equity... this is dispersed amongst a large number of 
institutions, few of which hold significant fractions of shares in any one 
firm. There are good reasons why institutions may wish to diversify their 
holdings across a large number of firms but this has come at the expense 
of good corporate governance. (Mayer 1996,11) 
Given the significance of institutional investments to life insurer solvency, the 
importance of effective corporate governance is therefore another factor worthy 
of consideration. Thus, agency theory provides an invaluable theoretical 
framework from which to evaluate other issues relevant to an understanding of 
life insurer solvency. 
4.6 Insolvency Prediction: Models of Financial Distress 
The problems of insolvency within the insurance industry are well-documented 
(see Chapter 2). As a result, various approaches to the problem of identifying 
financial distress have come to be used in empirical work. Financial distress 
refers to the state in which, "insurers experience liquidation, receivership, 
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restraining orders, rehabilitation, etc., " (BarNiv and McDonald 1992,543). 
Financial distress models attempt to identify those factors that assist with 
insolvency prediction. These models vary in terms of their methodology and are 
often constrained by significant data restrictions. The usefulness of financial 
distress models is self-evident: the ability to classify and identify those 
significant factors which serve in the early detection of financially distressed 
insurers is central to the aim of regulators, legislators, policyholders, insurers, 
and the public at large. 
As in the case of theoretical analysis, it is important to emphasise that insurance 
is different from other forms of business. As Carson and Hoyt (1996) point out, 
there exist important differences between non-insurance financial distress and 
insurer financial distress. These differences stem from the nature of the costs 
associated with insurer failure, versus the costs associated with the failure of a 
non-insurer. When a non-insurer is declared insolvent the customer stands to 
lose no more than the value of the product/service purchased. By contrast, for 
the policyholder who has bought an insurance contract, he stands to lose not only 
the premiums invested, "... but may have had losses for which they will not be 
indemnified- precisely the contingency for which they had sought coverage, " 
(Carson & Hoyt 1996,770). 
The above point illustrates the fact that there are a number of interested parties 
involved in solvency surveillance. These groups are summarised with reference 
to Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Interested Parties in Solvency Surveillance 
Interested Party Description 
Regulators While the exact objective of the regulator may be 
open to questioning, it is clear that the detection of 
financial distress is a central consideration. 
Consumers/Policyholders Consumers and policyholders cannot accurately 
assess the solidity of insurers due to a variety of 
information asymmetries. 
Insurers/Managers/Shareholders/Brokers The self-interest of these individuals would tend to 
point towards a requirement for financial solidity in 
the long run. The reputation effects of insolvency 
mean that the growth of the insurance market may 
be adversely affected, (Akerlof, 1971). 
Source: Lamm-Tennant, J., Starks, L. and Stokes, L. 1996. Considerations of the Cost Trade-offs 
in Insurance Solvency Surveillance Policy. Journal of Banking & Finance 20: 835-852. 
With reference to Table 4.4, it can be seen that there are three divisions of 
interested parties. Regulators will be interested in policyholder protection and 
hence insolvency detection. Consumers have a direct interest in solvency 
surveillance. Insurers also have self-interest in solvency surveillance from the 
perspective of market stability. 
The interests of those groups given in Table 4.4 have helped to motivate the 
financial distress research agenda. The research into financial distress uses a 
variety of techniques. Each technique attempts to model probabilistic statements 
about insolvency. The multitude of models used in the prediction and early 
warning of financial distress may be divided into four groups. The first group 
uses Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA), including the linear probability 
model (LPM). The second group uses conditional probability models (Logit and 
Probit). The third type of group uses non-parametric techniques, whose 
assumptions are less restrictive than the LPM, Logit or Probit. The last group 
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considered deals with a new class of models, the so-called neural network 
models, which have provided renewed interest in the area of financial distress. 
The study of financial distress extends back many years. The earlier studies used 
accounting data within a straightforward statistical methodology in the 
classification and prediction of bankrupt firms (for discussions see BarNiv and 
McDonald 1992). Applied work in this field dates back to the pioneering work 
of Beaver (1966) who employed a univariate, dichotomous model in the 
prediction of corporate bankruptcy. By 1968, Altman introduced the idea of 
using financial ratios within a multivariate framework to predict the failure of a 
set of manufacturing firms. The model correctly identified 95% of the total 
sample (Altman 1968). 
BarNiv and McDonald (1992) classify corporate bankruptcy detection models 
according to the following criteria: (1), sample selection procedures; (2), data 
collection procedures; and (3), classification errors. The majority of these 
corporate bankruptcy studies use a `matched-pair sample' (one non-failed firm 
for each failed firm) consisting of the population of failed firms with complete 
data, assuming that the costs of misclassification (ratio of type I errors to type II 
errors) are generally equal. 16 Note that since the cost of a Type I error is likely to 
exceed the cost of a Type II error, other studies have used alternative 
assumptions (BarNiv and McDonald 1992). 
16 A type I error is classifying an insolvent insurer as solvent; and, a type II error is classifying a 
solvent insurer as insolvent. 
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4.6.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
As noted, work on Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) dates back to Altman 
(1968). The idea is to classify companies in terms of two groups, those 
companies that require additional regulatory supervision and those that do not. 
A composite score is calculated for the observations using a procedure which 
maximises the ratio-score of the `need attention' group, to the `not need 
attention' group. 
The MDA approach is illustrated as follows. Assume a set of n ratios, x j, x2, 
x3... x,,, and also a set of coefficients, cl, c2, c3, ... c,,, that are the weights to 
be 
used in the calculation of the composite score, yj for thejth company, viz. 
(4.14) y; _ c; x; `dj 
i=I 
A decision rule can be constructed for the classification of the jth company, 
using a cut-off point, y* for the composite score. Thus, for example, if the 
composite score is less than the cut-off y*a company may therefore be classified 
as `distressed' and this may bring about regulatory action. Note that in addition 
to the MDA, the Linear Probability Model (LPM) was used, though the validity 
of its underlying assumptions were not addressed in earlier studies (see as an 
example Eck (1982)). 
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One of the first studies to apply MDA to solvency surveillance in the insurance 
(property-liability) industry was the study by Triechmann and Pinches (1973) 
who used data on 26 companies that experienced financial distress, and 26 
companies that did not, for the years 1966-1971. They used six ratios, including 
for example, the ratio of direct premiums written to surplus. The predictions of 
the model were close to that of actual experience, with approximately a5 percent 
type I error reported. Triechmann and Pinches (1973) also used the same 
sample to examine the efficiency of the MDA analysis by comparing univariate 
and multivariate financial ratio models, and concluded that the MDA 
outperformed the univariate models. 
While this method gained popular appeal in the early 1970s, the problems 
associated with the MDA technique soon became highlighted, with warnings 
sounded about the misuse and misinterpretation of such models in the 
classification and prediction of financial distress (Eisenbeis 1977, Altman and 
Eisenbeis 1978). These concerns related primarily to measurement error and 
also to the low statistical significance associated with the sample size. More 
recently the application of MDA has been shown to be dependent on very strong 
assumptions (BarNiv and Raveh 1989). 
Furthermore, although discriminant analysis has the advantage of simplicity, for 
most countries it is not possible to obtain a large enough sample of distressed 
firms to be able to apply this method (this applies equally to limited dependent 
variable models of financial distress). In the U. K., for example, between 1990 
and 1996 there were only 2 cases of insurance companies having authorisation 
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withdrawn due to financial distress (Department of Trade and Industry 1998). It 
would therefore be impossible to conduct MDA. Also, even if adequate 
representation can be achieved within the sample, there is then the question of 
data reliability and the problem of insurance companies manipulating their 
financial reports to reduce the likelihood of regulatory intervention. 
4.6.2 Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) 
The operational use of financial ratios and discriminant analysis is illustrated in 
the Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS), developed by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the United States. '7 The 
IRIS has served as the baseline solvency screening system for the U. S. IRIS 
aims to help regulators prioritise insurers that are financially distressed in order 
that the regulator may allocate their resources more efficiently. 
IRIS analysis consists of two stages: a statistical phase and an analytical phase. 
The statistical phase involves the assessment of a number of financial ratios (11 
for property/casualty & 12 for life/health) used to define the performance of each 
insurer (Lamm-Tennant, Starks and Stokes 1996). In the case of life/health 
insurance, financial ratios would encompass profitability, investments, and 
changes in operations as well as any other variable that reflects the overall 
financial condition of the insurer. The next step, the analytical phase, classifies 
insurers according to the following decision rule: insurers with four or more 
" The NAIC is an organisation consisting of all the U. S. state insurance regulators from the 50 
states, the District of Columbia and the four U. S. territories. 
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financial ratios outside a pre-specified range, are classified as financially 
distressed and as a result come under immediate regulatory scrutiny. In 1992, 
under this system, 39.8 percent of life companies were subjected to greater 
regulatory investigation (Klein 1995). 
With the problems of MDA cited above, it is not surprising that the IRIS system 
has been heavily criticised. The system has been criticised for its `pass/fail' 
nature, its equal weighting of financial ratios, the interdependence between 
ratios, the omission of certain ratios or variables that might have significant 
predictive value, and its reliance on annual statement data (Thornton and Meader 
1977; and, Hershbarger and Miller 1986). The history of IRIS has shown that it 
has resulted in a large proportion of Type II errors, mis-classifying solvent 
insurers as insolvent (Klein 1995). 
A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the IRIS early warning system. 
Harrington and Nelson (1986) estimated an OLS equation to predict a firm's 
premium-to-surplus ratio based on a variety of firm-operating characteristics. 
Although their model provided promising results, it was still not conclusively 
superior to that of IRIS. Hershbarger and Miller (1986) examined the IRIS ratios 
and whether exogenous factors should warrant inclusion in financial distress 
models. The authors found that the endogenous 
factors appeared to be more 
important than exogenous factors in the prediction of solvency 
(Hershbarger and 
Miller 1986). Thus, the IRIS system provides a useful indicator of 
financial 
distress, although there remain a number of methodological concerns 
associated 
with this approach. 
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Note that recently, the IRIS system has been updated to include a computerised 
analytical routine: Financial Analysis and Solvency Tracking System (FAST). 
The FAST system prioritises companies automatically. It has been introduced by 
the NAIC to oversee state regulators within a peer review system of insurance 
regulation. 
4.6.3 Limited Dependent Variable Models 
Having accepted the limitations of MDA analysis and the linear probability 
model, the use of limited dependent variables may be seen as a step forward in 
reducing the problems associated with previous work. In limited dependent 
models, such as logit and probit models, the distributions of the dependent 
variable or score, Z are conditional on the vector of explanatory variables x, and 
the probability of Z, given x is assumed to be distributed according to the logistic 
distribution (for the Logit model) and the normal distribution (for the probit 
model). For recent works see BarNiv and Hershbarger (1991), BarNiv (1989, 
1990), and Carson and Hoyt (1996). 
Martin (1977) uses a logit model to identify bankruptcies among commercial 
banks. In contrast, BarNiv (1989,1990) uses a logit model to identify 
insolvencies in the property-liability insurance industry, and emphasised the 
respective roles of alternative accounting practices, cashflow, and asset values in 
explaining insolvency. In terms of comparisons of the relative merits of limited 
dependent models and discriminant models, there have been a number of studies 
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which suggest that the Logit and Probit models are more robust than MDA 
(Amemiya 1981, BarNiv and McDonald 1992). 
In examining the life insurance industry, BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990) applied 
a number of different methodologies and found that the change in product mix is 
an important predictor variable of insolvency, and that those insolvent insurers 
tend to be smaller in size than solvent insurers. Ambrose and Seward (1988) 
found that financial variables combined with IRIS ratios in a logistic regression 
model outperformed other methods in distinguishing between solvent and 
insolvent insurers. Carson and Hoyt (1996) found that surplus and leverage 
measures are also strong indicators of insurer financial strength. 
For a recent review of these techniques and a discussion of economic and market 
predictors of life assurance insolvency see Chen, et al. (1994). It should be 
noted that criticisms relating to data reliability are relevant to the discussion of 
limited dependent variables. 
A 
4.6.4 Non-parametric Techniques 
Non-parametric techniques have also been used to evaluate the problem of 
financial distress, see BarNiv and McDonald (1992), and Carson and Hoyt 
(1996). A valuable contribution came from the introduction of a technique 
called Recursive Partitioning (Frydman, Altman, and Kao 1985). This technique 
searches for an optimal linear combination of variables that yield minimum 
overlap between the `distressed' and `not distressed' groups. Frydman, et al. 
ý...... 
(1985) found that Recursive Partitioning compared favourably to MDA and 
concluded that additional information may be derived from such an approach in 
the early prediction of bankruptcy; for a more recent comparison of these 
techniques, see Carson and Hoyt (1996). 
Carson and Hoyt (1996) attempt to provide evidence on the relative strength of 
three types of bankruptcy detection models, the MDA model, the Logit model, 
and the Recursive Partitioning model. They use data taken from the life 
insurance industry in the U. S. They conclude that the three models perform 
reasonable well in classifying financial distress, with the Logit model dominating 
the MDA and Recursive Partitioning models, in terms of the number of correctly 
classified solvent insurers. By contrast, the Recursive Partitioning model 
dominated the Logit and MDA models in terms of the number of correctly 
identified insolvent insurers. On balance, with the emphasis on insolvency and 
lower tail of the solvency distribution, the Recursive Partitioning model is 
therefore to be favoured. 
Note that another area of research concerns the application of neural network 
techniques. This class of model offers great potential for the study of financial 
distress. Such models attempt to set up the model structure along the lines of the 
neural networks observed within the human brain. Goss and Ramchandani 
(1995) compare the insolvency classification accuracy of neural networks with a 
binary logit regression and a discriminant analysis. The use of a neural network, 
a non-parametric alternative to past techniques, demonstrates how this 
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methodology predicts life insurer insolvency more effectively than parametric 
models. 
4.6.5 The American Risk Based Capital Model 
Insurance regulations in most western countries (including the U. K. ) take the 
form of fixed or crude proportionate capital and surplus standards. Such 
regulations are limited in terms of their relationship to risk. However, insurers 
range widely in terms of their size and the types of risk that they assume, which 
makes these types of regulations cumbersome at best in attempting to control for 
insolvency. 
The limitations of fixed capital standards in the U. S. resulted in the introduction 
of risk-based capital standards by the NAIC in 1990. The principle criticisms of 
the previous system were that the standards were, (1) unrelated to risk, (2) too 
low for many insurers, and (3) provided an insufficient basis for timely 
regulatory action (Atchinson 1997). As a consequence, the new RBC standards 
had the objective of developing a standard of capital adequacy that, (1) was 
related to risk, (2) raised the safety net for insurers, (3) was uniform among 
states, and (4) provided appropriate authority for regulatory intervention, 
(Atchinson 1997). 
The risk-based capital system uses a formula that establishes the 
minimum amount of capital necessary for an insurance company to 
support its overall business operations, considering its size and risk 
profile. That amount is then compared to the company's actual statutory 
capital to determine whether a company is technically solvent. 
(Atchinson 1997,60) 
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The mechanics of the risk-based capital approach are illustrated with reference to 
the formula for life/health insurance. The formula for life/health insurance is 
made up of four major categories of risk: asset risk; insurance or pricing risk; 
interest rate risk; and, business risks (Klein 1995). Asset risk concerns itself 
with the risk of default and decline of asset value. Insurance, or pricing risk, 
addresses the risk that premiums (and attendant reserves) will be insufficient to 
meet liabilities (claims). Interest rate risk then addresses the possibility that an 
insurer will have liquidity problems from `disintermediation' due to interest rate 
changes. The final category, business risk, refers to the insurer's obligation to 
the guarantee fund and the risk from paying out on this obligation. Consider 
Table 4.5, which illustrates some of the risk categories used in the assessment of 
asset risk. 
Table 4.5. Sample of Risk-Based Capital Charges for Selected Asset Categories 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT Risk-Based Capital (RBC) FACTOR 
U. S. government bonds 0.000 
Highest quality corporate bonds 0.003 
Cash and short-term investments 0.003 
High quality corporate bonds 0.010 to 0.100 
Bonds in default on principle or interest 0.300 
Mortgages and collateral loans 0.050 
Unaffiliated common stock 0.150 
Real estate 0.100 
Partnerships and joint ventures 0.200 
Reinsurance recoverables 0.100 
Miscellaneous recoverables 0.050 
Source: Atchinson, B. K. 1997. Remarks on the American Risk Based Capital Model. The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 22: 60-68. 
This table shows that the risk-based formulas apply loading factors to various 
amounts reported in (or related to) the financial statement of an insurance 
company in order to calculate a company's required risk-based capital. The 
application of these loading factors reflects each type of risk mentioned above. 
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A `covariance adjustment' is then made to the accumulated risk-based capital 
charges, to account for the interdependence of that exist between major risk 
categories. This results in the adjusted total risk-based capital amount. 
Figure 4.2. The Risk-Based Capital (RBC) System 
aD 
MANDATORY, AUf iORIS$Dý REGULATORY 
CAPITAL CONTROL ACTION 
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Source: Atchinson, B. K. 1997. Remarks on the American Risk Based Capital Model. The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 22: 60-68. 
Notes: A- Regulator must liquidate or rehabilitate. 
B- Regulator Djay require liquidation or rehabilitation. 
C- Regulator may issue a collective order. 
D- Insurer or reinsurer must submit a plan for correction to the regulator. 
This adjusted total risk-based capital is then compared to an insurer's actual 
capital (the total adjusted capital (TAC)), to determine a company's risk-based 
capital position. Under this assessment, certain company and regulatory actions 
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are required if a company's TAC falls below its calculated level of risk based 
capital (Atchinson 1997), see Figure 4.2.18 
A voluminous amount of literature has developed around the risk-based capital 
model. Risk-based capital regulations have been in operation within the banking 
sector for some time, and research has focused on establishing a theoretical and 
empirical framework for evaluating such standards (see Grenadier and Hall 1996 
and Gjerde and Semmen 1995). A number of perspectives are taken on the 
merits of such a system within the banking sector, such as the effect of these 
regulations on credit provision (Engineer 1994; Berger and Udell 1994); for 
example, Berger and Udell (1994) argue that such standards may have been 
responsible for a `credit crunch' in the U. S. 
Insurance risk-based capital standards have also been the source of attention 
within the literature, and have been criticised in terms of the lack of theoretical 
grounding governing the calculation of the risk-based capital factors (Atchinson 
1997). The establishment of a theoretical framework for evaluating these 
regulations and setting explicit standards is also discussed (Dickinson 1997). 
The weights assigned to the different categories of risk have, in addition, been 
the focus for work (Bradley, Wambeke and Whidbee 1991). 
Cummins, Harrington & Klein (1995) analyse the risk-based capital formula for 
property-liability insurance. They use a predictive accuracy test of solvent and 
18 The TAC is expressed as a percentage of the risk-based capital (the so-called `authorised 
control level'). Regulatory action is based on the size of this ratio. 
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insolvent insurers for the period 1989-1993. They show that the predictive 
accuracy of the TAC/RBC ratio is poor when this is the only independent 
variable, but that its accuracy improves significantly when the components of the 
formula and variables for firm size and organisational form are used as 
regressors. 
Thus, at the applied level, it is evident that a wide variety of methodologies exist 
in the early warning/prediction of financial distress. These techniques have 
evolved to produce more accurate predictions, with useful prescriptions for the 
review and design of insurance regulations. However, data restrictions and 
methodological concerns have questioned the reliability of such techniques in 
solvency surveillance. 
4.7 Summary 
It is possible to view solvency from many different perspectives. As a 
consequence, it is evident that research into insurance solvency has moved away 
from the tradition of collective risk theory, into many other areas using 
alternative theoretical and applied techniques. These alternative approaches are 
frequently complimentary. Moreover, the interplay of financial economics and 
empirical research has helped to resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding our 
understanding of insurer solvency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MODELLING INSURANCE COMPANY DECISIONS: 
PORTFOLIO BALANCE, EXPECTED UTILITY AND 
REGULATION 
5.0 Introduction 
Previous chapters have served to demonstrate the variety of risks that affect the 
solvency position of a life assurance company. One particular source of risk, that of 
investment risk, can be seen as a major contributor to the uncertainty associated with 
life-insurer solvency measurement. Moreover, the nature of the life assurance 
contract is such that its future financial position is governed to a large extent by the 
performance of its investment portfolio. Chapter 4 introduced some of the analytical 
tools of portfolio analysis. This chapter extends this development by providing an 
extensive formal account of portfolio theory applied to the issue of insurer solvency 
regulation. 
Life contracts, from basic term assurance to substantive policies such as endowment 
assurance, are often effected for periods in excess of 10 years, and frequently for 
periods up to and beyond 25 years. 1'2 Such contracts are to be contrasted with other 
forms of insurance, such as general insurance business (e. g. car insurance), where 
'A policy is substantive if the premium paid by the policyholder is used to build up a savings fund in 
addition to providing a financial benefit on the occurrence of death (as in a the case of a basic term 
assurance contract). 
2 Substantive life assurance policies are effected for at least 10 years in order that their non-death 
benefits `qualify' for tax exemption. 
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contracts are typically effected for periods of one year. The life contract therefore 
provides the insurance company with a stream of payments in the form of premium 
income, which after deductions will be placed into a collective fund (the `life fund') 
and invested. Here lies the distinction between life assurance and other forms of 
insurance: the investment opportunity of a life insurer is enhanced by the fact that it 
is provided with an expected income stream, which extends many years into the 
future and is reasonably well defined in terms of its magnitude and fluctuation. 3 
Thus, it is the long-term nature of the life assurance contract that enables an 
insurance company of this type to engage in an alternative investment strategy to 
that of any non-life assurance company. The time interval between payment of 
premium and claim outflow is such that a life insurer has a unique opportunity to 
profit from employing a long-term investment strategy. 
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to consider the issue of insurer liquidity. While 
a life insurer will have an underwriting portfolio consisting predominantly of long- 
term contracts, it is important to emphasise that for a given day/month/year, a life 
insurer, like any other business, will need liquidity in order to service its immediate 
cash outflows. Cash outflows may come in a variety of forms, such as intermediate 
policy claims, surrender value entitlements, and the servicing of any other debts. 
Cash outflows will be governed by the nature of the underwriting portfolio (the 
composition of policies and their associated risks). For life contracts, the nature of 
3 Aside from deaths, fluctuations in premium income might also be brought about by policy 
surrenders ('cashing in'). 
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these liabilities will lend themselves more readily to assessment and prediction (in 
contrast to general insurance contracts); mortality tables provide valuable 
information in this regard. 4 Thus, the relative predictability of claims associated 
with the underwriting portfolio provides additional motivation for an analytical 
investigation into the role of the investment portfolio and its influence upon the 
financial solidity of the insurance company. The success/failure of a given 
investment strategy (and its attendant risks) can therefore be seen as a central factor 
in the determination (and understanding) of life-insurer solvency. In order to 
formalise these ideas, it will be necessary to employ the tools of financial theory and 
in particular portfolio analysis (Markowitz 1952,1959). As introduced in Chapter 
4, portfolio theory provides an influential analytical framework for modelling 
insurer decision-making. The theory derives the efficient set of portfolios, from 
which an insurer (under standard assumptions (see Section 5.3)) selects one 
portfolio, the `optimal portfolio'. The selection of an `optimal portfolio' will 
depend on the contribution from an additional theoretical development, namely 
utility theory. 
As noted in Chapter 4, portfolio theory has been used in the solvency analysis of a 
variety of financial intermediaries. For example, portfolio theory has been used as a 
means of evaluating the regulation of banking institutions, see Morgan (1984), Kim 
and Santomero (1988), and Keeley and Furlong (1990). The portfolio analysis of 
life assurance has also been addressed in a number of settings; for example, see 
4 Prediction is assisted especially in terms of the timing of claims. 
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Krouse (1970), Krinsky (1985), and Chan and Krinsky (1985) for specific 
applications to the problem of portfolio optimisation and life insurer decision- 
making. MacMinn and Witt (1987) use financial theory to model the solvency of an 
insurance company and examine the insurer's performance under alternative 
regulatory standards. Much of the work on the application of portfolio theory to 
insurance dates back to the work of Kahane (1978). 
In line with these developments, discussion will proceed as follows. An outline of 
the traditional portfolio problem will be given in Section 5.1 and this will be 
followed by a detailed exposition of a general portfolio model of an insurance 
company in Section 5.2. The introduction of utility theory to the analysis of insurer 
portfolio selection will be made in Section 5.3, while in Section 5.4 solvency 
regulation is illustrated. Analysis is also extended to include `insurance leverage' in 
Section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides a summary of the main developments. 
5.1 The Standard Portfolio Selection Problem 
The Markowitz (1952,1959) portfolio selection problem may be expressed as 
follows. Initially, consider the case where an investor wants to invest a given sum 
of wealth into a portfolio made up entirely of n risky assets (liabilities are excluded 
for the time being). 5 The portfolio selection problem typically involves investing a 
5The name `investor' is used as a generic term to cover anything from an individual consumer, to an 
institutional investor. The important point is that the investor is that unit which has control over the 
investment decisions. 
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fixed amount of money, the investor's initial wealth KO, in order to achieve a desired 
outcome in terms of end-of-period wealth 
k. Since the solution to the portfolio 
problem does not depend on the size of the initial amount invested, the problem 
reduces to one of choosing asset proportions (or weights) w, to be assigned to each 
of the asset classes, i=1... n (Wilkie 1985). Investors make their decisions based 
upon the first two moments of the return distribution for end-of-period wealth. That 
is, decisions are based on the expected return [E(R; )], which may be taken as a 
measure of profit, and variance of return [Var(R; )=6=a, 
2], which may be taken as 
measure of the uncertainty (risk) associated with the expected return. Expected 
returns for all assets are denoted by the row vector, e' viz. 
(5.1) e'= [E(R, ), E(R2)1 ..., 
E(R,, )] 
The covariance of the returns between a pair of assets, i and j, is given by 
Cov(R;, R)-cr, . Denote the variance/covariance matrix 
by V, where V is defined as 
follows: 6 
a1 
2 
612 ... 
61n 
2 
(5.2) V= 
621 62 ... 62n 
2 
6n1 an2 ... 6n 
6Note that qj, =o,, so that the variance-covariance matrix of returns is symmetric. All such matrices 
are positive semi-definite (Wilkie 1985,230). 
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Using the definitions for expected return and variance, the efficient frontier is 
defined as follows: 
The frontier of all feasible portfolios which can be constructed from 
these n securities is defined as the locus of feasible portfolios that have the 
smallest variance for a prescribed expected return. (Merton 1972,1851) 
Let w; be the proportion of initial wealth invested in the ith security, i =1... n, where 
n 
by definition w, = 1. Denote the vector of these proportions, or weights, as 
follows: 
(5.3) W'= (W15 WZ,..., wn) 
The efficient frontier is defined by a set of portfolios, which satisfy the following 
constrained minimisation problem (for a full formal account of this problem see 
Merton (1972)). 7 
(5.4) min(! 6 p=1 w' 
Vw 
Subject to the following: 
e'w=E* 
w >_ 0 (The `short sale restriction') 
W't=1 
7The inclusion of 1/2 in front of the variance expression is made to simplify the analytical solution. 
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Where the subscript p refers to the portfolio, E* is a constant to be specified, and 0 
is a vector of zeros. The decision variables are the portfolio weights w, and by 
solving for different values of E*, the efficient frontier can be constructed in 
expected return/risk space using standard quadratic programming techniques (see 
Figure 5.1). 8 Markowitz (1959) was the first to define the investor's portfolio 
selection problem in this way (and also to show that it is equivalent to maximising 
the investor's expected utility (Levy and Markowitz 1979)). 
Figure 5.1. Mean-Standard Deviation Portfolio Frontier (Risky Assets Only) 
E(. ) 
E 
Source: Merton, R. C. 1972. An Analytical Derivation of the Efficient Frontier. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 7: 1851-1872. 
With reference to Figure 5.1, it can be seen that the portfolio frontier is a hyperbola. 
For a given level of risk there are two alternative portfolios available to an investor. 9 
There are portfolios with returns in excess of E* and portfolios with returns below 
E*. E* represents the return consistent with that of the minimum risk portfolio. 
Thus, every portfolio with a return in excess of E* strictly dominates a portfolio of 
8Additional constraints can be imposed on the quadratic program (e. g. solvency constraints). 
9 This is a direct consequence of the quadratic program. 
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equivalent risk with return below E*. Those portfolios with an expected return 
greater than, or equal to E* are defined as the efficient set of portfolios (including 
the minimum risk portfolio P). 
5.2 A General Portfolio Model of a Life Insurer 
A general portfolio model of a life insurer can be constructed as follows (see 
Krinsky (1985), Chan and Krinsky (1985), and Cummins and Nye (1981) for this 
standard treatment of insurance within a portfolio setting). Assume that, for the 
purposes of exposition, the insurance company is a proprietary life insurer, and that 
there are n types of possible investments and (m-n) types of life assurance contracts. 
Table 5.1 provides the names and definitions of the variables to be used within 
subsequent analysis. 
Table 5.1. Variables and Definitions 
NAME DEFINITION 
Ko Initial wealth 
Rate of return on the i`h investment: R" 
i =1, ..., n 
in period t. 
Rate of underwriting return on the i`" type of insurance contract: 
i =(n+1), ..., m 
in period t. 
11t Investment in the i`" asset, i =1, ..., n 
in period t. 
Actuarial Reserves for the ith type of insurance contract, i=(n+1), ..., m 
in period t. 
Kot Policyholder's surplus plus shareholders' equity in period t, where Ko, =So, +E0, 
Sol Policyholders' surplus in period t. 
Eot Shareholders' equity at the beginning of period t. 
Source: Krinsky, I. 1985. Mean-Variance Utility Functions, Flexible Functional Forms, and the 
Investment Behaviour of Canadian Life Insurers. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 52: 
241-268. 
Note: (a) The tildes denote the fact that the variable is a random variable. 
(b) "Insurance contracts" could be aggregated to distinguish insurance business along 
insurance product lines (e. g. term assurance, whole life, endowment, etc. ). 
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Following Krinsky (1985), the profit of the insurer in period t is given by ýc, and is 
defined as a linear combination of the random rates of return on the n investments 
and the m-n insurance contracts, viz. 
(5.5) i' _ l;; R;; 
The rate of return on equity in period t, rp, 5 is given 
by dividing Equation 5.5 by 
equity Eot in order to obtain the following: 
m 
(5.6) 
E= 
rpý _Ey wit R; l 
o, =1 or i=1 
Where, w,, is i`h asset-to-equity ratio for asset i (in period t), i=1... n, and the ith 
actuarial reserves-to-equity ratio for insurance contract i (in period t), i=(n+1)... m. 
Expanding 5.6 we have: 
(5.7) rp' = Wl R11 +w21R2, +... +wnRi +W(n+l), R(+1), +... +Wm1Rmr 
In order to complete the portfolio model, it is necessary to introduce the balance 
sheet constraint, which makes certain assumptions regarding the investment funds 
generated by selling policies (Krinksy 1985,244) and hence the extent of insurer 
investment leverage. The investment-funds generating factor needs to be 
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determined; for example, it could be assumed that one pound of underwriting 
business (as measured by actuarial reserves) generates one pound of investment 
funds (Cummins and Nye 1981,415). Note here that Krinsky (1985) does not 
explicitly model insurer premiums. Actuarial reserves are taken as a proxy for 
premium income because of some of the problems, particularly valuation problems, 
associated with comparing premiums across different contracts. For a discussion of 
the use of reserves see Krinsky (1985). 
Whatever variable is used to define the insurer's activities, the l, 's (i=1... m) must be 
determined such as to equate total assets with the sum of liabilities. Hence, the 
following balance sheet constraint must hold: 
nm 
(5.8) 1] l,, = Eli, + Ko, 
r=1 i=n+t 
Dividing Equation 5.8 by equity, E01 results in: 
o` (5.9) w,, - W;, =Kos =1 +s 
i=1 i=n+1 Eor Eor 
The first term on the LHS of Equation 5.9 represents the ratio of the ih (i=1... n) 
asset class investment to equity (the asset weights), and the second term on the LHS 
represents the ratio of the ih (i=n+1... m) contract reserves to equity (the contract 
182 
weights). The RHS can be used to simplify Equation 5.9 into a standard weight 
constraint, assuming that the RHS ratio (So/Eor) represents another weight W(m+J), t, 
the surplus-to-equity ratio. Equation 5.9 therefore simplifies to the following: 
n MA 
(5.10) E w, -Yw, =1 
i=1 i=n+1 
The treatment of liabilities simply as negative assets is clear within the formulation 
given in Equation 5.10.10 Having established a general portfolio model of an 
insurance company, it is possible to develop a formal rule for the insurer's portfolio 
selection problem. The expected value and variance of the rate of return on equity 
r, may be expressed as follows: 
m+l 
(5.11) E(Fp) wi E(Ri ), and 
i=1 
m+l m+l 
Var(Fp) _ w; wjCov(R,, k) 
'=1=1 
Hence, the expected return E and variance V of the insurer's end-of-period wealth, 
K is given by: 
10 Note that this equation holds for every time period and hence, the use of time subscripts is no 
longer required. 
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_ 
m+l 
(5.12) E(K) = Ko 1+w; E(R; ) and 
_ 
m+1 m+l 
_ 
V (K) = Kö IIw; wj Cov(R; , 
R. ) 
1=1 j=1 
The Lagrange L, defines the insurer's optimisation problem for the delineation of the 
efficient set of portfolios: 
(5.12) Minimise {L = Var(rp) - 
ýE(rp) 
- E(rp) (wi, i=1,..., m+l ) 
Subject to the following constraints: 
w; >_0Vi 
n m+l 
wi =1+ ywi 
i=1 i=n+1 
Where E(rp) * is a constant and this is to be determined by the investor. As in the 
previous section, the decision variables in the minimisation problem are the m+1 
portfolio weights. Solving for different values of E(iýp) * results in the delineation 
of the efficient frontier. 
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5.3 Utility Theory and Portfolio Selection 
The previous two sections outline the analytical procedure for deriving the efficient 
frontier. The actual portfolio selected by an insurer from this identified set of 
efficient portfolios will depend on the use of a pre-specified insurer decision rule. 
While there are a number of alternative specifications for this decision rule, the use 
of utility theory and in particular an expected utility maximisation rule is assumed 
here. 11 
In order to arrive at an analytical solution for the insurer operating point on the 
efficient frontier, further assumptions need to be made regarding the investor's risk 
preference. A strictly concave objective function U(. ) guarantees a unique solution 
to the insurer's portfolio selection problem. The solution is determined by equating 
the insurer's marginal rate of substitution (MRS), between return and risk, to the 
marginal rate of transformation (MRT) defined by the slope along the derived 
efficient frontier. That is, the point of tangency between the efficient frontier and 
the insurer's indifference curve provides a solution to the insurer's portfolio 
selection problem. Critically, this `optimal portfolio' will depend upon the degree 
of insurer risk aversion. 
Another decision-rule that can be used to solve for an `optimal portfolio' is derived from `ruin' 
theory (see Chapter 3, and Cummins and Nye 1981). 
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Before proceeding, it is worth reviewing the main properties of an insurer's utility 
function. Let U(K) be an insurer utility function, where as before k is end-of- 
period wealth, such that: 12 
(5.13) K=Ko(1+i ) 
The utility function U(k) is assumed to be well-behaved, continuous, and twice 
differentiable. In order to specify risk aversion for the insurer, the function must 
satisfy the following conditions: 13 
U' (K) >O; and (5.14) 
U"(K) <0 
A utility function that exhibits the above characteristics implies that the insurer 
prefers more than less; that is, the insurer exhibits monotonocity of wants. Thus, the 
insurer has a positive marginal utility of wealth. However, Equation 5.14 
demonstrates that this marginal utility is increasing at a decreasing rate showing 
that, "... investors are more concerned with reducing the incidence of adverse 
outcomes than they are with increasing the incidence of favourable outcomes of 
12 Implicit within this development is the assumption that the investment decision-makers have the 
same preferences as those of the owners of capital. 
13Examples of explicit functional forms include the quadratic utility function, the logarithmic utility 
function and the negative exponential utility function (see Chapter 11). All these functions are 
consistent with the properties of Equation 5.14 but vary according to their relative and absolute risk 
aversion. For a full account of the various risk preference properties of utility functions see Booth, et 
al. (1997). 
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equivalent magnitude, " (Booth, Chadburn and Ong 1997,3). In other words, an 
investor exhibiting risk preferences of this type is said to be risk averse, and would 
therefore reject a `fair' gamble. The utility function and its resulting indifference 
curves are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. 
Figure 5.2. Typical Risk Averse Utility Function (A), with Resulting 
Indifference Map in (B) 
(A) (B) 
U E 
Given appropriate specification of the utility function, it is now possible to define 
the objective of the insurer. Since the insurer faces uncertainty associated with its 
objective, namely end-of-period wealth, it must therefore maximise expected utility 
E(U), viz. 
(5.15) Maximise IE[U(K)] =f U[KO + FpK0 ]dF(rp) =f U[K0 (1 + FP)]dF(rP )} wi (i=l,... m+l) 
Where, F(7) represents the probability distribution function of the random rate of 
return on the portfolio, rp . 
There is evidence to suggest that an optimisation 
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problem that involves maximising expected utility is (approximately) mean-variance 
efficient. For a detailed discussion on this issue see Levy & Markowitz (1979). For 
a more general critique of the expected utility paradigm see Ong (1995). Note that 
the conditions set out in Equation 5.14 establish that the objective function is at least 
strongly quasi-concave and hence this satisfies the existence and uniqueness of an 
optimal solution to the expected utility program (Chiang, 1984). 
As illustrated in the previous section, the mean E and variance V of end-of-period 
wealth k are respectively: 
E(K) = Ko [1 + E(rP )]; and (5.16) 
V(K) = KöV(r, ) 
Using the Taylor expansion of the utility function U[K0 +rpKO], around the initial 
wealth of the insurer K0, yields: 
IU(K°) U'(Ko) U"(Ko) z1 (K-K°) +J (5.17) U(K)= 
0! 1! 
(K-K°) + 
2! 
Note that in addition the following simplification can be made: 
(5.18) K- Ko = (Ko + rp KO) - Ko = rp Ko 
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Using this simplification and taking expectations of Equation 5.17, while neglecting 
higher order terms (Pratt 1964) yields: 
(5.19) E[U(Ko+rPKo)] E[U(Ko)+U'(Ko)(rPKo)+IU"(Ko)(rpKo)2 
U(K0)+U'(Ko)K0LE(rp)- 
I 
. 0. 
[[E(rP)]Z +6P]] 
N U[E(rp), V(7,, )] 
Where O= -Ko Uf'(KQ) 
represents the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion 
0 
parameter. Given this objective function, the marginal rate of substitution along a 
given indifference curve (between expected return and variance) is derived by taking 
the total differential of Equation 5.19 with respect to E(rp) and V(rp) = 6p, viz. 
(5.20) dE(U) =0=a 
E(U) 
dE(r )+a 
E(U) 
d62 
ä E(7p) "ö 6z 
0= [U'(K0) - OU'(K()E(rP)PE(ip) + 
[- (1 / 2)U' (Ko )O]d62 
(5.21) 
d6p 
=_ 
U'(Ko)-U'(Ko)OE(rp) 
=2 
1- 
E(ip) 
dE(rp) 
u_u -(1 / 2)U'(K0)O 
{O } 
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The utility maximisation problem can be illustrated with reference to Figure 5.3 
below. The diagram illustrates the tangency point between the investor's 
indifference curves and the efficient frontier. 
Figure 5.3. Portfolio Selection and Expected Utility 
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Thus, optimality requires that the MRS be equal to the objective trade-off between 
risk and return at a given point along the efficient frontier, viz. 
d6Z r1 
(5.22) 
dE(rP )= 
2I 
ý- 
E(Fp )) 
This result may be interpreted as the price of risk; that is the real trade-off between 
risk and expected return (Ong 1995). 
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5.4 Incorporating Insurer Solvency Regulation 
The previous sections of this chapter have developed the necessary analytical tools 
for defining the insurer's set of efficient portfolios and selecting an insurer's 
`optimal portfolio'. Attention now turns to addressing the role of regulatory 
supervision of insurer solvency. 
As a point of departure for discussion, it is useful to note some of the other 
developments within the study of insurer solvency regulation. Much of the work on 
insurance regulation has tended to concentrate on factors that influence capital 
decisions under default risk. Using the work of Borch (1981,1982), Munch and 
Smallwood (1982) and Finsinger and Pauly (1984) consider the possible loss of 
goodwill in the event of insurer default and show that optimal capital is positively 
related to the amount of loss that the shareholders would suffer if claim costs were 
to exceed the firm's financial assets (Finsinger and Pauly 1984,165). By contrast, 
applied research has tended to concentrate on quantifying the effects of solvency 
regulation, using cross-state data in the United States. For example, Munch and 
Smallwood (1980,1982) examine why an unregulated market for property-liability 
insurance would not automatically produce the efficient level of solvency. Munch 
and Smallwood demonstrate that, "... minimum capital requirements do reduce the 
number of insolvencies, but that this is achieved solely by deterring the entry of 
small, relatively risk free firms, " (Munch and Smallwood 1980,262). 
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While much can be said about the developments within insurance economics, it is 
useful now to employ the tools of portfolio theory to elaborate further on the role of 
solvency regulations. Insurer insolvency may be defined as an event where the 
insurer's equity capital is completely eliminated, that is: 
(5.23) probll + rP _< 
0] = prob[ S -l] 
There are two very important issues to note with respect to this definition of 
insolvency. First, implicit in a discussion of solvency is the issue of asset (liability) 
valuation. Valuation and the assessment of an insurer's solvency position will be an 
inexact science and a matter of some debate for the regulator. However, following 
Kahane, et al. (1988), it will be assumed that the market value is equal to the book 
value. 
The second consideration to be made with regard to Equation 5.23 is that the 
probability rule will be insurer specific, and hence the insolvency definition is 
specified for a given insurer, insurer i. Given the idiosyncrasies that will exist 
between insurers within the industry, it is reasonable to expect that the return 
characteristics and resulting probability distribution will be different for each 
insurer. These will in turn depend upon the nature of the cashflows (and their 
respective probability distributions), the composition of the asset portfolio, and other 
factors that together affect the insurer's net cash flow position. A regulatory policy 
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aimed at reducing the probability of insolvency would therefore need to account for 
these relationships. 
Following Kahane, et al. (1988), if the return on equity is normally distributed, the 
standardised form of equation 5.23 can be written as follows: 
(5.24) prob[E[rp ]5 -1] = prob 
1- E[r 
p6 P< 
6P 
Where the term p is defined as, the maximum acceptable insolvency probability. 
With the normality assumption that ? -N(E[rp], a), the standard normal table can 
be used to find a constant q5(p), which fulfils the following: 
(5.25) E[} ? (-1)- q5(P). 6 
Where 0(. ) is the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
The value of 0(. ) is always negative since the probability of failure addresses only 
the lower tail of the distribution (that is, the downside risk (see Chapter 4)). A 
greater absolute value of t(. ), Iq(. )' corresponds to a lower probability of insolvency 
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for a given insurer (portfolio); for example, when the probability of insolvency is 5 
percent, q5(p=0.05) will equal -1.645, while for a probability of insolvency of I 
percent, the associated value of &=0.01) is equal to -3.1. Thus, a simple 
functional relationship can be constructed to represent the insolvency constraint in 
expected return (E[? P 
] ), and risk (6) space. 
The solvency definition in Equation 5.25 defines a half-plane bounded by a straight 
line, the insolvency constraint (Kahane 1978). For a given level of insolvency 
probability p, the insolvency (or ruin) constraint can be restated as follows: 
(5.26) E[] = (-1) - O(p)6 
Equation 5.26 provides the means by which to construct the insolvency constraint 
graphically in return/risk space (see Kahane, et al. 1988). It represents a constraint 
separating those portfolios that pass the insolvency constraint and those portfolios 
that fail the constraint. The constraint has a slope equal to [-O(p)]. The 
interpretation of this slope coefficient reflects the assumed level of `acceptable' 
insolvency probability (as distinct from the portfolio risk, a). Note the importance 
of the term `acceptable'. Typically the analysis of solvency assumes exogenously 
the regulatory standard governing the insolvency probability. In practice such a 
probability would need to be evaluated in terms of its costs and benefits. The 
establishment of such a standard would depend upon a number of factors, including 
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the trade-off that exists between the need for adequate policyholder protection 
versus the need to ensure commercial efficiency. Therefore, the relationship in 
Equation 5.26 may be seen as a means of representing the regulator's preferences, 
through the construction of `degenerate' indifference curves for a given level of p. 
This relationship measures downside risk in terms of the `safety first/minimum a' 
criteria (Roy 1952) see Chapter 4. 
The above points can be illustrated though the use of a diagram, see Figure 5.4. In 
this diagram the efficient frontier is illustrated in conjunction with two insolvency 
constraints, L* and L** reflecting two different levels of `acceptable' insolvency 
probability, a* and a** respectively where a*aa**. 
Figure 5.4. The Probability of Insolvency 
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Derrig, R. A., eds. Financial Models of 
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London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
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Assume that for whatever reason, the regulator settles for a solvency standard of a*. 
Thus, portfolios on the frontier to the right of the intersection between the L *(a*) 
ray and the efficient frontier (represented by the point X) are not permissible 
according to this solvency standard. Conversely, insurance companies represented 
by portfolios located on the efficient frontier to the left of point X may be classified 
as being `solvent' for the purposes of regulatory review and intervention assessment. 
Having outlined the procedure for deriving the efficient frontier, the means of 
selecting an operating point on that frontier, and the means of representing 
`degenerate' regulatory preferences in the form of a solvency constraint, the full 
model can now be illustrated, see Figure 5.5 below. 
Figure 5.5. Portfolio Selection within a Regulatory Setting 
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Solvency. In Cummins, J. D., and Derrig, R. A., eds. Financial Models of Insurance Solvency. 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
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In Figure 5.5, the efficient frontier is presented with two alternative operating points 
at u* and u**, which represent the points of tangency between the insurer's 
indifference curves and the efficient frontier. The insolvency constraint intersects 
the efficient frontier at point x. An insurer located at point u* would be classified as 
`solvent' while an insurer operating at point u** would be classified as `insolvent'. 
Thus, the efficiency frontier can be differentiated into two sets of strategies: namely, 
`permissible' and `non-permissible' strategies (Kahane, et al. 1988,225). 
5.5 Solvency Regulation in Terms of Insurance Leverage 
Frequently cited as a mechanism for controlling the insolvency risk of insurers, is 
the regulation of insurance leverage (work in this field dates back to the work of 
Kahane (1978)). Insurance leverage is defined as the amount of premiums written 
per pound of equity (Kahane 1978). The portfolio model developed in the previous 
section can be represented in a slightly different form, modelling the insurer 
explicitly in terms of its insurance leverage. 
In the previous section, it was assumed implicitly that the degree of insurance 
leverage was constant. To illustrate this, discussion will proceed following Kahane, 
et al. (1988). Assume an insurer is engaged in only one insurance line and has a 
single investment opportunity. As before, the profit for the period is denoted by Tr. 
A simplified model of insurer profit can be constructed by making profit a linear 
combination of the profit received from underwriting and investment activities, viz. 
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(5.27) it= Ü+I 
Where U and I represent the total underwriting and investment profit respectively. 
Assume that there is an indicator of insurer activity P, and that assets are defined by 
A. As noted in the previous sections, P can be typically actuarial reserves or 
premiums. Kahane, et al. (1988) assume that insurance activity is defined in terms 
of total premiums. Note the contrast with the multi-line insurer model of Section 
5.3, which used actuarial reserves as an indicator function of insurer activity. 
However, as demonstrated shortly, reserves and premiums can be linked through a 
simple relationship. 
Discussion will return to the reserves shortly, but for now assume that the rate of 
return on underwriting activities r, (in this simplified model) is a function of the 
premiums written and is given by: 
(5.28) r, =U/P 
The rate of return on investment activities is given by i2 and is defined as follows: 
(5.29) rZ =TIA 
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Thus, the rate of return on equity rp , 
is now defined as: 
(5.30) rp= 
Pr, 
+Ar2 
Eo Eo 
Where, as before, equity capital is given by E0. In this example, the reserves are 
assumed to be equal to a certain multiple, f of the premiums; this is the reserve 
`funds generating factor' where each pound of premiums generates f pounds of 
reserves. Hence, the balance sheet constraint is now given by: 
(5.31) A=Eo+fP 
The rate of return on equity may now be derived from Equations 5.30 and 5.31 as 
follows: 
(5.32) ?P =kr, +(1+fk)? Z 
Where k denotes the amount of insurer activity, in this case premiums written, per 
pound of equity (k=P'/Eo), and this variable is referred to in the literature as 
"insurance leverage" (as distinct from more general financial leverage). The 
advantage of the formulation given in Equation 5.32 is that the only decision 
variable is the insurance leverage, k. Thus, the expected return and risk faced by the 
insurer can be defined exclusively in terms of k, viz. 
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(5.33) 
E(7, )=kE(r, )+(l+)k)E(r2), and 
2 Var(Fp) = kVar(F, )+(1+ fk)ZVar(r2 +2(1+ fk)kCov(ri22) 
Equation 5.33 defines the opportunity set for all possible combinations of expected 
return and risk through varying the degree of insurance leverage, k. In order to 
extract the influence of k upon the shape of the frontier it is helpful to re-write 
Equation 5.33, factoring out k as follows: 
E(F)=E(F2)+k[fE(r, )+E(r2)]and, 
(5.34) 
Var(rp) =2fCov(rrz)k2 +[2fVar(7)+2Cov(YI, 
Y2)]k 
From Equation 5.34 it can be seen that E(PP) increases with insurance leverage k if 
JE(rý) >_ -E(7) . Also, the variance 
is of quadratic form, viz. 
(5.35) Var(rp) = ak z+ bk + c, with : 
dVar(rP)=Zak+b=0=k=- b 
and dk 2a 
d2Var(rp ) 
dK2 =2a>0=min 
ifa>0 
As it is reasonable to expect a positive covariance between the rates of return on 
underwriting and investment activities (Kahane, et al. 1988), one would also expect 
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that the second derivative of the variance expression to be positive, hence implying 
that efficient frontier must be concave. 14 
The concept of insurance leverage can be used to extend the insurance model in 
previous sections of this chapter. As noted earlier in the multiple contracts/multiple 
assets portfolio model (Section 5.2 and Section 5.3), use is typically made of 
actuarial reserves as a measure of underwriting activity (Krinsky 1985). Equation 
5.31 provides the means of relating the portfolio model of previous sections with the 
insurance leverage model in this section. Note that total reserves in this section are 
m 
defined as fP and this is equivalent to 11; in Section 5.2, for a given fund 
i=+I 
generating factor f. Recall that the delineation of the insurer's efficient frontier, for 
a multiple contracts/multiple assets portfolio model, may be expressed as follows: 
(5.36) Minimise {L =V (rp) - I. 
[E(Fp) 
- E(Fp) * 
J} 
w, (l,... m+I) 
Subject to 
w; _O, 
Vi 
m+l 
Yw; =1 
r=1 
14The shape of the efficient frontier will depend upon the exact nature of the relationship between 
expected return and insurance leverage (Kahane 1978). 
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Where the expected return on the insurer's portfolio E(r) *, is a constant to be 
specified and the decision variables in the minimisation problem are the portfolio 
weights, w,. The solvency regulation of insurance leverage is introduced explicitly 
into the quadratic program as follows. The optimisation problem in Equation 5.36 is 
solved subject to a constraint imposed that keeps the insurance leverage k at a 
constant level, ko. The role of insurance leverage can be incorporated into the 
analysis by making the following developments. In the multiple contracts/multiple 
M 
assets case, the sum I w, is a proxy for the amount of insurer business (reserves) 
n+l 
written for each contract, per-pound of equity. Thus, the insurance leverage 
constraint is of the following form: 
m 
(5.3 7) 1 w; = ko 
n+1 
This new constraint is imposed upon the quadratic program in Equation 5.36 to 
generate a different efficient frontier for each level of leverage, ko. Repeating the 
procedure for different values of ko generates a set of efficient frontiers that together 
trace out an envelope curve, which in turn is tangential to these respective frontiers 
(Kahane and Nye 1975). The envelope frontier is illustrated in Figure 5.6, where a 
movement along the envelope curve is consistent with a change in the level of 
insurance leverage. 
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Figure 6.2. New Ordinary Life Business in the U. K., 1986-1996 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the rapid growth in single premium business, and also 
demonstrates that regular premium business has remained relatively constant 
over the same period. 5 There are a number of points to note with respect to the 
trends in single and regular premium business. Almost half of new annual 
business came from mortgage related products (Association of British Insurers 
1997b). As a consequence, the depressed state of the housing market in the early 
1990s significantly affected the generation of new annual premium business. 
The role of the housing market is confirmed by the fact that by 1996 there was 
an upturn in regular premium business, a move consistent with the upturn in the 
housing market. Thus, the general state of the economy provides a `demand' 
driven explanation for the relatively poor performance of regular premium 
contracts. 
5 The only exception to this trend came after the 1987 stock market crash, which adversely 
affected the sale of single premium policies, (funds generated from single premium plans are 
typically invested heavily into the equity market). 
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With respect to the single premium contracts, it should be noted that the growth 
in single premium contracts is largely a result of the relatively high performance 
of life savings contracts such as the `with-profit' bond. The performance 
advantage of these contracts may be explained by the fall in interest rates since 
1992, which lead to higher returns being offered by insurers as compared with 
those returns offered by deposit accounts at banks and building societies 
(Association of British Insurers 1997b, 13). Thus, there is a performance 
argument for the success of single premium contracts. 
While much can be said about the relatively strong performance of single 
premium contracts, it is important to note the reason why single premium 
contracts make up the vast majority of new business income. In terms of the 
generated funds for a given year, new single premium contracts represent a 
greater source of new income as they come in the form of a lump sum 
investment. Such income is therefore comparable to the funds of annual 
premium policies over the entire term of the contract. 
6.4 Basic Life Assurance Products 
A review of the various life policies available in the U. K. is now developed. 
There are six basic types of business that life assurance companies engage in: 
term assurance, endowment assurance, whole of life assurance, permanent health 
insurance, and annuities and pensions. The latter category of policies is a 
relatively new area of development for the life assurance industry, the former 
five classes making up the traditional business of `ordinary' life assurance. 
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Products sold by life insurers may be defined in terms of three basic functions: 
life cover, sickness protection, and a means of savings. 6 The costs associated 
with life assurance contracts vary significantly; these costs reflect the extent to 
which a given contract employs each of the three basic functions. For this 
reason, it is worth noting the treatment of policy charges within basic life 
contracts. 
Expenses charged on life assurance plans aim to meet three costs: first, the cost 
of mortality; second, the expenses associated with a contract; and third, 
investment management costs. Each cost is evaluated in terms of the respective 
risks facing the policyholder and insurer. Mortality cost is readily calculated 
from life tables and actuarial assessments. `Expenses' is a generic term used to 
cover a variety of insurer costs both fixed and variable. There are also product 
specific charges that relate to the investment management of life funds. 
Frequently misunderstood is the interplay that occurs between the three cost 
categories. For any given premium, the respective charges will vary during the 
term. Investment management charges, for example, are typically charged at the 
beginning of the policy term. Thus, charges of this kind are typically `front-end 
loaded' and the percentage of the premium devoted to other functions, such as 
savings, is correspondingly reduced at the start of the term. As the term of the 
6 As noted earlier, policies that contain the savings element are referred to as substantive 
contracts. 
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plan progresses these `front-end loaded' charges decline whilst the amount of the 
premium devoted to savings correspondingly increases. 7 
Having explained the charges associated with life contracts, it is now useful to 
consider the basic product variants. The basis of any life assurance contract is 
term assurance. Term assurance pays a lump sum only on the death of the life 
assured within the term of the contract. The plan has no savings element, nor 
does it provide any protection against illness. The premiums paid go towards 
providing life cover only and therefore this contract may be expected to be one 
of the cheapest life contracts available on the market. 
Term assurance contracts come in many forms including decreasing term and 
increasing term contracts. Decreasing term assurance plans are designed for 
capital repayment mortgages where the amount of protection required reduces 
over the term (note that the premiums remain constant). 8 By contrast, increasing 
term assurance plans allow for the sum assured to be increased during the term 
up to a certain limit without any additional medical questions, (with the 
premiums revised accordingly). 
Endowment policies also pay out a lump sum on the death of the life assured. 
However, their usefulness lies in their application as a savings device. 
`Endowments' have become widely used as a means of repayment for 
There are many justifications for `front-end loading'. The most likely justification is that such 
a plan will encourage saver loyalty and reduce policy `surrenders' for cash before the end of the 
term. Charges of this kind make the returns on life assurance particularly small at the start of a 
policy's term. 
Repayment mortgages, or capital and interest mortgages, calculate a monthly payment that 
covers the interest of the loan and makes a partial repayment on the capital borrowed. 
222 
mortgages. Thus, while life cover is afforded to the life assured, the majority of 
the premium paid contributes to the development of the policyholder's savings 
fund. 
Another basic life contract is the whole of life policy. Whole of life contracts 
have the primary purpose of providing the policyholder with a substantial level 
of life coverage, but unlike pure term assurance, premiums do include a savings 
element. The ratio of life cover to savings is variable depending on the needs of 
the policyholder. Also, a whole of life policy provides a level of protection to 
the life assured for the lifetime of the policyholder; there is no policy term. 
More recently, many life insurers have sold sickness protection. This contract 
offers a benefit (either in the form of a regular payment or lump sum) to the 
person assured, dependent on his or her state of health. One of the main forms 
of sickness protection is that of Permanent Health Insurance (PHI). PHI is 
designed to replace the loss of income for an individual who is unable to work 
(for more than a pre-specified period of time) due to illness or accident. 
Premium income generated from PHI equalled £301 million in 1996 
(Association of British Insurers 1997b, 13). Another main form of sickness 
protection is that of Critical Illness Cover (CIC) which pays out a lump sum on 
the diagnosis of a particular illness. CIC has been referred to as `life assurance 
for the living' (Association of British Insurers 1997b, 16). 
Annuities are an additional product offered by life companies. The importance 
of annuities comes from the fact that they are typically used as insurance against 
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`longevity risk'- the risk of extinguishing savings due to living longer than 
expected. 9 Annuities are a lump sum investment which is used (invested by the 
insurer on behalf of the policyholder) to produce benefits usually in the form of a 
regular payment; in effect a premium paid from the insurer to the life assured. 
Annuities come in two main forms: immediate and deferred. Immediate 
annuities give the policyholder an immediate income once the premium is paid. 
By contrast, a deferred annuity may be bought with either a single premium or a 
regular premium over a number of years in advance of the required annuity 
income. The ability to sell annuities represents a competitive advantage for life 
insurers since banks and building societies are not permitted to sale annuities, 
except through insurance company subsidiaries (Association of British Insurers 
1997b). 
Related to annuity business is pension business. There are numerous and varied 
pension contracts available to both private individuals and organisations. '° 
Insurance companies are involved in all forms of pension provision. Insurers 
provide private pensions to employees and the self-employed. They also provide 
occupational pension schemes where an employer wishes to offer its employees 
a pension scheme. 1I The employer might also agree to retain an insurance 
company solely for the purposes of being a fund manager; such a pension 
scheme is referred to as `self-administered'. Private pensions and occupational 
9 Typically, annuities are bought by pension funds. 
10 Note that pension contracts sold to institutions by insurance companies are distinct from 
employer managed occupational pension schemes, which are established and managed by an 
employer itself for the benefit of some or all of its employees. 
Depending on the function and size of the employer, it may choose to set up and manage a 
pension scheme itself. 
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pensions together accounted for almost 50 percent of U. K. long-term insurance 
premium income in 1996 (Association of British Insurers 1997a, 7). 
Pension schemes offered by insurance companies may form the entire provision 
for retirement or may be used in conjunction with established occupational 
pension schemes. 12 Private pensions allow individuals to retire as early as 50, 
and take advantage of a tax-free lump sum that can be taken from the proceeds 
of the pension fund. This arrangement has also lead to the introduction of the 
so-called `pension mortgage' whereby the tax-free lump sum is used as a means 
of repayment for the outstanding balance on a mortgage. 
Additional products used for retirement provision are the `free-standing' 
additional voluntary contributions. Additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) 
are a special type of pension arrangement that is available only to employees of 
organisations who are members of an occupational pension scheme. These plans 
aim to `top-up' the retirement funds and are `free-standing' because the 
insurance company offers the product, rather than the employer. 
Figure 6.3 provides a product breakdown of the new yearly premiums for 
individual life business in the U. K. over the period 1984-1996. The two most 
prominent categories of new business are ordinary life assurance contracts and 
personal pension contracts. 
12 The selling of private pensions has been the source of regulatory review. Insurance advisors 
have been criticised for advising that employees `opt-out' of occupational pensions using private 
pension plans instead. Such actions resulted in significant losses to consumers and appear to 
have been justified only on the grounds of greater sales commission. 
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Figure 6.3. New Yearly Premiums for Individual 
Long-Term Business in the U. K. 
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Sources: (a) Association of British Insurers. 1995. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1984-1994. 
Table 12. London: Association of British Insurers. 
(b) Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 12. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Notes: (a) All figures are for `stand-alone' contracts where the policy is effected for the 
specified reason and not as a policy `add-on'. 
(b) Additional Voluntary Contributions, Personal Health Insurance and Critical Illness 
Cover were all products that were introduced within the period. 
With reference to Figure 6.3, it can be seen that personal pensions have 
expanded since the mid- i 980s with new premiums rising three-fold in the period 
under discussion. By 1996, total personal pension contributions amounted to 
£972 million, just short of 40 percent of new yearly premiums. The downturn in 
new pensions business between 1992 and 1995 may be explained by two factors: 
first, the economic climate of the time; and second, the controversy and 
associated negative publicity surrounding the sale of personal pensions in the 
late 1980s. 
There are a number of additional points to note with respect to Figure 6.3. 
Industrial business has declined, while the introduction of new products, such as 
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Personal Health Insurance (PHI) and Critical Illness Cover (CIC), has provided 
the potential for additional growth in new long-term business. PHI business 
grew by more than 25 percent in the last year of the period under discussion, and 
the potential for this relatively new line of life business, together with CIC, 
would seem substantial. Additional Voluntary Contributions have also provided 
a significant source of new business with income standing at £54 million by 
1996. 
It should be noted that the contributions of individual product lines to single 
premium business shows that pension business and ordinary life assurance 
business are the dominant products. In 1996 pension and ordinary life business 
together accounted for nearly 90 percent of single premium business 
(Association of British Insurers 1997b, 13). 
The introduction of new products can be seen to play a vital role in maintaining 
new business income. The motivation for new products can be seen to depend 
critically on two factors, the degree of competition, and the changes to tax 
legislation. In particular, tax legislation has been instrumental in the growth of 
personal pensions and 'AVCs' (Association of British Insurers 1997b). 
In addition to the basic life products, substantive policies (such as endowment 
policies) may come in two forms: `with-profit', and `unit-linked'. These terms 
are used to define the investment basis of substantive plans. Traditionally, 
substantive policies have been invested into the `life fund'. If a policy were 
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with profit then policyholders would buy a stake in any insurer profit, where the 
reward for this stake would be in the form of policy bonuses. 13 
Policy bonuses attached to `with-profit' contracts come in two forms, 
reversionary (or annual) and terminal. Annual bonuses are attached to the 
policy each year, based on the performance of the insurer in that year and usually 
are guaranteed once declared. At the end of the policy term, all the accumulated 
bonuses are assessed and combined with one final bonus, the `terminal' bonuses. 
Typically the terminal bonus is much larger than the individual reversionary 
bonus so that there is an incentive for the policyholder to keep a contract in 
effect until the end of the agreed term. 14 
Recently, there has been a growth in the use of unit-linked policies. Under these 
contracts, premiums are used to purchase directly units in one of the life 
insurer's investment funds. These units represent a share in the fund and its 
price reflects the value of the assets within the fund. Values of the unit-linked 
funds can go down as well as up, and in order to reduce this risk a variety of 
unit-linked funds are typically offered with varying degrees of associated risk. 
The premiums paid to the insurer can go into any number of unit-linked funds 
and the proportion invested in these funds may be changed on demand (though 
this may incur a minor `switch' fee). 
13 Profits relate to the performance of a proprietary life company. A mutual life insurer would 
have its performance measured in terms of life fund surplus. 
14 In other words, terminal bonuses aim to keep surrender values down and thereby reduce the 
incentive to cash-in a policy. 
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As noted earlier, all unit-linked funds differ in terms of their associated risk 
profiles. Standard unit-linked funds include the following: a cash fund, where 
premiums paid go into the short term money markets, (bank deposits and 
treasury bills); an `equity fund', which specialises in ordinary shares invested 
principally in the U. K.; and a `fixed-interest fund', where premiums are invested 
in government stock (including overseas government stocks). In addition, one of 
the most commonly used unit-linked funds is that of the `managed fund'. This 
fund appeals to those policyholders not wishing to control the day-to-day 
investment decisions and would rather delegate the responsibility to an insurance 
company's investment manager. The managed fund is typically sold as a 
relatively low-risk fund since it is usually well diversified. 
The growth in the popularity of unit-linked policies may be explained in the 
context of a wider share ownership in the U. K. The investment growth of unit- 
linked funds is widely acknowledged as being greater than its `with-profit' 
counterpart (Association of British Insurers 1997b). In addition, unit-linked 
policies are seen as being far more flexible in order to meet ever-changing 
policyholder needs. However, there is an important caveat to all of this, namely 
that of the associated investment risk. While the growth in the `with-profit' 
funds is guaranteed once declared, the unit-linked plans carry no such assurance. 
For the risk-averse, the choice would be to invest in the life fund every time, and 
therefore select a with-profit policy where the variance of return is smaller than 
that of a unit-linked plan and the accumulation of the investment funds is 
assured. 
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The significance of unit-linked policies can be appreciated by inspecting Figure 
6.4 below. This outlines the respective proportions of regular premium business 
invested in unit-linked funds, for ordinary life business, personal pension 
business, and for `free-standing' AVCs. 
Figure 6.4. The Proportion of New Yearly Linked-Life Business 
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Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. Table 
14. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Figure 6.4 shows that there has been a positive trend in the proportion of new 
annual business being invested into unit-linked plans over the period 1984-1996. 
This growth was checked by the disturbances to the stock markets in 1987. 
However in spite of this, the majority of personal pensions and `free-standing' 
AVCs in 1996 were invested into linked funds. The amount of ordinary life 
business being invested into unit-linked funds has remained relatively constant, 
standing at about 40 percent in 1996. The contrast in linked-life proportions, 
between pensions and ordinary life assurance, may be explained by differences 
in policyholder risk preference. It is likely, for example, that those individuals 
purchasing `top-ups' to retirement plans may be willing to take on the greater 
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risk associated with the stock market than those policyholders who are investing 
in a mortgage repayment plan for the first time. Thus, risk preference can be 
seen to play an important role in the explanation of the relative proportions 
invested into unit-linked funds. 
In general, the life assurance industry can be seen to offer products that are 
flexible and dynamic. Moreover, the changing structure of the market for life 
assurance can be seen as a response, in part, to the new requirements arising 
from changing social and economic conditions. Also, such policies have been 
well adapted to meet changing tax (and social security) regulations (Association 
of British Insurer 1997b). 
6.6 Overseas and Domestic Markets for Life Assurance 
In 1995, global gross insurance premiums were £1,360 billion, (Association of 
British Insurers 1997a, 31). This represented a real growth in worldwide 
premium income of 4 percent over the previous year. The previous four years 
had also seen real growth in excess of this figure. While there has been an 
overall growth in the world insurance market there has also been substantial 
regional variation in insurance market growth rates (Association of British 
Insurers 1997b). 
Table 6.4 shows the growth experience of the principle regions of the world. 
This table also presents the different regional shares of the global economy for 
insurance. 
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Table 6.4. Share of the Global Economy 
-------------- Region 1993 1995 
Asia 35 (6) 35 (8) 
North America 33 (5) 31(l) 
Europe 27 (8) 30 (3) 
Oceania 1 (6) 2 (-14) 
Latin America 1 (6) 1 (3) 
Africa 1 (1) 1 (17) 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report (September 1997). 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: Figures in brackets give the real gross-premium annual growth rate (%). 
With respect to Table 6.4, there are number of unusual features to note. Africa 
and Asia have growth rates in excess of the average rate, at 8 percent and 17 
percent, respectively. By contrast, the other markets, especially North America 
and Europe, have reported sluggish growth. This may be explained, in part, by 
the state of the respective economies. Moreover, recent financial conditions in 
Asia would probably change the above results quite markedly. In terms of 
global market share North America, Europe and Asia dominate global 
premiums, together these regions account for over 90 percent of the global 
economy. 
Out of all of the results, the African result seems a little surprising. Although the 
absolute size of the African market is small, the growth rate is significant in spite 
of the many underwriting risks that present themselves and would appear to 
make prospective policyholders virtually uninsurable. These risks include the 
uncertainty surrounding the political and economic climate, and health factors 
such as the spread of HIV and AIDS. However, this rather paradoxical result 
might be explained in terms of regional growth `pockets' (such as South Africa) 
where these risks are reduced. A detailed breakdown of the regional 
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concentration of insurance business might therefore provide some clarity 
regarding this issue. 
In order to gain an appreciation of the importance of individual country markets 
to the overall world insurance market, Table 6.5 sets out the ten largest insurance 
markets in terms of their gross premium income. 
Table 6.5. Ten Largest Insurance Markets in 1995 
Country Gross Premium Income (im) +% share of worldwide premium income 
1 1993 1995 
Japan (1) 404 30 30 
USA (2) 395 31 29 
Germany (3) 98 6 7 
France (4) 83 5 6 
UK (5) 81 6 6 
S. Korea (6) 38 2 3 
Italy (7) 24 2 2 
Canada (8) 24 2 2 
Netherlands (9) 22 2 2 
Switzerland (10) 20 1 2 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report (September 1997). 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: 1995 ranking given in brackets. 
The above table illustrates the dominance of the United States and Japan in the 
worldwide insurance market- these countries account for around 60 percent of 
worldwide income. The U. K. is ranked fifth (accounting for 6 percent of 
worldwide premiums) and is of a similar size to the number third and fourth 
ranked countries, Germany and France respectively. 15 In order to provide an 
account of the importance of life business to the ten largest countries, Table 6.6 
provides details of the level of premiums per person; the so-called `insurance 
15 The above figures are subject to currency conversions and therefore exchange rate 
performance. This is a critical factor to be mindful of in the light of the Asian crisis in 1997/98 
and the recent growth in the strength of sterling. 
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density' function. 16 This provides a means of comparison for insurance 
expenditures across a number of different countries. 
Table 6.6. Insurance Density in the Ten Largest Insurance Markets 1993 & 1995 
Country: 1993 (£) 1995 (£) % Growth 
Japan 2300 2580 12% 
USA 610 640 5% 
Germany 380 480 56% 
UK 820 680 -17% 
France 660 910 38% 
S. Korea 450 660 47% 
Italy 110 160 45% 
Canada 380 350 -8% 
Netherlands 600 770 28% 
Switzerland 1230 1830 49% 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report (September 1997). 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: All figures are converted to sterling using the ann ual average exchange rate. 
With reference to Table 6.6, it can be seen that the expenditure on life assurance 
in 1995 varied significantly across the countries. The largest per-capita spending 
on life assurance was in Japan (£2,580) as compared with the smallest per capita 
spending in Italy (£160). In terms of growth, France (38 percent), South Korea 
(47 percent) and Switzerland (49 percent) posted the largest growth rates, while 
the U. K. and Canada were alone in having their per-capita spending actually fall 
by 17 percent and 8 percent, respectively. While the Far East presents a great 
potential in terms of market growth, the possibilities for expansion have 
remained heavily constrained by the recent economic difficulties experienced 
within the region. 
16 Comparison across countries must be checked by the fact that the public/private provision ratio 
for benefits, such as pensions, will vary. 
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The U. K., especially the city of London, has had a long tradition of insurance 
provision. The development and expansion of the British Empire in the 
nineteenth century enabled insurers to establish themselves in a number of 
overseas markets. Today, the U. K. life assurance industry remains strong with 
the majority of U. K. market share belonging to U. K. controlled insurance 
companies. Figure 6.5 illustrates the sector shares of foreign controlled 
companies for new yearly premiums and new single premiums. 
Figure 6.5. Foreign-Controlled Insurers' Share of the U. K. Life Market 
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Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 39. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Another area of interest concerns the contribution of overseas markets to the 
growth of U. K. insurers. This contribution remains strong with overseas net 
premium income standing at nearly £14 billion in 1996, approximately 20 
percent of long-term business for life insurers in the U. K. (Association of British 
Insurers 1997b, 8). The significance of the U. K. insurers within overseas 
markets is difficult to determine since data needs to be collected from those 
respective overseas markets. However, it is possible to examine the source of 
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U. K. insurer premium income by country of origin. Table 6.7 provides details 
on this overseas net premium business. 
Table 6.7. Market Share of Total Overseas Net Premium Income by Country of 
Origin, 1986-1996. 
Year EU Rest of Canada USA Australia & Africa 
Europe New Zealand 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Other 
(g) 
Overseas Income 
as % of Total UK 
business 
(h) 
1986 37 2 26 6 21 4 4 15 
1987 34 2 17 22 21 1 3 16 
1988 28 4 18 27 20 1 2 18 
1989 28 5 18 25 21 1 2 17 
1990 30 5 18 28 17 1 1 16 
1991 30 6 16 29 16 1 2 17 
1992 31 6 13 32 15 1 2 18 
1993 32 6 14 28 15 1 4 17 
1994 36 78 26 17 1 5 20 
1995 41 69 25 12 1 6 20 
1996 42 47 28 11 1 7 21 
Source: The Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 4. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Notes: Columns (a) to (g) give the percentage contribution of the relevant country or region to 
total overseas business. 
Column (h) gives the total overseas contribution to life business in the U. K. as a 
percentage. Percentages are rounded to the nearest percentage point. Also, the figures 
for Africa prior to 1995 (column (f)) relate to South Africa. 
With reference to Table 6.7, there appears to be a number of trends in overseas 
markets that are note worthy. Consider first the ranking of the groups. By 1996, 
the largest contributor to overseas net premium income came from the European 
Union, which accounted for approximately 42 percent of overseas business. 
This is no surprise given the political and economic changes that have occurred 
in the last decade. 12 The market shares of the remaining groups are (with the 
relevant percentages being given in parenthesis): USA (28), Australia and New 
Zealand (11), Canada (7), the rest of Europe (4), and Africa (1). `Others' 
12 Out of the many changes that have been brought about, the changes that have been particularly 
instrumental in encouraging growth are the various insurance reforms that have been aimed at 
harmonising insurance regulations in the E. U. 
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accounted for about 7 percent. Most markets, other than the USA, have seen a 
decline in their contributions to U. K. overseas business. For example the decline 
in business in Australia and New Zealand is significant. For this category, 
overseas income fell by around 50 percent over the period of concern. In spite 
of this pattern, total overseas business has continued to rise from 15 percent in 
1986 to 21 percent by 1996. This is accounted for largely by the strong overseas 
performance in the European Union as well as in the USA. 
A breakdown of the contributions made by the respective European Union 
countries to the U. K. long-term premium income is given in Table 6.8. This 
table details the country share within the E. U. overseas market as a whole. In 
order to place these proportions within some context the amount of net-premium 
income generated by the E. U. as a whole is also provided for comparison. 
Table 6.8. E. U. Long-Term Insurance Net Premium Income by Country 
Year Total Net 
Premium 
Income from 
the E. U. (£m) 
(a) 
France 
b) 
Netherlands 
(c) 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Germany Denmark 
_ 
Spain 
(8) 
Italy 
(h) 
Belgium 
G)__ý 
__ 1986 1193 12 35 31 16 4 1 0 2 
1987 1378 13 32 34 15 3 1 0 2 
1988 1372 16 34 27 13 3 4 0 2 
1989 1797 19 34 31 10 3 1 0 2 
1990 1995 22 35 27 9 3 2 1 2 
1991 2366 23 34 25 9 4 4 1 1 
1992 2800 26 23 21 10 7 4 2 1 
1993 3022 23 30 20 11 8 4 2 1 
1994 3881 34 26 15 10 8 4 3 1 
1995 4654 39 23 12 10 6 4 3 1 
1996 5718 48 18 11 8 6 4 4 1 
Source: The Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 5. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: Columns (b) to (j) expressed as a percentage of the total European Union business in 
each year that contributes to the U. K. premium income (see column (a)). Total net 
premium income from the E. U. countries is given in column (a). 
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Table 6.8 confirms the significant growth in net premium income from the E. U., 
1986-1996. In the last year of the period under discussion income grew by 
around 22 percent over the previous year. Within the context of a rising 
premium income from the E. U., France has seen its share increase drastically. In 
1986, France accounted for 12 percent of E. U. income, yet by 1996 this amount 
had increased four-fold to 48 percent. Against this background, there has been a 
drastic fall in the contributions made by the Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland 
and Germany. These respective countries have seen decreases in their market 
shares of between one-third and one-half over the period. By contrast, Spain and 
Italy have seen moderate increases in their contributions, with both their 
respective market shares rising to 4 percent of E. U. premium income in 1996. 
While much can be said for the significance of the overseas market as a whole, it 
is important to stress the role of overseas markets to individual U. K. life 
insurers. What becomes clear is that fact that the life earnings of U. K. life 
insurers are becoming increasingly dependent upon the performance of overseas 
markets. In addition, the growth of insurance companies has occurred largely as 
a result of expanding overseas markets. In 1996, the number one ranked life 
insurer in terms of world wide life business received overseas premium income 
of £4.2 billion (see Table 6.9). This amount had grown 59 percent over a 
previous 4-year period. 
Growth in overseas markets has remained strong for many other large insurance 
companies. Table 6.9 summarises the contribution of overseas earnings within a 
context of growing world life assurance premium income. This table 
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demonstrates that for U. K. life insurers, overseas life earnings account for a 
significant volume of their total life business; for example, four of the insurers 
have overseas income accounting for more than 40 percent of their total income. 
Table 6.9. Overseas Life Net Premium Income- Percentage of Total Company 
Premium Income, 1992-1996 
Company 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Prudential (1) 39 35 43 42 43 
Commercial Union (3) 65 69 76 82 79 
Royal & Sun Alliance (7 ) n/a n/a n/a n/a 38 
Standard Life (2) 21 21 15 22 19 
Norwich Union (4) 32 26 44 30 26 
Legal & General (5) 18 18 23 23 19 
Eagle Star (15) 34 35 41 50 52 
Guardian Royal 27 29 38 45 44 
Exchange(16) 
Clerical Medical (10) 9 10 12 13 21 
General Accident (8) 27 29 22 19 15 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report, (September 1997). 
Table 10b. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: All figures expressed as a percentage. Figure in parenthesis represents the ranking of the 
UK insurer in terms of its worldwide life business in 1996. 
Another pattern to note with respect to Table 6.9 is that the contribution of 
overseas income varies greatly across the insurers. In 1996, for example, 
Commercial Union, ranked 3, gained 79 percent of its life business from 
overseas business, while Standard Life, ranked 2, only saw 19 percent of its life 
business come from overseas income. 
There also appears to be a number of dynamic effects present within the above 
table. Amongst the smaller insurers, for example Eagle Star and Guardian Royal 
Exchange, there has been a tendency for the percentage of overseas life business 
to increase greatly over the period 1992-1996. By contrast, the proportion of 
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overseas life income received by the larger insurers has remained relatively 
constant for the greater part of the period under consideration. 
6.6 The Number and Size Distribution of Insurers 
An examination of industry structure must, by definition, include an account of 
the number and nature of firms within the life assurance industry. There are 
many reasons for providing such an account both on theoretical and pragmatic 
grounds. Typically an industry is defined in terms of its firms, and it is the 
relative size and distribution of these firms that is usually the focus of theorising 
in microeconomic theory. Indeed an examination of market shares and firm 
market concentration will enable conclusions to be drawn on market conditions 
and the competitive processes that may or may not exist within the life assurance 
industry. As a consequence of this, a judgement about economic welfare might 
also be made. Also, information of this kind will be instrumental to an 
understanding of industry conduct and performance. 
A further point to note relates to the public interest and regulation of life 
assurance. As outlined in previous sections, the importance of various life 
assurance products to the personal sector is significant and increasing. The 
growth in substantive contracts, such as mortgage payment plans and personal 
pension plans, makes the future wealth in the personal sector heavily reliant 
upon the performance of insurance funds. Moreover, with the growth of 
insurance funds, the contribution of insurance companies to the economy at large 
is critical, since insurance funds represent a significant source of capital for trade 
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and industry. Thus, the regulatory implications of market concentration are 
clear. Market concentration must therefore be seen as a useful source of 
information in designing regulatory strategies. 
In order to provide an account of industry firms and their respective size 
distribution, a variety of data will be presented. Discussion proceeds with an 
examination of firm authorisations, followed by an account of the firm size 
distribution within the life assurance industry. Use will be made of 
concentration ratios and a statistical summary produced in the form of a Lorenz 
Curve will also be presented. 
In previous sections, distinctions were made between various insurance markets. 
As a point of departure for discussion, it is worth noting the breakdown of firms 
along different market lines. Information on this is derived from the Department 
of Trade and Industry in its annual report on the insurance industry. 17 Insurance 
Company authorisation is granted along product lines, as defined in the 
Insurance Companies Act of 1982 (see Chapter 2). There are seven product 
classes in long-term business and eighteen classes in general insurance. 
Typically, an insurance company is authorised to conduct general insurance, or 
long-term insurance, or both forms of insurance. Where an insurer conducts 
both forms of business it is referred to as a `composite' insurer. Table 6.10 
provides details on the total number of insurance company authorisations. 
17 The responsibility for producing an annual report on the insurance industry now rests with the 
Financial Services Authority. 
241 
Table 6.10. Authorised Insurers 
Year General Only Life Only Composite Total 
1986 550 215 69 834 
1987 557 213 68 838 
1988 564 209 65 838 
1989 562 206 64 832 
1990 570 203 64 837 
1991 570 202 64 836 
1992 565 196 62 823 
1993 575 194 59 828 
1994 573 191 57 821 
1995 594 174 58 826 
1996 578 177 59 814 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996 
Table 113. London: Association of British Insurers. 
The total number of authorisations in the U. K. has remained relatively constant 
over the period 1986-1996. The number of authorised general insurers has 
grown from 550 in 1986 to 578 in 1996. The number of long-term life 
authorisations has fallen in the period by 38 to stand at 177 in 1996. Composite 
insurers have also seen their numbers decline from 69 to 59. The breakdown of 
authorisations for U. K. and foreign insurance companies is given in Figure 6.6. 
Figure 6.6. Authorised U. K. and Foreign Insurers 
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Sources: (a) Association of British Insurers. 1997a. The Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986- 
1996. London: Association of British Insurers. 
(b) Department of Trade and Industry. 1997. Insurance Annual Report 1996. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
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Figure 6.6 shows that the number of authorised foreign insurers is comparatively 
small in all three classes. The total number of U. K. and foreign authorised 
insurers amounted to 658 and 156 respectively (Association of British Insurers 
1997a, 75). The most active market in which foreign insurers operate is in the 
general insurance market where foreign insurers account for 23 percent. Note 
that such numbers must be placed in the context of market share. As noted in 
previous sections, foreign insurers accounted for around one quarter of life 
business in the U. K. in 1996 (Association of British Insurers 1997a, 29). 
As a supplement to the totals presented above, Table 6.11 provides details on life 
insurer authorisations across product categories for the period 1986-1996. 
Table 6.11. Number of Insurers Authorised for Each Class of Insurance 
Business 
Year Life and 
Annuity 
Marriage and 
Birth 
Linked Long 
Term 
Permanent 
Health 
Capital 
Redemption 
Pension Fund 
Management 
1986 285 264 280 274 264 272 
1987 283 259 277 272 258 266 
1988 277 251 270 265 250 258 
1989 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1990 273 239 204 261 238 248 
1991 268 232 199 256 230 240 
1992 262 223 191 250 221 233 
1993 257 217 185 243 215 228 
1994 244 208 234 236 207 217 
1995 240 200 229 230 199 209 
1996 293 192 225 228 192 203 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 1997. Insurance Annual Report 1996. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
Note: Authorisations quoted as at end of year. Figures for 1989 were not available at time of 
data collection. 
Within the context of a growing insurance market, it can be seen that the number 
of authorised insurers for each individual class of insurance is falling for every 
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insurance category except life and annuity. At this stage, without additional 
information, it is difficult to determine whether the patterns are a result of exit, 
entry, and/or consolidation of insurance businesses. It should be stressed that 
counts in the columns of Table 6.11 do not necessarily represent different 
insurers. In many cases an insurer is authorised to conduct business in all 
categories (Department of Trade and Industry 1997). 
Another distinction to be made is in defining insurance companies in terms of 
their ownership. In particular, insurers may be defined as mutual or proprietary 
companies. Mutual insurers are companies that are owned solely by the 
policyholders and whose objective is to maximise the wealth of these individuals 
though bonus declarations and life fund surpluses. Proprietary life companies 
are owned by policyholders and shareholders and issue their own share capital. 
Mutual companies are in the minority accounting for roughly 1 in 7 insurers in 
1996 (Department of Trade and Industry 1997,14). 
While much can be said about the breakdown of mutual and proprietary life 
insurers, it is also important to consider the extent of interlocking ownership of 
shares of life insurance companies. If a significant amount of insurance 
companies' investments are geared towards other insurance companies, then the 
role and importance of solvency regulations may be less clear, since insurance 
companies will have a direct interest in maintaining the financial well being of 
each other. That is, in effect there would be a mutual insurer function operating 
across all companies. 
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ownership of other insurance companies. From the table it can be seen that there 
is a significant variation in the amount invested by the insurance company into 
affiliates; for example, Norwich Union and Standard Life both invest over 2 
percent of their total investments in affiliates while Nat-West life and American 
Life invest 0 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. These proportions compare 
with a sample average of 0.9 percent. Note that specific information on the 
breakdown of share ownership was not available. 
Table 6.12. Asset Holdings in Other Insurance Companies - Evidence from the 
Largest Insurers in the UK (1998). 
Name of Insurance Company Proportion of Total Investments made up be 
Investments in Otherlnsurance Companies (%) 
American Life Insurance Company 0.2 
AXA Sun Life PLC 0.5 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society 0.4 
Legal & General Assurance Society 0.5 
National Westminster Life Assurance Ltd. 0.0 
Norwich Union Life & Pensions 2.5 
The Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. 0.9 
Scottish Equitable PLC 0.5 
Scottish Widows' Fund & Life Assurance Society 1.2 
The Standard Life Assurance Co. Ltd. 2.1 
Source: Standard & Poor's (1998). 
As Standard & Poor's note, much of the investments in other insurance 
companies are in affiliate companies; for example, the Legal & general 
Insurance Company is the majority shareholder in Legal & General Fund 
Management (Standard & Poor's 1998,77). That is, the investments in other 
insurance companies appears to be the result of `within group' strategic 
management considerations - this is especially the case with the growth in the 
number of insurance/financial services groups - rather than any bias in overall 
investment allocation decisions. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the 
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regulator suggests that whilst the members of a given insurance group may have 
an incentive to maintain the financial strength of other members within that 
group (the strategic management considerations), there is little evidence to 
suggest the operation of wider share ownership amongst other insurance 
companies. 
While much has been said on the number of insurers operating in the life 
assurance industry, it is important to understand the associated size distribution 
of companies. Defining insurance company size is a complex task. There is 
some ambiguity associated with measuring insurer size. Size can be defined in 
terms of a variety of measures including total premiums written, total sums 
assured, the life fund size, and the total new business written (Franklin and 
Woodhead 1980). There is no `right' or `wrong' measure and it is for this reason 
that caution must be attached to any subsequent conclusion. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting the Lorenz relationship in Figure 6.7 
below. This graph determines the extent of equality between two distributions, 
the number of insurers, and the new business written. Although data was only 
available up until 1992, it helps provide an indication of market concentration. 
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Figure 6.7. A Lorenz Curve Relationship between New Business and the 
Number of Insurers (1992) 
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Sources: (a) Post Magazine. 1994. The Post Magazine Insurance Directory. 
London: Post Magazine. 
(b) Department of Trade and Industry. 1992. Insurance Company Annual 
Returns. London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
With reference to Figure 6.7, there are two relationships present. The forty-five 
degree line represents the so-called `line of equality'. This is a hypothetical 
relationship that would be present if there were an equal distribution of new 
business amongst all insurers in the industry. The greater the movement away 
from this equality line, the greater the inequality between the two distributions. 
It will be noted that there is a substantial inequality between new business 
written in 1992 and the distribution of insurers. This gives some indication of 
what to expect regarding concentration ratios and the distribution of market 
shares across the industry. In particular, the above pattern is evidence of a few 
insurers accounting for a disproportionately large amount of new business in the 
life assurance industry. 
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Consider next the insurance company concentration ratios. There is a 
voluminous literature concerning the measurement of industrial concentration. 
Most of this work concerns the construction of an appropriate index to capture 
industrial concentration (see Stigler (1968), Adelman (1969), Davies (1979) and 
Geroski (1983)). The k firm concentration ratio is a frequently adopted indicator 
of market structure. This measures the ratio of k firm market shares to total 
market size. The result can give an indication of the extent of market power and 
dominance of an individual firm or group of dominant firms. For alternative 
measures of industrial concentration, such as the Herfindahl index, see Kwoka 
(1985). 
It is already known that a large number of insurers operate within the life 
assurance industry. At first sight this might be taken as a depiction of a 
relatively competitive market structure, yet it is the relative sizes of the firms 
across this number of insurers that matters. The relative size measure gives an 
indicator of market power and, with the use of microeconomic theory, it can then 
be used to predict associated welfare losses or gains (see Martin (1993)). 
Table 6.13 provides details of the market concentration of the top 10 long-term 
U. K. registered insurance companies for 1996. As already noted, there are a 
variety of means with which to measure the relative market size. Due to the 
availability of data, worldwide net premium income will be adopted as a 
measure of size. Total premiums have been used in previous studies of the life 
assurance industry (Richards and Colenutt 1975,155). 
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Table 6.13. Concentration Ratios of the 
Leading 10 Long-Term Life Assurance Companies in 1996 
Rank of Company 1996 Worldwide % Share of 
Life Net Premium Total 
Companies Income £m Premiums 
Cumulative Share 
of Total Premiums 
% 
1 Prudential Assurance 9152 13.76% 13.76% 
2 Standard Life Assurance 4253 6.40% 20.16% 
3 Commercial Union Assurance 3669 5.52% 25.68% 
4 Norwich Union Life & Pensions 3517 5.29% 30.97% 
5 Legal & General Assurance 2837 4.27% 35.23% 
Society 
6 Equitable Life Assurance 2830 4.26% 39.49% 
Society 
7 Royal & Sun Alliance 2545 3.83% 43.32% 
8 Scottish Equitable plc 1919 2.89% 46.20% 
9 General Accident Fire & Life 1848 2.78% 48.98% 
Assurance Corporation plc 
10 Sun Life Assurance Society plc 1715 2.58% 51.56% 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 124. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: All company results presented as a percentage of to tal net premium income in 1996. 
Cumulative share of the top k firms yields group concentration ratio. 
A difficulty that is associated with the above calculations is that the worldwide 
premium income measure includes overseas business. Thus, insurer size and 
total market size are an overestimate of the sizes in respect of the U. K. market 
alone. However, given the fact that the majority of life insurer business comes 
from the U. K. market, it is believed that in spite of these problems a meaningful 
result can be still gained by using this data. 18 
With reference to Table 6.13, it can be seen that the top 10 insurance companies 
accounted for more than half of premium income in 1996. The largest individual 
share goes to the Prudential, which accounts for approximately 14 percent of the 
total. The three-firm concentration ratio accounts for one quarter of net premium 
income, while the top 5 companies account for over 35 percent. It is also worth 
'S U. K. net premium income accounted for just fewer than 80 percent of the worldwide total in 
1996 (Association of British Insurers 1997a). 
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noting the 20 firm concentration ratio equals just fewer than 70 percent of total 
net premium income (Association of British Insurers 1997,79). 
What is the regulatory implication of the results presented in Table 6.13? In 
order to assess the regulatory implications, it is necessary to resort to some form 
of yardstick against which to compare the above results. Einhorn (1964) 
proposes a yardstick that requires a four-firm concentration ratio to be no greater 
than 50 percent, assuming that insurance may be classified as a four-digit 
industry (Einhorn 1964,43). Based on this yardstick, insurance would therefore 
pass the regulatory test. 
6.7 Entry into the UK Life Assurance Industry 
Entry and exit into an industry is another major aspect of industry structure. 
This aspect of industry structure is another indicator of the extent of competition 
and the associated economic welfare. Entry and exit provides evidence of the 
pricing policy and cost structure of incumbents and the consequent `height' of 
any potential barriers to entry (see Bain (1956), Stigler (1968), Demsetz (1982) 
and von Weizsäcker (1980) for discussion of entry barriers). Note that entry and 
exit conditions may be evaluated in conjunction with the theory of contestable 
markets in order to provide some guidelines on government intervention (see 
Baumol (1982)). 
Barriers to entry bring about an imbalance in costs between the potential entrant 
and the incumbent: a potential entrant's unit cost is greater than the cost 
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associated with that of any incumbent firm. There are a few reasons that may 
help to explain this phenomenon (Bain 1956). Use will be made of the U. K. life 
assurance industry to illustrate these possible explanations before providing 
some empirical evidence on entry. 
The theories that have attempted to explain the so-called barriers to entry have 
done so by making reference to the cost structures of firms. The commonly 
referred to theories concern absolute cost disadvantages and economies of scale 
(Bain 1956,15-16). Absolute cost disadvantages come in a variety of forms. 
Incumbents will, for example, possess significant know-how and experience in 
the processing and organisation of life assurance. Experience in underwriting 
activities will provide invaluable information in making suitable solvency 
provisions. However, the exact size of the cost disadvantage faced by the 
potential entrant is difficult to quantify. 
Economies of scale might also be expected to exist within the life assurance 
industry (for recent empirical studies of economies of scale in the U. K. life 
assurance industry see Hardwick (1994)). Many insurance companies have 
centralised their operations in underwriting, investment and marketing. Thus, 
for example, investment management expenses will be expected to be lower per 
policy unit for larger insurance companies, since investment managers are able 
to pool investment funds and diversify investment risk. Also, note that the larger 
insurers will be able to offset a surge in claims more easily than that of a 
potential entrant. 
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Regulatory or legal barriers are another barrier to entry. Such constraints are of 
great importance when attempting to understand entry into the U. K. life 
assurance industry. The Insurance Companies Act of 1982 sets out the standards 
by which insurance companies must be regulated. In particular, insurance 
companies have to gain `authorisation' in order to engage in insurance business. 
Authorisation is defined in terms of a number of standards in respect of company 
solvency and management conduct (see Chapter 2). The solvency capital 
regulations impose a cost upon insurers and this, together with the annual 
regulatory reviews, imposes important restrictions upon insurers. 19 Note that 
Demsetz (1982) is critical of the whole notion of entry barriers and argues that it 
reflects a failure to define costs correctly (Demsetz 1982,56). 
Having set out some of the potential barriers to entry (especially the legal 
restrictions), consider Table 6.14, which sets out the changes in authorisations 
over the past 10 years. This is similar to the information provided in Table 6.10. 
In Table 6.14, column (a) and (b) represent the total authorisations for domestic 
and overseas insurers. These totals are the net outcome for the year and as such 
include authorisation withdrawals and new authorisations. To provide some 
evidence of new authorisations column (c) is also included. For both foreign and 
U. K. insurers the total number of authorisations has declined over the period. 
This might be the result of exit and/or consolidation and take-over. Within this 
trend there has been a constant influx of new entrants to the industry, although 
this clearly has not been enough to stop the fall in the headline total of 
authorisations. 
19 Other barriers to entry, such as buyer loyalty, will also be important. 
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Table 6.14. Entry to the UK Life Assurance Industry 
Year Total UK Life 
(a) 
Total Foreign Life 
(b) 
New Life Company Authorisation 
(c) 
1986 193(n/a) 22(n/a) 3(0) 
1987 191(-2) 22(0) 3(4) 
1988 195(+4) 14(-8) 1(1) 
1989 190(-5) 14(0) n/a 
1990 190(0) 15(+1) 9(0) 
1991 187(-3) 15(0) 4(0) 
1992 182(-5) 14(-1) 3(2) 
1993 180(-2) 14(0) 4(0) 
1994 173(-7) 18(+4) 4(2) 
1995 160(-13) 14(-4) 6(2) 
1996 163(+3) 14(0) 7(2) 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 113. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Notes: Columns (a) and (c) show the total number of long-term company authorisations both 
domestic and foreign . 
Figures in brackets show the change on the previous year. 
Column (c) shows th e number of new authorisations for the year. The figure in brackets 
relates to re-issued authorisation where authorisation has lapsed. 
In order to provide a full account of entry and hence arrive at an adequate 
conclusion vis-ä-vis government intervention, further details are required in 
respect of the type of entrant firms and the nature of exit from the industry. 
These standards are difficult to achieve within the scope of this paper and are 
restricted by available data. 20 However, the evidence presented above provides 
an initial indication of contestability. 
6.8 Summary 
In terms of the structure of the U. K. life assurance industry, there are many 
indicators by which to measure industrial structure. It is clear that the life 
20 In providing a full regulatory account, the desirability of government intervention can be 
discussed with reference to a two-part test, along the lines set out by Joskow and Klevorick 
(1979). 
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industry has undergone a dramatic change over the last century as a result of 
many factors not least those of product innovation and premium affordability. 
With respect to the insurance companies, the firm size distribution provides 
evidence of modest industrial concentration. The significance of the life 
assurance industry as a whole cannot be understated and, as Chapter 8 will 
demonstrate, the implications for the macro-economy are significant. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CONDUCT OF THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY 
7.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered some aspects of industry structure relating to 
the U. K. life assurance industry. Continuing with the structure-conduct- 
performance (SCP) theme, this chapter considers some of the aspects of 
industrial conduct. The SCP notion of conduct refers to the operating objectives 
pursued within the industry and the delivery vehicles that are available for the 
attainment of these objectives. As such, industrial conduct refers, in part, to the 
organisational structure of the firm and the relative importance of managerial 
objectives versus profit maximisation objectives. Given that insurance 
companies facilitate the smooth functioning of the economy at large, there might 
also be a public duty function to consider within the assessment of life assurance 
industrial conduct. 
The evaluation of market conduct by empirical means is subject to a variety of 
constraints. Empirical work is limited by commercial sensitivity, and ambiguity 
associated with objective definitions. The result is often an incomplete and 
therefore unsatisfactory evaluation of firm conduct within a given industry. 
However, it is possible to gauge some aspects of industrial conduct through a 
number of data sources, provided for the most part by the annual reports of the 
regulator (see, the Financial Services Authority (1999)). 
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Having established the background to assessing insurer conduct, it is worth 
noting the voluminous theoretical literature on market behaviour. Economic 
theory provides a detailed account of the setting of prices within a max/min 
framework (for examples of alternative conduct specifications within a SCP 
setting see Cowling (1976), and Cowling and Waterson (1976)). Work has also 
focused on a number of accounts of non-price competition (see Beath and 
Katsoulacos (1991)). Managerial theories of the firm provide an alternative 
framework from within which to view firm conduct (see Baumol (1958), Marris 
(1964), and Williamson (1963) for examples). 
In line with this theoretical framework a brief overview of the price setting 
behaviour of life insurers will be provided in Section 7.1, outlining the unique 
function of the actuary in the price setting behaviour of insurance companies. 
This is followed by an examination of insurer marketing policy in Section 7.2. 
While it is not possible to obtain readily information on insurance company 
objectives (such as through the use of questionnaires), it is useful to review some 
of the outcomes relating to insurer portfolio holdings; this is another aspect of 
conduct and is the basis of Section 7.3. Section 7.4 considers the incentives for 
marketing life assurance and this is followed by a summary in Section 7.5. 
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasise the significance of ownership 
structure to understanding life insurer conduct. As noted in the previous chapter, 
the ownership of life assurance companies falls into two classifications: mutual 
life insurers, and proprietary life insurers. Recall that mutual insurers are owned 
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exclusively by the policyholders while proprietary life insurers are owned by 
shareholders in addition to policyholders. 
While both policyholders and shareholders aim to maximise their respective 
wealth, policyholders are likely to have slightly different operating requirements 
to those of shareholders. Policyholders aim to maximise their wealth as 
measured in terms of life fund surplus and bonus declarations. Thus, in the case 
of a mutual insurer all excess returns are reinvested for the benefit of 
policyholders. By contrast, shareholders aim to maximise return on capital and 
require a certain proportion of this excess return paid out immediately in terms 
of a dividend. The dividend payment detracts from the size and frequency of 
any bonus declarations, and thus the accumulation of policyholder wealth. 
Therefore, it is clear that the conduct of insurance companies will be contingent, 
at least in part, on the ownership structure of the company. 
In addition to the ownership structure there is the issue of control, especially the 
separation of ownership from management control. A conflict may occur 
between the objectives of the owners (be they policyholders or shareholders) and 
the objectives of managers and this is a further factor to consider in relation to 
any discussion of industrial conduct (see, Barnard (1938), and Drucker (1946)). 
7.1 Price-Setting Objectives and the Function of the Actuary 
Central to the insurance company's operations, most notably its price-setting 
behaviour, is the assessment of the underwriting risk that any given insurance 
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company faces. This responsibility falls with the Actuary of the company. The 
Actuary imposes constraints upon the price setting behaviour of insurers and 
their associated objective function. In agreeing to assume the risk of a given life 
contract, the insurance company faces the potential of a significant cash outflow 
in the form of a policy claim. The estimation of this risk (that is, the probability 
of a claim) is of critical importance to the subsequent performance of the 
insurance company, as measured by its profitability and solvency. The 
assessment of this risk, and hence the function of the Actuary, are of direct 
importance to the policyholders and/or shareholders, as well as the market as a 
whole since reputation effects might lead, in the limit, to a crisis in consumer 
confidence (Akerlof 1970). 
The likelihood of a claim will affect the price (premium) charged. Thus, while 
an insurance company may be engaged in a price setting strategy that requires 
the maximisation of ownership wealth, this objective is subject to a risk 
constraint. Note that historically, one of the greatest risks to insurer solvency 
has come from premiums being set too low, thereby making an inadequate 
provision for claims (Finsinger and Pauly 1986). As a consequence of the 
significance of the Actuary to insurer conduct, an overview of the actuarial 
function within the insurer price setting process will be presented. 
For all types of annuity and life contracts, the process of actuarial premium 
determination is basically the same. To illustrate this fact, assume that the 
contract expenses and profits are normalised to zero. The net premium is then 
made up of the expected value of the loss and the necessary savings 
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contribution. ' Consider first the expected value of the loss. This is assessed 
from the so-called `life tables'. Life tables provide probabilities of surviving a 
given number of years for a `representative' individual of a given age in the U. K. 
(Government Actuary's Department 1994). 2 A life table reveals information on 
the number of individuals existing at time t surviving to time, t+n. The life table 
shows that the expectation of years to live declines with age. Variations in life 
expectancy will therefore occur over time, but also over the characteristics of the 
individual- see Table 7.1 below. 
Table 7.1. Expectation of Life at Birth According to Death Rates 
Assumed for 1994,2001 and 2031 
Males Females 
Region: 
1994 2001 2031 1994 2001 2031 
England 74.1 75.4 78.5 79.4 80.4 83.4 
Wales 73.9 75.2 78.2 79.2 80.2 83.2 
Scotland 72.1 73.5 76.7 77.5 78.6 81.8 
Northern Ireland 72.9 74.3 77.3 78.5 79.5 82.5 
United Kingdom 73.9 75.2 78.3 79.2 80.2 83.2 
Source: Government Actuary's Department. 1994. National Population Projections. Table 
5.4. London: Government's Actuary's Department. 
Note: All figures in years. 
Table 7.1 highlights the greater life expectancy of women when compared with 
men, and also that the life expectancy overall is increasing over time. In 
addition, there is evidence of regional variation in life expectancy with the 
English having the greater regional life expectancy within the U. K. While life 
expectancy may vary across groups, there exists one common pattern: the 
premium charged for a given level of life cover will necessarily increase with the 
age of the policyholder in order to cover the fall in life expectancy. 
1 Recall from Chapter 6, a savings element is required for `substantive' life assurance policies. 
2 Life expectancies will be expected to vary according to the background of the individual; for 
example, life expectancy might be expected to vary across country and region. 
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F- 
Further to the role of life expectancy in calculating a premium, the Actuary must 
also assess the expected returns on the assets of the investment portfolio. The 
rate of return that the Actuary expects to receive on the insurer's assets will 
directly affect the savings contribution required for substantive policies. Ceteris 
paribus, the higher the expected return the lower the premium required. 
Thus, with respect to the function of the Actuary, it can be seen that there are 
two informational requirements in order to determine the actuarial provision for 
premium setting; namely, the life table and the expected return. These two 
components are used, together with their associated assumptions, to construct the 
appropriate `monetary functions'. These functions exist for each contract type 
and calculate the net premium per £1 of cover (Franklin and Woodhead 1980). 3 
In practice, there are a number of additions to the net premium charged. These 
are centred on the expenses of the insurance contract. 4 Expenses may come in 
many forms, they may be specific to the size of the sum assured and premium, as 
well as varying according to the contract type and investment basis (for example, 
whether the contract is unit-linked or with-profit). In addition to any implicit 
profit margins, there will be an explicit profit charge in order to generate an 
adequate return to the shareholders (in the case of a proprietary life insurer). 
3 Monetary functions vary according to the interest rate, the life table, and the contract 
specifications assumed. 
4 It is important to stress that within the Actuary's assessment of the net premium there are likely 
to be `implicit margins'. These implicit margins may be a result of conservative risk 
assessments. 
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A further issue to consider in respect of price setting concerns the insurer 
specific variation in the premiums charged for a given category of risk. While 
there are standard life tables publicised by the government, an insurer will 
typically rely on the use of its own mortality estimates (Franklin and Woodhead 
1980). These life tables are usually built up as a direct result of the insurer's 
own claims experience. This provides some explanation for the variation in 
premium rates charged within the industry. Table 7.2 provides information on 
the quoted premiums for a low cost with-profits endowment. 
Table 7.2. Insurance Company Variation in Monthly Premium Rates for Low 
Cost With Profits Endowments 1998 
Company Assumed % Growth ANB 20yrs ANB ANB ANB 
30yrs 40yrs 50yrs 
Abbey National 7.50% 69.33 69.98 75.18 92.83 
Clerical Medical 7.50% 78.38 80.48 89.57 113.39 
Colonial 7.50% 80.84 80.99 85.99 103.04 
Commercial Union 7.50% 73.5 74.5 81 99.5 
Equitable Life 7.50% 65.38 65.73 70.31 84.74 
Friends Provident 7.50% 71.41 72.41 78.63 96.73 
GA Life 7.50% 73.5 75.41 81.56 102.71 
Legal & General 7.50% 73.63 73.98 79 94.92 
Liverpool Victoria 7.50% 68.7 69.8 75.4 91.9 
Norwich Union 7.50% 73.89 75.35 83.03 105.82 
RNPFN 7.50% 91.58 91.58 100.17 123.33 
Scottish Mutual 7.50% 80.26 81.29 87.06 106.93 
Scottish Provident 7.50% 74.4 74.93 78.73 91.14 
Scottish Widows 7.50% 76.36 76.86 81.89 97.74 
Sun Life 7.50% 76.06 77.08 84.99 110.98 
Maximum Premium 91.58 91.58 100.17 123.33 
Minimum Premium 65.38 65.73 70.31 84.74 
Mean Premium 75.148 76.02467 82.16733 101.0467 
Standard Deviation 6.187424 6.087899 7.058645 9.987259 
Source: Money Facts. 1998. Life & Pensions Money Facts. Page 14. London: Money Facts. 
Note: Premiums quoted in pounds for each `age-next-birthday' (ANB). The individual for 
whom the quote is provided is a male, non-smoker requiring a sum assured of £50,000. 
Table 7.2 shows that there is significant variation in the premiums charged for an 
identical risk class. For all ages, there is a spread of over twenty pounds 
between the largest and lowest premiums charged, and this amount increases 
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with the age of the life assured. Given the data in Chapter 6 on the largest life 
insurers in the U. K., it would appear that the lowest premiums are consistent 
with the larger life companies, for example Equitable Life posts the lowest rate 
for all ages of the life assured. The variation in prices posted suggests the 
existence of non-price competition and product differentiation. As such, the 
conduct of life assurance companies (as illustrated in Table 7.2) suggests that 
insurers are seeking to differentiate their product in the search for monopoly 
rents. This argument is the conclusion of the so-called `spatial models' of 
imperfect competition (see for example, Hotelling (1929)). More evidence for 
this form of conduct will be given in the discussion of life assurance marketing 
in the U. K. (see Section 7.2). 
Another pattern to emerge from Table 7.2 is the effect of life expectancy upon 
the premium charged. This age effect is especially evident when analysing the 
premium increment for different age groups- such as comparing the premium 
increment between 40 and 50 years of age with the premium increment between 
20 and 30 years of age. Table 7.2 demonstrates that this increment is increasing 
with age. As a consequence, the standard deviation about the mean premium 
rates is also increasing with the age group. 
The differences in premium rates charged might be explained by the variation in 
company mortality experiences, and also the company specific experiences 
associated with the expected return on assets. 5 These company specific 
5 Note that for comparison, the insurance companies presented in Table 7.2 assume the same rate 
of growth for the accumulation of the savings fund. In many cases, insurance companies do not 
have the same assumed growth rate (Money Facts 1998). 
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variations may therefore affect the future provisions of the insurance company, 
which in turn will affect the premium charged. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting the size of some of the different expense 
categories. Table 7.3 shows the relative size of commission payments in respect 
of other expenses associated with ordinary life assurance business. In particular, 
the breakdown between management expenses and taxation is shown. 
Table 7.3. Long Term Expenditure 
£m 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Expenditure associated with 
U. K. long-term contracts: 
Management Expenses 4978 4911 5149 5141 5416 
Commissions 2671 2794 2621 2318 2562 
Taxation 1030 1590 959 2374 2711 
Source: The Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996 
Table 8. London: Association of British Insurers. 
With respect to Table 7.3, in 1996 commissions accounted for just over £2.5 
billion, an increase of 5.3 percent over the previous year. This amount 
represents just under 5 percent of U. K. net premium income whilst management 
expenses accounted for over 10 percent. This demonstrates the significance of 
these expenses for the insurer, and is also an explanation for the discrepancy 
between the net and gross premium. Thus, there is additional evidence for the 
view that the insurance companies are engaged in a strategy that attempts to 
maximise market share. 
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7.2 Marketing Objectives 
As mentioned, while much can be said about the determination of price within 
an insurance company, the role of non-price competition is also central to the 
overall conduct strategy of the life insurer. Product differentiation and market 
segmentation will allow insurance companies to exploit market opportunities 
fully. The seminal work of Chamberlin (1933) established product 
differentiation within a rigorous theoretical framework, emphasising the 
respective roles of technical and psychological differentiation. The importance 
of brand loyalty and advertising were also emphasised. 
While evidence of technical product differentiation is available, it is more 
difficult to quantify the significance of psychological product differentiation. 
Attention will therefore focus on the observable characteristics of the products 
available in the life assurance industry. 
As discussed previously in Chapter 6, products sold in the life assurance market 
offer many policy options, including policy `add-ons' where a combination of 
policies may be purchased as a bundle. The packaging of insurance benefits into 
a single contract is now a popular feature of the insurance product market; for 
example, Critical Illness Cover (CIC) is offered in conjunction with other 
contracts such as endowment plans and pension plans and is sold more often in 
conjunction with other contracts than as a stand-alone contract (Association of 
British Insurers 1997b). 6 The combination of such plans has lead to a reduction 
6A `stand-alone' contract refers to a policy that is effected for a single benefit, rather than a 
contract sold in conjunction with a number of other insurance benefits. 
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in the combined policy charges, as compared with two separate `stand-alone' 
contracts offering the same level of benefit. 
Another recent product feature to be introduced to the life assurance market is 
that of low-cost payment schemes, where a policy is offered on terms that enable 
the initial premium to start low and increase with each subsequent year to a 
maximum level (typically after 5 years) for the rest of the term. These payment 
plans make life contracts more attractive to those individuals at the margin of 
affordability, thereby supporting the sales growth and market share performance 
of the insurance companies concerned. 
Having outlined briefly the product components of the marketing mix, attention 
now turns to addressing the various sales and distribution channels through 
which insurance companies aim to sell and market their products. Insurance 
companies have five main channels through which to sell their products. These 
marketing channels are differentiated according to whether the insurer sells to 
the consumer directly or indirectly through an intermediary. Table 7.4 sets out 
the new long-term insurance business generated by different distribution 
channels. 
A given insurance company will have a direct sales force, which serves as a 
representative of the insurer. 7 In addition, the insurance company will rely on 
7 Direct sales forces have been in operation for some time now. They have their foundations in 
the nineteenth century when industrial life policies were introduced and insurance contracts were 
effected through door-to-door selling. 
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direct selling and promotion through the use of mailings and so-called `cold 
calling'. 8,9 
Table 7.4. New Long-Term Business by Distribution Channel 
% share of premium 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
New Yearly Premiums- Total individual life and pensio n business 
IFAs: 29 28 30 35 37 
of which Banks 3 1 1 1 1 
Building Societies 1 1 1 1 1 
Independent Companies/brokers 22 23 25 31 33 
Others 4 3 2 2 2 
Company Agents: 68 69 67 62 60 
of which Banks 5 6 12 10 11 
Building Societies 5 4 5 3 3 
Direct Sales Force 48 50 42 42 40 
Tied Agents 10 9 8 7 8 
Direct Selling 2 3 3 3 3 
New Single Premiums- Total individual life and pension business 
IFAs: 56 50 53 59 60 
of which Banks 5 3 2 3 3 
Building Societies 3 3 3 3 2 
Independent Companiesibrokers 41 39 45 49 49 
Others 6 5 4 3 6 
Company Agents: 42 48 45 39 39 
of which Banks 3 7 12 11 11 
Building Societies 3 5 6 4 4 
Direct Sales Force 33 34 24 23 23 
Tied Agents 3 2 2 1 1 
Direct Selling 2 1 2 1 1 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report (Sept. 1997). 
Table 7.3. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Life assurance companies also have the opportunity to channel business through 
tied agents and independent financial advisors (IFAs). Tied agents are appointed 
representatives of the insurance company and are authorised to sell and advise 
on the products of the associated insurance company. Tied agents may include 
8 Details of individuals are readily accessed through consumer databases. 
9 Promotional material is regulated by the Financial Services Act of 1986 (see Chapter 2). 
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banks, building societies and estate agents. By contrast, the IFAs are authorised 
to advise and sell on the products of any insurance company. 
With reference to Table 7.4, the following points are note worthy. Consider first 
the new yearly contracts. Here the insurance company is responsible for 
controlling the majority of new business because at least 60 percent of this new 
business came from company agents in the period 1992-1996. However, the 
proportion of this new business has also been declining over the period. In 
contrast, the proportion of sales accounted for by the IFAs has increased over the 
period from 29 percent in 1992 to 37 percent in 1996. The growth in 
independent companies and brokers appears to be a major factor in explaining 
this trend. While banks and building societies have been able to act as IFAs, the 
information above implies that most of these institutions favour being company 
tied agents instead. 
When turning attention to the single premium contracts, a slightly different 
pattern emerges. Here, unlike yearly premium contracts, the majority of new 
business comes from the IFAs (approximately 60 percent). The independent 
companies/brokers account for approximately one half of new business. 
Company agents still account for a significant volume of new business, roughly 
40 percent in 1996.10 The size of the investment associated with single premium 
contracts may help to explain this trend. The perceived impartiality of IFAs may 
10 The growth in the number of IFAs has lead to a significant amount of rationalisation among 
IFA firms. This has been motivated, at least in part, by the bargaining strength of larger IFAs in 
respect the levels of commission payments that are agreed upon between the IFAs and the life 
assurance companies (The Association of British Insurers 1997,43). 
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appeal more to those individuals seeking to place a large lump sum investment 
than those investing in a more modestly sized regular premium contract. 
In addition to the mainstream distribution channels, there are two relatively new 
marketing channels emerging. Recognising the importance of insurance as 
source of business, banks and building societies have started establishing their 
own life assurance subsidiaries. This area of the life assurance market has come 
to be known as bancassurance. In 1996, bancassurance accounted for 14.5 
percent of new yearly premiums, and 16.3 percent of new single premiums, 
(Association of British Insurers 1997a, 29). 
Another development in the marketing of life assurance has come in the form of 
`execution only' selling. The idea behind `execution only' contracts is to 
circumvent the existing regulations on selling regulated insurance products by 
making the consumer responsible for its decisions within a `buyer-beware' 
provision of the insurance contract. The consumer is therefore expected to take 
full responsibility for what he or she buys. l l 
Commission payments help to promote and maintain distribution channels. 
Table 7.3 illustrated the significance of commission payments to the U. K. life 
assurance industry. Commission payments have been the focus for competition 
11 The responsibility of consumers, in respect of financial contracts, is the focus of recent 
regulatory review by the Financial Services Authority. In particular, there has been a substantial 
amount of lobbying occurring which relates to the issue of whether or not the `buyer-beware' 
clause should be explicitly stated within the upcoming 2000 Financial Services and Markets Bill. 
Consumer groups are opposed to such a move, while the financial services industry (especially 
the insurance industry) claims that consumers must also be held explicitly accountable for the 
enactment of a contract (FSA 1999). 
268 
amongst insurance companies as they compete to gain business referrals. As 
noted, commission payments amounted to £2,562 million in 1996 (Association 
of British Insurers I997a). 
The evidence on marketing provides some useful pointers vis-ä-vis life 
assurance company conduct. In particular, it provides some useful insights into 
the possible incentives that may or may not operate within an insurance 
company. The use of sales commission payments and an elaborate system of 
distribution channels provide an indication of the importance of sales growth to 
insurance companies' objective functions. 
7.3 Portfolio Objectives 
The time lag between premium income and claim outflow and the resulting 
accumulation of funds is specific to life assurance products: life assurance 
companies are uniquely placed to take advantage of such funds, being able to 
take advantage of a long-term investment strategy. As a result of this, portfolio 
management can be seen as an important consideration within a more general 
asset-liability management (ALM) strategy: 
ALM involves the management of risks arising from 
simultaneous effects of financial market moves on both assets and 
liabilities. (Smink and van der Meer 1997,128) 
ALM is therefore central to an understanding of insurer conduct. Moreover, 
ALM strategies provide a useful indicator of the significance of the rate of return 
as an objective for the life assurance industry. 
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Smink and van der Meer (1997) conducted an international survey on life 
assurance ALM management policies. The results cover some 287 insurance 
companies from France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the U. K., and the 
United States. 12 The authors show that most insurers have an active ALM policy 
using a combination of actuarial and financial techniques, although the German 
and Japanese insurance companies appear to be behind most other countries in 
implementing an effective ALM policy (Smink and van der Meer 1997,131). 
In terms of individual ALM strategies, there are a number of points to develop. 
Out of those insurance companies using the ALM techniques, most (over 70 
percent) considered asset/liability projections using scenarios important (Smink 
and van der Meer 1997,132). Other ALM strategies considered included 
investment performance measurement, risk-return analysis, interest rate 
immunization and cashflow matching and these were rated `important' by 70.6 
percent, 47.1 percent, 34.3 percent, and 60.8 percent of the sample respectively 
(Smink and van der Meer 1997,132). Thus, the emphasis is biased in favour of 
investment performance analysis and cashflow matching. This is tentative 
evidence to support the view that it is the investment portfolio and its associated 
performance that is central to an understanding of life assurance company 
solvency. Moreover, the emphasis on investment performance would also imply 
that the rate of return is a very important consideration for insurer conduct (as 
defined in Chapter 5). For those companies who did not heavily promote ALM, 
most justified this approach on the grounds that better models were needed, 
although they also agreed to the need for adequate ALM. In addition, half of 
12 According to Smink and van der Meer (1997), the countries surveyed account for 
approximately 70 percent of world premium income. 
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those who responded claimed that the insurance company regulations were an 
important restriction to effective ALM. The vast majority of companies also 
believed that the capital markets provide a sufficient set of instruments for 
effective ALM. 
In terms of the attitudes of life insurers to risk within an ALM strategy, the risks 
rated important by insurers were credit risks, equity risks and real estate 
investment risks; currency risks were also considered as undesirable (Smink and 
van der Meer 1997,134). Again this result emphasises the role and importance 
of the investment portfolio, rather than the underwriting portfolio, to life insurer 
conduct. Also, what becomes clear out of the work of Smink and van der Meer 
(1997) is the fact that computer scenario testing of financial risks is becoming 
increasingly important to modern insurer ALM. 
The above results provide an indication of the significant considerations that 
insurance companies need to address in constructing an appropriate ALM 
strategy. In particular, useful insights into insurer objectives and constraints are 
made. While rate of return can be seen as a key objective, there is evidence to 
also suggest that this objective be constrained by specific risk considerations and 
that these are well understood within insurer ALM. 
It is worth making a few additional comments at this stage. Given the variation 
in industry structure, objectives and constraints faced by asset/liability managers 
might also be expected to vary; for example, this variation may be cross- 
sectional or dynamic. As mentioned, cross-sectional effects may be reported 
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across the different ownership structures of insurance companies, with the 
objectives of mutual life insurers being different to that of proprietary life 
insurers. By contrast, judicial review and regulatory shift may bring about a 
dynamic effect with new regulations imposing additional constraints on any 
given ALM strategy. 
Having reviewed some of the considerations relating to ALM conduct, it is now 
appropriate to consider the size of insurer portfolio holdings and their 
significance to the wider economy, see Figure 7.1. Unlike other aspects of 
market conduct, there exists a substantial amount of information on the 
composition of long-term insurance investment funds. Long-term funds 
represent, "... the actuarially calculated amounts held against companies' 
liabilities to pay for future claims, " (Association of British Insurers I997a, 70). 
Figure 7.1. Long-Term Insurance Funds (£m) 
. 19-11 Ili, 101P 1: 11111Source: 
Association of British Insurers. 1997a. The Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 108. London: Association of British Insurers. 
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Figure 7.1 demonstrates the nominal growth in long-term insurance funds over 
the period 1986-1996. Over this period funds have grown four-fold with the 
growth in the 1996 being in excess of 10 percent, a significant real increase. 13 
In order to obtain an idea of the portfolio holdings of U. K. insurance companies, 
Table 7.5 also provides a breakdown of insurer investments held by asset class, 
with the value of total assets held by insurers for the period 1986-1995. It is 
evident that insurance companies engage in a variety of investment activities 
within the risk/return space; total assets for 1995 accounted for over £500 
billion. This confirms the significance of long-term funds as an institutional 
investor. 
In terms of the cross-sectional analysis, insurance companies can be seen to 
invest significantly overseas in addition to their domestic holdings. The 
importance of equities to the insurance companies' investment portfolio is clear 
with 44 percent of asset market value being made up of equities in 1995. This 
contrasts with public sector securities that account for approximately 20 percent 
of the total gross asset value. 
Table 7.5 also illustrates the significant insurer holdings in property and 
mortgages that account together for nearly 10 percent of total assets. Note that 
short-term assets account for approximately 6 percent of asset market value. 
Note also that total investments account for over 90 percent of total assets and 
13 The difference between the total value of long-term funds and the market value of total 
investment funds can be used as a proxy for the reserves held by insurance companies (Franklin 
and Woodhead 1980). 
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that this proportion has remained constant over the period. This clearly serves to 
highlight the importance of investment activities to the solvency position of the 
insurance company. 
Table 7.5. Insurance Companies' Asset Holdings as a Percentage (%) of 
Total Assets 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
ASSET 
CLASS: 
UK Public 20.39 20.63 17.73 10.83 13.67 13.68 16.18 17.44 17.02 17.02 
Sector 
Securities 
Overseas 2.37 2.05 2.12 2.11 2.78 2.96 3.58 2.90 2.59 2.70 
Securities 
UK Equity 36.12 35.88 35.72 39.25 37.56 40.06 41.19 43.71 43.65 44.44 
Unit Trusts 7.18 7.36 7.84 8.98 7.77 8.29 7.47 7.73 6.48 6.81 
Overseas 10.25 7.62 8.18 10.85 8.48 9.92 9.55 10.89 11.22 11.38 
Equity 
Loans and 2.90 3.19 3.10 2.87 3.34 2.77 2.53 1.86 1.77 1.53 
mortgages 
Investments 12.93 14.44 15.94 15.38 14.23 11.27 8.91 7.60 8.45 6.84 
in Fixed 
Assets 
Other 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.52 0.51 0.87 0.31 
Investments 
Total 92.27 91.27 90.75 90.51 88.10 89.25 89.94 92.65 92.05 91.02 
Investments 
Cash 3.77 4.54 4.73 4.59 6.16 5.06 4.66 3.83 3.93 4.33 
Other Short- 1.07 1.31 1.23 1.29 1.71 1.50 1.90 0.96 1.30 1.42 
Term Assets 
Total Short- 4.84 5.86 5.96 5.88 7.87 6.56 6.56 4.78 5.23 5.74 
Term Assets 
Other 2.89 2.88 3.29 3.61 4.03 4.19 3.50 2.57 2.73 3.23 
Assets 
TOTAL 188646 205393 235485 290708 274759 321537 375384 489003 461479 565869 
GROSS 
ASSETS 
(£m)=100% 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 1998b. Business Monitor MQ5. Table 1.2. London: 
Office for National Statistics. 
Note: Asset holdings expressed in terms of market values. Figures for 1995 have their 
proportion of total gross assets in brackets. 
When considering the trends over time, it becomes evident that, on average, 
asset class proportions remain relatively constant. The holdings in U. K. equities 
have increased from 36 percent in 1986 to 44 percent in 1995. In addition, the 
amount held in public sector securities has declined slightly, falling by 3 percent 
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over the nine-year period. Short-term assets varied between 5 and 8 percent over 
the period. It should be stressed that these figures represent assets' market 
values. As a result, the above trends may not necessarily be taken as an 
indication of insurers taking a more aggressive equity position in their portfolios, 
since the changes may merely reflect shifts in underlying asset values; for 
example, stock market fluctuations might result in these relative holdings being 
changed significantly. '4 
What explanations can be given for the above trends? In explaining these trends 
an account must be made of the requirements imposed by ALM. Table 7.5 
demonstrates the significance of three major investment holdings for life 
assurance companies; namely equities, public sector securities, and property. In 
terms of the expected return and the variance of return, each asset category 
represents a distinct asset class. 
Consider first the asset class of property. Property is by its very nature a 
medium to long-term investment vehicle. This therefore provides the insurance 
company with an instrument to `match' its liabilities in addition to gilt-edged 
securities. Moreover, a historical justification for holding property is the belief 
in relatively high and predictable rates of returns. 
Another reason for holding property might be associated with portfolio 
diversification. Property may provide a return, which is less than perfectly 
14 In order to appreciate fully the investment activities of insurers, account must be taken of the 
net investment, by class and per-period. 
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correlated with the return on other investments. 15 One aspect of property that 
makes it unusual is its disposability. Property, unlike equities or short-term 
assets, is subject to sizeable transaction costs, both in terms of money and time. 
Such features make property suitable as an investment for the medium or long- 
term, but not so suitable as an investment for the short term. 16 Table 7.6 
demonstrates the net investment of long-term insurance funds for the period 
1994 to 1996 inclusive, where the investments into fixed assets represent about 5 
percent of total net investments in 1996. 
Table 7.6. Insurance Companies' Net Investment (£m) 
1994-1996 
Investment: 1994 1995 1996 
UK Public Sector Securities 8069 6934 10997 
Equities 16803 11165 14414 
Loans & Mortgages -1052 794 -155 
Fixed Assets 2928 363 1361 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 1998b. Business Monitor MQ5. Table 2.1. London: 
Office for National Statistics. 
Note: Fixed assets include investment in land and existing buildings, property and ground 
rents in addition to new buildings. 
While the above table demonstrates the contribution of property to insurance 
company net investments, it also serves to reinforce the dominance of equities 
and public sector securities as first shown in Table 7.5. Table 7.6 confirms that 
investments by long-term insurance funds are spread across a variety of 
risk/return classes, thereby ensuring adequate diversification. 
15 Evidence on asset class correlation is provided in the simulation studies produced in Chapters 
10 and 11. 
16 One exception to this rule might be in times of rapidly rising property prices, where the 
expense of transactions costs can be offset against the profits realised from the increase in 
property values. When this is the case, the disposability of property increases and it might 
therefore be more suited to providing a short-term return. 
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Table 7.6 also illustrates the significance of gilt-edged securities, or gilts. Gilts 
benefit from the following investment features: a known term, a predictable 
return and maturity value, and a relatively high degree of marketability. As 
such, these securities are well placed to serve as a means of `matching' within an 
immunization ALM strategy (see Chapter 4). Also, they provide an efficient 
means of portfolio diversification when combined with equities. In terms of 
risk, public sector securities have returns that are known with certainty. 
However, the limited capital gains associated with gilts is seen as an important 
motivation for holding equities, another major destination for long-term 
investment. Indeed the potential for substantial equity gains is significant. This 
helps to explain the motivation for holding a large portion of investment 
holdings in equities (approximately 44% in 1996 (Office for National Statistics 
1998b). 
Another major explanation of investments into equities comes from the 
composition of liability portfolio. Unit linked products have grown over the last 
25 years. Since most of these funds are equity based, this might explain the 
growth in equity based investment holdings in recent years. In 1996, unit-linked 
business accounted for 32 percent of U. K. yearly life business. This contrasts 
with a figure of 25 percent at the beginning of the decade (Association of British 
Insurers 1997a, 13). The importance of underwriting portfolio composition upon 
the investment decisions of life assurance companies is considered below in 
Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2 demonstrates the investment holdings of long-term insurance 
companies and the relationship that this has to the nature of the insurance 
business written. In particular, a breakdown of the various long-term investment 
holdings is given for linked long-term business and non-linked long-term 
business and this demonstrates a number of specific relationships. Recall the 
basic distinction between linked and non-linked contracts. With linked 
contracts, the performance of a policy depends upon the performance of the 
various `units', which in turn are tied to the performance of individual asset 
classes. By contrast, non-linked plans aim to tie policy performance to the 
overall performance of the insurance company. 
Figure 7.2. Breakdown of Long-Term Business Investment Holdings for Non- 
Linked and Linked Funds (%) 
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Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. The Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Tables 106a and 106b. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: IL stands for index-linked and NI stands for non index-linked. Also, the `debentures' 
category includes loan stock as well as preference and guaranteed stocks and shares. 
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Considering the results of Figure 7.2, it is clear that differences exist between the 
investment profiles of linked and non-linked long-term funds. While the largest 
share of both of these funds is still made up by equities, the total exposure to 
equity-based investments remains much greater for linked contract funds. The 
most note worthy example is the exposure of linked contracts to overseas 
equities, approximately 15 percent; this contrasts with only 8 percent exposure 
for non-linked contracts. This might signify that the risk preferences of the unit- 
linked funds are significantly different from that of the non-linked funds, the 
latter being more risk averse. This evidence is confirmed with respect to the 
investment in public sector securities, which attracts more investments from non- 
linked funds that linked funds. Also important is the exposure to equity unit 
trusts where the amount being invested by linked funds is over 20 percent, more 
than ten times the amount invested by non-linked contracts. 
In explaining these results, it is important to understand that linked funds offer 
the policyholder the chance to opt for high risk/high expected return funds. By 
contrast, non-linked funds leave the investment allocation decision to the 
investment manager of the life fund. As non-linked funds are considered 
relatively low risk for the policyholder, one would therefore expect this fact to 
be reflected in associated investment holdings; for example, non-linked funds 
would be expected to invest more heavily in land and property and ordinary 
government securities than linked funds. 
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Figure 7.2 would seem to support the hypothesis that the composition of 
insurance company asset holdings is a function of the nature of the business 
written (and in turn the risk preference of the associated policyholders). In 
particular, the risk associated with the business written and its respective 
investment holdings appear to be similar; implying asset/liability matching. This 
result is not surprising given the requirements of policyholders and the structure 
of the current U. K. life assurance regulations in respect of immunization (see 
Chapters 2& 4). Another important measure of an investment strategy concerns 
the income derived from the long-term insurance business funds and this is given 
below in Figure 7.3. 
Figure 7.3. Long-Term Business Investment Income 1986-1996 
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Figure 7.3 provides a breakdown of investment income along linked and non- 
linked businesses. The illustration shows a rise in total net investment income 
from £10 billion in 1986 to over £33 billion by 1996. There has been a 
particularly strong performance in the last year of the period, with income 
growing at a rate of 10 percent between 1995 and 1996. In addition to this trend, 
there has been some growth reported in the proportion of income received from 
linked long-term investment funds. Over the period, investment income 
associated with linked business has grown from 17 percent in 1986 to 23 percent 
in 1996. This data is consistent with the explanation associated with Table 7.5; 
namely, the specific relationship between the insurer's life funds and the 
associated investment holdings. 
In addition to the above, two further points should be made in respect of 
insurance company venture capital provision and the use of financial derivatives. 
In 1996, insurance companies contributed 9 percent to the total venture capital 
raised in the U. K. (£240 million), (Association of British Insurers 1997b, 6). 
The growth in such funds is another direct consequence of the unit-linked 
policies that specialise in these specific investment funds. Insurance company 
regulations have also reduced the barriers to insurance companies providing 
venture capital, while also allowing the greater use of financial derivatives such 
as futures and options in investment activities (Association of British Insurers 
1997b, 6). 
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From the above discussion, it is clear that there are a number of different ALM 
strategies that are being employed, and that these depend on the ownership 
structure and the product composition of the insurance company. However, the 
importance of rate of return remains significant within the objectives of 
insurance fund managers. 
7.4 Acquisition and Merger Objectives 
The acquisition and merger of insurance companies is another major component 
of industry conduct. In particular, acquisitions and mergers can be taken as 
evidence of sales maximisation, subject to a valuation constraint relating to the 
proposed organisational change and the ability of the insurance company to 
finance its expansion. The number and size of mergers and acquisitions have 
been growing in the last five years. Table 6.18 provides evidence on the 
acquisitions and mergers for the period 1996/97. 
Table 7.7. Takeovers and Mergers in the U. K. Life Assurance Industry for 
1996/97 
Mergers 
French Insurers AXA and UAP announced plans to merge in November 
Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance merged in July 
United Friendly and Refuge Assurance merged to form United Assurance 
Lloyds TSB announced plans to merge TSB's insurance business with Lloyds Abbey Life 
Takeovers and Acquisitions 
Acquirer Acquired 
Halifax Clerical Medical 
Liverpool Victoria Frizzell 
General Accident Provident Mutual 
Halifax Life Leeds Life 
Life Assurance Holding Corporation Combined Life 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. Page 
4. London: Association of British Insurers. 
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Note that with the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the pace of change in 
mergers and acquisitions has increased substantially. The development of the 
Euro-zone sets a challenge to all types of businesses, especially financial 
businesses. Consolidation is motivated, in part, out of an ambition to establish a 
pan-European operation and product. To see this change, consider one of the 
most prevalent insurers, namely the powerhouse of European insurance, the 
French insurer, AXA Equity Law. In 1998 AXA merged with Sun Life. Then 
earlier this year, AXA succeeded in buying Guardian Royal Exchange for £3.4 
billion (The Economist, February 6t' 1999,83). 
In line with the argument outlined above, mergers and acquisitions are typically 
explained in the insurance industry by one of the following factors: 
consolidation, globalization, over-capacity in home markets, and access to 
distribution networks (Association of British Insurers 1997b, 19). The first three 
factors can be seen as important in the development of insurance company 
market share in international insurance markets. The latter factor concerns the 
ability of insurance companies to secure a sales network and establish a 
dominant market share position. 
7.5 Summary 
Various aspects of life assurance industry conduct have been illustrated. While 
there are a number of theoretical accounts relating to firm conduct, there are 
practical limitations associated with any empirical analysis, not least that of 
commercial sensitivity. The aim of this chapter has been to provide an overview 
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of some of the observable aspects of conduct within the U. K. life assurance 
industry. 
There are a number of significant factors to consider in the understanding of 
insurer conduct. Of great importance are the risk preferences of the insurance 
company owners, suggesting that there is an insurer objective function that is a 
constrained utility maximisation rule subject to the articles of association. Thus, 
insurer conduct is concerned with more than just rate of return maximisation; 
sales growth is another factor considered important in the conduct of life 
insurers. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY 
8.0 Introduction 
Previous chapters have examined the structure and conduct of the U. K. life 
assurance industry. In line with the structure, conduct, performance (SCP) 
paradigm, attention now turns to assessing the performance of the life assurance 
industry. Performance, as defined within the SCP paradigm, can be represented 
by a myriad of different measures, reflecting aspects of performance such as 
allocative efficiency, supernormal profits, innovation and equity. 
From a regulatory perspective, industrial performance measures attempt to 
capture the extent to which a given industry departs from a competitive 
equilibrium. Standards by which to measure industrial performance include the 
use of rate of return as a performance benchmark, and also the use of the price- 
cost margin as a performance measure. Consider first, the use of the rate of 
return, r. Performance is measured by the deviation of r from a benchmark r* 
that is r-r* (for examples of this approach within industrial organisation see Bain 
(1956) and Mann (1971)). Next consider the price-cost margin as another form 
of performance measure. Using this approach, performance is measured by the 
deviation of price P from marginal cost MC, that is P-MC (for examples of this 
approach using different conduct assumptions, see Cowling (1976), Cowling and 
Waterson (1976), Saving (1970), and Geroski (1982)). 
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While much can be said about the alternative theoretical approaches from which 
to assess insurance company performance, in practice such terms have no 
definitive empirical measurement. As a consequence, it is useful to take a 
`basket' of different empirical performance indicators, both at the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic level. Although some of these measures 
may not fall within the traditional SCP notion of performance, they nevertheless 
provide an indication of industrial performance that is also directly or indirectly 
related to profitability and efficiency. The indicators that will be discussed here 
include, firm level profitability, the size of policy benefits, the returns on 
insurance investment funds, and the solvency assessments by the industry 
regulators. In addition, the contributions made by insurance companies to the 
macro-economy can be gauged in terms of employment, overseas invisible trade, 
and the levels of institutional investment. 
Discussion will proceed in Section 8.1 with an evaluation of the microeconomic 
performance indicators, examining in particular the profitability of insurance 
companies, the performance of various life funds, and the results of the annual 
regulatory reports. This discussion will then be followed in Section 8.2 by an 
examination of the macroeconomic measures of performance, emphasising the 
role of insurance companies as a source of funds to the capital markets, as well 
as the contributions made by insurers to invisible earnings in the Balance of 
Payments. Section 8.3 will bring the SCP discussion to a close, providing a 
summary of the main developments. 
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8.1 Life Assurance Performance: a Microeconomic Perspective 
This section considers aspects of performance relating to firm-level data. As 
such, discussion commences by addressing the traditional notion of performance, 
namely the profitability of firms. As a supplement to this, information is also 
presented on the performance of different insurance funds, which in turn can 
provide an indication of the relative sizes of the returns to policyholders and/or 
shareholders. 
8.1.1 Profits in Life Assurance 
As reported within previous chapters, life assurance companies are owned by a 
combination of policyholders and shareholders. As a result, policyholders and 
shareholders will require a return in terms of profit and life fund performance, 
respectively. ' 
Consider first the significance of profits. The term `profit' has been the subject 
of historical debate in attempting to find a universally acceptable empirical 
definition. 2 In comparing company data from profit and loss accounts, 
conclusions may only be drawn with respect to the accounting profit. This 
measure of profit is subject to the accountant's assumptions underpinning his or 
her judgements, and as such this restricts the ability to make straightforward 
1 Fund performance for `with-profit' contracts will be measured in terms of the annual bonus 
declarations. 
2 Probably one of the most frequently cited explanations of the term profit comes from Frank 
Knight in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit first published in 1921 (Knight 1971). 
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comparisons of insurer profitability. Add to this the central role of the Actuary, 
and there are then further assumptions that may vary between insurers. 
Recall that the Actuary makes a solvency assessment of an insurance company's 
liabilities. Only after the full consideration of these liabilities will the Actuary 
report a surplus on the life fund. On the basis of these results the Actuary then 
decides how much to allocate to profits and bonuses (for a proprietary life 
insurer). In the case of a proprietary life assurance company, the allocation 
between policyholders and shareholders will depend critically upon the 
assumptions underpinning the calculation of surplus (Franklin and Woodhead 
1980,274). Thus, the fact that so many assumptions need to be imposed by 
accounting and actuarial assessments necessitates great caution in respect of any 
inter-firm performance comparison. 
Having addressed some of the concerns associated with company data, the 
measures of performance used here are now defined. As demonstrated, the 
profitability associated with insurance companies is intimately related with the 
solvency position and the surplus reported on the life fund. While the surplus 
allocation decision is relatively straightforward for a mutual insurer, this 
allocation is less clear for a proprietary insurer. For proprietary insurers, the 
amount of surplus allocated to shareholders is given in the valuation reports as a 
transfer to the Profit and Loss Account (Insurance Company Accounts and 
Statements 1996, Form 60). The allocation of bonuses to the policyholders is 
given within the Distribution of Surplus Account (Insurance Company Accounts 
and Statements 1996, Form 60). Transfers to the profit and loss account 
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therefore provide a measure of the shareholders' share of the insurer's profits 
and hence the overall performance of the firm. Table 8.1 provides an illustration 
of the typical returns experienced within the life assurance industry in 1997 
using this measure of performance. 
Table 8.1. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Proprietary Life Insurers' 
Profitability in 1997. 
Amount Transferred as a Percentage of: 
Name of Firm Amount Transferred to Worldwide Net Long-Term Insurance 
Profit and Loss Premium Income Fund 
Account £000 
(1) (2) (3) 
AXA Equity & Law 63824 4.604906 0.812567 
Eagle Star 106200 8.309859 1.549464 
Legal and General 172800 6.090941 0.922216 
Pearl 100376 7.978203 1.191352 
Prudential 218200 2.384178 0.777196 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 1998. Insurance Company Returns. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
Table 8.1 provides some examples of the size of surplus transfers to shareholders 
(column 1). In order to standardise the above results for comparison, account is 
made of the relative sizes of the insurance companies by calculating the size of 
surplus transfers as a proportion of the insurer's worldwide net premium income 
(column 2), and as a proportion of the insurer's long-term insurance fund 
(column 3). It can be seen that, regardless of the relative measure used, there is 
significant variation in profitability. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 9, the 
cross-sectional variation in insurer profitability may be explained by a variety of 
factors. However, it is sufficient to note here that if insurance companies have 
different liabilities, and actuaries make alternative assumptions on how to treat 
these liabilities, then inter-firm performance variability is a likely consequence 
(Franklin and Woodhead 1980,277). 
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In addition to cross-sectional variations in profitability, there is also some 
variability over time. Table 8.2 provides an illustration of performance variation 
over time. 
Table 8.2. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Proprietary Life Insurers' Profit 
Growth between 1996 and 1997. 
Name of Firm 1997 Profits as a Percentage of 1996 Profits 
AXA Equity & Law 126.5 
Eagle Star 129.3 
Legal and General 112.2 
Pearl 31.4 
Prudential 115.2 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 1998. Insurance Company Returns. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
While the inter-firm variation in profitability is significant over time, it is 
important to note the relationship between the amount of transferred surplus and 
the actual amount received by shareholders in the form of dividends. This 
relationship is relatively straightforward for insurance companies specialising in 
long-term business only. However, as noted in Chapter 6, many insurance 
companies are composite insurers. 3 As a consequence, transfers from long-term 
business to the profit and loss account may be used to subsidise the activities of 
the general insurance funds and hence the return received by the shareholder will 
be affected accordingly. 
Mutual insurers also make an important contribution to the life assurance 
industry. A measure of profitability can be gained with reference to the total 
3 Recall from Chapter 6 that composite insurers are insurance companies that engage in general 
insurance as well as long-term insurance. 
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surplus reported in the valuation balance sheet. In contrast to the proprietary life 
insurers, mutual insurers only allocate their surplus to policyholders. 
Table 8.3. Inter-Firm Comparison of Selected Mutual Life Insurers' 
`Profitability' in 1997. 
Name of Mutual Total Surplus as shown in Valuation Total Surplus as a Percentage of End 
of Year Long Term Funds 
Friends Provident 580836 5.639487 
Scottish Provident 231728 3.90123 
Standard Life 782693 2.521317 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 1998. Insurance Company Returns. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
Table 8.3 illustrates that the `profitability' associated with mutual insurers is also 
variable and might also be explained by the function of the Actuary. The 
distribution of profitability within the life assurance industry is illustrated below 
in Figure 8.1. The distribution accounts for some 80 percent of U. K. worldwide 
premium income. 
Figure 8.1. Inter-Firm Profitability of Life Insurers in 1997. 
oooooooooProfitability 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 1998. Insurance Company Returns. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
Notes: (a) Profit reported as a percentage of total long-term insurance funds. 
(b) Sample size of 103 insurance companies authorised to conduct business in the U. K. 
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Figure 8.1 depicts the profitability of proprietary life insurers and mutual life 
insurers using the definitions of profit in Table 8.1 and Table 8.3, respectively. 4 
`Profits' are calculated as a percentage of the total long-term funds. As indicated 
in the above frequency distribution, the mean profitability for the sample of 103 
insurance companies is 4.24 percent. The distribution about this mean is 
significant with a standard deviation of 2.43 percent. The distribution is 
relatively symmetrical about the mean with an approximate range in profitability 
of 14 percent, from -4 percent to +10 percent. However, the rates of return for 
the majority of insurance companies appear to be concentrated about the mean 
rate of return (the coefficient of kurtosis was equal to 91.3). This provides 
evidence to suggest that profit rates are similar across the majority of life 
insurers in the U. K. life assurance industry. 5 
8.1.2 Policy performance in Life Assurance 
The arguments developed within the previous section served to highlight the 
ambiguity surrounding much of the reported information within accounting data. 
The variation in actuarial assumptions complicate assessment and for these 
reasons the validity and meaningfulness of the profitability results is brought 
into question. As a consequence, another perspective from which to assess inter- 
firm performance in the life assurance industry is with respect to the associated 
performance of the substantive policies. The performance of substantive policies 
provides an indication of the returns to the policyholders in the form of policy 
° Recall that mutual insurers do not make profits per se, but instead have their performance 
measured in terms of life fund surplus. 
5 The benchmark for assessing the performance of the life assurance industry is the average rate 
of return. 
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bonuses. Thus, emphasis here is placed upon bonus declarations rather than 
accounting profitability. To provide an account of the variation in bonus 
declarations across insurance companies, Table 8.4 provides information on the 
performance of endowment policies as measured by their maturity values listed 
for a pre-specified individual over a 25-year term. 
Table 8.4. Top 15 With-Profit Endowment Maturity Values, 1998 
Company name 1998 Maturity Value 1998 Rank 
C. I. S. £97,365 13 
Commercial Union £108,210 4 
Friends Provident £106,188 9 
GA Life £120,784 2 
Norwich Union £100,247 11 
Prudential £ 106,278 8 
Rechabite FS £84,357 15 
Scottish Friendly £90,301 14 
Scottish Life £103,325 10 
Scottish Mutual £108,544 3 
Scottish Provident £94,820 12 
Scottish Widows £107,941 5 
Standard Life £ 107,379 6 
Tunbridge Wells Equitable FS £106,573 7 
Wesleyan £120,959 1 
Source: Moneyfacts. 1998. Life and Pensions Money Facts. Bonus Declarations. London: 
Moneyfacts Group. 
Note: (a) Reported maturity values for a 25-year term endowment. 
(b) Results for a male with age-next-birthday equal to 30, contributing £50 per month. 
(c) Median maturity value for the top 15 insurers is £106,278. 
Table 8.4 demonstrates the significant variation in maturity values of a `with- 
profit' endowment policy. The range for the top 15 insurance companies is 
£36,602. The above results illustrate the variation in policy performance and 
associated fund performance and bonus declarations. Bonus declarations form 
the basis of growth for the `with-profit' endowment plans. Bonuses consist of 
reversionary and terminal bonuses and the size of these bonuses provides another 
measure of the returns to the policyholders. An indication of the significance of 
alternative forms of bonus is given in Table 8.5 below. 
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Table 8.5.1998 Bonus Declarations for Top 12 Life Companies 
Company 1998 Bonus on Sum 
Assured 
1998 Accumulated 
Bonus 
1998 Terminal Bonus 
C. I. S. 3.25% (5) 4% (10) 47%-230% 
Commercial Union 2.5% (8) 4.5% (5) 12%-42.5% 
Clerical Medical 2.5% (8) 4.5% (5) 9.5%-13.6% 
Friends Provident 2.75% (7) 4% (10) 95%-187.5% 
GA Life 3.25% (4) 6.25% (2) % based on sum assured 
Norwich Union 2.5% (8) 4% (10) % based on sum assured 
Rechabite FS 10% (1) N/A 50% 
Scottish Friendly 3.5% (2) 6.5% (1) 4.5% for each full year 
excluding first six 
Scottish Provident 3.5% (2) 5.25% (3) % based on sum assured 
Standard Life 3% (6) 4.25% (9) 4%-298% 
Tunbridge Wells FS 2.5% (8) 5% (4) % based on sum assured 
Wesleyan 2.5% (8) 4.5% (5) special bonus 6.25% of basic 
sum assured 
Source: Moneyfacts. 1998. Life and Pensions Money Facts. Bonus Declarations. London: 
Moneyfacts Group. 
Notes: (a) Results presented are given with the associated ranking in parentheses. 
(b) `Bonus on Sum Assured' represents reversionary bon uses for the year. 
As implied in Table 8.4, there is significant variation in associated insurance 
company bonus declarations for with-profit policies. This variation is 
particularly prevalent for terminal bonuses where this bonus can be up to 300 
percent of the sum assured. However, the format that terminal bonuses can take 
may vary between insurers; for example, terminal bonuses may or may not be 
based on the size of the sum assured. By contrast, the variation in reversionary 
bonuses is much less significant with a bonus spread of only 7.5 percent of the 
sum assured. The highest ranked company, in terms of its declared reversionary 
bonus, is Rechabite FS that declared a 1998 reversionary bonus of 10 percent. 
The results depicted in the above table reflect the bonus preferences of the 
insurer. In particular, it is likely that those insurers that have a relatively poor 
performance in reversionary bonus declarations are likely to provide greater 
terminal bonuses. For an example of this contrast between the two types of 
bonuses see the results for Friends Provident as compared with Rechabite FS; 
these two insurers demonstrate significant variation in reversionary and terminal 
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bonuses. Regardless of the nature of the policy bonus, it is evident that 
policyholders receive a relatively modest level of annual (or reversionary) 
bonuses. Just under half of the total sample of insurance companies interviewed 
had reversionary bonuses within 2 percent of the average (Moneyfacts 1998,15). 
Thus, there is further evidence to support the view that the performances of 
insurers (as measured in terms of the annual bonus declaration) are centred about 
the average rate of return. 
What explains the reported differences across companies in terms of their bonus 
declaration strategy? In order to provide an answer to this question, it is 
necessary to be clear over the differences between reversionary and terminal 
bonuses. Reversionary bonuses are attached to a policy each year while terminal 
bonuses can only be attached at the end of the policy term. Bonuses can be used 
in a strategy that attempts to ensure policyholder loyalty. In a strategy to reduce 
policy surrenders, insurance companies offer high terminal bonuses that result in 
the majority of the savings fund being accumulated in the final year of a policy's 
term. 6 This therefore encourages policyholder loyalty throughout the full term, 
in order that a policyholder may derive the maximum benefits from the 
substantive plan. 7 Note that high reversionary bonuses may represent a 
significant liability for the insurer at the end of the policy term. Reversionary 
bonuses, once declared, are guaranteed. These annual bonuses are redeemed at 
the end of the policy term where the market conditions may be significantly 
6 Placing greater emphasis upon terminal bonuses means that fund performance will be more 
heavily dependent upon the market conditions at the end of the policy's term. In contrast, a 
bonus strategy that focuses upon reversionary bonuses ensures that the fund performance is more 
dependent on the market conditions for all the years preceding the end of a policy's term. 
In addition to annual and terminal bonuses, there may also be `loyalty bonuses' for 
policyholders that remain with an insurer over a given period of time. 
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different to those conditions prevailing at the time of the bonus declaration. 
Thus, in the event that the market conditions at the end of the policy term are 
poor, an insurer may have to realise its assets at a greatly depreciated value to 
that value assumed by the original bonus declaration. By contrast, placing a 
greater emphasis upon terminal bonuses provides a further area of flexibility for 
the insurance company in terms of its ability to offset any losses associated with 
interim bonuses. 
The relative sizes of insurance benefits are another measure by which to assess 
the microeconomic performance of the life assurance industry. Figure 8.2 
demonstrates the significance of policy surrendering to the insurance companies' 
cash flows. 
Figure 8.2. Breakdown of Benefits Paid on U. K. Ordinary Life Insurance 
1986-1996 
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Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 7. London: Association of British Insurers. 
In 1996, surrenders stood at £7085m, some 43 percent of total benefit payments 
(Association of British Insurers I997a). This represents a significant drain on 
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insurer liquidity and also suggests that current policyholder incentive schemes 
may not be operating as first thought. A further point to note with respect to 
Figure 8.2 is that the total amount paid out in policy maturities is equal to 
£6986m in 1996. Death claims represent the smallest proportion of total 
benefits, accounting for some 14 percent. The relative sizes of death claims, 
maturities and surrenders have remained similar over the period 1986-1996, 
although the proportion of benefits paid out in maturities has experienced some 
growth. In terms of the total benefits, the amount paid was £16352m in 1996, 
nearly three times the amount paid out in 1986. To provide an account of the 
product variation in performance, Table 8.6 provides a breakdown of the 
insurance benefits across 5 different product categories. 
Table 8.6. Breakdown of Benefits for Different Product Lines in 1996 
Ordinary Life Industrial Life Annuity All Pensions PHI 
Death Claims 5.66% 1.13% 0.05% 1.86% 
Maturities/Lump sums on 17.32% 3.51% 0.10% 11.52% 
Maturity 
Surrenders/Refunds on Pensions 17.57% 0.74% 0.12% 26.80% 
Periodical Payments n/a n/a 2.35% 10.39% 
Total 40.54% 5.38% 2.63% 50.58% 0.89% 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 7. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Notes: (a) All figures expressed as a percentage of total benefits in 1996. 
(b) Periodical payments exist only for annuity and pension products. 
Table 8.6 illustrates the dominance of ordinary life and pensions benefits within 
the total benefit payments of insurance companies. Together ordinary life and 
pension benefits account for over 90 percent of the total insurance benefits. In 
terms of the breakdown of benefits within each product category, surrenders 
make up the greatest proportion of these benefits accounting for 44 percent of 
total benefits. Periodical payments on pensions and annuity business is also 
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significant accounting for just under 13 percent of the total. The results are 
determined largely as a result of product features: pensions and life business are 
made up largely of substantive policies that have the option of being surrendered 
at any given time for a cash value and hence this explains the sizeable surrender 
values reported. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, there are many different unit-linked funds available. In 
order to provide a brief account of the performance of these funds, Table 8.7 
presents details on the performance of `Managed' funds for various life 
insurers. 8 Table 8.7 illustrates the variation in fund performance across firm and 
time. The largest insurers tend to be located in the mid-point of the distribution 
between the highest and lowest return, with insurer performance being relatively 
similar overall. As expected, the range between the highest and lowest fund 
performances increases with time and associated fund size. 
Also note that the spread within the top 10 insurers is much less than the spread 
associated with the market as a whole. In particular, the 10-year fund 
performance range for the top insurers was equal to £376 in 1998, whereas the 
figure for the entire market was £2970 in 1998 (Moneyfacts 1998). In terms of 
fund performance volatility, the greatest variation is associated with Sun Life 
(2.37 percent), the lowest being reported by Royal & Sun Alliance (1.95 
percent). Since the managed fund consists of a mix of investments, it provides a 
useful summary indicator of the experience associated with all unit-linked funds. 
The composition of managed funds may vary across insurers and thus 
8 Recall from Chapter 6 that a managed fund invests into a variety of asset classes. 
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performance variations might reflect the different mix of assets within these 
respective managed funds. 
Table 8.7. Managed Fund Performance for Largest Insurers 
Company Bid/Offer 3 Month I Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years Volatility 
spread % (bid-bid) (bid-bid) (bid-bid) (bid-bid) (bid-bid) (3 years) % 
Highest Performance * 1206 1310 1903 2222 4438 3.55 
Lowest Performance * 998 1058 1214 1386 1468 1.55 
10 Largest Insurers- 
Prudential 4.01 1113 1222 1573 1774 2697 2.2 
Standard Life 5 1104 1194 1519 1714 2881 2.01 
Norwich Union 5 1101 1184 1509 1762 N/A 2.02 
Legal & General 5 1100 1199 1535 1738 2741 2.23 
Equitable Life 5 1107 1214 1572 1777 2678 2.03 
Royal & Sun Alliance 5 1105 1204 1509 1673 2556 1.95 
Scottish Equitable 5.02 1101 1206 1536 1779 2790 2.23 
General Accident 4.97 1103 1191 1495 1717 2522 2.09 
Sun Life 5 1106 1199 1496 1699 2838 2.37 
Scottish Widows 5.02 1095 1190 1531 1663 2514 2.13 
Source: Moneyfacts. 1998. Life and Pensions Money Facts. Bonus Declarations. London: 
Moneyfacts Group. 
Notes: (a) Figures presented give the fund performance based on a lump sum invested of 
£1,000. 
(b) Results assume bid-to-bid net income reinvested at a given pay date. 
(c) Volatility is in performance is captured by the standard deviation of the monthly 
performance over 3 years. 
(d) The size of the insurer is defined in terms of the worldwide net premium income. 
(e) The list of the largest insurers excludes Commercial Union Assurance. Figures were 
not available for this insurance company. 
(f) Closing prices as of 3 151 March 1998. 
As noted in Chapter 6, unit-linked plans offer many alternative funds into which 
premiums can be invested. In contrast to the managed fund, the performance of 
alternative unit-linked funds varies significantly. Table 8.8 illustrates this 
variation across the different funds (the managed fund is given for 
completeness). 
Table 8.8 provides evidence on the nature of the risk/return characteristics for 
the various unit-linked funds. It also illustrates the fund diversity available in 
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the insurance market. Moreover, the number of new funds available within the 
unit-linked product space has increased three-fold in the period 1990-1996 and 
thus this implies a significant rate of innovation (Association of British Insurers 
1997b). 
Table 8.8. Variation in Life Fund Performance 
Average 
Performance over 
10 ears 
Average 
Volatility over 3 
years 
Average Fund 
Size (£m) 
Fund Size as a% 
of Total Average 
Funds 
Managed 2586 2.17 247.2 30.81 % 
Distribution 2900 1.75 180.99 22.56% 
Friendly Societies 2854 2.16 29.69 3.70% 
UK Equity General 2994 2.3 119.7 14.92% 
UK Equity High Yield 3029 2.12 35.33 4.40% 
UK Smaller Companies 1970 2.88 4 0.50% 
UK Growth Specialist 2491 2.67 9.43 1.18% 
International 2631 3.3 31.24 3.89% 
European 3932 3.23 23.73 2.96% 
North American 3861 3.69 12.83 1.60% 
Far East- incl. Japan 1503 4.89 8.15 1.02% 
Far East- excl. Japan 2953 6.67 6.67 0.83% 
Japan 812 6.12 8.62 1.07% 
Commodity & Energy 1434 5.56 0.5 0.06% 
Money Funds 1775 0.09 14.67 1.83% 
Currency Funds 1652 1.73 1.4 0.17% 
Fixed Interest- Sterling 2081 1.37 30.5 3.80% 
Fixed Interest- 1805 1.6 3.85 0.48% 
International 
Index-linked Gilt Funds 2111 1.37 5.27 0.66% 
Property Funds 1768 1.2 28.54 3.56% 
Source: Moneyfacts Group. 1998. Life and Pensions Money Facts. Bonus Declarations. 
London: Moneyfacts Group. 
Notes: (a) Figures give the fund performance based on a lump sum investment of £1,000. 
(b) Bid-to-bid net income assumed to be reinvested at pay date. 
(c) Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly performance over 3 
years. 
(d) Closing prices as at 3 1st March 1998. 
Table 8.8 illustrates that the risk (standard deviation) and return associated with 
each fund is in line with the predictions of portfolio theory (see Chapter 5). For 
example, the risk associated with equity based investments is much larger than 
the risk associated with government securities. Hence, the greater the reported 
return, the greater the risk (that is, there is a positive risk/return trade-off). 
However, the Far East fund is the notable exception to this generalisation. This 
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fund experienced high variation in return, yet at the same time the fund 
performance was relatively poor. The financial crisis in the Far East explains 
these unusual patterns, this effect being most prominent in Japan, the major 
destination for investments of this type (Moneyfacts 1998,33). 
Thus, there exists a substantial amount of available data with respect to the 
performances of the life policies. Such information is relevant to an assessment 
of industrial performance because it represents the return to policyholders that 
are, at least in part, the owners of insurance companies. Moreover, with the 
ambiguity surrounding profitability assessments, the returns on policies provide 
useful additional evidence relating to inter-firm performance. In line with the 
profitability results, the evidence presented on policy performance suggests that 
substantive policy performance be centred about the industry average. 
Note that economies of scale are another microeconomic performance 
consideration. It is clear that there exist many differences in product 
performances across insurance companies. While this might be explained by the 
performance of the investment managers and general investment conditions, it 
may also be the result of other factors including insurer size and fund size; 
economies of scale may therefore play an important role. Hardwick (1994) 
provides a statistical cost analysis of the U. K. life assurance industry analysing 
the extent of scale and scope economies. Hardwick assumes that a life insurer's 
outputs can be aggregated into three products: life policies, pensions and health 
policies: 
The results demonstrate that there are positive economies of 
scope in the production of pensions and permanent health insurance, but 
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diseconomies of scope otherwise. This evidence suggests that there are 
potential costs savings achievable from the creation of separate offices 
for life assurance on the one hand and pensions and permanent health on 
the other. With regard to economies of scale, the results indicate that 
there are product-specific economies of scale attributable to all three 
insurance products. Taking the diseconomies of scope together with the 
product-specific economies of scale, we find evidence of roughly 
constant ray average costs for small and medium-sized companies, but 
significant overall economies of scale for large companies. (Hardwick 
1994,83) 
Thus, the findings of Hardwick (1994) confirm the findings in Chapter 7 on 
mergers and acquisitions; namely, that there is a tendency towards greater 
industrial concentration within the U. K. life assurance industry. The potential 
economies of scale will therefore have important implications for the 
performance of the life assurance industry over the coming years. 
8.1.3 Regulatory Perspectives 
A further microeconomic indicator of insurer performance comes in the form of 
the annual regulatory review by the industry regulator. 9 Each year the regulator 
is required to produce a report on the solvency performance of insurance 
companies, as authorised in the 1982 Insurance Companies Act. There exists an 
intimate relationship between solvency and profitability and for this reason it is 
worth noting the results of the regulator's report. The report consists of 
information relating to insurance company authorisations and regulatory 
interventions. One particular aspect of the report worth noting concerns the 
powers of intervention. 
9 Up until the last year, this responsibility fell with the Department of Trade and Industry. 
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Table 8.9 gives a breakdown of the frequency of regulatory interventions, 
classified in terms of the motivation for regulatory action. The table 
demonstrates that the insurance industry is subject to a significant amount of 
regulatory interventions, although these are not related primarily to the `winding 
up' of insurers. These interventions are brought about by many concerns 
relating to the performance of insurer investments, the risk associated with 
claims, and the regulator's requirements for additional information on certain 
insurance companies. 
Table 8.9. Number of Insurance Regulatory Interventions 1990-1996 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Power: 
Requirements about investments 45 28 28 51 35 27 32 
Maintenance of Assets in EEA 3 
Custody of Assets 3 
Freezing of Assets 
Premium Income Limit 44 22 35 44 29 33 36 
Actuarial investigations 12 3 2 1 
Accelerated accounting information 2 8 9 2 
General investigations 
Obtaining information 57 32 37 52 35 40 58 
Obtaining information by production of speci fic 2 * 2 2 
books and papers 
Residual power to impose requirements to 47 32 42 57 34 31 61 
protect policyholders 
Successful petitions to wind up an insurance 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
company 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. Insurance Annual Report (Various Publications). 
London: Department of Trade and In dustry. 
Notes: (a) For the `maintenance of assets' category the figure for 1990 refers to U. K. assets 
only. 
(b) An * signifies that there was no regulato ry intervention. 
One other important area concerns the use of the regulator's `residual power'. 
This is imposed if the regulator is concerned about the ability of the insurance 
company to meet its liabilities (such interventions have risen from 47 in 1990 to 
61 in 1996). It should be noted that the above interventions are triggered merely 
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in response to an early warning signal and as such they aim to act as a 
preemptive strike on any major risk to insurer solvency. Indeed as the last 
category in Table 8.8 demonstrates, petitions made by the regulator to the court, 
requesting authorisation to `wind-up' an insurance company, were minimal; only 
two cases were reported in the period 1990-1996. 
8.2 Life Assurance Performance: a Macroeconomic Perspective 
While much can be said on the microeconomic performance indicators of the life 
insurance industry, there are also performance measures relating to the macro- 
economy. Life insurers play a critical role as a source of employment, as a 
source of capital, and also as a source of international trade. These 
macroeconomic functions will be addressed in turn. Consider insurance 
employment, where Figure 8.3 provides information on employment over the 
period 1986-1996. 
Figure 8.3. Total Employment in the Insurance Sector 
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Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook (1986-1996). 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Note: Figures include direct insurance employment and employment auxiliary to insurance. 
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Total insurance employment amounted to over 200,000 people in 1996. Add to 
this the auxiliary employment generated by the insurance industry and the total 
insurance employment was equal to approximately 345,000 in 1996 (Association 
of British Insurers 1997a, 79). Employment during the period 1986-1996 
increased up until 1991, where it reached a peak of 375,000. Since 1991, 
employment has declined and by 1996 it stood at 345,000. These trends have 
been matched in male and female employment respectively over the period, and 
might be explained by the recent trend in insurer mergers and acquisitions (see 
Chapter 7). 
Consider next the role of insurance companies in capital markets. As a point of 
departure, it is worth considering life offices' own capital issues. Recently, there 
has been a trend amongst insurance companies towards issuing share capital and 
therefore becoming proprietary life insurers rather than remaining mutual life 
insurers. As Table 8.10 illustrates, the rights issues by insurers in the U. K. 
market is significant with net capital issues growing to one billion pounds in 
1996. 
Table 8.10. Rights Issues by Insurers 
Year Net Capital Issues on the UK Market (£m) 
1986 606 
1987 -2 
1988 -11 
1989 184 
1990 -29 
1991 63 
1992 394 
1993 1694 
1994 494 
1995 578 
1996 1007 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 120. London: Associati on of British Insurers. 
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As outlined in Chapter 7, the life assurance industry provides a substantial 
source of funds to the capital markets with total investment holdings in excess of 
£500 billion. Holdings of ordinary shares amounted to 44 percent of total 
holdings in 1995 (Office for National Statistics 1998, Table 1,2). Table 8.11 
gives an indication of the relative size of net investments made by different 
financial institutions. 
Table 8.11. Net Investments by Financial Institution as a Percentage of Total 
Net Investments 1987-1996 
Year Total Self 
Administered 
Pension Funds 
Long-Term 
Insurance Funds 
Other Than Long- Investment 
Term Insurance Trusts 
Funds 
Unit Trusts and 
Property Unit 
Trusts 
1987 34117 35.24% 33.68% 10.03% 2.58% 18.47% 
1988 24970 46.56% 42.04% 10.66% -0.50% 1.25% 
1989 37824 38.36% 43.48% 7.39% 1.34% 9.43% 
1990 29764 41.09% 56.30% 1.58% 0.32% 0.71% 
1991 36325 23.46% 67.36% -0.81% 2.55% 7.43% 
1992 36327 22.45% 64.86% 6.56% 2.19% 3.95% 
1993 51001 8.52% 54.92% 9.00% 5.94% 21.62% 
1994 52531 10.24% 50.41% 10.89% 11.30% 17.17% 
1995 45944 17.39% 57.80% 8.34% 2.61% 13.88% 
1996 64383 17.65% 52.14% 11.57% -0.23% 18.87% 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 122. London: Association of British Insurers. 
As the above table demonstrates, long-term insurance funds generate the 
majority of net investments by financial institutions, accounting for some 52 
percent in 1996. This has fallen from a maximum of 67.36 percent in 1991. 
Thus, the importance of life assurance and pension funds as an institutional 
investor is clear. 
Other significant sources of funds came from self-administered pension funds 
and unit trusts that in 1996 accounted for 17.65 percent and 18.87 percent, 
respectively. However, the fact remains that long-term insurance funds, as an 
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institutional investor, represent a vital source of funds for trade and industry. In 
particular, when this information is combined with the trends in insurer net 
investments (see Table 7.6), it also becomes clear that insurers provide an 
important source of equity finance to industry and trade. Furthermore, since 
insurance companies purchase significant volumes of government securities- 
some £10 billion in insurer net investment in 1996- insurance companies may 
also be seen as an important source of finance for the Government. 
Within an analysis of insurance companies and capital markets, it is worth noting 
the contributions made by insurance companies to overseas trade. The 
contributions are represented in the form of invisible earnings within the Balance 
of Payments. The U. K. exports approximately one-third of its GDP each year 
(Office for National Statistics 1998a). In 1996, invisible earnings (Association 
of British Insurers 1997b) accounted for £22 billion worth of exports. 
Moreover, during the last 15 years it has been the surplus in invisible trade that 
has helped to limit the effects of a Balance of Trade deficit upon the Balance of 
Payments. Table 8.12 demonstrates that the growth in the value of goods 
exported has exceeded the growth in services: the value of goods exported is 
over three times the value of services exported in 1995. Insurance companies 
make up a small proportion of the total services exported- approximately 4 
percent in 1995.10 Thus, as an internationally traded product, insurance is still 
relatively modest in size. Note, however, that there are contributions by 
insurance companies to interest profit and dividends (IPDs) through insurance 
'o Other service exports include tourism, telecommunications, and computer services. 
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companies making returns on their investments abroad. Between 1993 and 1995 
insurance companies' IPD credits grew from £2,914m in 1993 to £3,445m by 
1995, an increase of around 18 percent. 
Table 8.12. U. K. Current Account, 1993-1995 
£ million 1993 1994 1995 
1 Exports of Goods 121,398 134,666 152,346 
2 Imports of Goods 134,858 145,497 163,974 
1+2=3 Visible Balance (13,460) (10,831) (11,628) 
4 Exports of Services 38,599 41,399 45,254 
5 of which: 
* insurance companies (a) 419 484 363 
* Lloyds 76 185 383 
* Insurance brokers 1,152 1,101 1,085 
6 Imports of Services 33,083 36,652 39,112 
4-6=7 Balance of trade in services 5,516 4,747 6,142 
8 Interest, profit and dividends(IPD) Credits 74,144 77,919 93,139 
9 of which: 
* insurance companies' portfolio investment 1,936 1,711 2,111 
earnings 
* insurance companies' direct investment 978 528 1,334 
earnings 
10 IPD Debits (b) 71,946 69,228 83,567 
10-8=11 Net IPD 2,198 8,691 9,572 
12 Transfer credits 5,536 5,616 6,135 
13 Transfer debits 10,543 10,645 13,113 
12-13=14 Net transfers (5,007) (5,027) (6,978) 
7+11+14=15 Invisible balance 2,707 8,411 8,736 
3+15=16 Current account balance (10,756) (2,419) (2,892) 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997b. Insurance Quarterly Report (Sept. 97). Table 
1.3. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Notes: (a) Exports of insurance can be shown as negative because the figures are essentially 
premiums received from abroad less claims paid abroad. 
(b) The profits of foreign owned insurers operating in the U. K. (which leave the U. K. ) 
are included in IPD debits. 
Additional information on the significance of insurance company overseas 
returns is derived by comparing the overseas earnings of insurance companies in 
the U. K. with other financial institutions. Figure 8.4 shows the proportion of 
overseas earnings made up by the activities of different financial institutions in 
1996. 
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Figure 8.4. Earnings of U. K. Financial Institutions 1996 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 112. London: Association of British Insurers. 
With respect to Figure 8.4, banking and insurance dominate institutional 
overseas earnings, together accounting for nearly 60 percent in 1996. Total 
earnings for the year amounted to £22,658m. The activities of pension funds and 
securities dealers are also significant as together they provide roughly 20 percent 
of total earnings. 
Additional insights may be derived from Table 8.13. This table shows the trends 
in U. K. overseas earnings for the period 1986-1996 for four types of financial 
institution. Insurance funds remain a major source of overseas earnings for the 
period 1986-1996 when compared with the other financial institutions in Table 
8.13. Recently, overseas earnings of insurers have tended to increase. By 1996, 
insurer earnings stood at £6,141 m, as compared with £2,157m in 1990. Also 
note worthy is the substantial growth in pension fund overseas earnings; these 
earnings were nearly four times what they had been in 1986. Thus, the overall 
importance of life assurance to overseas earnings has remained significant. 
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Table 8.13. Overseas Earnings of UK Financial Institutions (£m), 1986-1996 
Year Banking Insurance Funds Pension Funds Securities Dealers Other Total 
1986 3,934 4,865 615 933 1,925 10,347 
1987 2,740 4,578 695 1,503 1,726 9,516 
1988 2,974 3,344 1,079 1,170 2,117 8,567 
1989 4,067 2,605 1,371 2,048 1,421 10,091 
1990 5,152 2,157 1,356 1,232 1,969 9,897 
1991 5,163 3,723 1,608 480 1,672 10,974 
1992 5,830 3,739 1,486 2,158 2,084 13,213 
1993 1,869 4,960 1,697 2,005 3,694 10,531 
1994 7,046 3,990 1,723 2,185 3,411 14,944 
1995 5,917 6,905 1,845 1,758 4,275 16,425 
1996 7,113 6,141 2,271 2,190 4,943 17,715 
Source: Association of British Insurers. 1997a. Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1986-1996. 
Table 112. London: Association of British Insurers. 
8.3 Summary 
The aim of this paper was to provide an account of the performance of the life 
assurance industry in the U. K. In line with the results presented in the previous 
two chapters, use was made of the structure, conduct, and performance (SCP) 
paradigm as a basis for discussion. 
The SCP notion of industrial performance concerns the extent to which an 
industry departs from a competitive equilibrium. In line with this approach, the 
first part of this chapter dealt with this concept of performance and it was shown 
that the profitability of insurance companies is centred about the industry 
average. Thus, from the perspective of the regulator there is some evidence to 
suggest that rates of return are approximately equal for the majority of life 
insurers, and this, according to economic theory, might be the result of 
competition. 
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In addition to a discussion of excess returns, evidence was presented on a 
number of other aspects of insurer performance. While some of this data does 
not conform to the traditions of SCP, it nevertheless provides a useful context for 
discussion and also compensates for some of the limitations relating to 
profitability as a measure of performance in the life assurance industry. 
Moreover, the importance of life assurance to the economy at large was also 
highlighted within these developments. 
It is important to stress the causality considerations associated with the SCP 
paradigm. While an attempt has been made to limit any inference of the 
causality flow between industry structure, conduct and performance, there are, 
underpinning the analysis, many possible explanations for the flow of causation. 
Discussion on the flow of causality, as well as the development of some formal 
statistical relationships within a SCP setting, forms the basis of discussion in the 
Chapter 9. 
In bringing the SCP discussion to a close, it is evident from all of the evidence 
developed that the life assurance industry is an industry that has undergone 
dramatic change over the last 100 years. This change has been necessitated out 
of changing social and economic conditions. The result today is an industry 
providing insurance coverage across a wide range of risk categories to an ever- 
increasing consumer base. The challenges of a global insurance market will 
undoubtedly form the backdrop to a discussion of the U. K. life assurance 
industry in the twenty-first century. 
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CHAPTER 9 
FIRM-LEVEL STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE 
RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM 
THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE INDUSTRY 
9.0 Introduction 
Previous chapters have served to outline taxonomically the main aspects of the 
U. K. life assurance industry, referencing the nature of industry structure, conduct 
and performance. These chapters demonstrated that the life assurance industry 
has experienced substantial historical change and that it is now made up of a 
variety of firms, each exhibiting significant variation in terms of their structural 
characteristics. The aim of this chapter is to take these largely qualitative results 
and formalise some statistical relationships that may exist between firm-structure 
and firm-level performance using a cross-section of insurance companies that 
together makeup the majority of the long-term insurance market in the U. K. 
Section 9.1 develops the theoretical foundations of this chapter and also reviews 
the various methodological approaches that have been used to analyse industrial 
structure-performance relationships, both at the industry-level and at the firm 
level. Section 9.2 provides a brief literature review. Section 9.3 introduces the 
components of this empirical analysis, outlining the data, variables and their 
respective interpretations. Then in Section 9.4, the principle results are 
presented and discussed. Finally, Section 9.5 brings together a summary of the 
main developments. 
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9.1 Theoretical and Methodological Background 
Many debates exist within industrial organization concerning the appropriate 
theoretical and methodological approach to the study of the relationship between 
industry (and firm) structure and performance. Prior to the 1950s, the dominant 
approach to the study of industrial organization was that of case studies of 
individual industries. The seminal work of Bain (1951,1956) helped to shift 
research in industrial organization to a higher level though his inter-industry 
cross-section approach. Since that time, discussion has reigned over the 
appropriate model specification of structure-performance studies and in 
particular the violation of three OLS assumptions: first, simultaneous causality; 
second, measurement error; and third, the omission of relevant explanatory 
variables. While each assumption is important to ensure unbiased and consistent 
estimators, the problem of simultaneity has been pervasive amongst scholars of 
industrial organization in recent years. 
To understand these issues further, it is necessary to review briefly the 
theoretical foundations of empirical studies from the work of Bain (1951,1956) 
to the present day. The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm has 
proved to be one of the most influential approaches to the study of industrial 
organization, with its foundations in the work of Mason (1939,1949) and its 
advances being made through the work of scholars including Bain (1959) and 
Markham (1950). The basic proposition was that there existed a unidirectional 
flow of causality between industry structure, conduct and performance. Thus, 
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one of the central hypotheses proposed by theory was that profitability varied 
across industries as the concentration level varied (with no explicit account of 
conduct). That is, structure helped to explain performance. Explicit 
formalisation of conduct was introduced to develop formal structure- 
performance relations; two common examples of this approach are the Cournot- 
Nash model (Cowling 1976) and the Dominant Firm Model (Geroski 1982). 
However, while the SCP approach remains an influential analytical framework, 
the interpretation of its basic proposition- namely a unidirectional flow of 
causality- has been concluded to be unsatisfactory in light of causality problems 
and simultaneity. Thus while structure may affect performance, improved 
performance may also affect conduct, which in turn may affect structure; that is, 
there exists the potential for causality feedback between the SCP components. 
This result led many to question the OLS technique and suggest instead that any 
structure-performance relation be part of larger system of relations with 
estimation techniques accounting for this fact (Reid 1989,48). 1 Note that this 
approach has itself been the subject of debate in terms of model specification and 
whether any `structure' variables, in any definitive sense, are truly independent 
(Schmalensee 1989a). This is a crucial point since independent variables are 
`predetermined' and may therefore be used as `instruments' in subsequent 
consistent estimation techniques. 
1 Consistent estimation of a `recursive' system may be achieved using OLS. A recursive system 
exhibits no bias from the application of OLS because such a system exhibits one-way causation 
and is exactly identified (Reid 1989,50). 
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Schmalensee's point above is emphasised within the more general debate 
concerning the usefulness of cross-section studies. Cross-sectional studies 
assume that variations across observations represent variations in long-run 
equilibrium positions. The task, implied above, is to determine the number of 
endogenous variables within a given structural equation and to account for this 
endogeneity within estimation in order to obtain consistent estimators. The 
difficulty, as Schmalensee (1989a) argues, is that: 
In the long-run equilibria ... all variables that 
have been 
employed in such studies [cross-section studies] are logically 
endogenous. (Schmalensee 1989a, 954) 
That is, in the long-run market structure is clearly affected by conduct and 
performance; mergers and acquisitions, for example, will have an impact upon 
the level of industrial concentration. This poses a significant problem for 
estimation: the number of logical candidates for use as an instrumental variable 
in order to obtain consistent estimators is significantly reduced. 
Given the theoretical and methodological complexities introduced above, what 
justification can be made for the presentation of an empirical cross-sectional 
study of industry structure-performance? Schmalensee (1989a) argues that the 
aim of cross-sectional studies is really to explain the main patterns of the data set 
employed: 
The appropriate mind-set ... 
is accordingly that of descriptive 
statistics, not structural hypothesis testing. (Schmalensee 1989a, 955) 
Regression analysis is one such descriptive technique, which may provide an 
interesting initial insight into the variations across the data. This approach might 
315 
also be justified on the grounds that it is most parsimonious. Such work may 
still be able to demonstrate stable and robust empirical regularities: 
It is clearly facile to argue simply that `everything depends on 
everything else'. The role of model building is to identify the major 
causal connections and to establish their quantitative significance. (Reid 
1989,26) 
Regardless of the estimation approach assumed, the violation of the other two 
OLS assumptions (measurement error and omission of relevant variables) must 
also be brought into consideration when discussing industrial structure- 
performance relationships. 
9.2 Brief Literature Review 
As noted in the previous section, empirical research relating to industrial 
structure-performance relationships is concerned primarily with inter-industry 
variations rather than intra-industry variations. However, there exist a number 
of studies using firm-level data, (see for example, Hall and Weiss (1967), Martin 
(1983) and Mueller (1986)). More recently, a study of the impact of firm size 
and age upon firm level performance in India was presented by Majumdar 
(1997) who showed that older firms were found to be more productive and less 
profitable, whereas the larger firms were found to be more profitable and less 
productive. Other recent structure-performance papers include the work of 
Willis and Rogers (1998), and Bhattacharya & Bloch (1997)- the latter paper 
provides a useful insight into the methodological difficulties (outlined above) by 
examining profit-concentration relationships in Australian manufacturing. 
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While much can be said about the study of industry in general, it is important to 
re-state that this chapter is concerned with the U. K. life assurance industry. In 
terms of assessing structure-performance relationships within the life assurance 
industry little research exists, however notable exceptions include the works of 
Cummins and Harrington (1987), and the paper by Chidambran et al. (1997) 
who provided an investigation into the performance of the U. S. property-liability 
insurance industry. The concentration ratio for each insurance line was found by 
Chidambran, et al. (1997) to be a significantly negative determinant of 
performance. 
9.3 Research Design 
9.3.1 Data 
Data was collected on 103 insurance companies for the years 1996 and 1997. 
These companies all operate in the long-term insurance industry. Together these 
companies account for approximately 80 percent of U. K. worldwide long-term 
insurance business. 2 A comprehensive database of all 103 insurance companies 
was constructed using accounting data from company accounts and other 
statutory reporting submitted to the Department of Trade and Industry (the 
regulator in 1997). In addition to the general company requirements to lodge 
accounts at Companies House, insurance companies also submit a detailed 
breakdown of their operations by completing a series of forms as specified in the 
2 This figure includes both U. K. and overseas business of insurance companies with head offices 
in the U. K. as well as the U. K. business of branches and subsidiaries of foreign insurers (that is, 
those insurers with head offices outside the U. K. ). 
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1996 Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations and 
authorised under the 1982 Insurance Companies Act (section 18). These forms 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) cover all aspects of insurance company operations 
including a breakdown of company performance and asset/liability portfolio 
composition. This data was supplemented by additional information made 
available in the Post Magazine Insurance Directory 1997 and the DTI's 
Insurance Annual Report for 1996/1997. All three data sources represent a 
significant resource upon which to build empirical work on structure- 
performance relationships at the firm level. 
9.3.2 Performance 
The performance of insurance companies is captured using two performance 
indices, profitability and solvency. The former index is commonly used as a 
measure of economic performance (see Schmalensee (1989b) for a discussion of 
accounting profitability measures). In particular, profitability is defined as the 
ratio of total transfers to the profit and loss account (from the insurer surplus on 
long-term funds), to the total value of long-term funds (see Appendix 2). As 
noted in Chapter 8, mutual insurers do not make profit per se. However the total 
surplus reported in the valuation balance sheet is used as a proxy for mutual 
insurer `profit'. 
By contrast, the second measure of performance is a solvency index (as 
measured by the solvency margin). This index is less commonly used in studies 
of structure-performance relationships. However, U. K. regulators use solvency 
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as one of the main performance signals for insurance companies. Moreover, 
regulatory intervention is defined through the size of the solvency margin: the 
`available assets for long-term business required minimum margin' (The 
Insurance Company (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 1996, Form 9). 
Insurance company solvency is reported in the `statement of solvency', which is 
submitted to the regulator and recorded in the statutory annual returns. 
It is useful here to stress that while an obvious relationship exists between 
profitability and solvency as respective performance measures, there are also 
distinct differences between these two measures. Profitability has strict 
governance over cash flows that immediately impact upon the net revenue 
position of an insurance company. By contrast, solvency is a more rigorous 
measure of performance. Solvency requires the assessment of all the operations 
of the insurer, not just those impacting upon annual cashflow. It is the role of 
the Actuary that helps to differentiate the two measures of performance, with the 
solvency measure requiring an extensive valuation of the risk profile of assets 
and liabilities that is not accounted for explicitly within a profitability index. 
An additional factor to consider in selecting the performance measures is with 
respect to the ownership of insurance companies. Part of the aim of this research 
was to try and capture variations in performance across ownership structures. 
Insurance companies in the U. K. comprise of mutual life insurers and proprietary 
life insurers. While a measure for profitability can be constructed for mutual 
insurers (using the reported life fund surplus as a measure of `profit'), a more 
robust measure of performance (in the form of a solvency index) would 
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strengthen any conclusions because, strictly speaking, mutual insurers do not 
make profit. It is for this reason and also the regulatory context that the solvency 
performance index is included within the subsequent analysis. 
9.3.3 Structure 
In order to explain the firm-level performance across insurance companies in 
1997, a wide variety of variables were constructed reflecting the various aspects 
of insurance company structure. At this stage, it is assumed that the problems 
associated with simultaneity are not significant, although this issue will be 
returned to subsequently in section 9.4.3. The variables take the following form: 
(9.1) PROFIT or SOLVENCY = al + b1Zl + b2Z2 
Where bi = (bjl, ... 
b1,, ... b113) and 
b2 = (b21, b22, b23) and Z1 represents a vector 
of exogenous intensity variables as well as other indices, and Z2 represents a 
vector of dummy variables. Each of these variables will be addressed in turn. 
In line with other inter-firm studies, AGE and SIZE are included. AGE is seen 
as important in capturing life cycle effects and indeed the insurance companies 
in the U. K. have a long history of operation, with an average age of 71 years. As 
Majumdar (1997) points out, theory is equivocal on the relationship between age 
and performance: research demonstrates that age may be beneficial in terms of 
experience, while research also demonstrates that age may bring with it 
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inflexibility and inertia to change. AGE is defined as the number of years since 
the insurer was established. 
Similar contrasting arguments have been put forward in explaining firm size. 
The basic proposition is that under competition, profit rates will tend towards 
equality. However, Baumol (1959) argued that large firms have the resources so 
that they are able to pursue ventures of such a magnitude that small firms are 
precluded from taking up the same opportunity. The result is that larger insurers 
may have the chance to earn higher rates of return than smaller insurers in the 
long run. Clearly, this assumes some form of capital barrier and the question 
that is to be discussed in light of the results, is whether or not such a barrier 
would be expected to exist within the financial sector. Also, Baumol's 
proposition assumes that the presence of diseconomies, such as x-inefficiencies 
(Leibenstein 1976), is outweighed by these economies of scale. For the purposes 
of this study, SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of insurer total premium 
income. 3 
Diversification is a means of utilising a firm's excess resources. Operation of an 
insurance company across multiple lines of insurance requires a given skill and 
knowledge base such that the capabilities of the company are enhanced with 
increasing diversity, with all the attendant positive effects that this may have 
upon performance. For this reason, DIVERSITY is used to capture this effect 
and is defined as the total number of insurance lines for which the insurance 
3 Size measures are also useful in controlling for heteroskedasticity. 
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company is authorised to conduct business. This variable also reflects the reality 
that financial products are significantly differentiated. 
The benefits to diversification, as outlined above, will apply to insurance 
business outside of the long-term market, such as business within the general 
insurance market. For this reason, the number of authorised insurance lines used 
in the construction of the DIVERSITY variable includes all insurance markets, 
both general and long term markets. 4 
As defined in Chapter 5, an insurance company may be defined in terms of two 
portfolios, the underwriting portfolio and the investment portfolio. To reflect 
this theoretical framework, variables were constructed with the aim of 
representing the main features of these two portfolios. Discussion now turns to 
addressing these variables. 
Consider first the investment portfolio. As noted throughout, the performance of 
the investment portfolio is seen as crucial to the financial solidity of the 
insurance company. Recall that the distinguishing feature about life assurance is 
the long-term nature of the contract, which affords the insurer with a steady 
stream of income into the future. The investment of the premiums and the 
attendant rate of return on these insurance funds are seen as critical determinants 
of insurer performance since they will have a direct effect upon company 
valuation and an indirect consumer reputation effect, through public reports of 
poor returns on personal sector savings. 
4 This variable will have implications for the performance of so-called `composite' insurance 
companies, which operate in both the general and long term insurance markets. 
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While much can be said about the significance of the investment portfolio, the 
construction of an adequate financial ratio to measure investment return is often 
fraught with measurement difficulties; that is, the noise to signal ratio is high. 
However, the inclusion of the INVESTMENT RETURN variable is still seen as 
a useful first step in acknowledging the importance of this area to insurance 
company operation. INVESTMENT RETURN is defined as the ratio of 
investment income received on long-term business to total assets. 
Consider next the underwriting portfolio. The performance of the underwriting 
portfolio depends on the relative performance of claim outflow and premium 
income. Clearly the outflow of claims will be central to any insurance company 
performance evaluation. While the outflow of maturing policies will be planned 
for in advance, frequently well in advance, the occurrence of policy surrenders 
are less certain and will clearly have an important impact upon profitability and 
solvency. Death claims, while being more predictable than policy surrendering, 
still pose a significant threat to adequate insurer performance. In terms of 
markets, the role of domestic and overseas markets is also important in respect 
of claims and hence insurer performance. 
For the reasons outlined above, three variables are included: DEATH, 
SURRENDER, and OVERSEAS CLAIMS. Each variable represents the ratio of 
the respective claim category to total claims. The impact of these claim 
categories upon performance would be hypothesised to be negative. However, 
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the extent and significance of this effect is of interest, especially in respect of 
overseas markets. 
In terms of premium income, the variable SALES GROWTH is included to 
capture the rate of change in sales between the observation year (1997) and the 
preceding year, as measured in terms of the total premium income. Such a 
variable would be expected to capture business-cycle effects and sometimes is 
also used as a proxy for industry elasticity of demand (Schmalensee 1989a). As 
with age and size, predictions about the relationship between this variable and 
performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, greater sales growth may offer an 
insurance company the potential to make enhanced returns, yet on the other 
hand, such a structure-performance relationship may serve to act as a signal to 
new entrants, and hence negatively impact upon long-run returns. 5 
Two other variables are included to account for the structure of life assurance 
markets: EXPORTS and SINGLE PREMIUMS. EXPORTS are included to 
control for the relative income from overseas markets. The operation of this 
variable will depend upon the relative performance of the domestic and overseas 
markets. If domestic markets exhibit superior performance over their overseas 
market counterparts, then insurers with lower export orientation would be 
expected to have a relatively superior performance than insurers with higher 
export orientation. 
5 This latter argument will depend on the nature of the barriers to entry (Bain 1956). 
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SINGLE PREMIUMS is included as a variable to control for the product 
differentiation of insurance products. This variation is defined in terms of 
premium frequency. Long-term insurance contracts may be subdivided into two 
types of contracts: single premium contracts and regular premium contracts. 
While the latter category has been popular traditionally within the life assurance 
market, the former category has become more common through the growth in 
single contract bonds and private pension provision (see Chapter 6 on life 
assurance market structure). To account for this market segmentation the ratio 
of single premiums to total premiums is measured. This variable may serve as 
an assessment for an emerging market. Due to the rapid expansion of the single 
premium contract market, it is hypothesised that the variable has a positive 
impact upon performance in the long run. 
Another important factor to consider in respect of insurance company 
performance is that of operating expenses and transactions costs (Williamson 
1975). AGENCY COST is therefore included as a variable to account for the 
overall efficiency of an insurance company. AGENCY COST measures the 
ratio of expenses (including commission) to premium income. Insurance 
companies often use this ratio to measure internal efficiency in respect of new 
business (Franklin and Woodhead 1980). Thus, this measure helps to capture 
firm-specific features, since the ability to reduce the ratio of costs to income 
depends on skills and abilities present within the firm, which in turn are also 
likely to generate enhanced returns and therefore have a positive impact upon 
performance. 
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Within the managerial view of the firm, the importance of marketing and 
promotion can be seen as a further factor to control for (Marris 1964, 
Williamson 1963). The variable MANAGERIAL EXPENSES is defined as the 
ratio of managerial expenditures to total expenses. The so-called `managerial 
theories of the firm' provide an influential alternative account to the classical 
theory of the firm. In particular, the managerial view, which received notable 
attention during the 1960s, "... is concerned with the consequences of pursuing 
and attaining certain goals within a given framework, " (Reid 1989,177). These 
goals reflect managerial motives and organisational observations. The theories, 
most notably those of Marris (1964) and Williamson (1963), emphasise the 
effects of the separation of ownership from control, and the consequent 
divergence in objectives that can best be represented within a principal agent 
setting. These theories stress the importance of managerial utility. Williamson 
(1963) introduces the notion of `expense preference' where, "... managers have 
a positive preference for expenditures on staff, emoluments and discretionary 
investment, " (Reid 1989,182). Thus, it is anticipated that a managerial 
objective would result in a marked departure from profit maximisation and hence 
a negative relationship between managerial expenses and performance is 
hypothesised. 
Another aspect of marketing concerns the distribution methods used by 
insurance companies. DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS is therefore included as a 
variable to control for the `selling costs' involved in markets for highly 
differentiated products. DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS is an index that equals 
the number of distribution channels used by the insurance company in promoting 
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its products. There are up to three potential means by which insurance 
companies market their products. Products may be sold through the use of an 
insurance company's own sales force, the use of an independent sales force, and 
also through the use of `direct' selling (see Chapter 7). This variable therefore 
helps to control for these firm-related factors. It is assumed that a positive 
correlation exists between the number of channels, and the size of distribution 
and marketing expenditures. As a consequence, it is hypothesised that an 
increase in the number of distribution channels will have a positive effect, 
through product differentiation and monopoly rents, upon performance. 
Consider next the vector of dummy variables, Z2. This vector addresses a 
number of issues relating to the ownership of insurance companies. MUTUAL 
is a dummy variable used to capture the changing ownership structure across the 
insurance industry. The variable takes a value of 1 if the insurer is a mutual and 
0 if the insurance company is a proprietary life insurer. `De-mutualisation' has 
been a recent trend amongst building societies and some life insurers and the 
inclusion of this variable is used to try and detect any performance variation 
across the ownership structure. 
FOREIGN is a variable that attempts to address another aspect of ownership: the 
impact of foreign ownership. FOREIGN is a dummy representing 1 if there is 
foreign ownership, and 0 if no foreign ownership is present. This helps to 
control for performance variation between domestic and foreign companies; for 
example, foreign firms may display superior performance over their domestic 
counter-parts due to the additional skills necessary in operating overseas. 
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GROUP is a dummy variable taking 1 if the insurance company is part of an 
insurance group and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the spillover effects 
that may arise between companies of a similar operation, with a consequential 
positive impact upon insurance company performance within the insurance 
group. 
9.4 Results and Discussion 
9.4.1 Estimation Technique 
Two regressions are estimated, one for each of the performance measures 
PROFIT and SOLVENCY. The results are presented in Table 9.1 and are 
calculated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity (White 1980). 6 In the presence of heteroskedasticity the OLS 
variance-covariance matrix estimator may not be consistent since the variables 
are correlated with the observation specific variances. White (1980) proposes a 
consistent estimator of the OLS variance/covariance matrix, using a diagonal 
matrix with the squared OLS residuals along the diagonal. Learner refers to this 
as "White-washing" heteroskedasticity (Learner 1988). 
9.4.2 Discussion 
A number of significant statistical relationships are reported in Table 9.1. Some 
of these results are specific to the performance measure used. Other results are 
6 See Appendix 2 for a detailed breakdown of this study. The appendix provides details on the 
definitions of variables, the sample set, and the nature of the residual plots. 
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robust across the two performance measures. Overall significance and 
explanatory power associated with the two regressions is also significant. 
Table 9.1. Regression Results 
Profitability Solvency 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
SIZE -0.0432 -2.43* -0.0239 -3.78** 
AGE 0.0001 0.27 0.0111 1.34 
DIVERSITY -0.0006 -1.18 0.0008 0.35 
INVESTMENT RETURN 0.3724 3.42** -0.1046 -0.27 
DEATH -0.0784 -2.28* 0.3766 2.75** 
SURRENDER -0.0064 -0.52 -0.225 -4.42** 
OVERSEAS CLAIMS 0.0165 0.08 -2.1778 -2.69** 
SALES GROWTH -0.0029 -1.19 0.0144 1.54 
EXPORTS 0.2294 1.46 1.5289 2.53* 
SINGLE PREMIUMS -0.0367 -3.13** 0.0428 0.81 
AGENCY COST 0.0013 1.14 0.0012 0.28 
MANAGERIAL EXPENSES -0.0478 -3.81** -0.0395 -2.98** 
DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS -0.0043 -1.09 0.0059 0.39 
MUTUAL 0.0073 0.78 -0.0652 -1.48 
FOREIGN -0.0045 -0.44 -0.0969 -2.44* 
GROUP -0.0021 -0.27 0.0764 1.96 
CONSTANT 0.0651 2.59* 0.3347 3.95** 
R2 0.358 0.583 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.505 
F 3.99 8.50 
N 103 103 
Note: (a) **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
(b) All estimates corrected for Heteroske dasticity (Whit e 1980). 
Consider first those results that are significant across the PROFIT and 
SOLVENCY measures of performance. Table 9.2 provides a summary of these 
main findings. 
Table 9.2. Findings on Size, Death, Managerial Expenses, and Performance in 
the U. K. Life Assurance Industry 
Measurement of Performance 
Profitability Solvency 
SIZE (-) (-) 
MANAGERIAL EXPENSES (-) (-) 
DEATH* (-) (+) 
*The coefficient for this variable reports a significant sign change across performance 
measures. 
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The reported coefficients in Table 9.1 demonstrate that SIZE, MANAGERIAL 
EXPENSES and DEATH are all statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 
both profitability and solvency (though DEATH reports a sign change across the 
two performance indices). The coefficients reported for SIZE therefore show 
that there is initial statistical evidence to support the proposition that larger 
insurance companies are less profitable and less solvent at the 5 percent level. 
This would seem to reject Baumol's (1959) proposition that larger firms may be 
able to take advantage of performance enhancing business opportunities that are 
unavailable to the smaller firm. Indeed as noted earlier, the proposition assumes 
the existence of adequate capital barriers, the form of which might be unclear in 
the financial sector in general and the insurance industry in particular (aside 
from the relatively modest U. K. solvency regulations). Moreover, the SIZE 
result would seem to imply that the presence of diseconomies and so-called x- 
inefficiencies (Leibenstein 1976) are significant within insurance companies. X- 
inefficiencies arise from changes in the incentive structure of the firm; x- 
inefficiencies occur out of reduced effort and productivity, which are a 
consequence of the changing environmental pressures that occur with increasing 
firm size. 
One further point to note is that there may be an interactive effect with SIZE: the 
larger insurers may be the older insurers and with this certain life cycle effects 
could be present. The results for AGE are insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
However, when an alternative regression run was attempted and the variable 
SIZEAGE included (defined at the natural logarithm of SIZE*AGE), a negative 
coefficient was reported for both measures of performance, see Table 9.3 below. 
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Table 9.3. Results using SIZEAGE 
Profitability 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Solvency 
Coefficient t-ratio 
SIZEAGE -0.0034 -2.761** -0.0303 -2.052* 
DIVERSITY -0.0061 -1.059 0.0076 1.497 
INVESTMENT RETURN 0.3765 2.406* 0.0675 0.127 
DEATH -0.0691 -2.032* 0.1867 1.079 
SURRENDER -0.5273 -0.419 -0.2922 -4.559** 
OVERSEAS CLAIMS 0.0325 -0.362 -2.0627 -2.693** 
SALES GROWTH -0.0032 -0.896 0.0104 0.77 
EXPORTS 0.0473 0.574 2.01 2.705** 
SINGLE PREMIUMS -0.0374 -3.352** -0.0211 -0.399 
AGENCY COST 0.0009 0.724 0.0013 0.23 
MANAGERIAL EXPENSES -0.0476 -3.247** -0.0631 -2.162* 
DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS -0.0043 -1.088 -0.0009 -0.055 
MUTUAL 0.0063 0.781 0.0214 0.527 
FOREIGN -0.0054 -0.556 -0.1178 -2.472* 
GROUP 0.0008 0.14 0.0652 1.552 
CONSTANT 0.0624 2.172* 0.6413 2.636** 
RSq. 0.355 0.456 
AdRSq. 0.244 0.363 
F 3.19 4.93 
N 103 103 
Note: (a) **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
(b) All estimates corrected for Heteroskedasticity (White 1980). 
With reference to Table 9.3, the coefficient on the variable SIZEAGE was 
significant at the 5 percent level.? As noted in previous chapters, many of the 
larger insurance companies have a long tradition of operation within the life 
assurance industry. As a consequence, this interactive result may also help to 
explain the relatively poor performance of the larger insurance companies. 
A further point to note with respect to SIZE is within the context of overall 
market concentration and the size distribution of the long-term insurance market. 
Recall that in Chapter 6, results showed that market concentration in the long 
term insurance market was relatively modest, with the four-firm concentration 
ratio being approximately 31 percent. This might be additional evidence to 
7 Most of the other results to be discussed were robust across the change in variables from SIZE 
and AGE, to SIZEAGE. 
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support the results in Table 9.1; namely that there exist significant restrictions 
upon firm size. 
Returning to the principal findings in Table 9.2, MANAGERIAL EXPENSES 
are also a significant variable in explaining the variation in performance across 
insurance companies. The finding suggests that the greater the proportion of 
total expenses made up by managerial expenses, the poorer the performance 
associated with the insurer. This demonstrates that managerial expenses have an 
important bearing upon firm-level performance outcome in the life assurance 
industry. Also, this would appear to confirm the view that managers have a 
positive preference for expenses and that this has a detrimental effect upon 
overall profitability. As the `managerial theories' demonstrate, the separation of 
ownership from control implies that the divergence in incentives between owner 
and manager may produce a marked departure from the profit predictions 
associated with the classical theory of the firm. Thus, the results presented in 
Table 9.1 and 9.2 suggest that MANAGERIAL EXPENSES are an important 
variable in understanding the performance of insurers and hence the relevance of 
managerial theories of the firm is signified. 
All product variants within the life assurance industry are based around some 
form of death coverage. As a consequence, a priori, the relationship between 
DEATH and performance would appear to be important to any understanding of 
insurance companies operating in the long-term market. The statistical 
significance of DEATH in explaining performance is confirmed in the results, 
although there is a notable change in the sign of the coefficient across the 
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performance measures. The greater the proportion of total claims made up by 
death claims, the lower the profitability. However, the greater the proportion of 
death claims, the greater the solvency of an insurance company. This variation 
in the findings is more difficult to explain. Death claims for a given period will 
impact negatively on the net cash flow position of an insurance company and 
hence profitability. However, there is evidently some other mechanism at work 
in respect of solvency and thus this may reflect the differences between the two 
measures of performance. 
At this point, it may be prudent to recall the distinctions between the two 
measures of performance. Profit makes up part of the overall solvency position 
for an insurer. However, solvency is, by definition, an all-encompassing 
evaluation of an insurance company, taking into account more than just revenue 
and cost, but rather valuation of all assets and liabilities. For this reason, 
solvency is arguably a more `dynamic' measure of performance than 
profitability in terms of the extent to which it makes assumptions about the 
future. One possible explanation of the above results might be related to the 
predictability of claims. Death is relatively predictable and for this reason 
appropriate provisions can be made for such a liability. The greater the 
proportion of claims made up by these relatively predictable claims, the less 
likely the opportunity to `surprise' the solvency position of an insurance 
company. Conversely, the greater the proportion of claims made up by less 
predictable categories, such as surrendering, the less equipped the insurer may be 
to meet its liabilities. It is therefore the predictability of claims that may have a 
crucial impact upon the solvency result reported in Table 9.2. 
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While much can be said about the significance of variables across performance 
measures, it is now worth considering the variables significant only with respect 
to one or other performance index. Evidence relating to the predictability 
explanation outlined above can also be found using the variable SURRENDER, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level in explaining solvency variation. 
Policy surrenders have a negative impact upon the solvency position and the lack 
of predictability in this claims category may serve as an explanation for this 
finding. Policy surrenders impose a significant cash outflow that is a lot more 
difficult to predict than the risk associated with death claims. 8 A similar style of 
argument might also be found in respect of OVERSEAS CLAIMS: the greater 
proportion of claims from overseas, the lower the insurer's solvency 
performance. Claims from abroad may introduce market specific risk factors; 
risk factors in the overseas markets that may not be experienced in the domestic 
market. 
The importance of overseas markets is also supported by evidence on 
EXPORTS, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the 
solvency performance measure (and the 10 percent level for the profitability 
measure). The greater the percentage of premium income from overseas, the 
greater the performance. The ability to appropriate the gains from overseas 
markets is clearly an important source of increased performance. Indeed, the 
S There are obviously some indicators that can be used for predicting policy surrenders; for 
example, the overall performance of the economy will have an impact upon the personal sector's 
ability to maintain premium payments and hence there is an income effect present within policy 
surrenders. 
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skill and knowledge required to operate overseas is such that the expertise 
needed may also help to enhance overall performance. 
In terms of the solvency index, there is another significant variable, FOREIGN. 
This dummy variable shows that there is a negative relationship between 
solvency and foreign ownership. On the basis of these results, foreign owned 
insurance companies have a negative impact upon solvency performance, when 
compared with domestically owned insurers. This might reflect variations in 
skill levels inherent within insurers that in turn would be accounted for in 
performance. 
It is also worth highlighting the variables significant and specific only to the 
profitability index. These variables are INVESTMENT RETURN and SINGLE 
PREMIUMS. INVESTMENT RETURN is positively related to profitability 
such that the greater the investment returns, the greater the reported profitability. 
This seems a reasonable result, given the importance of investment activities to 
the operation of an insurance company. 
By contrast, the greater the proportion of total premiums made up by SINGLE 
PREMIUMS, the lower the profitability. This has important implications for the 
markets in which insurance companies operate. Note that recent evidence 
suggests that single premium contracts make up a growing proportion of total 
insurance business (see Chapter 6). The results imply that such business has an 
adverse impact upon performance. However, this might not be a long-run result. 
A dynamic account might therefore provide additional insights into this result. 
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It is also worth noting those variables that were insignificant across both 
performance indices. These variables were DIVERSITY, SALES GROWTH, 
AGENCY COST, DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS, MUTUAL and GROUP. 
Evidently there are some important relationships at work and the results 
presented above are no definitive statement on the relevance or irrelevance of 
these variables given the methodological concerns mentioned earlier. As noted, 
the problems associated with measurement error may play a substantial role. 
The high noise-to-signal ratio present in accounting data makes further comment 
difficult with respect to intensity variables and other variables constructed out of 
accounting data. 
However, there are a couple of comments worth noting in respect of the dummy 
variables. The results associated with MUTUAL would suggest that there is no 
significant difference in insurer performance across ownership structure. 
Therefore, it might be suggested that the objectives for policyholders in respect 
of performance are similar to that of shareholders. The GROUP variable is 
significant at the 10 percent level for the solvency measure and might be 
explained by the gains to the risk-knowledge base from common ownership. 
9.4.3 A Note on Simultaneous Causality 
As discussed in section 9.1, estimation problems associated with causality and 
simultaneity are important considerations within any industrial organization 
study. While it is not the purpose of this research to explore these issues fully, it 
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is clearly a very important caveat to the results reported in Table 9.1. For this 
reason, a brief digression will be made into simultaneity and in particular the 
relationship between performance and size. 
Recall that one of the major issues in evaluating structure-performance 
relationships, is that of determining the number of endogenous variable. Theory 
can go some way to answering this question. Consider the simple case of the 
profit and concentration relationship. Under the original formulation of the SCP 
paradigm, the relationship and direction of causality between profit and 
concentration is as follows: 
(9.2) PROFIT = f(CONCENTRATION, Zo) 
Where, Zo is a vector of other exogenous variables. Ceteris paribus, higher 
levels of concentration are assumed to lead to greater profitability. However, a 
regression of this form may lead to spurious results due to problems of causality 
feedback from PROFIT to CONCENTRATION; that is: 
(9.3) CONCENTRATION =((PROFIT, ZI) 
Where, Zl is also a vector of exogenous variables. Thus, increased performance 
may also bring about greater concentration directly (through competitive 
advantages from allocative and technical efficiencies) or indirectly via conduct 
(through aggressive marketing policies). As a consequence, OLS estimation of 
Equation 9.2 ignores this underlying system within which the structure- 
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performance relationship is established and hence generates estimates that are 
biased and inconsistent, since there may exist contemporaneous correlation 
between the endogenous CONCENTRATION variable and the error term. 
Many estimation techniques are available to resolve the problem of simultaneity, 
assuming adequate knowledge of the underlying system and its `identification'. 
To keep matters simple, use of Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation is made 
here and the only endogenous variable assumed is SIZE through its relation to 
market share, which in turn forms part of market concentration. 9°1o 
The IV estimation procedure is a single equation technique that uses an 
`instrument' for each endogenous variable. Assuming such instruments exist, IV 
estimators are consistent. Instruments ideally should be strongly correlated with 
the variable they are serving to replace. Other exogenous variables may be 
useful candidates because, by assumption, they are exogenous. However, as 
noted by Schmalensee (1989a), the determination of exogeneity is open to 
question and as a result in order to maintain a high degree of correlation between 
instrument and variable, an alternative instrument is proposed here, namely the 
lagged value of the SIZE variable (SIZEt_1). This is usually correlated with the 
original independent variable, and although it is correlated with the disturbance 
vector, because it is lagged it is not contemporaneously correlated with the 
disturbance. " 
9 As measured by an appropriate concentration index such as the Herfindahl index of 
concentration. 
10 The problem of determining endogeneity needs to be addressed within any full discussion of 
simultaneity, with evidence being taken from tests such as the Hausman test (Hausman 1978). 
11 This in turn assumes that the disturbance vector is not autocorrelated. 
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Formally, assume that the matrix of explanatory variables (X) is made up by KI 
columns of exogenous variables (including the intercept) and K2 columns of 
endogenous variables. The intercept and the exogenous variables serve as their 
own perfect instruments and new variables must be found to act as instruments 
for the endogenous variables (at least one for each variable). 
Assuming there are K3 instruments available, a total of K1+K3 instruments are 
gathered together to form a matrix Z. By regressing each column of X on Z 
results in 1k, the desired matrix of final instruments. The K2 endogenous 
variables now have as instruments the best linear combination of all possible 
instruments. Thus, ff v the vector of instrumental variable estimates is produced 
by regressing y on k= Z(Z' Z)-' Z' X, viz. 
(9.4) 8'v =(x'x)-'x'y=[x'z(z'z)-'z'x]-'x'z(z'z)-'z'y 
If Z is the same dimension as X, then Equation 9.4 simplifies to produce 
,ß 
I" = (Z'X)-' Z'y . The results associated with this regression are reported in 
Table 9.4 below. Most of the findings reported in the previous section are also 
reported after IV correction. SIZE and MANAGERIAL EXPENSES both 
remain significant at the 5 percent level for both forms of performance 
measurement. Prior findings, specific to the performance indices, also hold with 
the only exception being FOREIGN, which is insignificant. Explanatory power 
is reduced, though the overall significance of the regression is high. 
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Table 9.4. Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
Profitability 
Coefficient t-ratio 
Solvency 
Coefficient t-ratio 
SIZE -0.0412 -2.11 * -0.2142 -2.167* 
AGE 0.0001 0.735 0.0075 0.161 
DIVERSITY -0.0007 -1.289 0.0026 0.851 
INVESTMENT RETURN 0.3699 2.383* 0.0404 0.078 
DEATH -0.0726 -2.041 * 0.3181 2.108* 
SURRENDER -0.0034 -0.273 -0.2951 -4.518** 
OVERSEAS CLAIMS -0.0523 -0.584 -1.9745 -2.08* 
SALES GROWTH -0.0032 -0.884 0.0107 0.686 
EXPORTS 0.0656 0.796 1.7686 1.939 
SINGLE PREMIUMS -0.0343 -3.308** -0.0892 -1.193 
AGENCY COST 0.0003 0.279 0.0001 0.02 
MANAGERIAL EXPENSES -0.0479 -3.266** -0.0342 -2.47* 
DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS -0.0037 -1.043 -0.0389 -1.462 
MUTUAL 0.0058 0.635 -0.0734 -1.433 
FOREIGN -0.0059 -0.682 -0.1087 -2.632** 
GROUP 0.0018 0.301 0.0817 1.847 
CONSTANT 0.0816 3.111 ** 0.3753 3.565** 
R2 0.361 0.422 
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.311 
F 3.03 4.88 
N 103 103 
Notes: (a) **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
(b) SIZE,., is used as an instrumental varia ble for SIZE,. 
Although other possible corrections may need to be addressed, the initial 
findings reported Table 9.4 seem to suggest that the results are robust across 
different estimation techniques, and [perhaps] this is tentative (stress tentative) 
evidence to support the view that problems associated with simultaneity are not 
prevalent here. 
Note that while much can be said concerning the theoretical determination of 
endogeneity, it is important to also note that empirical tests have been devised to 
test for endogeneity. Such a test was indeed constructed out of the works of 
Hausman (1978) and Wu (1974). The Hausman test for contemporaneous 
correlation between the OLS error term and an explanatory variable can be used 
to test for endogeneity, under the null hypothesis of independence and an 
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alternative hypothesis of endogeneity. 12 As an illustration, a Hausman test was 
performed for the variable SIZE1997 and the results are reported in Table 9.5 
below. 
Table 9.5. Results of the Hausman exogeneity test for the variable SIZE1997 
Dependent Variable Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
Profitability -0.0231 -1.724 0.0803 
Solvency -0.0285 -1.436 0.1548 
Notes: (a) The omitted variable version of the Hausman test was performed. 
(b) The t-test was constructed under the null hypothesis of independence and an 
alternative hypothesis of endogeneity. 
The results, presented in Table 9.5, cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
independence at the 5-percent level (although it can reject the null at the 10- 
percent level using profitability as the dependent variable). Thus, there is 
evidence to suggest that the size variable may indeed be independent. However, 
these results must be treated with great caution; for example, the Hausman test is 
sensitive to several types of specification error (see Godfrey and Hutton (1994) 
for discussion). For this reason, the above results may or may not imply 
endogeneity of the SIZE variable. This section therefore illustrates the 
complexity associated with simultaneous causality. 13 
9.5 Summary 
This paper has provided a cross-sectional study of insurance company 
performance for the period 1996/1997 using data on 103 insurance companies. 
12 Rejecting the null hypothesis would therefore imply a need for structural modelling. 13 Note that a similar test was performed for the managerial expense variable. The results 
demonstrated that there was no statistically significant evidence to suggest that this variable was 
endogenous. 
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Findings in respect of SIZE and MANAGERIAL EXPENSES report consistent 
results with poorer performance associated with larger insurers and greater 
managerial expenses being associated with poorer performance. In terms of 
general results specific to each performance measure there are two points to 
note. With regard to profitability, the variables that perform better are those that 
reflect the period-by-period net revenue position of the insurance company. By 
contrast, the solvency performance index appears to reflect underlying factors 
relating to the risk profile of its liabilities. In addition, the results confirm the 
importance of overseas markets to the operation of the U. K. life assurance 
industry. 
Methodological issues relating to the fundamental problems associated with 
empirical work in the field, such as measurement error and simultaneity, provide 
an important backdrop to the results presented in this chapter. However, the 
findings presented provide useful preliminary guidance in the explanation and 
understanding of inter-firm structure performance relationships within the U. K. 
life assurance industry. 
Section 9.6 Implications of SCP study for The Probability of Insolvency 
The evidence drawn together in this chapter, built on the developments of the 
previous 3 chapters, has helped to provide a number of indicators that together 
could be used to assist in predicting financial distress and in particular the 
probability of ruin. While the relationship between PROFIT and SOLVENCY 
has been emphasised, it is worth concentrating on the SOLVENCY variable 
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since this has been taken from the information submitted to the FSA/DTI and it 
is this information that assists in the assessment of ruin probability. 
Consider the key variables identified in the previous sections that have reported 
significant results at the 95 per cent level. The variables of interest are SIZE, 
DEATH, SURRENDER, and OVERSEAS CLAIMS. SIZE, SURRENDER and 
OVERSEAS CLAIMS have reported a negative influence on SOLVENCY and 
hence an increase in these indicators would be expected to be matched by an 
increase in the size of the probability of ruin. Conversely, with respect to 
DEATH, the results imply that the larger the amounts of death claims the lower 
the probability of ruin. However, it is important to note that as with all forms of 
estimation, the results are subject to questioning. This point is illustrated with 
reference to the negative coefficient on the SIZE variable. Whilst there may be 
theoretical explanations for this result, it is clear that this result is counter- 
intuitive and indeed the growth in consolidation is the result of insurance 
companies aiming to maintain their competitive position and financial strength. 
As a consequence there is the potential for spurious results to be reported and 
due caution must therefore be attached to any interpretation. 
How can this information be helpful in solvency surveillance? Given that the 
indicators highlighted above have a robust statistical relationship with 
SOLVENCY, they could be employed in a qualitative analysis of insurance 
companies in the first instance. For example, the results could lead to the sub- 
dividing of the insurance company population into peer groups, where larger 
insurance companies - assuming a criteria for defining `larger' exists - might be 
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subjected to a further weighting on their required capital in order to take account 
of the greater probability of insolvency. A similar treatment might be given with 
respect to the recent surrender experience. 
The preliminary evidence provided within this chapter might be used to 
construct a measure of insolvency probability using a limited dependent model 
as a basis for estimation. The effect of a change in the explanatory variable on 
the probability of ruin could then be evaluated - through an appropriate 
interpretation of the slope parameters on a limited dependent model - assuming 
adequate statistical leverage. However, the difficulties in obtaining adequate 
data are such that an alternative approach is required in order to quantify the 
probability of insolvency. A simulation model of a life office is one such 
approach that can be adopted and indeed the approach lends itself quite neatly to 
the incorporation of additional variables, such as the influence of surrendering. 
This `Monte-Carlo' simulation approach is the point of departure for the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10 
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
MODELLING OF A LIFE INSURER'S ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
10.0 Introduction 
The previous four chapters have provided a detailed descriptive account of the U. K. 
life assurance industry. Such information is a prerequisite for subsequent model 
building. In addition, as emphasised in Chapter 4, the dominant paradigm for the 
evaluation of insurer solvency is simulation methodology and operational research. 
This chapter forms the basis of Chapter 11, which uses the `Monte-Carlo' 
simulation approach to evaluate a number of regulatory issues. As a forerunner to 
the principle model and its results in Chapter 11, this chapter attempts to provide a 
detailed account of the simulation algorithms, while also providing an illustration of 
the main features of simulation methodology. 
The construction of an operational model of a life insurer will, by definition, 
necessitate the use of certain assumptions regarding the nature of the economic 
environment in which the insurer operates. Assuming that an `operational' 
definition of insurer solvency is a net cash-flow function, further assumptions need 
to be made regarding the insurer's assets and liabilities (see Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of solvency operational research). In particular, assumptions regarding 
the cash inflows from investment returns and the cash outflows from underwriting 
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claims require detailed specification. Under this formulation, any given solvency 
outcome will be a consequence of a variety of factors, both internal to the insurer- 
for example the assessment of underwriting risks policy- and external to the insurer- 
for example the size of investment returns. These factors will, in turn, affect to 
differing degrees the respective performances of the investment and underwriting 
portfolios and hence the overall performance of the insurance companies (see 
Chapter 5). 
In attempting to understand the solvency position of an insurer, it is therefore 
necessary to specify the main components of the economy in which the `operational' 
insurer functions. Moreover, since this is an investigation into the regulation of the 
U. K. life assurance industry, it would be an advantage for this model to reflect some 
of the main characteristics of the U. K. economy; this therefore has implications for 
the estimation or calibration of an insurer solvency simulation model. Having 
defined the set of algorithms, the cash inflows and cash outflows can be calculated 
period-by-period so that the insurer's net cash flow position may be evaluated across 
time, given various hypothesised scenarios. 
Discussion will proceed by examining the exact nature of the investment and 
underwriting portfolios. Emphasis is placed on the operational definition of the 
investment portfolio, and as a consequence this will therefore form the basis of 
discussion within this chapter, see respectively Sections 10.1-10.4 inclusive. A 
review of the main characteristics of the underwriting portfolio is given in Section 
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10.5. In particular, assumptions concerning the composition of the underwriting 
portfolio and its associated claims process (since actuarial operational research has 
already focused heavily on the insurer's underwriting portfolio (see Chapter 3)). 
Section 10.6 provides a summary of the main developments and sets the stage for 
the application of the `operational' insurance company in Chapter 11. 
10.1 Asset Class Selection 
Providing a full account of the investment activities of a life insurer requires an 
assumption on the number of asset classes and the nature of their associated return 
distributions. Such `stochastic' returns are a necessary source of information since 
they will form the major source of fluctuation within insurer solvency. The 
relationship between these returns is summarised in the variance-covariance matrix 
of returns and is discussed in section 10.3. Moreover, this matrix provides the 
necessary information in order to solve the portfolio balance problem, such as the 
portfolio selection problems defined in Chapter 5. 
In defining the asset mix of a life insurer, it is necessary to ensure that the asset 
classes used are at least representative (for a detailed discussion of the criteria 
relating to asset class selection see Booth, et al. (1997)). This provides a useful 
starting point when considering the selection of alternative asset classes. Chapter 7 
illustrated that the investment activities of U. K. insurers are substantial, with a 
market value of total net assets equal to approximately £566 billion in 1995 (see 
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Table 7.6 (Chapter 7)). Any well-diversified investor (be it an individual, or 
institution) will exploit investment activities across the risk/return profile, from the 
relatively secure assets of government securities to the less secure assets such as 
equities. As discussed in Chapter 4, greater expected returns are associated with a 
greater variance about this expected return; that is, according to portfolio theory the 
risk/return trade-off is positively sloped (Markowitz 1959). 
As Chapter 6 highlighted, the composition of the underwriting portfolio is another 
important factor to consider when establishing the composition of the asset 
portfolio. The first point to note is that depending on the nature of the policies 
underwritten, different liquidity requirements may be imposed upon the insurer at 
different periods of time within the policy term. Thus, there is a need for adequate 
representation of short-term assets within the asset portfolio of an insurer in order to 
meet this liquidity requirement. 
A further point worth addressing is that policy types themselves vary in terms of risk 
and return. The majority of long-term funds (aside from the re-investment of 
positive net returns) will come from substantive policies (see Chapter 6). Within the 
class of substantive policies there is a wide variation in policy features relating to 
the investment allocation of premiums. Hence, funds generated by a traditional non- 
profit life policy would be expected to be invested into government fixed interest 
securities (low risk and near certain return). By contrast, the growth of unit-linked 
policies has generated funds which, by definition, are invested into the equities 
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market with its associated characteristics of greater risk and expected return. Thus, 
the selection of asset classes must reflect the product specific features of life 
assurance companies in the U. K. 
Having set out some of the practical considerations relating to asset class selection, 
it is useful to address briefly the theoretical considerations (see Booth, et al. (1997) 
and Ong (1995)). To start with, it is evident that there needs to be enough asset 
classes to ensure adequate portfolio diversification. Diversification sets constraints 
upon the selection of asset classes. In particular, diversification requires at least 2 
asset classes. Furthermore, there is the need to avoid sampling error by ensuring 
that the asset classes are distinct (in terms of their return distribution characteristics). 
As Ong (1995) argues: 
If two or more asset classes have similar characteristics, the relative 
preferences for these asset classes are likely to be very sensitive to sampling 
error and model specification. (Ong 1995,48) 
Thus in relation to the argument made by Ong (1995), asset class `distinctness' may 
be defined in terms of asset class returns, risks, and especially their associated 
covariance structure. The probability that a given asset class is not distinct will 
increase in proportion to the total number of asset classes selected. 
The above points serve to highlight some of the considerations, both practical and 
theoretical, in selecting the number of asset classes. These considerations, together 
with the availability of suitable model algorithms, have resulted in the selection of 5 
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asset classes to be used in subsequent operational research. Following the recent 
literature on modelling stochastic investment returns (see Wilkie (1995), and Ong 
(1995)), assets are subdivided into the following 5 classes: equities, fixed-interest 
securities (Consols), index-linked government securities, cash, and property. Such 
classes are representative and distinct, as defined above. However, it might be that 
greater asset subdivision could have been achieved without significant loss of 
distinction. While this may have been the case, the assumption of 5 asset classes is 
justified on the grounds of parsimony and also because the current literature 
provides only a limited number of stochastic asset return models. 
On the basis of the selected asset categories, there is reasonable representation 
across the risk/return profile. Consider each of the five asset classes in turn. In the 
case of index-linked securities, its inclusion seems appropriate given the growth in 
such investments in recent years and the need for adequate protection against 
excessive inflation within public sector securities. 
Consider next the asset classes of Consols and equities. The fixed interest securities 
represent the (relatively) safe asset, while equities account for an asset class with 
greater associated risk. In recent years, equity performance is credited for the 
growth in substantive policy performance (Moneyfacts 1998). Increasingly 
nowadays, substantive contracts assume an investment strategy that is centred on the 
stock market and its associated performance. Thus, it becomes apparent that in 
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practice equities (and their associated variance of return) will be a central 
consideration in the measuring and regulation of insurer solvency. 
With respect to cash, another asset-subdivision, its inclusion is justified on the 
grounds that it represents the short-term assets of an insurer's investment portfolio. 
The inclusion of cash provides the means by which an insurer can meet its liquidity 
requirements. The final subdivision of assets is property. This asset class has been 
the subject of debate within the operational research literature (see Ong (1995) for a 
full account of this debate) and for this reason it is worth expanding on the 
arguments for and against the inclusion of property within the investment portfolio. 
The evidence, as exemplified in Table 7.5 (Chapter 7), suggests that property is a 
significant investment for life insurers. However, it has been argued by some, 
notably Ong (1995), that property is a unique asset and, as a result, cannot be readily 
incorporated into a stochastic model of an insurance company. Property is not easily 
disposed of (or acquired) due to its particularly high transactions costs (included 
here are the search costs of finding a buyer (seller)). The ability to buy and sell with 
ease would seem a necessary requirement for continuous portfolio re-balancing and 
this therefore limits the usefulness of property. However, subsequent simulations 
consider the run-off performance of an insurer, and is for this reason that property is 
included. 
One final consideration in relation to the number of asset classes to be selected, is 
that of overseas' investments. The extent of investments overseas is significant (see 
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Chapter 7), yet the complexity involved in modelling such activities would seem 
considerable and it is for this reason that such assets are excluded from the model. 
However, in spite of this limitation, the vast majority of insurer investment activities 
are represented within the 5 asset classes assumed. 
10.2 The Wilkie Model of Stochastic Investment Returns 
The original Wilkie Investment Model (Wilkie 1986) provides a stochastic account 
of the investment returns for a life office or pension fund (see Chapter 4). The 
model has been applied to a variety of situations (especially issues pertaining to 
insurer solidity, see for example Hardy (1993,1994)). The Wilkie model (Wilkie 
1986) provides an estimated econometric model designed to be used in simulating 
investment returns. In its original formulation, the model comprised of the retail 
price index (RPI), the yield on Consols (long-term interest rates), and the yield on 
U. K. equities. While the model received widespread attention and frequent 
application, it was subject to a variety of criticisms both at the theoretical and 
econometric level (these concerns are addressed in Section 10.4). To counter some 
of these concerns, Wilkie revised and updated his original model to include 
additional asset classes (notably short-term assets, index-linked securities and 
property), and alternative estimation techniques, such as Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models and cointegrated models (Wilkie 1995). The 
`revised' Wilkie model has also been the subject of debate and criticism. However, 
in spite of these criticisms, the Wilkie model has been widely endorsed on the 
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grounds that it provides a practical means of examining complex issues relating to 
insurer solvency. As a consequence, use will be made of the `revised' model 
(Wilkie 1995). ' 
10.2.1 Simulation Techniques 
A full account of the 1995 Wilkie model will be developed here. The model is 
designed for the expressed purpose of simulation, or `Monte-Carlo' techniques. 
These techniques use computer models to `imitate' real life situations. Inputs to the 
system reflect variables that are based on probabilistic statements. It should be 
noted that the use of simulation techniques has become commonplace because of its 
ability to handle complex systems (especially with the growth in computer 
processing power). Note that all simulation results are calculated and presented 
using the `@RISK' add-in to Microsoft Excel. In particular, `summary graphs' are 
used to present the results of the output distributions. These graphs are produced by 
@RISK and summarise the changes in probability distributions across the output 
variable range. It is assumed that the time horizon for all simulations is 25 years. 
Within the summary graph, 5 parameters are calculated for the output probability 
distribution across the time horizon; namely, the mean, two upper band values, and 
two lower band values. The two upper band values represent respectively the +1 
1 Implicit here is the relationship between model calibration and model estimation. The Wilkie model 
(Wilkie 1995) will be used to `calibrate' the insurer model subsequently developed in Chapter 11. 
This is justified on the grounds that the Wilkie model is based on data that is taken from the U. K. and 
as such, the model can be seen as representative of the long-term investment climate faced by U. K. 
life insurers. 
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standard deviation, and the 95th percentile of each distribution. The two lower band 
values represent respectively the -1 standard deviation, and the 5th percentile of 
each distribution. Thus, the summary graph charts the performance of these five 
parameters through time; the wider the interval between the band values the greater 
the associated uncertainty with respect to the output variable. 
The number of iterations within a simulation will be 10000 and this number is 
justified on the grounds that all the output distributions are `converged'. 2 
Convergence is defined in terms of the respective percentage change in the 5 
statistics of the summary graph. @RISK monitors three convergence statistics with 
respect to the output distribution: first, the average percentage change in the 
percentile values; second, the percentage change in the mean; and third, the 
percentage change in the standard deviation. Convergence is defined in terms of the 
changes in these statistics over successive iterations. In particular, a distribution is 
said to have converged when all its convergence statistics have changed by less than 
1 percent for two successive iterations. The number of iterations required for 
convergence varies according to a given model's complexity (see Appendix 3 for all 
convergence results). 
2 Convergence is a central aspect of simulation methodology. Convergence tests the stability of the 
output distributions created during the simulation. As more iterations are run, output distributions 
typically become more "stable" as the statistics describing each distribution change less and less with 
each additional iteration. Thus, it is important to run enough iterations so that the statistics generated 
on the outputs are reliable. 
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10.2.2 The Basic Time Series 
Discussion now turns to addressing explicitly the nature of the asset model's 
computer algorithms (Wilkie 1995). Each asset class is addressed in turn, with the 
retail price index being defined first because of its central role in generating the 
sequences of the Wilkie model. 3 
The Retail Price Index 
The value of the Retail Price Index (RPI) is given by the series Q,, where t denotes 
the time period: 
(10.1) Q, = Q, _,. exp{I, 
} 
Where the rate of inflation over the period (t-1, t) is given by I, = lnQ, - In Q, _,, 
which in turn is generated by a first order autoregressive series (AR(1)) defined as: 
(10.2) 1, = QMU + QA. (I, _, - 
QMU) + QE, 
QE, = QSD. QZ, 
QZ, - iid N(0,1) 
3 Most of the notation used to define the computer algorithms is taken directly from Wilkie (Wilkie 
1995), with time periods denoted in subscript. 
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The estimates provided by Wilkie for the RPI model are as follows. 4 The results 
were QMU=0.047, QA=0.58 and QSD=0.0425 (Wilkie 1995,785). Thus, for a 
given year the rate of inflation is equal to its mean rate (4.7 percent), plus 58 percent 
of last year's deviation from the mean, plus a random innovation term which has 
zero mean and standard deviation of 0.0425. Figure 10.1 shows the results of 
simulating the rate of inflation (I, ) over a 25-year period. 
Figure 10.1. Simulated Inflation Rates 
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Note: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
With reference to Figure 10.1, it is evident that there exists significant variation in 
the rate of inflation about its mean rate of 4.7 percent. Note that the model allows 
for negative inflation. This model feature was criticised especially in the mid-1980s 
after Wilkie introduced his original model (Wilkie 1986). Recently, the inflation 
" Wilkie (1995) updates and `rebases' the original Wilkie model (Wilkie 1986) using the period 
1923-1994. 
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experience has led most commentators to accept this feature. However, the extent 
of negative inflation can be constrained (for example Hardy (1993) imposes a 
minimum inflation rate of (-) 5 percent). As will be demonstrated, the RPI is of 
central importance to the workings of the Wilkie (1995) model and the generation of 
its stochastic asset returns. 
Equities: Share Prices and Dividends 
To construct a share price index (P, ), Wilkie models share dividend yields (Yr) and 
share dividends (D), to give P, =D/Yt. Consider the index of equity dividends on 
ordinary shares D, first, this is defined as follows: 
(10.3) D, = Dl_,. exp{DW. DM, +DX. I, +DMU+DY. YE, _, +DB. 
DE, 
_, 
+DE, } 
DM, = DD. I, + (1- DD). DM, _, 
DE, = DSD. DZ, 
DZ, - iid N(0,1) 
Parameters suggested by Wilkie were DW=0.58, DD=1.3, DMU=0.016, DY=(- 
0.175), DB=0.57, DSD=0.07 (Wilkie 1995,844). Also, DX is constrained to equal 
(1-DW). Thus, for any given year, the change in the logarithm of the dividend index 
is equal to a function of past and present values of inflation, plus a mean real 
dividend growth (1.6 percent), plus an influence from last year's dividend yield 
innovation, plus an influence from last year's dividend innovation, plus a random 
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error (innovation) term with zero mean and standard deviation equal to 0.075. The 
series is represented in Figure 10.2. 
Figure 10.2. Dividend Index for Ordinary Shares 
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Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
(c) Base Year =1. 
There is positive trend for the dividend index from the base year t=1 (index =1). In 
addition, there exists greater uncertainty about the mean as t-25. This fluctuation 
is such that there may be no nominal growth at all in the index over the 25-year 
period (possibly even a nominal decline). The increasing spread of the probability 
distributions reflects the accumulation of uncertainty (through time) inherent within 
the predictions. 
Consider the next component of the share price index, namely the dividend yield Y, 
on the same set of ordinary shares. This is defined as: 
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(10.4) Y, = exp. {YW. I, + In YMU + YN, } 
YN, =YA. YN, _, +YE, 
YE, = YSD. YZ, 
YZ, - iid N(0,1). 
Wilkie's suggested parameters were YW=1.8, YA=0.55, YMU=0.0375, YSD=0.155 
(Wilkie 1995,822). Figure 10.3 demonstrates that dividend yields are relatively 
constant about the mean. 
Figure 10.3. Simulated Dividend Yields 
7% 
D 
6% 
_ 
V y5%- 
1 14% 
DE 
I L3% 
ED 2% 
N 1% 
D 
0% 
15 15 25 
YEAR 
......... 5% '-1SD Mean -'+1SD----'+95% 
Note: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
The dividend yield function shows that the logarithm of the dividend yield is equal 
to its mean value (1n0.0375), plus 55 percent of its deviation a year ago from the 
mean, plus an additional influence from inflation (equal to 1.8 times the rate of 
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inflation), plus a random error term with zero mean and standard deviation 0.155. 
The two series, YY and D1, can therefore be used to construct the equity price index, 
Pr. Pt is derived be evaluating (Dr/Y1) using Equation 10.3 and Equation 10.4. The 
new combined series is illustrated in Figure 10.4 below. 
Figure 10.4. Simulated Equity Price Index 
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Notes (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
(c) Base year, t=1. 
Government Fixed Interest Securities 
The yield on (irredeemable) fixed interest securities C, is generated by the following 
series. 
5 The Consols model can therefore be used to provide an approximation to long-term interest rates in 
the U. K. 
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(10.5) C, = CW. CM, +CMU. exp{CN, } 
CM, = CD. I, + (1- CD). CM, _, 
CN1 = CA!. CN, _, 
+ CY. YE, + CE, 
CE, = CSD. CZ, 
CZ, - iidN(0,1). 
Suggested parameters were CW=1.0, CD=0.045, CMU=0.0305, CAI=0.9, CY=0.34 
and CSD=0.185 (Wilkie 1995,862). Thus, at any date the Consols yield is 
decomposed into two parts, an allowance for expected future inflation, and a real 
yield. The series is presented in Figure 10.5 below. 
Figure 10.5. Simulated Yields on (Irredeemable) Fixed Interest Securities 
14% 
12% 
Y 10% 
1 8% 
E 
L 6% 
D 4% 
2% 
0% 
_ _. 
l -`ý 
15 15 25 
YEAR 
5% 1 SD Mean -'+l SD --- -'+95% 
Notes: (a) Yield on Consols. 
(b) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(c) Results over a 25-year period. 
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Although the Consols yield is relatively constant, there is a tendency for uncertainty 
to increase about the mean yield as time increases. This uncertainty may seem an 
appropriate risk to incorporate into an insurer model of solvency, given the 
importance of long-term interest rates. 
Cash (Short-term Interest Rates) 
The model presented by Wilkie (1995) for generating the return on cash (and hence 
short-term interest rates) is given by the autoregressive series, B,: 
(10.6) B, = C,. exp{-BD, } 
BD, = BMU + BA. (BD, _, - 
BMU) + BE, 
BE, = BSD. BZ, 
BZ, - iid N(0,1) 
Parameters suggested for this model were BMU=0.23, BA=0.74 and BSD=0.18 
(Wilkie 1995,871). The series is illustrated below in Figure 10.6. In effect, cash is 
treated as a one-year (irredeemable) bond. 
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Figure 10.6. Simulated Short-term Interest Rates 
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Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
Figure 10.6 demonstrates that the volatility associated with short-term interest rates, 
about its mean rate of return, is substantial. This will therefore provide another 
relevant source of uncertainty in modelling insurer solvency. 
Property: Yield and Income 
A property-price index A, represents the price and income performance of a given 
property portfolio and is developed as follows. The index is defined in a similar 
fashion to that of the equity price index Pt with the relevant components being 
property yield Z1 and property income E,, with A, =E1/Zt. 
363 
Consider first, the property yield ZZ, which is given by the following function: 
(10.7) Z, = exp{ZN, 1 
ZN, =1nZMU+ZA. (lnZ, _, -1nZMU)+ZE, 
ZE, = ZSD. ZZ, 
ZZ, - iid N(0,1) 
Suggested parameters were ZMU= 0.074, ZA= 0.91 and ZSD= 0.12 (Wilkie 1995, 
877). At this point, it is important to emphasise that there are some difficulties 
associated with these parameter specifications and the ultimate prediction of the 
property price index At. The use of these parameters (together with the parameters 
of the equity share price index) results in a property price index (Ar) that consistently 
out-performs an equity price index (P). Such a result holds where there is a lower 
associated risk (variance of return) for property than equity and thus implies a 
negatively sloped risk-return trade-off between these two asset classes. 6 On the 
basis of the predictions from portfolio theory, this result seems counter-intuitive. 
Moreover, the average nominal return for 80 sampled property life funds is roughly 
10 percent and this is less than the predicted returns from an equity portfolio of 
equivalent initial size (Moneyfacts 1998). For this reason the above parameters are 
amended to produce outcomes which are consistent with the recent evidence. 
6 There are many potential explanations for these predictions generated by the Wilkie model. Much 
of these relate to the uncertainties surrounding the true model and the availability of accurate data (for 
a discussion of these explanations see Section 10.4). 
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As a consequence of the above concerns, use is made of the parameters provided by 
Daykin and Hey (1990) in order to calibrate the Wilkie model and produce 
outcomes that are more consistent with the risk/return predictions of portfolio 
theory. The parameters used by Daykin and Hey (1990) were ZA=0.6, ZMU=0.05 
and ZSD=0.075 (Daykin and Hey 1990,181). As before, this represents a simple 
autoregressive AR(1) model where the logarithm of property yield is equal to its 
mean value (ZnO. 05) plus 60 percent of its deviation a year ago from the mean, plus a 
random error term with zero mean and 0.075 standard deviation, see Figure 10.7. 
Figure 10.7. Simulated Yields on a Given Property Portfolio 
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Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
While much is said about the yield on a property portfolio, it is also necessary to 
consider the property income component of a property-price index. For income on 
property (especially income in the form of rent), Wilkie attempts to estimate the 
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income growth over the period 1967 to 1994. The property income index is given 
by Et, and is defined as follows: 
(10.8) E, = E, _,. exp{EW. 
EM, +EX. I, +EMU+EE, } 
EM, = ED. I, + (1- ED). EM, _, 
EE, = ESD. EZ, 
EZ, - iid N(0,1) 
The parameters used by Wilkie were EW= 1.0, ED= 0.13, EMU= -0.01, and ESD= 
0.05 (Wilkie 1995,879). See Figure 10.8 for an illustration of simulated property 
income. 
Figure 10.8. Simulated Property Income Index 
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Note: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
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Figure 10.8 indicates the upward trend in property income (which includes property 
rental) together with an expansion in projected uncertainty with time t. The model is 
centred on the inflation rate Ir, its mean value (ln(-0.01)), plus a random error term 
with zero mean and 0.05 standard deviation. 
Having defined the yield and income components associated with property, a 
property price index A, can be constructed. The resulting property price index is 
illustrated below in Figure 10.9. 
Figure 10.9. Simulated Property Price Index 
P 120 
R 
1001 1 100 
C 80 
E 
60 
N 40 
D 20 "- 
_....... E 
X0 
15 15 25 
YEAR 
'-5% '-1SD Mean -- '+1SD --- -'+95% 
Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Results over a 25-year period. 
Index-Linked Government Securities 
The real yield on index-linked stocks, denoted by R, (at time t), is an AR(1) model 
and is defined as follows: 
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(10.9) 1n R, = 1nRMU+RA(lnR, _I -1nRMU)+RBC. 
CE, +RE, 
RE, = RSD. RZ, 
RZ, - iid N(0,1) 
(Note. CE, is the error term from the model for fixed interest securities) 
Suggested parameters for this model were RMU= 0.04, RA= 0.55, RBC= 0.22 and 
RSD= 0.05 (Wilkie 1995,883). The real yield of these securities fluctuates about 
the mean return of 4 percent- see Figure 10.10 below (note the modest variations in 
real yields). Thus the logarithm of the real yield is equal to the logarithm of its 
mean value (In 0.04), plus 58 percent of the deviation a year ago from the mean, 
plus a random innovation from the fixed interest securities, plus its own random 
innovation with zero mean and standard deviation 0.05. 
Figure 10.10. Simulated Real Returns on Index-Linked Government Securities. 
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10.2.3 The `Rolled-Up' Indices 
Having defined the basic time series associated with the 5 asset classes, Wilkie 
(1995) proceeds by constructing a `rolled-up' index for each asset class. These 
indices represent the total `rolled-forward' nominal returns at time t for a unit sum 
invested; such an index therefore gives the compounded returns over a given period 
of time. The rolled-up series are defined as follows: 
(10.10) PR, = PRr-1. _P, 
+D,. (1-t, )} (Equities) 
P, 
-, 
(10.11)CRr =CR, _1. 
I 
+(1-t2) . C, _, 
(Consols) 
r 
(10.12) BR, = BR, _,. 
I1+(1-t3). B, 
_, 
I (Cash) 
(10.13) RR, = RR, _, .1+ 
(1- t4) . R, _, . 
Q` 
(Index-linked) 
R, Q1-1 
(10.14) AR, = AR, (Property) A, 
_, 
Where t; (i=1 to 5) represents the tax rate for the respective asset class (should the 
tax rate wish to be incorporated into the analysis). However, since the tax 
calculation is not a simple one with respect to insurance companies and their 
investment income, gross returns will be assumed. 
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As an illustration of the application of the Wilkie model, use is made of the 
generated returns to derive the efficient set of portfolios (see Chapters 4 and 5). In 
order to calculate the variance/covariance matrix for the standard Markowitz 
portfolio selection problem, calculations of asset returns are required. To calculate 
these rates of returns, the following variables derive the nominal and real rates of 
return for a variable X1, viz. 
(10.15) FXI = 
X` 
0 
(10.16) GX, = 100 FX, 
J 
-1 
(10.17) HX, _ FQFXI 
, 
l 
(10.18) JX, =I 00. HX, 
1`J 
-1 
The variable FX, is the return over t years from an investment of 1 at time 0, and GX, 
is the equivalent compound annual rate of return (expressed as a percentage). HXt 
and JX1 are defined in the same way, but they are based on real returns rather than 
nominal returns and hence are defined relative to the retail price index, Qt. 
Table 10.1 and Table 10.2 provide simulation results for nominal and real returns 
respectively. This information provides a useful illustration of the performance of 
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the Wilkie model and also demonstrates some other features specific to the model. 
Consider first nominal returns- see Table 10.1 below. 
Table 10.1. Rates of Nominal Return (%) by Asset Class for Various Terms 
Asset Class Mean & Term Term Term Term Term Term 
Standard t=1 t=5 t=10 t=15 t=20 t=25 
Deviation 
Equities E(GPR) 13.42 11.23 10.87 10.79 10.74 10.75 
(GPRt) 
SD(GPR) 19.65 11.04 6.66 4.62 3.55 2.43 
Consols E(GCRd 8.12 7.94 7.86 7.91 7.83 7.85 
(GCR, ) 
SD(GCRr) 7.83 4.97 3.55 2.90 1.96 1.88 
Cash E(GBR) 6.69 6.45 6.28 6.45 6.56 6.51 
(GBR, ) 
SD(GBR j 0.02 1.32 1.36 1.27 1.21 1.18 
Index-linked E(GRR) 9.55 9.37 9.22 8.93 8.96 8.97 
(GRRt) 
SD(GRR) 12.68 6.83 5.11 3.41 2.73 1.92 
Property E(GAR) 11.76 10.04 9.64 9.87 9.52 9.55 
(GAR) 
SD(GAR) 15.33 9.71 5.93 4.05 3.49 2.14 
Notes. (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) E(. ) denotes the expected real return. 
(c) SD(. ) denotes the standard deviation of real return. 
(d) For evidence of convergence- see Appendix 3. 
The rates of nominal returns demonstrate a positive risk/return trade-off. The 
relative ranking of the asset classes is as follows (from largest expected return to 
lowest expected return): equities, property, index-linked government securities, 
fixed-interest government securities, and cash. 
Next consider the real returns- see Table 10.2. This table demonstrates a crucial 
operational distinction between real returns and nominal returns; namely, that the 
371 
risk/return trade-off is not the same for nominal and real returns. Note that the 
summary graphs of the associated real return simulations are given in Appendix 3. 
Table 10.2. Rates of Real Return (%) by Asset Class for Various Terms 
Asset Class Mean & Term Term Term Term Term Tenn 
Standard t=1 t=5 t=10 t=15 t=20 t=25 
Deviation 
Equities E(JPR) 8.45 7.55 5.94 5.93 5.90 5.89 
(JPR) 
SD(JPR) 20.67 12.08 7.54 3.52 2.94 2.16 
Consols E(JCR) 3.57 2.98 2.78 2.96 3.09 3.23 
(JCR, ) 
SD(JCR) 9.35 6.46 5.94 3.10 2.54 1.87 
Cash E(JBR) 1.24 2.53 2.48 2.37 2.26 2.39 
(JBR) 
SD(JBR) 4.30 3.53 2.82 2.38 2.06 1.44 
Index-linked E(JRR) 3.97 3.96 4.01 4.01 3.99 4.03 
(JRR ) 
SD(JRR) 3.66 1.47 0.77 0.52 0.37 0.31 
Property E(JAR) 8.20 6.95 5.89 5.28 4.95 4.78 
(JAR) 
SD(JAR) 14.34 5.85 3.68 2.76 2.4 1.96 
Notes. (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) E(. ) denotes the expected real return. 
(c) SD(. ) denotes the standard deviation of real return. 
(d) For evidence of convergence- see Appendix 3. 
Table 10.2 demonstrates the results of the simulations for `real' rates of return. 
With respect to the risk/return trade-off there are a number of points to consider. 
For equities, property, Consols and cash, the risk/return trade-off is positive and 
hence in line with the predictions of portfolio theory. However, an anomaly is 
reported with respect to index-linked government securities; in particular, index- 
linked securities outperform the real returns of Consols and cash, yet have the 
lowest overall associated risk (standard deviation). This is a direct consequence of 
using the real returns as a basis for comparison. From a practical perspective, 
index-linked securities are designed to provide a return that matches inflation yet 
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also is as secure as fixed-interest securities. From an operational perspective, the 
explicit functional forms used to generate the sequence of returns might also be an 
explanation for the real return results. As a consequence, it is not surprising to see 
why the real return risk associated with index-linked securities is very small. 
10.3 The Variance/Covariance Matrix of Returns 
Having defined the nature of nominal and real returns for the five asset categories, 
the next step towards illustrating the efficient frontier is to construct the associated 
variance-covariance matrix of returns. The converged estimates of the variance- 
covariance matrices are given in Table 10.3 and Table 10.4 for nominal and real 
returns, respectively. 
Table 10.3. The Variance/Covariance Matrix for Nominal Returns (25 years) 
Cash Consols Index-linked E ui 
Cash 1.39 0.97 1.02 0.94 
Consols 3.53 0.15 0.83 
Index-linked 3.68 1.56 
Equities 5.90 
Property 
Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Variance-covariance estimates based on a 25-year period. 
Consider first Table 10.3. The main diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix 
represents the respective asset variance about return whilst the remaining values off 
the main diagonal of the matrix represent the covariance (A, B) where, A and B are 
the row and column asset respectively. Only the upper half of the matrix is 
1.05 
-0.05 
2.09 
2.05 
4.57 
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completed due to its symmetry. The results reported for the variance/covariance 
matrix of nominal returns shows that there is only one negative covariance reported, 
the covariance between Consols and property. Next consider the results reported in 
Table 10.4. 
Table 10.4. The Variance/Covariance Matrix for Real Returns (25 years) 
Cash Consols Index-linked Equities P 
Cash 2.07 4.62 0.12 3.58 2.46 
Consols 3.49 2.21 7.57 3.56 
Index-linked 0.09 0.32 0.01 
Equities 4.66 3.75 
Property 3.84 
Notes: (a) Results given for 10000 iterations. 
(b) Variance-covariance estimates base d on a 25-year period. 
It is evident that there exists only positive covariance between the real returns on 
different asset classes. This might be a feature that is exacerbated when dealing 
with real returns rather than nominal returns, since the influence of the RPI will be 
prominent (especially given the structure of the Wilkie model algorithms). Another 
explanation of the positive covariance terms might be associated with the number of 
the asset classes; for example, the low number of asset classes may disguise 
underlying negative covariances that might exist between individual securities 
(rather than the groups of securities assumed here). However, regardless of the 
cause, the lack of negative covariance places a limit on the extent to which 
diversification can take place within this hypothetical insurer asset portfolio. 
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The Asset-Only Efficient Frontier 
The frontier of efficient portfolios with respect to nominal returns and real returns is 
illustrated in Figure 10.11 and Figure 10.12, respectively. These illustrations show 
the `efficient' portion of the hyperbola (for the analytical treatment of efficient 
frontiers, see Chapter 5). 
Figure 10.11. The Efficient Frontier Using the 
1995 Wilkie Model (Nominal Returns) 
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Notes: (a) Asset returns, variances and covariances are based on the results of simulations 
performed by the Wilkie (1995) model over a 25 year period and presented in Table 10.1 
and Table 10.3. 
(b) Solutions to the quadratic program provided with the use of `Solver'- an add-in to 
Microsoft Excel. 
(c) Quadratic program solved by varying risk for a given return, assuming that the portfolio 
weights sum to unity and that they are all individually non-negative. 
The Markowitz (1959) quadratic program (see Equation 5.4 and Figure 5.1 in 
Chapter 5) was used to calculate the efficient frontiers presented in Figure 10.11 
(nominal returns) and 10.12 (real returns). These calculations trace out hypothetical 
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efficient frontiers (based on the estimates of Section 10.2) and this in turn 
demonstrate the operational distinction between nominal and real returns. 
Figure 10.12. The Efficient Frontier Using the 1995 Wilkie Model (Real Returns) 
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Notes: (a) Asset returns, variances and covariances are based on the results of simulations 
performed by the Wilkie (1995) model over a 25 year period and presented in Table 10.2 
and Table 10.4. 
(b) Solutions to the quadratic program provided with the use of `Solver'- an add-in to 
Microsoft Excel. 
(c) Quadratic program solved by varying risk for a given return assuming that the portfolio 
weights sum to unity and that they are all individually non-negative. 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3), the problem of selecting an operating 
point along the efficient frontier is solved typically with reference to utility theory 
(see equations 5.15-5.21 for the derivation of optimality conditions using utility 
theory). However, it should be noted that the above illustrations are only with 
respect to the five asset classes, with no account of the insurer's liabilities. 
Liabilities are defined in Section 10.5 and are incorporated into utility theory using 
the Sherris model (Sherris 1992), see Chapter 11. 
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10.4 Discussion of the Wilkie Model 
Before addressing some of the main points of interest associated with the Wilkie 
(1995) model, it is important to note the initial conditions for the simulations. The 
initial conditions need to be defined in order that the simulation may begin at time 
t=0. As Wilkie notes, there are many potential candidates for selecting the initial 
conditions. 
`Neutral' initial conditions are proposed here where, "... the starting values are set at 
what their long-run means would be if all the standard deviations were zero, " 
(Wilkie 1995,902). This would seem a reasonable assumption upon which to 
commence the simulation. The full set of neutral conditions is given below in Table 
10.5. 
Table 10.5. Initial Conditions. 
Initial Conditions: 
1(0) = QMU = 0.047 
Y(0) %=4.0811% 
C(0)% = 7.75% 
B(0)% = 6.1576% 
R(0)%=RMU%=4.0% 
Z(0)% = ZMU% = 5.0% 
DM(0) = CM(0) = EM(0) = QMU = 0.047 
YE(0) = DE(0) =0 
Q(0)=D(0)=P(0)=E(0)=A(0)=PR(0)=CR(0)=BR(0) =RR(0)=AR(0)=1 
(for the construction of indices) 
The previous sections have been used to develop the series of stochastic asset 
returns and demonstrate that the Wilkie model's strength is in terms of its practical 
usage and ease of interpretation. Most of the series are built around an 
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autoregressive structure. Moreover, considering the structure of the Wilkie model, 
for example the structure of the retail price index (RPI), it is clear that there is an 
adaptive expectation mechanism underpinning much of the model. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, some of the predictions relating to the property price 
index are inconsistent with the predictions of portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959). 
One of the difficulties in constructing a statistical model is that it is constrained by 
data availability and estimation techniques. While many alternative estimation 
techniques were explored, the available data with respect to property income and 
yield has been questioned (Ong 1995,49). As a result, it is not surprising to find 
unusual predictions.? However, the inclusion of property is still seen as a valuable 
addition to the analysis and for this reason this asset class remains within the 
analysis. 
In terms of the robustness of the security returns it is useful to make reference to a 
recent paper on the sensitivity of life office simulation outcomes to differences in 
asset model structure (see Chadburn and Wright (1999)). Chadburn and Wright 
examine whether the choice of stochastic asset model structure is a material factor in 
determining the output and hence interpretation of stochastic actuarial asset-liability 
modelling experiments, or whether such differences can effectively be removed by 
appropriate parameterisation and hence remain under simple effective control by the 
7 The generation of real yields for index-linked securities also provides a result that might be model 
specific. 
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used. In accordance with this objective they use various simulation output measures 
related to both solvency and policy payout levels to test their sensitivity to asset 
model structure. Three different stochastic asset models were tested: the Wilkie 
(1995) model, a Vector auto-regressive (VAR) model, and a so-called first order 
auto-regression (AR(l)) model. The paper makes the following observations: 
Simulated probabilities of ruin appear to be reasonable 
robust to model structure. Other output measures, particularly the simulated 
bonus rates and policy maturity values, are distinctly sensitive to model 
structure, reflecting residual differences which exist in the simulated asset 
returns from the different models over shorter durations. (Chadburn and 
Wright 1999,27) 
Thus, a discussion of model structure is highlighted as a basic consideration and the 
output of a simulation system will be a function of the asset and liability model. 
Hence, the results of any given solvency assessment need to be interpreted in light of 
the characteristics of the underlying stochastic model. 
The significance of the Wilkie (1995) model in its application to life office analysis 
is seen as enough justification for its use within the simulation work performed here 
and for this reason discussion proceeds to preparing for the simulation work in 
Chapter 11. Note that model assumption will also be a consideration in the 
implementation of any policy change vis-ä-vis solvency measurement (see Chapter 
12). 
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Related to the above point regarding the use of statistical models, Huber & Verrall 
(1997) critically assess the Wilkie model within a methodological context. In 
particular, they debate the relative merits of an essentially `data-based' methodology 
with that of a theoretical methodology where: 
Data based methods assume that the main features of the financial 
system can be adequately approximated by directly modelling [historical] 
data... [and] ... theoretical methods assume that the economy is too complex 
to learn about it directly and that a substantial part of the historical data is 
time specific. (Huber and Verrall 1997,1) 
Huber and Verrall highlight the fact that the Wilkie model is largely `data-based' 
and is therefore likely to fall foul of the theorists. While this might be the case, on 
balance it is argued here that the practical advantages of using the Wilkie model 
outweigh these concerns. Moreover, since the objectives here are to examine 
insurer solvency issues relating to the U. K. life assurance industry, the use of 
`historical' experience as a starting point for discussion would seem a reasonable 
assumption. 
10.5 Liabilities 
An extensive account of the life insurer's assets has been presented. In order to 
complete the preparations for subsequent simulations, the liabilities of the life 
insurer need to be defined. The operations of insurance companies may be broken 
down into annual cohorts of policies (Waters 1988). The overall performance of the 
insurance company will depend on the performance of these cohorts. For ease of 
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illustration and subsequent analysis, discussion will focus on just one of these 
cohorts. As a consequence, liabilities are assumed to be fixed and are defined by a 
single cohort of policies made up of non-smoking males, with an age next birthday 
equal to 35, and a policy sum assured equal to £50,000. At time t=0,1000 identical 
policies are issued by the insurer simultaneously and these policies will therefore 
define the underwriting composition of the life insurer. 
The policy type assumed is the (full) endowment assurance policy. The endowment 
assurance plan provides a guaranteed benefit on the occurrence of death and also 
provides this benefit, if death has not already occurred, at the end of the policy term. 
Such contracts are used as a means of repayment on mortgages and will have 
premiums far greater than those quoted for regular low-cost endowment plans where 
the maturity value of the substantive plan is not guaranteed. The premium for 
endowment assurance is an approximation of the net premium, calculated on the 
basis of the assumed mortality rate and the associated `monetary' function (Faculty 
of Actuaries 1989) assuming 5 percent interest. The calculated premium is £1075 
per year. 
The claim outflows are defined as follows. If the policyholder dies before the end of 
the policy term, payment of the sum assured will occur before the policy matures. If 
the policyholder survives the term of the contract, the payment will be made and be 
equal to the sum assured. Withdrawals from policy contracts are normalised to zero. 
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While the size of the payment outflow is defined above (equal to £50,000), the 
timing of this payment will depend upon mortality rates. Therefore, it is assumed 
that mortality is deterministic and follows the projections of the Government 
Actuaries Department (Government Actuaries Department 1994). 
10.6 Summary 
The assets and liabilities of a hypothetical life assurance company have been 
defined. These definitions will form the basis of the simulation model used in 
Chapter 11 in order to evaluate life insurer solvency within a regulatory setting. 
Five asset classes were selected: equities, Consols, cash, index-linked securities and 
property. Use is made of the 1995 Wilkie model of stochastic investment returns. 
On the liability-side, a single cohort of endowment assurance contracts was 
assumed. 
From the simulation results of real returns, index-linked securities seem the most 
stable both over the short-term and longer-term. This is a direct consequence of the 
way in which the asset class is `operationalised' and also serves to illustrate the 
sensitivity of outputs to the way in which a simulation model is constructed. One of 
the problems associated with simulation methodology is that scenarios are 
frequently generated that might not be easily explained in practice. However, in 
terms of nominal returns the results (that are the returns) are as expected and hence 
in line with the predictions of portfolio theory. 
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As a point of departure for discussion in Chapter 11, returns generated from the 
Wilkie model (Wilkie 1995) are assumed to be representative of the insurer's 
financial environment, and as a result these returns are used as a proxy for insurer 
expectations regarding the future performance of its associated investments. Thus, 
the returns generated by the Wilkie model will be employed in an insurer optimising 
routine for the purposes of solving an insurance company's portfolio selection 
problem at the start of the solvency simulation, at time t=0. 
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CHAPTER 11 
LIFE INSURER RISK PREFERENCE AND SOLVENCY: 
A SIMULATION APPROACH 
11.0 Introduction 
This chapter uses a `Monte-Carlo' simulation approach to address solvency 
considerations in the regulation of U. K. life assurance industry. As such, this 
analysis builds on the formal developments of the previous chapter, Chapter 10. 
The previous chapter constructed an `operational' model of a life insurer's assets 
and liabilities employing simulation techniques to reproduce investment returns. 
Having defined the assets and liability in Chapter 10, a simulation model of insurer 
solvency is constructed in this chapter. The aim of the `operational' insurance 
company is defined as follows: the insurer must decide how to allocate its premium 
fund amongst five asset classes in order to meet a fixed liability (see Chapter 10). A 
hypothetical insurance company is constructed and its decision-making modelled in 
terms of an expected utility maximisation rule. The insurance company decisions 
are evaluated in terms of their solvency outcome at the end of the simulation period. 
The regulatory implications are discussed with respect to the use of solvency 
margins as a means of regulation, and also with respect to the more general 
considerations in the measurement (and regulation) of insurer solvency. While a 
number of different aspects of insurer solvency will be discussed in this chapter, the 
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simulations have been designed to focus on answering to the following two 
questions: 
1) What is the probability that the premium fund together with any accrued 
investment-income will be insufficient to meet the cost of the claims? 
2) What `margin of solvency' is required in order that the operational insurer will 
pass a predetermined regulatory standard? 
This chapter builds on the basic framework developed by Waters (1988), extending 
his essentially statistical approach to modelling solvency to include a sound 
theoretical basis for portfolio selection. As already noted, an expected utility 
maximisation rule defines the objective for the insurance company. Such a 
programming problem will be a function of a number of factors; for example, the 
characteristics of the return distributions associated with each asset class, the risk 
preference of an insurer, and also the characteristics of the liability portfolio. This 
latter factor marks an important point of departure from the traditional asset 
portfolio selection problem (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the significance of liabilities to 
the portfolio selection problem has been the focus of recent work in this area- see 
for examples Wilkie (1985), Wise (1987), Sherris (1992) and Booth and Ong 
(1994). In line with this work, an insurer portfolio model is defined and asset 
weights are derived for various levels of risk aversion, given the appropriate 
specification of the insurer's utility function. The solvency performance associated 
with each level of risk aversion (that is, each `optimal portfolio') is then evaluated. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 11.1 develops the theoretical 
basis for the insurer's investment strategy. Section 11.2 presents the solvency 
simulation algorithm with the simulation results being given in Section 11.3. The 
explicit role of risk preference together with its associated solvency implications is 
discussed in Section 11.4. Note that the reader is referred to Chapter 10 for a 
detailed analysis of the simulation algorithms used to model the stochastic asset 
returns. Section 11.5 provides a summary of the main findings. 
11.1 The Insurer Optimisation Problem 
11.1.1 The Asset-Only Portfolio Selection Problem 
Recall from Chapter 5 that the portfolio selection problem is defined in terms of 
maximising the expected utility of terminal wealth and that a solution to this 
problem occurs where the insurer's indifference curves are tangential to the efficient 
frontier. ' The efficient frontier is therefore derived by solving the following 
minimisation problem for different values of portfolio expected return (E*), viz. 
} (11.1) min{! w' Vw 
Subject to: e' w=E 
w >: 0 
wit=1 
1 That is, the insurer's `optimal portfolio' is where the Marginal rate of Substitution (MRS) is equal 
to the Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT) in risk/return space. 
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Where V is the variance-covariance matrix and w is a vector of weights. The 
characteristics of the asset-only efficient frontier are illustrated in Figure 10.11 and 
Figure 10.12. As explained in Chapter 5, utility theory provides the means of 
selecting an `optimal portfolio' from the set of efficient portfolios. Moreover, the 
respective risk/return characteristics of the asset classes are incorporated into the 
minimisation problem in Equation 11.1 and asset classes are selected assuming a 
given level of insurer risk aversion. 
The hypothetical life assurance company constructed in this chapter consists of five 
asset classes i=1,2,3,4,5, respectively cash, Consols, index-linked government 
securities, equities and property. Each asset class is subject to uncertainty 
concerning its performance over the simulation period (the 1995 Wilkie model (see 
Chapter 10) defines this uncertainty). The asset mix selected by the insurer will be a 
row vector of portfolio weights w'= (wl, W2, W3, W4, w5), where the w; 's (i=1... 5) 
represent the portfolio weights assigned to each of the asset classes per unit sum 
invested. In the absence of any explicitly defined liabilities, the variance-covariance 
matrix, denoted by the matrix V, is a 5*5 symmetric matrix. 
Having defined the required information for portfolio balance, the quadratic 
minimisation problem can be solved for different values of expected return, E*. An 
expected utility objective function is used to select the `optimal portfolio' amongst 
all efficient portfolios. Note that this framework does not take into account the 
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risk/return profile of the liabilities and it is for this reason that additional 
assumptions need to be incorporated into the asset-only approach. 
11.1.2 Insurer Optimisation in the Presence of Liabilities 
Consider the explicit development of a portfolio model in the presence of fixed 
liabilities. In order to incorporate these liabilities into the quadratic program, use is 
made of the model developed by Sherris (1992). The Sherris model provides an 
analytical framework for evaluating the portfolio selection problem of a life fund, 
selecting assets to meet a fixed liability. As Sherris notes, liabilities for life funds 
are fixed in terms of their marketability and disposability (Sherris 1992,88). It is 
for this reason that the simplification is made and liabilities are therefore assumed 
fixed. 2 Sherris (1992) demonstrates that the portfolio selection problem for a life 
fund may be expressed in terms of the mean and variance of ultimate surplus. 
Ultimate surplus is defined in terms of a net cash flow at a fixed time horizon; it is 
the difference between the accumulated asset funds and the accumulated liability. 
Thus, ultimate surplus provides an `operational' definition of insurer solvency. 
Following Sherris (1992), it will be assumed that the initial value of assets held to 
meet the liability is denoted by A, and that this value consists of two components, C 
and K. C is a fixed component and belongs to the fund claimants, and is represented 
by the premium funds (the expected value of the liability). By contrast, K is a 
2 Recall that under the general portfolio model of a life assurance company (see Chapter 5), different 
insurance lines were treated as negative assets and assumed to be as marketable as the asset classes. 
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variable component and is the provision for adverse conditions, that is K is the 
insurer's equity. The appropriate size of K, in order to pass a predetermined 
regulatory standard, will be investigated in Section 11.4. For now, the initial 
amount of assets is given by the following expression: 
(11.2) A= (1 + p). C 
Where p= K/C and this represents the size of the insurer's solvency margin. 
Furthermore, there are assumed to be five asset classes (i=1,2,3,4,5) in addition to 
one liability, L. With respect to the asset classes, the cash flows at the end of the 
simulation period, assuming that all intermediate cash flows are reinvested until the 
end of period, are random variables and may be denoted by Ri (i=1... 5). These 
amounts are all per unit of security purchased and therefore the cash flow of security 
i is given by: 
(11.3) R; _(1+u, 
Where fi, is the rate of return on asset i over the period with an expected value of E;, 
a variance of Vj=o"; 2, and a covariance with asset i of C; =a; ý. Note, since it is only 
the mean, variance and covariance of asset returns that determine the asset 
allocation, it is not necessary to specify the total cash flows for these assets in the 
maximisation problem. 
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Consider next the liability L. The amount of the `rolled-forward' liability will be a 
and variance VL=6L2. These amounts are in random variable with expected value EL 
pounds and square pounds, rather than per unit (Sherris 1992,90). The variability 
comes from the fluctuations in claim rates over the interval (if claims were assumed 
to be stochastic) and in the rates used to compound the funds to their `ultimate' 
liability. The liability cash flow may be correlated with the asset returns and hence 
the covariance with asset i is given by CL; =6LI. Thus, the variance-covariance 
matrix used in the insurer's portfolio selection problem is defined as follows (only 
the top-half of the matrix is specified due to the symmetry of the variance- 
covariance matrix): 
2 61 612 613 614 615 UIL 
2 
62 623 624 625 (7S, 2L 
(11.4) V= 
2 
63 634 U35 63L 
2 
64 U45 ° 4L 
2 
U5 ° 5L 
2 
6L 
In addition, the vector of expected returns is given by e'as follows: 
(11.5) e'=(EI, E2, E3, E4, Es, EL) 
The ultimate surplus function S may now be defined. Ultimate surplus is a random 
variable because it is a function of the random amount of the `ultimate' liability cash 
flow and the random amount of the `ultimate' cash flows associated with the 5 asset 
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classes. Surplus is also a function of the vector of asset weights w'; these weights 
are the decision variables for the insurance company and are defined within ultimate 
surplus as follows: 
(11.6) S= A(w R, + w2 R2 + w3 R3 + w4 R4 + w5 RS) -L 
Note that Sherris uses the result in Equation 11.2 to show that ultimate surplus is 
equivalently stated as (Sherris 1992,91): 
(11.7) S=C(1+p) -( 
1)] 
l+p 
RL 
The above formulation makes explicit the role of the rate of return on liabilities 
RL=L/C and demonstrates the effect of the solvency margin, p. This formulation is 
not used here and is presented merely to demonstrate the explicit role of the 
solvency margin. For this reason, discussion proceeds with reference to Equation 
11.6 above. 
In addition to the five asset weights (i=1... 5), the weight assigned to the insurer's 
liability is constrained to equal (-1) to reflect the fact that the liability is fixed, and 
thus the vector of weights w' is now given by: 
(11.8) w'= (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, -1) 
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The expected value and variance of ultimate surplus will therefore be given 
respectively by: 
(11.9) ES=w'e 
(11.10) VS = x' Vx 
Having set out the information required for solving the portfolio selection problem, 
the probability of insolvency can be defined by two states of ultimate surplus. If the 
fund is solvent, then ultimate surplus satisfies the following inequality, S _> 
0. In the 
event of solvency, the providers of equity K will be entitled to the full surplus S and 
the claimants (the policyholders) will be paid the full liability, equal to the amount 
L. By contrast, where the fund is insolvent, S<0, the fund claimants will receive 
L+S<L (S<O), and the providers of equity will be liable for the full loss in the event 
of unlimited liability. 
The solution to the insurer's portfolio selection problem is now made with reference 
to the following expected utility maximisation rule: 
(11.11) Maximise{E[U(S)]J, subject to : 
w 
w't=1 and w >_ 0 
Sherris (1992) notes that a solvency constraint can be incorporated into the 
maximisation problem in Equation 11.11. The constraint specifies some pre- 
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determined level of insolvency probability (a). 3 If the cumulative distribution 
function of ultimate surplus is given by Fs(. ) then the solvency constraint may be 
given by: 
(11.12)FS(0)<_a 
In order to arrive at explicit solutions to the above maximisation problem, 
assumptions need to be made regarding the specification of the insurer's utility 
function. Discussion turns to addressing this issue in the next sub-section. 
11.1.3 Insurer Optimisation and the Specification of the Utility Function 
It is evident that numerical solutions to the general portfolio problem in Equation 
11.1, and the specific portfolio problem in Equation 11.11, will require explicit 
specification of the insurer's utility function. As illustrated in Chapter 5, there are 
many factors that need to be taken into account when considering the selection of an 
explicit functional form for a utility function. These factors relate primarily to the 
risk preference properties of the utility functions concerned. 
Before proceeding further, there are a number of points to note. Chapter 5 assumed 
that an insurer would maximise the expected utility of terminal wealth; a function of 
3 Alternatively, a constraint could be placed on the margin of solvency such that assets are required 
to exceed the liabilities by some minimum amount, p. 
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expected return and variance, based on a second order Taylor series approximation. 4 
Tobin (1958,1963) showed that an investor who maximises expected utility can be 
analysed in terms of a mean and variance approximation if at least one of the 
following conditions hold: first, that the investor has a quadratic utility; and second, 
that the returns are normally distributed. 
Subsequent work attempted to analyse the applicability of the mean-variance 
approximation to the case where neither of Tobin's two conditions held. The work 
of Tsiang (1972) demonstrated that the mean-variance approximation is still 
applicable in the absence of Tobin's conditions. Furthermore, Levy and Markowitz 
(1979) tested the conclusion Tsiang assuming a variety of utility functions and 
return distributions. They demonstrated that, for an investor who maximises 
expected utility, the mean/variance approximation to expected utility is still 
applicable in the absence of quadratic utility and normally distributed returns (Levy 
and Markowitz 1979,316). 
Having mentioned one of the possible functional forms for the insurer's utility 
function, it is instructive to examine this function in greater detail together with two 
other types of functional form, the logarithmic utility function and the negative 
exponential utility function. Consider first the logarithmic utility function, which is 
defined as follows: 
4 This approach imposes explicit restrictions upon the functional form used to specify the insurer's 
utility function (see Chapter 5). 
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(11.13) U{Wealth (= W)} = In(W) 
Where U' (W) =->0 and U"(W) = -{ 
W2I<0, 
and W is wealth. The above 
functional form yields an absolute risk aversion measure a(W) defined as: 
(11.14)a(W)=- -1 U'(W) W 
The degree of absolute risk aversion is therefore decreasing in wealth and hence 
different investors will require a different risk premium for a given risky investment 
depending on the value of their initial wealth. By contrast, the relative risk aversion 
parameter, w(ffý is defined for the logarithmic utility function as follows: 
(11.15)tu(W)=-W 
U"(W) 
=W. a(W)=1 U'(W) 
Thus, there is constant relative risk aversion exhibited by the logarithmic utility 
function. That is, an insurer will have constant risk aversion to a proportional loss 
of wealth even though the absolute loss increases with wealth. 
Consider next the quadratic utility function. This functional form is defined below 
in Equation 11.16. 
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(11.16)U(W)=aW-bW2 
In the case of quadratic utility, the absolute and relative risk aversion parameters are 
respectively: 
(11.17)a(W)=- 
2b 
. 
da(W) 
>Oand 
a- 2bW dW 
zu(W) - 
2b 
, 
dw(W) 
0 
(a/W)-2b' dW 
Thus, the quadratic utility function exhibits increasing absolute and relative risk 
aversion. Such a result is counter-intuitive: an investor defined by quadratic utility 
would be more averse to a given percentage loss in wealth as wealth increases. 
The final utility function to be considered is the negative exponential function where 
utility, absolute risk aversion, and relative risk aversion are respectively defined as 
follows: 
(11.18) U(W) = -exp{-aW} 
Where a(W) =a and, zu(W) = aW. For the negative exponential utility function, 
the parameter a, is the only parameter considered and this represents the degree of 
absolute risk aversion, where greater values of a represent increasing absolute risk 
aversion. This utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion: all insurers 
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with this utility function, regardless of the size of their initial wealth, would require 
the same risk premium for a risky project of a given amount. Thus, all insurers with 
a given risk parameter a, would have the same utility maximising portfolio for 
different starting values of initial wealth. Thus, it is for this very reason (and the 
unusual risk properties associated with alternative functional forms), that the 
negative exponential utility function is used in subsequent discussion. One further 
point should also be noted with regard to the selection of the negative exponential 
utility function. This point relates to the issue of local versus global risk aversion 
(Pratt 1964). Pratt (1964) demonstrated that the use of a constant risk aversion 
parameter (such as a in Equation 11.18) avoided the complication of distinguishing 
between `local' or `global' risk aversion (Pratt 1964,122). 5 
Given an explicit functional form in order to define insurer preferences, utility can 
now be expressed in terms of ultimate surplus, S. In addition, to be consistent with 
previous work in this area (see Sherris (1992), Ong (1995), Booth, et al. (1997)), the 
absolute risk aversion parameter a, will be represented in terms of a risk tolerance 
parameter r, viz. 
(11.19) U(S) -exp(-106 
r 
s) 
5 The absolute risk aversion measure {-u"(W)/u'(W)} is a `local' measure; risk aversion in terms of 
small risks. An investor A is globally more risk averse than another investor B, only when it can be 
shown that for every risk, investor A's cash equivalent of the risk is smaller than that of investor B 
(Pratt 1964,124). 
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The absolute risk aversion parameter a, is set equal to {1/106r}, where r is the 
measure of risk tolerance. Hence, increasing values of r represent increasing risk 
tolerance of the insurer. 6 The scaling of 106 was found to be necessary in order that 
a reasonable variation in portfolio composition would be produced using values of r 
between 1 and 34. It is important to note that the magnitude of this scaling is a 
direct consequence of the size of the liability. Recall from Chapter 10 that the 
insurer's liability consists of 1000 identical full endowment policies covering a 
£50,000 sum assured for an annual premium of £ 1075. 
11.1.4 The Life Insurer's Portfolio Selection Problem 
Analysis proceeds by evaluating the asset allocation for different levels of risk 
tolerance (r=1, ... 34), assuming a given 
level of initial wealth. 7 In order to derive 
analytical solutions to the expected utility maximisation problem in Equation 11.11, 
it will be assumed that the underlying probability distribution of ultimate surplus is 
normal. While alternative distribution assumptions could be made, the normality 
assumption is adopted here in order to simplify the analytical solution to the 
portfolio selection problem. 
6 In other words, the risk tolerance parameter (r) is equal to the inverse of the absolute risk aversion 
parameter (a). 
7 Experimental evidence on fund manager risk tolerance suggests that, after appropriate scaling 
corrections, the size of r is 25, and hence a =0.04 (Sharpe and Tint 1990). 
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Es and VS are respectively the mean and variance of ultimate surplus, S. The 
portfolio selection problem may now be defined in terms of an explicit function 
relating utility to ultimate surplus S, and risk tolerance r, viz. 
(11.20) Maximise{E[U(S)]} = Maximise E- exp{- Sl 
Subject to: 
W'1=l 
Non-negativity restrictions may also be imposed on the portfolio weights and S is 
defined in Equation 11.6. There are two methods by which a solution to the above 
problem can be developed analytically: first, by using moment generating functions; 
and second, by using Taylor's expansion. The latter approach was addressed in 
Chapter 5.8 The method of moment generating functions is a method that has been 
developed extensively in the actuarial literature as a means of solving the 
maximisation problem in Equation 11.20. Moment generating functions are a 
powerful analytical tool in statistics, and as the name suggests these functions are 
used to generate moments for a random variable Xwith cumulative density function 
FX (Casella and Berger 1991). The n`" moment of a given probability distribution is 
equal to the nth derivative of the moment generating function (MGF), Mx(t) 
evaluated at t=0, where: 
8 This is only an approximation where the distribution is not normal (and the utility function is not 
quadratic). 
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(11.21) Mx (t) = E[exp{tX}] =f e`X fx (x)dx 
For the normal distribution with mean Es and variance Vs, the MGF is given by: 
(11.22) MX (t) = exp{ tEs+t2. 
V2 
Where t={-1/r} and r is the risk tolerance parameter. In order to maximise the 
expected utility expression in Equation 11.20, use is made of the following result: 
(11.23) Maximise{E[- exp{tS}]} = Minimise{E[exp{tS}]} W. W. 
Given the normality assumption, the above problem can be set up using the normal 
moment generating function for ultimate surplus, S. Equation 11.23 may then be 
restated as follows: 
(11.24) Minimise exp Est + 
VSt2 
W. 2 
For the two-asset case, the variance Vs and expectation ES of ultimate surplus S is 
given by: 
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(11.25) ES = Awl E1 + Awe E2 - EL 
VS = AzwI V, +A2w2V2 +VL +2A2w1w2C12 -2Aw1C1L -2Aw2C2L 
Hence in this case, the optimal asset allocation is derived by differentiating 11.24 
with respect to the portfolio weights, w;, (see Appendix 4 for a guide to the portfolio 
solutions in the Sherris (1992) model). 9 In order to solve for the vector of portfolio 
weights w', given each level of risk tolerance r (r=1... 34), the expected return 
vector e' needs to be defined, together with its associated variance-covariance 
matrix, V. The expected returns and variances are defined for each of the five 
`rolled-up' asset classes in addition to the `rolled-up' total cash outflow associated 
with the liability (assuming tax rates are normalised to zero). The expected returns 
and variances are defined below in Table 11.1 and are set at their `converged' 
values. 10 
Table 11.1. Expected Returns and Variance-Covariance matrix (25 years) 
Variance-Covariance Matrix 
Assets: - Expected Cash Consols Index- Equities Property Liability 
'Rolled-up' linked 
return 
Cash 6.02 6.5025 29.27 0.27 39.96 15.6 1566418 
Consols 8.24 6.76 28.8 94.13 28.78 1986696 
Index-linked 9.66 25.81 1.31 7.53 3329418 
Equities 17.4 195.72 35.37 3544015 
Property 11.36 28.3 3465692 
Liability: 54284270 1.1405E+12 
Note: Only top half of matrix given due to symmetry of variance covariance matrix. 
9 This is equivalent to minimising the logarithm of the moment generating function. 
10 Convergence is defined as the case in which the mean, percentiles and standard deviation of the 
output distributions have respectively changed by less than 1 percent for two consecutive iterations 
(see Appendix 4 for details on output distribution convergence). 
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Due to nature of the maximisation problem, the nominal accumulations of assets are 
reported in Table 11.1 for the initial sum invested over a 25-year period. The set-up 
of the problem requires that the liability be defined in terms of the total cash outflow 
(Sherris 1992,90). Note that the cashflows are an alternative formulation to the 
nominal and real returns reported in Table 10.1 and Table 10.2, respectively. 
Following Wilkie (1985), intermediate claims are paid for by borrowing cash at the 
stochastic rate of (short-term) interest (see Figure 10.6). This provides the source of 
variability in the expected value of the liability. This assumption, namely the 
financing of liabilities through the borrowing of cash, is justified on the grounds that 
such financing represents the lowest opportunity cost to the insurer. Alternative 
means of finance- such as depleting asset funds- would impose a greater real cost. 
A couple of additional remarks need to be made with regard to the construction of 
the liability cash-outflow. Recall from Chapter 10, that mortality is assumed to be 
deterministic. Based on this assumption, the liability cash outflow at year t 
(t=1... 25) will be defined by the number of people dying at year t (as specified by 
the mortality rates) multiplied by the sum assured (£50,000). Thus, the timing and 
size of each cash outflow is known for each year. However, the valuation of each 
annual cash outflow (intermediate claims) is evaluated at time t=25 in order to 
define the `ultimate liability' (intermediate claims plus policy maturities) and hence 
construct the measure of solvency, ultimate surplus. As stated above, the interest 
rate used to compound the intermediate claims to time t=25 is the short-term 
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interest rate and this is therefore the source of the random fluctuation in the 
`ultimate liability'. 
Having outlined some of the general considerations with respect to the insurer's 
optimisation problem, attention now returns to providing an explicit solution to the 
`optimal portfolio' using the information in Table 11.1. As noted, the moment 
generating function in Equation 11.24 can be used to solve the expected utility 
maximisation problem. The definition of ultimate surplus S (see Equation 11.6) 
requires the value of initial wealth (A) to be specified in order to solve for the 
`optimal portfolios'. The calculation of initial wealth requires a number of further 
simplifying assumptions. 
The initial funds available for investment at time t=0 are assumed to be equal to the 
discounted stream of premium payments, a total of £11,900,098. Consider how this 
sum was calculated in further detail. One of the considerations in designing the 
simulation model was the way in which to treat the stream of premium payments. 
The difficulty in investing premiums year after year is that the problem is essentially 
a dynamic program. Investment strategy and risk-aversion are therefore a function 
of time and an optimal path must be derived for these variables in order to solve for 
the year-by-year asset-allocation problem. Since a dynamic program requires a 
significant extension to the analysis, it is assumed that the problem should remain a 
single-period problem. Moreover, the single period framework can still provide 
some useful insights and the important features of a life insurer; namely, that the 
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determination of insurer asset allocation involves explicit consideration of the 
liabilities. As a result, at time t=0 the insurer is assumed to have the present value 
of all future premiums associated with the cohort of policies. This discounted 
stream accounts for deterministic mortality and the resultant reduction in the 
number of total polices (and premium income) throughout the term. I l 
11.1.5 The `Optimal Portfolios' 
Given that the aim of this paper is to address some basic issues in solvency 
regulation, particularly in respect of the risk aversion and asset allocation, it is 
believed that the single-period framework can provide some useful insights. Table 
11.2 presents the `optimal portfolios', the numerical solutions to the insurer's 
portfolio selection problem in Equation 11.24 assuming the variance-covariance 
matrix in Table 11.1. 
Table 11.2 reports the solutions to the expected utility maximisation rule using the 
numerical techniques available on Microsoft Excel's add-in, `Solver'. The 
associated values of surplus, variance and expected utility are given in addition to 
the portfolio weights. The table reports details of the optimal asset mix for a life 
fund comprising 1000 full endowment policies effected over a 25-year period (see 
Chapter 10). The results demonstrate a number of trends across the risk tolerance 
scale. 
11 Note that the premium steam is discounted to time t=0 using the mean long-term interest rate (see 
Figure 10.5). 
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Table 11.2. Optimal Portfolios 
Risk 
tolerance, 
Cash Consols Index- Equities 
linked 
Property Expected 
utility 
Mean 
Surplus 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 0.7 0 0.3 0 0 -0.00869 30223390 27293510 
2 0.352539 0 0.41618 0.014807 0.216474 -0.01264 51143140.5 38875782 
3 0.032922 0 0.47405 0.056705 0.436323 -0.02445 73294439.6 48793080 
4 0 0 0.479674 0.061753 0.458573 -0.05278 75637675.2 49733271 
5 0 0 0.453343 0.092564 0.454092 -0.07333 78382851.6 51094589 
6 0 0 0.42726 0.123416 0.449324 -0.13157 81128027.7 52941660 
7 0 0 0.401177 0.154268 0.444555 -0.18685 83873203.1 55225765 
8 0 0 0.375094 0.185119 0.439786 -0.23607 86618378.1 57895201 
9 0 0 0.349011 0.215971 0.435018 -0.27898 89363556.1 60899321 
10 0 0 0.322928 0.246823 0.430249 -0.31621 92108730.6 64191148 
11 0 0 0.296845 0.277674 0.425481 -0.34856 94853905.7 67728746 
12 0 0 0.270762 0.308526 0.420712 -0.37682 97599090.3 71475647 
13 0 0 0.244679 0.339378 0.415943 -0.40163 100344264 75400627 
14 0 0 0.218596 0.370229 0.411175 -0.42355 103089440 79477324 
15 0 0 0.192513 0.401081 0.406406 -0.44303 105834617 83683565 
16 0 0 0.16643 0.431933 0.401637 -0.46044 108579796 88000781 
17 0 0 0.140347 0.462784 0.396869 -0.47608 111324970 92413407 
18 0 0 0.114264 0.493636 0.3921 -0.4902 114070150 96908428 
19 0 0 0.088181 0.524488 0.387331 -0.50301 116815328 1.01E+08 
20 0 0 0.062098 0.555339 0.382563 -0.51467 119560502 1.06E+08 
21 0 0 0.036015 0.586191 0.377794 -0.52534 122305680 1.11E+08 
22 0 0 0.009932 0.617043 0.373025 -0.53513 125050863 1.16E+08 
23 0 0 0 0.649295 0.350705 -0.54472 127569956 1.2E+08 
24 0 0 0 0.682408 0.317592 -0.55395 129950018 1.24E+08 
25 0 0 0 0.715521 0.284479 -0.56251 132330081 1.28E+08 
26 0 0 0 0.748635 0.251365 -0.57047 134710142 1.33E+08 
27 0 0 0 0.781748 0.218252 -0.5779 137090206 1.37E+08 
28 0 0 0 0.814861 0.185139 -0.58484 139470269 1.41E+08 
29 0 0 0 0.847974 0.152026 -0.59134 141850332 1.46E+08 
30 0 0 0 0.881087 0.118913 -0.59744 144230394 1.5E+08 
31 0 0 0 0.9142 0.0858 -0.60317 146610457 1.55E+08 
32 0 0 0 0.947314 0.052686 -0.60858 148990519 1.59E+08 
33 0 0 0 0.980427 0.019573 -0.61367 151370582 1.64E+08 
34 0 0 0 1 0 -0.62038 152777435 1.66E+08 
With reference to Table 11.2, for the least risk tolerant insurer, the optimal portfolio 
consists of 70 percent cash and 30 percent index-linked government securities. 
12 By 
contrast, for the greatest insurer risk tolerance, an optimal portfolio consisting of 
1Z Note that numerical trials demonstrated that this optimal portfolio was the limit case for the least 
risk-tolerant insurer. 
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100 percent equities was reported. Between these two limit cases, the optimal 
portfolios vary in terms of their respective composition. 
Note that the results in Table 11.2 show that the non-negativity constraint on the 
portfolio weights is binding with respect to Consols. This result holds for all levels 
of risk tolerance. Chapter 10 demonstrated that index-linked government securities 
dominated Consols in terms of expected real return and risk and this operational 
distinction might be reflected in the optimal portfolios. In addition, as Ong (1995) 
notes, a combination of securities (e. g. cash and index-linked securities) may strictly 
dominate another security (e. g. Consols). Changes in the portfolio composition 
illustrate a linear trade-off across the risk tolerance scale, although there are some 
distinct breaks in this trade-off (see Figure 11.1). 
11.2 The Ultimate Surplus Simulation Algorithm 
Having established the criteria for asset selection and presented the `optimal 
portfolios', it is now necessary to turn to the simulation model of ultimate surplus. 
Assuming that expenses are normalised to zero, the ultimate surplus of the fund is 
equal to the net-cashflow at the end of the simulation period (t=25). The ultimate 
surplus is a combined profit/performance measure of the insurer's underwriting and 
investment portfolios. 
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With reference to Chapter 10, the simulation model provides details on the 
respective performances of five asset classes, cash (B, ), Consols (C, ), index-linked 
government securities (R, ), equities (P, ), and property (At) (Wilkie 1995). The U. K. 
mortality estimates define the liability outflow, which in turn are assumed fixed. 
Initial conditions are assumed neutral. 13 This can be justified on the grounds that 
such an assumption rules out any carried forward effects from before the stage at 
which the cohort of policies was issued. 
For a given period of time, the ultimate surplus simulation generates the returns 
associated with the 5 asset classes. The neutral initial conditions enable the 
simulation to proceed from, t=0 to t=25. Having `rolled forward' the accumulated 
nominal funds for assets and liabilities, the performance of `ultimate' surplus can be 
assessed at time t=25. In order to appreciate the mechanics of simulating ultimate 
surplus, Table 11.3 illustrates the main assumptions and the steps involved in the 
simulation process. 
From the layout in Table 11.3, it is important to stress the relationship between the 
insurance company and its policyholders. The insurance company is involved in a 
contract with 1000 policyholders that commits the insurer to make future payments 
to the policyholders under various conditions as defined in the contract. 14 The 
13 Starting values are `neutral' in that they are set equal to their long-run means assuming standard 
deviations are equal to zero. 
14 In this simplified insurer model, the payment of an insurance benefit occurs either when the 
policyholder dies, or when the term of the contract expires at time t=25. Policy surrenders are 
normalised to zero. 
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insurer uses the stream of premium payments to invest in assets that provide the 
insurer with a return that can be used to meet its liability. '5 
Table 11.3. Generating a Simulation of Ultimate Surplus 
To simulate the present value of ultimate surplus associated with 1000 policies of a given type 
(which may in turn be used as a measure of profit), the following assumptions are made: 
A. 1 Claims are deterministic and follow the national population projections for 1994 (Government 
Actuary's Department 1994). Borrowing funds at the short-term rate of interest pays for 
interim claims. 
A. 2 At t=0 the asset portfolio is constructed according to the expected utility maximisation rule in 
Equation 11.24. 
A. 3 All nominal returns are reinvested in the class from which they came from, assuming zero 
transactions costs. 
A. 4 The investment experience associated with all 5 asset classes is defined according to the 
Wilkie (1995) stochastic investment model, with the modifications for property (see Chapter 
10). 
With the assumptions specified, the algorithm for the generation of ultimate surplus is defined in 
terms of a number of stages: 
S. 1 At t=0, generate the total premium fund accounting for interim claims using A. 1. 
S. 2 From A. 2 generate the returns for the 5 asset classes given A. 4 and accumulate the premium 
fund for successive years according to A. 3. 
S. 3 Repeat S. 2 until all liabilities are `run-off - at the end of the time interval, t=25. 
S. 4 Calculate ultimate surplus, S then: 
(1) If at the end of the term all the claim (maturity) payments are so large that they cannot be 
met by cash inflows plus the realisation of all investments, then ultimate surplus is 
negative and the insurer is strictly insolvent (i. e. S<O). 
(2) If ultimate surplus is greater than zero after all claims and maturity payments are made 
then the value of remaining assets is a measure of the company's financial strength (i. e. 
S>O). 
S. 5 Repeat the whole process 10,000 times, building up a probability distribution of ultimate 
surplus and its `convergence' according to predefined criteria (see Chapter 10). The 
proportion of occasions when the assets prove insufficient to meet liabilities may be used as a 
proxy for the probability of insolvency. 
15 As mentioned in the previous chapter, an insurance company can be viewed in terms of a 
collection of policy cohorts. The simulation model therefore analyses the performance of just one of 
these cohorts. 
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A further point to note with respect to the simulation algorithm is the way in which 
the insolvent insurers have been included within the simulations. The main point to 
note is that the solvency assessment is performed at t=25 and hence it is possible 
that an insurer could be technically insolvent before the end of the simulation; for 
example, an insurer could be insolvent at t=10. In such an event the simulation 
allows the insurer to proceed up until the next screening at t=25 and hence 
insolvency during the 25 year interval is not accounted for within this analysis. 
While in practice regular annual screening would remove such an insurer before 
t=25, the approach is justified on the grounds that the problem of discrete screening 
exists whatever the time interval assumed (in practice a year). Moreover, since 
continuous screening is not feasible from the point of view of a resource constraint, 
changes to the time interval does not necessarily add anything further to the analysis 
or change any of the basic propositions put forward here. Indeed, the problem of 
allowing insolvent insurers to proceed until the next screening remains. 
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11.3 Ultimate Surplus Simulation Output Data 
The basic hypothesis is that there exists a positive relationship between risk 
tolerance and insolvency probability. The central role of risk preference in the 
measurement and regulation of insurer solvency is therefore emphasised. Thus, the 
importance of the optimal portfolios that are calculated in Section 11.1 is clear: 
optimal portfolios are the analytical link between the risk preference of the 
insurance company and the solvency outcome of the simulation. 
Note that while in practice the exact nature of this relationship between risk 
tolerance and solvency outcome is subject to empirical research and many debates, 
the ultimate surplus simulation model will define the explicit linkage. The results of 
the simulations are reported in Table 11.4. 
Table 11.4 reports, in terms of probabilistic statements, the values of ultimate 
surplus and the nature of the associated probability distribution function. The 
reported surpluses are in present value terms in order that a discussion can be made 
regarding the use of reserves at time t=0. Note that for a graphical representation of 
the ultimate surplus probability distributions see Appendix 4. 
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Table 11.4. Simulation Results for Ultimate Surplus & Insolvency Prediction 
(25 years) 
Risk 
Tolerance 
Expected 
Surplus 
(£) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(£') 
Expected 
Surplus 
(Standardised) 
Skewness Kurtosis Insolvency 
Probability 
{ Surplus<O} 
M) 
Reserves 
{£) 
Margin of 
Solvency 
eo) 
1 3279783 2593015 1.264853 1.29 8.71 3.74 1144285 15.49807 
2 6101077 3581152 1.703663 0.69 3.99 1.692 710246 5.968405 
3 8621236 5520325 1.561726 1.19 5.95 1.427 418703 3.518484 
4 9370603 5956693 1.573122 1.21 6.1 0.92 -520788 -4.37633 
5 9811736 6218954 1.577715 1.13 5.27 1.35 370754 3.115554 
6 10165460 6513164 1.560756 1.33 7.15 1.28 12975 0.109033 
7 10494784 7225964 1.452371 1.94 11.45 0.74 -232228 -1.95148 
8 10905810 7482450 1.457519 1.77 9.65 1.31 223893 1.881438 
9 11628850 8000423 1.453529 1.68 8.59 1.06 84725 0.711969 
10 11753600 8725850 1.346986 2.21 13.81 1.17 171930 1.444778 
11 12209480 8601134 1.41952 1.39 6.25 1.27 134529 1.130486 
12 11756680 8593904 1.368026 1.58 7.33 1.35 338378 2.843489 
13 12300220 9275299 1.326127 1.84 9.41 1.38 195775 1.645155 
14 13099050 10533250 1.243591 1.89 9.1 1.64 869320 7.30515 
15 13528270 11109840 1.217684 2.27 12.8 1.52 456759 3.838279 
16 14398170 11416760 1.261143 1.64 7 1.72 661777 5.561105 
17 14673960 12560380 1.168274 2.18 10.8 2 464346 3.902035 
18 14942600 12714990 1.175196 2.15 10.5 1.84 835781 7.023312 
19 15623430 13647240 1.144805 2.48 13.35 2.24 1076972 9.05011 
20 15494480 14484850 1.069702 2.87 20.03 2.29 1035894 8.70492 
21 15675400 13830960 1.133356 1.95 9.46 3.15 1053544 8.853238 
22 16980350 16590290 1.023511 2.63 16.86 3.44 169229 1.422081 
23 16557970 18548730 0.892674 6.99 11.34 2.7 1503447 12.6339 
24 17464200 17461580 1.00015 2.33 12.45 3.53 1613737 13.5607 
25 17426100 15825620 1.101132 2.06 9.91 2.72 1455641 12.23218 
26 17581090 18421040 0.954403 2.91 17.15 3.03 1828282 15.36359 
27 17580480 17540180 1.002298 2.38 12.98 4.49 2217335 18.63291 
28 17746970 18668440 0.95064 2.76 15.22 5.07 1960416 16.47395 
29 18201070 20546450 0.88585 3.06 18.67 4.5 2816817 23.67054 
30 18770610 20443740 0.918159 3.13 25.78 5.42 2531492 21.27287 
31 17807440 19030370 0.935738 3.22 26.33 5.8 6659207 55.95926 
32 19391840 21736210 0.892144 3.06 18.22 6.72 5335910 44.83921 
33 19882020 22448980 0.885654 3.51 29.42 7.13 7556363 63.49833 
34 20114706 21007510 0.957501 3.69 31.6 7.8 7946512 66.77686 
Notes. (a) Simulation results of (discounted) ultimate surplus reported for 10,000 iterations for each 
lev el of risk tol erance. 
(b) Standardised expected surplus is given by d ividing the expected value by i ts standard 
deviation. 
(c) The coefficient of skewness measures the departure from symmetry in the probability 
dis tribution by expressing the difference between the me an and the median relative to the 
standard deviat ion. For a normal distr ibution a0 coefficient would be expected. Thus, for a 
positively (negatively) skewed distribution, the coefficient is positive (negative). 
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Table 11.4 - Continued 
(d) The coefficient of kurtosis measures the distribution of the observations across the 
range, that is whether the distribution is platykurtic (flat), leptokurtic (peaked), or 
mesokurtic (neither flat nor peaked). A value of 3 is reported for the normal distribution. A 
value greater (smaller) than 3 implies a greater (smaller) tendency for leptokurtosis in the 
probability distribution. 
(e) The probability of insolvency measures the probability that the reported ultimate surplus 
will be negative. 
(f) The Vt reserve column reports the amount of reserves (capital) that the insurer would 
need to have so that the probability of not requiring any further capital is 99 percent. This 
value is calculated using the lower one-percent point of the distribution. 
(g) Using the reserves calculated in (f), the margin of solvency is calculated by evaluating 
the required reserves as a percentage of the present value of the premium income. 
As noted in Chapter 10, the stability of the output distributions is necessary in order 
to demonstrate stable relationships between inputs and outputs. For this reason, 
evidence of convergence is given in Table 11.5. 
Table 11.5. Extract from @RISK Convergence Reports 
3 Convergence Statistics: 
Name of Output Percentage Change in 
Percentiles 
Percentage Change in 
Mean 
Percentage Change in 
Standard Deviation 
Discounted surplus (r=5) 0.08 0.05 0.06 
Discounted surplus (r=10) 0.09 0.04 0.02 
Discounted surplus (r=15) 0.10 0.06 0.01 
Discounted surplus (r=20) 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Discounted surplus (r=25) 0.08 0.03 0.20 
Discounted surplus (r=30) 0.07 0.05 0.13 
Note. Convergence is defined where the percentage change in all three-convergence statistics is less 
than 1 percent for at least 2 successive iterations. 
Table 11.5 illustrates the convergence in the ultimate surplus distribution associated 
with 10000 iterations. The results demonstrate that there is significant stability 
associated with the output distributions (the ultimate surplus probability distribution 
function, for a given risk tolerance). 
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11.4 Discussion of Results 
11.4.1 Ultimate Surplus 
With reference to the Table 11.4, there are important points to note, particularly 
with respect to the form of the probability distribution for ultimate surplus, and the 
central role of risk preference. Consider first, the relationship between expected 
surplus and surplus standard deviation for given levels of risk tolerance- see Figure 
11.2. Ceteris paribus, the greater the risk tolerance, the greater the expected surplus 
and the greater the standard deviation of ultimate surplus- see Figure 11.2. 
Figure 11.2. Expected Return and Standard Deviation of Ultimate Surplus 
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With reference to Figure 11.2, expected surplus increases from approximately £3.3 
million for the least risk tolerant insurer, to roughly £20 million for the most risk 
tolerant insurer. For these two limiting cases, the standard deviation rises 
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respectively from £2.6 million to £21 million. Thus, the variation about the ultimate 
surplus expected value increases with risk tolerance. Note that for the most risk 
tolerant insurer the standardised expected ultimate surplus is less than unity. 16 This 
will have clear implications for the spread of the surplus distribution and hence the 
probability of insurer insolvency. 
Consider next the results of two higher moments of the ultimate surplus distribution 
function; namely, skewness and kurtosis. The simulations demonstrate that the 
distribution of surplus becomes more positively skewed with increasing risk 
tolerance. In addition, evidence on kurtosis implies that the observations 
themselves are becoming more concentrated at the peak with increasing risk 
tolerance; the distribution is becoming increasingly leptokurtic. This evidence 
therefore suggests that as risk tolerance increases, the ultimate surplus probability 
distribution tends toward a lognormal distribution function. Note that skewness and 
kurtosis have important implications for the measurement of insolvency probability 
and the design of appropriate solvency constraints. 
11.4.2 The Central Role of Risk Preference in Measuring Solvency 
While much can be said about the moments of the surplus distribution function, 
discussion now turns to considering insolvency prediction and the relationship 
between investment strategies and ultimate surplus. An examination of the financial 
16 Recall that the standardised expected value is equal to the expected value divided by the standard 
deviation. 
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strength of the insurance company requires probabilistic statements about the ability 
of the insurer to meet its liabilities when they fall due. '7 That is, the investment of 
premium income into various asset classes must be such that their combined return 
is expected to cover the liability with only a degree of probability. 
As emphasised throughout, it is the probability associated with insurer insolvency 
that is the crucial point for regulators. This probability sets the position of the 
boundary dividing `permissible' optimal portfolios from `non-permissible' optimal 
portfolios (see Chapter 5). In the absence of any regulations regarding the size of 
this downside risk, there is the incentive for highly risk averse insurers to assume 
excessive portfolio risk by selecting an otherwise `non-permissible' optimal 
portfolio, and therefore be more susceptible to insolvency. 
In order to define the regulations relating to the size of insurer insolvency 
probability, there are a number of questions that need to be addressed by the 
regulators. First, what is an acceptable probability of insolvency? Second, related 
to the first question, what is the probability of failing the imposed regulatory 
standard? As a consequence of these two questions, the regulator may then ask the 
following question: what kinds of measures should be adopted in order that the 
regulator can effectively monitor insurance company performance? 
17 If the value of liabilities were exactly known, then it would be feasible to design an investment 
strategy that would in turn provide a payoff that matched the liability exactly (i. e. the fund would be 
immunized (see Chapter 4)). However, since the value of the liabilities is not known exactly, because 
of the random fluctuations inherent in inflation and interest rates, the insurer's information set is 
therefore incomplete. Hence, it is only possible to make probabilistic statements about the solvency 
performance of the insurance company. 
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In order to answer the three questions posed above, it is necessary to understand the 
central role of risk preference; it is the risk preference of the insurer that provides 
the variation in the composition of the investment portfolio and consequently the 
variation in the performance of ultimate surplus (and hence the insolvency 
probability). The relationship between insolvency probability and risk tolerance is 
given below in Figure 11.3. 
Figure 11.3. The Probability of Insolvency and Regulation 
--0 Prob{Surplus<O} (%) -----Regulatory Constraint 
The above graph illustrates the probability that ultimate surplus is negative (the 
probability of insolvency), conditional on the level of risk tolerance. The 
probability of insolvency is presented in conjunction with an exogenously assumed 
regulatory standard, viz. 
(11.26) Probability {Ultimate Surplus 
_ 
O} = 0.01 
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Note that this constraint is derived purely for illustrative purposes; in practice this 
constraint would also be the subject of economic analysis within a cost-benefit 
setting. Figure 11.3 demonstrates that the probability of insolvency increases to a 
maximum of 7.8 percent where r=34. The composition of this portfolio is entirely 
made up of equities. Thus, for 100 insurance companies with such a portfolio 
composition, roughly 8 insurers would have insufficient funds to pay for claims. 
The illustration in Figure 11.3 demonstrates the variation in insolvency probability 
across the risk tolerance scale. The figure also demonstrates that most portfolios fail 
the assumed regulatory standard. In particular, out of the thirty-four portfolios 
simulated, only two portfolios passed the regulatory standard, at r=4 and r=7. 
Across the full range of risk preference, insolvency likelihood varies such that there 
is a `U' shaped relationship between the probability of insolvency and the risk 
tolerance of the hypothetical life assurance company; the central role of risk 
preferences is therefore highlighted. 
The `U' shaped relationship between the probability of insolvency and the risk 
tolerance of the insurer can be expounded as follows. Consider the solvency 
performance associated with risk tolerance r=1. Here the probability of insolvency 
is 3.74 percent; this insolvency probability is nearly three times the size of the next 
highest risk category r=2. Moreover, for the four lowest risk categories r=1... 4, 
and also r=6-7 there is a negative relationship between insolvency probability and 
risk tolerance. Thereafter, there exists a positive relationship between insolvency 
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probability and insurer risk tolerance. Thus, overall there is a `U' shaped 
relationship between risk tolerance and insolvency probability over the entire risk 
tolerance scale. For a rational investor, portfolios to the left of the optimal portfolio 
with minimum insolvency-probability (r=7) are strictly dominated by other optimal 
portfolios generated by greater risk tolerance (r> 7), which offer a greater expected 
surplus for a given level of insolvency probability. This result can be demonstrated 
with respect to the lowest risk tolerance category r=1, which has an insolvency 
probability consistent with r=25, yet offers a lower expected surplus. 
The importance of the `U' shaped relationship between risk tolerance and 
insolvency prediction needs explaining further, since there are clear implications for 
the design of regulatory standards. There are two explanations developed here: first, 
there is the interaction between changes in expected returns (and portfolio risk) as 
risk tolerance changes; and second, there is the role of model specification. 
Consider the interaction between risk tolerance and expected returns/standard 
deviation. At first sight, it appears that the more spread investments are across the 
different asset classes, the lower the insolvency probability; that is, diversification 
reduces insolvency probability (see Table 11.2 and Table 11.4). While this seems 
an intuitive explanation, the evidence provided in Table 11.2 and Figure 11.2 cast 
doubt on this view. The major difficulty with this explanation is that the benefits of 
diversification are not reported in the standard deviation results. If there are benefits 
to solvency from diversification, then there should be benefits reported in terms of 
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portfolio risk (standard deviation); that is, if the `U' shaped pattern in insolvency 
probabilities resulted from diversification, then there should be a `U' shaped pattern 
reported in the portfolio standard deviation (this is evidently not illustrated in Figure 
11.2). More likely, is the fact that the position and size of the probability 
distribution is changing with risk tolerance - through the changing preference set of 
the insurer and the consequential effect that this has on portfolio return and risk - 
and that it is the interaction of expected return and standard deviation with risk 
tolerance that is leading to the results presented in Figure 11.3. 
A further explanation of the `U' shaped relationship between insolvency probability 
and risk tolerance might come from the assumed stochastic model. In particular, the 
functional forms of the simulation algorithms will be important and in particular the 
role of inflation is crucial. As Chapter 10 demonstrated, inflation (or specifically 
the Retail Price Index (RPI)) is central to the evolution of the 1995 Wilkie model. 
Since the respective influence of the RPI upon the five asset classes will vary, a 
change in the optimal portfolio's composition might introduce model specific 
effects; for example it might introduce a variation in the role of inflation and hence 
have implications for insolvency prediction. Thus, the model specific 
considerations are important in the measurement of future insurer solvency. 
Evidence for the `model argument' comes from `sensitivity' analysis and the results 
that are reported in Table 11.6 below. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates the 
sensitivity of the ultimate surplus distribution function to its input distributions. 
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Table 11.6. Sensitivity Results for Ultimate Surplus by Asset Class 
Risk 
Tolerance 
R Cash Consols IL Gilts Equities Property Inflation 
1 0.77 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.2 
5 0.67 0.12 0 0 0 0 0.16 
10 0.53 0 0 0 0.14 0.09 0.17 
15 0.47 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0.15 
20 0.44 0 0 0 0.13 0.04 0.15 
25 0.46 0 0 0 0.14 0 0.12 
30 0.51 0 0 0 0.17 0 0.12 
Note. Average standardised coefficients reported across all input distributions for given asset class. 
The sensitivity analysis performed by @RISK involves the use of multivariate 
stepwise regression. Stepwise regression is used in sensitivity analysis because it 
removes all variables that provide an insignificant contribution to the simulation 
model (at the 5 percent level of statistical significance). The results that are 
reported in Table 11.6 are normalised regression coefficients for each input variable. 
Thus, for example, a regression value of 0 indicates that there is no significant 
relationship between the input and the output, while a regression coefficient of +1 or 
-1 indicates a +1 or -1 standard deviation change in the output for aI standard 
deviation change in the input. R2 values are reported for completeness. 
The results in Table 11.6 demonstrate the model specific variations as risk tolerance 
changes. In particular, the explanatory power of the input distributions also has a 
`U' shaped relationship with risk tolerance. This is a direct result of the respective 
changes in the composition of optimal portfolios. Consider the role of inflation 
within the surplus simulation. The evidence confirms that for all classes of risk 
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tolerance, the importance of fluctuations in inflation is seen as a significant 
explanation of fluctuations in ultimate surplus. This confirms the model specific 
effects present within the structure of the 1995 Wilkie model (see Chapter 10). 
With regard to the other results reported in Table 11.6, the signs of the reported 
coefficients are as expected, and the respective role of equities is confirmed as 
statistically significant in generating some of the variation associated with ultimate 
surplus. In line with the changes in portfolio composition, the relative significance 
of the different asset classes also changes. Thus, for example, where r->O, short- 
term interest rates become increasingly significant in explaining fluctuations in 
ultimate surplus, while by contrast, as r--34 the equity performance becomes 
increasingly significant. 
11.4.3 Regulatory Considerations 
As an illustration of the role of solvency constraints, consider the capital that an 
insurance company would require in order that the probability of needing any 
further capital to finance its activities is less than 1 percent (the assumed regulatory 
standard in Equation 11.26). The final two columns in Table 11.3 provide some 
guidance to the capital adequacy problem outlined above. Total reserves and the 
margin of solvency are reported in Table 11.3.18 Recall that Equation 11.2 sets total 
assets equal to two components- a variable (capital) component K, and a fixed 
18 Note that the calculated margin of solvency used in this study is a theoretical measure and must be 
contrasted with the regulations imposed on insurers in practice (see Chapter 2). 
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component C (that belongs to the fund claimants and is the expected value of the 
liability). At the start of the simulation the value of K has been assumed to be equal 
to zero. An attempt is made to calculate retrospectively the value of K that would 
have ensured that the regulatory constraint in Equation 11.26 was non-binding. 
Before proceeding to the reserve results, it is important to understand the basis of 
the reserve calculations. Waters (1988) highlights two points in this regard. First, 
required reserves are evaluated with respect to ultimate surplus and therefore at the 
end of the policy term. That is, with a 0.99-degree of probability, the calculated 
reserves ensure that the insurance company would have enough funds to meet its 
liability. However, it might be more reasonable to assume that the reserve funds are 
made available from the beginning of the policy term, since at time t=0 the liability 
was assumed (Waters 1988,60). The second point developed by Waters (1988), 
concerns the source of capital and how this in turn is serviced. On the basis of the 
reserve calculation in Table 11.4, it is assumed that reserves would be invested on 
the same basis as the premium funds; for example, for an optimal portfolio made up 
entirely of equities, the reserves are calculated assuming that they too are invested 
entirely into equities. This seems an unreasonable assumption, particularly where 
preferences are polarised at the two ends of the risk tolerance scale and where the 
risk of insolvency is correspondingly increased. 
The latter point outlined above needs greater elaboration and is the point of 
departure for further research. In particular, a richer theory of solvency regulation 
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would need to incorporate constraints on the composition of reserves, which would 
itself be a function of portfolio composition. While the above points will be 
material to the discussion, it is asserted that the results in Table 11.3 provide a 
useful introduction to some of the issues relating to insurer solvency regulation. As 
a consequence, consider the results relating to reserves and margins of solvency in 
Table 11.4. Although there are some significant variations about trend, the trend is 
positive as the required reserves rises with the risk tolerance of the insurer. This is 
an intuitive result since the variation in ultimate surplus is increasing with risk 
tolerance. The possibility of insurer insolvency necessitates the requirement for 
some form of solvency constraint. Thus, Table 11.4 shows that the required `margin 
of solvency' for a given premium fund size varies significantly with risk tolerance. 
Margins rise to a maximum of 67 percent of the premium fund size- a significant 
provision for adverse outcomes in order that the solvency regulatory standard is 
adhered to. Figure 11.4 illustrates the variation in the solvency margin along the 
risk tolerance scale. 
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Figure 11.4. Margins of Solvency 
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Figure 11.4 reflects the `U' shaped relationship that exists between insolvency 
probability and insurer risk tolerance. In addition, the required margin of solvency 
is insurer-specific; depending on the risk preference of the insurer, the required 
solvency margin will vary in order to ensure that the solvency constraint in Equation 
11.26 is passed. Note also that there exists a substantial jump in the margin of 
solvency between r=30 and r=31. This may, for example, indicate that there is a 
critical point beyond which it is not possible to exploit the gains from diversification 
and, as a result, a more than proportionate response in terms of an increase in the 
required solvency margin is required. 
Now it is useful to compare the insolvency probabilities associated with the optimal 
portfolios with those outcomes from actual portfolios operated in practice. As a 
basis for comparison, the portfolio allocations for the insurance industry as a whole 
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will be used in the simulation. Data on the industry investments are taken from 
Table 7.5 (page 274) and are simplified below in Table 11.7 for the purposes of 
using the 5-asset class model assumed here. In addition, the probability of 
insolvency is also calculated for 10 of the larger insurers using their asset 
allocations for 1998. 
Table 11.7. The Probability of Insolvency (%) and Actual Portfolios Holdings (%) 
Name of Insurance Company Cash Consols Index-linked Equities Property Probability of 
Insolvency 
American Life Insurance 52.4 31.2 15.6 0 0.8 1.56 
Co. 
AXA Sun Life PLC 3.3 25.1 9.5 54.5 7.6 0.58 
The Equitable Life 6.5 25.5 10 51.6 6.4 0.63 
Assurance Society 
Legal & General 1.1 27.3 11.7 49.4 10.5 0.44 
Nat West Life 0.7 88.1 11.2 0 0 1.46 
Norwich Union Life & 1.3 25.4 3.4 59.2 10.7 0.62 
Pensions Ltd 
Prudential Assurance 2.3 10.3 7.4 69.8 10.2 0.51 
Scottish Equitable 0.9 50.9 19.4 28.8 0 0.58 
Scottish Widows 4.1 25.6 13.2 51.1 6 0.76 
Standard Life 2.8 30.6 6.3 51.3 9 0.53 
Industry Average 8.74 13.3 5.99 62.6 9.37 0.48 
Note: (a) Company data taken from Standard & Poor's (1998) Life Insurance Report. 
(b) The number of i terations during the simulation was 10,000. 
(c) All convergence criteria s uccessfully passed. 
With respect to Table 11.6 there are a number of points to note. With respect to the 
portfolio holdings themselves, it is evident that most portfolios are diversified across 
all asset classes - notable exceptions to this pattern are the American Life Insurance 
Company and Nat West Life. Moreover, all insurance companies - except the two 
aforementioned insurers - have insolvency probabilities less than 1 percent using 
this simulation model. Correspondingly, the level of margin required would be 
negative under the current regulatory assumptions. However, the illustrative 
regulatory standard may in fact be quite high, as one failure in every one hundred - 
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given that there are approximately 160 authorised life insurers operating in the UK - 
would see an insurance company insolvency every year on average. As noted 
previously, the determination of what is the acceptable level of insolvency is a 
matter for cost/benefit analysis. 
With respect to the optimal portfolios, the actual portfolios perform rather better 
with most of the insolvency probabilities reported in Table 11.6 reporting 
insolvency probabilities significantly less than the optimal portfolio with the lowest 
insolvency probability (optimal portfolio, r=7 (probability 0.74 percent)). The 
outcome is in line with what might be expected. 
11.5 Summary 
The use of simulation methodology has provided a means of illustrating the central 
role of risk preferences in measuring and regulating the solvency of life assurance 
companies. The financial strength of a hypothetical insurance company was 
assessed in this chapter by making probabilistic statements about the accumulated 
cash, inflows and the accumulated cash outflows, as measured by the ultimate 
surplus at a fixed time horizon, t=25. The results and methodology demonstrate the 
complexities involved in quantifying insurer solvency. In particular, the models 
used to simulate are a critical consideration. Sensitivity analysis can provide an 
indication of the significance of these model specific factors. 
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The above point serves to illustrate the point that, as with any form of model 
building, results and conclusions are frequently assumption specific. One of the 
most important assumptions concerns the use of portfolio run-off performance as 
opposed to the use of portfolio going-concern performance. The absence of new 
business in the measurement of the insurer's solvency position is unrealistic at best. 
The inflow of new cash from new policy cohorts will introduce important crossover 
effects (such as cross-subsidy effects between different policy cohorts). However, 
the run-off case is justified on the grounds that it provides a relatively simple 
framework from which to demonstrate a number of central issues relating to insurer 
solvency measurement. Also, the assumption of new business introduces additional 
complications, such as the complication associated with determining the new 
business time horizon. 
Despite the methodological concerns, the central role of risk preference in the 
solvency assessment of life assurance companies is clear. The implications for the 
design of solvency regulation are discussed in Chapter 12. Note that experimental 
economics can provide an indication of the actual level of risk tolerance; for 
example there is evidence to suggest that an appropriately scaled risk tolerance 
parameter r would equal 25 for a fund manager (see Sherris (1992)). 19 On the basis 
of this experimental evidence and the simulations used in this chapter, the resulting 
insolvency rate is significant, suggesting that a cost-benefit analysis of regulatory 
shift might be worthwhile. 
19 There are a number of caveats to the experimental evidence including the sensitivity of results to 
the size of initial wealth, and the utility function assumed. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
12.0 Public Policy Perspectives 
A number of alternative approaches to the study of solvency in the U. K. life 
assurance industry have been explored and used to demonstrate factors that are 
worthy of further consideration in respect of the measurement of insurer solvency. 
The implications for public policy are explored in greater detail within this chapter, 
with particular emphasis on the possible directions for future research. Before 
proceeding, it is worth stating some of the policy questions that have been 
considered in respect of the current solvency regulations governing the U. K. life 
assurance industry. These questions are as follows: 
1. What are the objectives of the regulator? 
2. What has economic theory got to say about the current regulatory 
environment? 
3. What has the simulation analysis got to say about the value of the current 
information submitted to the regulator for the purposes of solvency 
screening? 
3(a) What measures of solvency are current regulations actually 
providing? 
3(b) Are these the types of measures that are consistent with the 
conclusions of the simulation analysis? 
3(c) If not, what types of measures should the regulator be seeking to 
identify? 
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The above questions serve to act as a focus for discussion within this chapter. 
Discussion proceeds in Section 12.1 with an analysis of the regulatory objectives 
associated with U. K. life assurance solvency regulation. Section 12.2 provides a 
performance appraisal of the current regulatory environment pertaining to life 
assurance. Section 12.3 develops some general considerations in the measurement 
of solvency, while in Section 12.4 the implications from a simulation approach to 
solvency are developed. Section 12.5 outlines considerations specific to ex ante 
solvency measurement, while closing remarks are presented in Section 12.6. 
12.1 Regulatory Objectives 
In order to understand the motivation for regulation, it is worth reviewing some of 
the conclusions that can be drawn from current regulations. There have been a 
variety of regulatory actions that have been in the public interest, aimed at 
correcting a perceived market failure, such as information asymmetry. The public 
interest argument can be applied to most of the regulatory changes, particularly 
those relating to the authorisation of insurance companies; for example, the 1982 
Insurance Company Act (see Chapter 2). These regulatory changes emphasise 
quality control, using insurance company accounts and statements (submitted to the 
regulator) as a signal for insurer solvency. 
The historical evidence would tend to suggest a degree of regulatory capture. One 
notable example is within the Insurance Ombudsman scheme, which has terms of 
reference that limits either the scope or the basis of judgement of the ombudsman. 
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Also, there is evidence of regulatory responses to consumer demands, such as the 
1975 Policyholders Protection Act, which followed widespread public concern over 
the Vehicle and General collapse in the early 1970s. 
A further point to note with respect to the underlying theories of regulation concerns 
the lack of flexibility in legislation. With the pace of innovation in financial 
services there is clearly a need for insurance legislation to be flexible, this was 
clearly not the case with the 1870 and 1909 Life Assurance Acts which were 
inadequate to deal with new types of insurance products. Moreover, the pace of 
financial innovation has highlighted the inadequacies of the 1986 Financial Services 
Act, especially with respect to the regulation of financial crimes. The development 
of a new unified financial regulator to oversee all aspects of financial supervision is 
an attempt to rectify these inadequacies. This regulatory shift also demonstrates a 
pattern that is consistent throughout history; namely that regulatory shift is primarily 
reactive in nature, rather than proactive. 
While much has been said about the evidence to support alternative theories of 
regulation in the U. K. life assurance industry, what can be concluded about the 
regulator's objectives (where the regulator is defined as the Insurance Director at the 
Financial Services Authority (formerly the Insurance Directorate at the DTI))? U. K. 
insurance regulations, in particular solvency margins, aim to provide an `early- 
warning' mechanism of financial distress within the life assurance industry. Do 
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these regulations aim to minimise the risk of insolvency? The answer to this 
question is not that clear. 
The accounts and statements submitted under the 1982 Insurance Companies Act 
can be seen as a signalling device to pre-empt financial distress and the declaration 
of insolvency. Changes to the regulations governing the informational requirements 
may therefore be seen as a means of improving the quality of the insurer solvency 
signal, rather than necessarily minimising the risk of insolvency, although this too is 
an important consideration. 
While there is clearly a need to restrict the probability of insolvency, and as a result 
ensure the quality of any solvency signal specified in the regulations, the regulator's 
objective still does not fit into an unconstrained max/min problem. This is because 
of the fact that it is highly inefficient to have an objective that aims to eliminate the 
probability of insolvency completely; the resources that would be required in order 
to eliminate the probability of insolvency would be exorbitant. Thus, the regulatory 
objective is focused on limiting the frequency of insolvency, while setting this 
objective within a cost/benefit framework; that is, the regulator minimises 
insolvency probability subject to a resource constraint. 
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12.2 The Performance of the Current Regulatory Environment 
What can be said about the performance of the current prudential regulatory 
structure? In terms of financial crises within the life assurance industry, the current 
regulatory system has performed relatively well over the last twenty years, with 
only one `life' case referred to the Policyholders Protection Fund (Department of 
Trade and Industry 1998). In addition, the Appointed Actuary scheme has proved a 
valuable means of insolvency control in ensuring that insurance companies do not 
assume excessive risks. However, there are a number of weaknesses and strains that 
are associated with the current system. One of the major problems concerns the 
frequency of regulatory review and the time lags involved in detecting financial 
distress. Forms are submitted to the regulator six months after the end of the year to 
which they relate. As a consequence, a possible 18 might pass before the regulator 
would detect financial distress. The speed of `risk-related supervision' (see Chapter 
5) needs to be improved so that public information disclosure is more timely. The 
potential for improving the speed of information disclosure is significant given the 
advances in information technology since the establishment of the 1982 Insurance 
Companies Act. Thus, the time lag in solvency-signal transmission results in a 
solvency measure that is outdated and unlikely to provide an accurate measurement 
of the current solvency performance exhibited within the U. K. life assurance 
industry. 
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The need for a more responsive, dynamic measure of solvency is highlighted when 
considering the pace of product innovation within the life assurance industry. As 
demonstrated in Chapters 6-9, the continued development of the life assurance 
industry has been supported through numerous product innovations (see Chapter 6), 
which supports new business, provides evidence for non-price competition (see 
Chapter 7), and yields the potential to earn monopoly rents (see Chapters 8 and 9). 
Furthermore, Chapter 6 highlighted more general financial innovation, such as the 
use of financial derivatives in asset/liability management. The importance of 
equities to the long-term performance of life insurers is clear: life insurers are 
heavily reliant upon the performance of the stock market (see Chapter 7). In sum, 
dynamic solvency testing, such as assessing an insurance company's ability to 
withstand a stock market crash of variable size, becomes another crucial 
consideration (see Chapter 4). Current insurer solvency measures must therefore be 
more dynamic in design. 
Another argument in favour of making the current regulatory assessments more up- 
to-date comes from organisational shifts, such as mergers and demutualisations (see 
Chapter 7), which represents significant adjustments that may adversely affect the 
performance of the company (see Chapter 9). All these changes mean that timely 
and flexible regulatory reviews are critical for the effective measurement of 
solvency in the U. K. life assurance industry (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
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12.3 Considerations in the Measurement of Solvency 
The actuarial and financial approaches to insurer solvency (respectively Chapters 3 
and 4-5) have highlighted the numerous methods by which to assess and measure 
solvency. Although these two approaches have a tradition of being developed in 
isolation from each other, they both highlight three attributes of solvency that are 
central considerations: the considerations of time, risk, and probability. The use of 
portfolio theory has become the dominant paradigm for analysing issues pertaining 
to insurance solvency in both actuarial science and economics (see Chapters 4 and 
5). This theoretical framework is complimented by stochastic simulation 
methodology that attempts to incorporate further the underlying probabilistic nature 
of insurer solvency (see Chapters 10 and 11). 
Paulson and Dixit (1988) argue that the main requirements for any sound 
investigation of solvency are as follows: first, to keep at a minimum the number and 
impact of assumptions made; second, to use actual company, industry-wide data as 
much as possible; third, to identify information that should be incorporated in 
prospective studies if it is not currently available; and fourth, to integrate the salient 
features and timing aspects of solvency into a cash flow model, which faithfully 
captures the essential character of the insurance firm subject to market and 
regulatory behaviour (Paulson and Dixit 1988,41). 
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While it is difficult to ensure that all of the above considerations are satisfied fully, 
the points of Paulson and Dixit (1988) provide a valuable guide for a discussion of 
solvency measurement. Throughout this thesis, it is evident that there is no simple 
answer regarding the `right' measure of insurer solvency. Any measure of solvency, 
by definition, necessitates the use of assumptions that contain subjective elements, 
which are a direct consequence of the time, risk and probabilistic attributes of 
solvency. Moreover, as Chapter 9 demonstrated, much of the current available data 
contains a high noise-to-signal ratio and this limits its usefulness. Also the static, ex 
post measures of solvency used in the U. K. regulations can never incorporate fully 
the dynamic factors that affect solvency. This fact is acknowledged implicitly 
within the U. K. insurance regulations. Regulatory actions are defined in terms of 
the `required margin of solvency'. As noted earlier, these solvency measures are 
used as an early warning signal, rather than a definitive criterion for the declaration 
of insolvency. Hence, the inadequacies associated with ex post solvency 
measurement means that definitive regulatory action (i. e. the ability to declare an 
insurer solvency or insolvency) is constrained heavily. 
The limitations associated with the current solvency measures yields a number of 
opportunities for the improvement of solvency measurement. However, these 
improvements must be checked by three qualifications. The first qualification is 
that any regulatory change must be assessed in terms of its cost and benefit. The 
second qualification (related to the first qualification) is that a full account of market 
processes must be made in the design of regulations. This qualification 
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acknowledges the fact that increasing the intensity of a solvency constraint imposes 
restrictions upon the ability of insurers to allocate their resources effectively and in 
addition may impose entry barriers, which might also serve to reduce productive 
efficiency (see Chapter 6). The third qualification to consider in respect of 
regulatory change is that the theoretical analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated the 
potential for regulatory constraints to be in conflict and hence a trade-off may exist 
between alternative measures of solvency. Thus, the implementation of a set of 
regulatory constraints in order to achieve a desired outcome (insurer solvency) 
needs to be fully integrated rather than implemented in a piecemeal approach. 
12.4 A Simulation Perspective 
Having acknowledged some of the more general considerations in the measurement 
and regulation of solvency, it is now worth considering the detailed implications 
from the simulations performed in Chapters 10 and 11. While the mechanics of 
simulations are relevant to discussion, it is the application of this abstract discussion 
to the practical problem of solvency measurement that yields some of the more 
interesting insights. 
There is a critical distinction between the simulation approach to measuring 
solvency and the measurement approach assumed by the insurance regulators in the 
U. K. The simulations provide an ex ante measure of solvency, `ultimate surplus' 
(see Chapter 11), in contrast to the ex post measures constructed out of the accounts 
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and statements currently submitted to the regulator. The distinction between ex ante 
and ex post is important, since solvency measurement is, by definition, involved in 
making predictions that are necessarily subject to future random fluctuations. For 
this reason, it is believed that in order to improve insurer solvency measurement the 
use of an ex ante measure of insurer solvency would be beneficial. In particular, an 
ex ante solvency measure incorporates the respective considerations of time, risk 
and probability far more than the current regulations. 
In order to illustrate these ideas in greater detail, a graphical illustration of the ex 
ante solvency measure is given below in Figure 12.1. The diagram illustrates the 
respective roles of ex ante and ex post regulation assuming the following: first, that 
there are two measures of solvency, ex post and ex ante; second, that solvency S is 
defined in terms of a solvency margin (recall that the `ultimate surplus' measure 
used in Chapter 11 is also a solvency margin measure); third, that regulatory review 
operates discrete rather than continuous monitoring; fourth, that insurer solvency 
performance, prior to the period under consideration, has been passed as 
satisfactory; and fifth, that the time horizon for ex ante solvency measurement is 
t+25. In addition, it is assumed that an appropriate measure of ex ante solvency can 
be constructed (this point will be revisited in the next section). 
Consider now the basic flow of argument with reference to Figure 12.1 below. 
Analysis commences assuming that the regulator only uses an ex post solvency 
measure. 
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Figure 12.1. Ex ante and Ex Post Regulation of Solvency 
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Notes: (a) XP denotes an ex post measurement of insurer solvency. 
(b) XA denotes an ex ante measurement of insurer solvency. 
At time t=0 the regulator measures the ex post solvency performance of a given life 
assurance company. This measure of solvency is similar to the current regulations, 
and the ex post required solvency margin is given by the bold portion of the line 
XP(O). The observed margin is equal to PS(O) and on this basis the insurer is 
signalled as solvent. Under the current arrangements this measurement of solvency 
allows the insurer to proceed to time t=1 (the actual path is illustrated by the dotted 
line), where again ex post solvency measurement XP(1) reports an observed margin 
of PS(1), which passes the required margin (the bold portion of XP(1)). It might be 
the case that the observed solvency margin is less than the required margin. Under 
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this scenario, a regulatory response would then be initiated (for a discussion of the 
current regulatory corrective action see Chapter 2). 
Now consider the inclusion of ex ante solvency measurement and its regulation. As 
noted in the previous sections, an ex post measure of solvency might ignore crucial 
factors that are relevant to solvency measurement (e. g. time, risk, and probability). 
Thus, an ex ante measurement of solvency may help to clarify the respective roles 
of these factors and thereby strengthen the current ex post regulations. 
To illustrate the advantage of an ex ante solvency measure, consider the following 
example. The form of ex ante solvency measurement consists of predictions about 
the future, and as a result only confidence statements can be made about the 
associated solvency measurements. At time t=0 (t=1) the regulator measures ex 
ante the projected solvency of the insurer at time t=25 (t=26). These predictions 
are defined in terms of confidence intervals, respectively A to B, and C to D. It 
might be the case that ex ante solvency constraints impose a limit on this confidence 
interval (as shown by the bold section of the XA(25) and XA(26) lines). 
Figure 12.1 shows that at time t=O the insurer passes both the ex post and the ex 
ante measures of solvency. However, this is not the case at time t=1 where the 
insurer passes the ex post measure, but fails the ex ante measure; the lower 
confidence bound of the ex ante measure is below the regulatory minimum at D. 
This might, for example, reflect changing market conditions and more pessimistic 
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scenario predictions used within simulations. The ex ante solvency measurement 
may indicate insolvency risks that are not identified by ex post measures of solvency 
and thus there is a greater likelihood that the regulator can initiate a pre-emptive 
strike against pending insurer insolvency. Note that the regulatory constraints are 
dynamic, in that the solvency margins and confidence bounds can be altered to 
account for changing conditions (such as short-term volatile movements in the stock 
market). 
12.5 Ex ante Solvency Measurement 
It is important to stress a number of additional points that relate to the design and 
implementation of ex ante solvency measurement. Consider first, the design of ex 
ante solvency measures. Guidance to this can come from a variety of 
considerations, such as those factors highlighted by Paulson and Dixit (1988). 
However, discussion here focuses on the simulation model used in the preceding 
chapter, Chapter 11. 
Central to the simulation analysis and the insolvency probability calculation, is the 
risk preference of the insurer. Thus on the evidence of the simulations, an ex ante 
measurement of solvency requires the measurement of insurer risk preference. Risk 
preference might be inferred from a variety of sources. ' Chapter 2 illustrated that 
' The separation of ownership from control and the predictions of agency theory (see Chapter 4) 
suggest that there may be a divergence between the risk preferences of the owners and the risk 
preferences of the investment managers. This point is therefore an important consideration in the 
assessment of insurer risk preference. 
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there is substantial data available in the accounts and statements submitted to the 
regulator regarding the portfolio composition of assets and this information might 
therefore be used to infer something about the insurer's risk preference. However, 
much of the submitted data are aggregate in nature and a detailed breakdown of the 
composition of assets and claims is not available (although the regulator could 
request this data). 
Questionnaires might be another useful resource from which to gauge insurer risk 
preference (although these are often fraught with design complications). For 
example, these questions might be used to construct an insurer risk preference 
index, though the weights assigned to each of the questions would need to be 
evaluated. 2 In sum, based on the theoretical and methodological approaches used in 
Chapters 10 and 11, the measurement of ex ante insurer solvency requires the 
adequate assessment of insurer risk preference. 
Another issue to arise with respect to the design of ex ante solvency regulation is 
that ex ante measurement (and regulation) is only as good as the models used to 
forecast ex ante. This issue introduces a plethora of additional considerations, from 
specific problems of model specification and estimation, to more general 
methodological debates concerning the predictive and explanatory value of 
simulation models. With respect to model specification and estimation, this clearly 
2 The problem of insurers manipulating answers is a concern with questionnaires. If, for example, 
questions are not weighted equally then insurers may have an incentive to concentrate only on those 
questions weighted heavily and manipulate their answers accordingly in order to ensure that they 
pass the ex ante solvency constraint. 
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is an area for future research. In Chapter 10, use was made of the Wilkie model 
(Wilkie 1995) to calibrate a simplified insurer solvency model in Chapter 11. 
However, there are a number of alternative approaches that could have been adopted 
with respect to model specification and estimation (indeed Wilkie (1995) reviews 
some of these alternative model specifications). 
Also important to any discussion of ex ante solvency measurement are the 
methodological concerns associated with simulation methodology. These concerns 
relate to the problems of the `black-box' approach, and in particular the relative 
importance of model explanation and model prediction in defining a criterion for ex 
ante model `validation'. A full account of the relative methodological merits of 
simulations is given in Balci (1994), Pidd (1996), and Robinson (1997). Many 
considerations relate to the views espoused by Friedman's instrumentalism, the 
influencial assertion that economic theories should be judged by the accuracy of 
their predictions rather than by the realism of their assumptions (Friedman 1953). 
Evidently, prediction is a central objective for solvency regulations, however 
questions persist regarding explanation; the black box remains. While it is possible 
to test the correlation between input and output distributions, it might not be 
possible to reach a sensible, plausible explanation of what the results mean. 
Moreover, an attempt has been made throughout this thesis to demonstrate how 
understanding a concept (solvency) provides invaluable guidance to its ultimate 
measurement and prediction. 3 
3 The simulations used in the previous chapters are justified in terms of their function as an 
`exploratory simulation', rather than as a `confirmatory simulation' (Robinson 1997). 
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Hardy (1994) summarises some of the main concerns associated with the use of 
stochastic simulation techniques. The first concern is that the level of uncertainty is 
such that not enough is known about parameter variability in order to assign 
probability distributions. The second concern is that the understanding of stochastic 
methods is at best incomplete. The third concern is that the results cannot be 
adequately explained. The final concern highlighted by Hardy is that stochastic 
simulation will inevitably throw up situations which could not happen in practice 
and hence challenge model validity. The concerns highlighted by Hardy are by no 
means conclusive and are open to debate. However, it is useful to bear these 
concerns in mind when designing an ex ante measure of insurer solvency. 
Of course the concerns about model validity in the ex ante measurement of insurer 
solvency has repercussions for the effectiveness and credibility of regulation. The 
introduction of new regulations will be subject to lobbying and the use of a given 
model needs to be justified; for example, the use of the Wilkie (1995) model as a 
basis for assessment would require some explanation for the selection of the model. 
There are two considerations in this regard: first, model sensitivity tests could be 
performed, (such as a convergence test of the stability of the predicted ruin 
probabilities across alternative model specifications) allowing the insurer to adopt 
more than just one model; and second, related to the first point, insurers are 
governed by the valuation guidelines put down by the Faculty of Actuaries and 
therefore guidelines could be extended to include the use of stochastic modelling 
techniques, allowing insurers to report their own solvency assessments with the 
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regulator performing model sensitivity tests. Whatever the assumption made, 
ultimately the regulator, through its sanction of withdrawing insurer authorisation 
can enforce its view on solvency measurement. 
A caveat to all of the discussion on ex ante regulation is that regulatory changes 
must be clearly evaluated in terms of their costs and benefits. Resource constraints 
mean that eliminating downside risk (see Chapter 4) is unrealistic and hence 
regulatory shift must therefore take account of any resulting reallocation of 
resources. 
12.6 Further Remarks 
Any ultimate theory of solvency regulation in the U. K. life assurance industry needs 
to take account of many features relating to solvency measurement, not least the 
consideration of time. A full `dynamic program' of insurer solvency regulation is 
therefore required. The basis for solvency simulation in Chapter 11 was essentially 
a single-period, insurer optimisation portfolio model. While this has provided a 
useful analytical tool for discussing various issues relating to solvency measurement 
in the life assurance industry, the analysis nevertheless remains incomplete. A full 
dynamic model of insurer decision-making might therefore be a useful point of 
departure for future research. The use of dynamic optimisation has already been 
established (see Booth, et al. (1997)), however this analysis is only partially 
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dynamic and key variables, such as the insurer's risk preference, is assumed 
constant throughout the period of analysis. Risk preference has been shown to play 
a central role in solvency measurement. A dynamic theory, where risk tolerance r is 
a function of time r(t) and the movement of this variable through time is given by 
dt ' will 
be of critical importance in measuring insurer solvency and hence 
designing appropriate regulations. Thus, a dynamic theory of insurer decision- 
making may shed more light on the problem of solvency measurement. 
Further considerations with respect to insurer solvency measurement are many and 
varied. Most considerations relate to an assessment of the impact from new 
solvency measures; for example, measuring the impact from insurers reallocating 
their resources in order to meet the solvency constraints. The opportunity cost 
associated with alternative means of financing the solvency constraint is another 
important issue. The role of `implicit' margins in solvency measurement (see 
Chapter 3) is a further consideration. Note that the role of reinsurance has not been 
addressed and this is an additional area for future research. 
In conclusion, the challenges to the newly established FSA regulator and the current 
insurance legislation are significant. The need for more accurate measurements of 
solvency is central to promoting public confidence within the U. K. life assurance 
industry. The greater understanding from recent theoretical and methodological 
advances suggests that current regulations are providing an incomplete solvency 
measure and that `a unified theory of insurer solvency regulation' might suggest a 
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more focused solvency signal, reflecting the considerations of solvency 
measurement that are probability, time, and risk. Thus, the potential to reduce the 
level of `noise' associated with current solvency measurements is significant, 
although due consideration must be given to the forecasting limitations of ex ante 
solvency measurement and the resource constraints imposed upon regulators. 
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APPENDIX 1: LEGAL MEASUREMENTS OF INSURER 
SOLVENCY 
A. 1.1. Solvency Margins for General Insurance in 1974 
Case Relevant Amount 
The general premium income of the body in its £50,000 
last financial year did not exceed £250,000. 
The income in that year was greater than One-fifth of the income in that year 
£250,000 but did not exceed £2,500,000. 
The income in that year exceeded £2,500,000. The aggregate of £500,000 and one-tenth of 
the amount by which the income in that year 
exceeded £2,500,000. 
Source: The Insurance Company Act 1974, s. 4. 
A. 1.2 Statutory Definitions of Long Term Insurance Business 
Number Description 
I Life and Annuity 
II Marriage and Birth 
III Linked Long Term 
IV Permanent Health 
V Tontines 
VI Capital Redemption 
VII Pension Fund Management 
[VIII Collective Insurance] 
[IX Social Insurance] 
Source: The Insurance Companies Act 1982, Schedule 1. 
Note: Classes VIII and IX have been inserted as a result of European Directives. 
A. 1.3. Statutory Definitions of General Insurance Business 
Number Description 
1 Accident 
2 Sickness 
3 Land Vehicles 
4 Railway Rolling Stock 
5 Aircraft 
6 Ships 
7 Goods in Transit 
8 Fire and Natural Forces 
9 Damage to Property 
10 Motor Vehicle Liability 
11 Aircraft Liability 
12 Liability for Ships 
Source: The Insurance Companies Act 1982, Schedule 2. 
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A. 1.4. Information `Schedules' submitted to the Regulator 
Schedule Description 
Number 
I Balance Sheet and profit and loss account (forms 9-17). 
2 General Business: revenue account and additional information (forms 20-39). 
3 Long term business: revenue account and additional information (forms 40-45). 
4 Abstract of valuation report prepared by the appointed actuary (forms 46-61). 
5 General business: additional information on business ceded. 
6 Certificates by directors and actuary and report of auditors. 
7 Regulations revoked. 
Source: Insurance Companies (Accounts & Statements) Regulations 1996 
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APPENDIX 2: DATA ON THE U. K. LIFE ASSURANCE 
INDUSTRY 
A. 2.1. Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Variables' Definitions Data Source b 
Profit Proprietary: amount transferred to the profit and loss account 1 
(0.04,0.02) (1997) divided by value of long-term funds (1996). 
Mutual: total surplus reported in the valuation balance sheet 
(1997) divided by value of long-term funds (1996). 
Solvency Solvency margin (1997 assets for long term business required 1 
(0.18,0.25) minimum margin) divided by total assets 1996. 
Size Natural logarithm of total long-term premium income. 1 
(11.23,2.84) 
Age Number of years since the insurer was established. 2 
(71.05,61.16) 
`SizeAge' Natural logarithm of. age multiplied by total long-term 1&2 
(17.27,3.12) premium income. 
Diversity Total number of insurance lines for which the insurer is 3 
(9.38,6.98) authorised to conduct business under the terms of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982. 
Investment Return Investment income receivable on long term business before 1 
(0.06,0.04) deduction of tax, divided by total assets. 
Death Total death claims incurred divided by total claims. 1 
(0.15,0.19) 
Surrender Total surrender of long term policies, divided by total claims. I 
(0.39,0.28) 
Overseas Claims Total overseas claims divided by total claims. 
(0.02,0.11) 
Sales Growth Total long-term premium Income in 1997 minus the 1996 total 1 
(0.37,0.78) divided by the 1996 total. 
Exports Long term premium Income from overseas markets divided by 1 
(0.03,0.11) total long-term premium income. 
Single Premiums Total premium income from single premium contracts, divided 1 
(0.46,0.32) by total long-term premium income. 
Agency Cost Total expenses (including commission) divided by total long- 1 
(0.79,3.72) term premium income. 
Managerial Expenses Total management expenses in connection with acquisition and 1 
(0.77,0.50) maintenance of business, divided by total expenses. 
Distribution Channels Number of distribution channels used for marketing of 3 
(1.7,1.02) insurance products. 
Mutual =0 for Proprietary Life Insurer, 1,2&3 
=1 for Mutual Insurer. 
Foreign =0 for domestic ownership, 1,2&3 
=1 for foreign ownership. 
Group =0 if insurer does not belong to an insurance group, 1,2&3 
=1 if insurer does belong to an insurance group. 
a Mean and standard deviation shown in parenthesis. 
b Source: (1) Department of Trade and Industry. Insurance Company Annual Returns (various 
editions). London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
(2) Post Magazine. 1997. The Post Magazine Insurance Directory 1997. London: 
Post Magazine. 
(3) Department of Trade and Industry. 1998. The Insurance Annual Report 
1996/1997. London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
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A. 2.2. Names of Insurance Companies 
INSURANCE COMPANY NAME COMPANY NUMBER 
Abbey Life Assurance Company Limited ac000846 
Aegon Life Assurance Company (UK) Limited ac001338 
Albany Life Assurance Company Limited ac001368 
Allchurches Life Assurance Limited ac000957 
Allied Dunbar Assurance PLC ac000960 
Ambassador Life Assurance Company Limited ac000963 
America Life Insurance Company Limited ac000744 
AXA Equity and Law Life Assurance Society ac000004 
Barclays Life Assurance Company Limited ac000943 
Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Company ac000525 
Bradford Insurance Company Limited ac000816 
Britannia Life Holdings Limited sa004348 
Britannic Assurance PLC ac000205 
Britannic Unit Linked Assurance Limited ac001516 
British Equitable Assurance Company Limited ac000089 
British Life Office Limited sa000179 
Caledonian Insurance Company ac000055 
Canada Life Assurance Company ac000197 
The Canada Life Assurance Company of Great Britain Limited ac001204 
Canterbury Life Assurance Company Limited ac001328 
Carlyle Life Assurance Company Limited ac000918 
Century Life PLC ac000255 
City of Westminster Assurance Company Limited (The) ac000975 
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited ac000164 
Commercial Union Life Assurance Company Limited ac001286 
Consolidated Life assurance Company Limited ac001544 
Co-operative Insurance Society Limited ac000158 
Cornhill Insurance PLC ac000281 
Criterion Life Assurance Limited ac000914 
Cuna Mutual Insurance Society ac001737 
Customs Annuity & benevolent fund ac000130 
Domestic and General Life Assurance Company Limited ac001707 
Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited ac001654 
Ecclesiastical Insurance Office PLC ac000214 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society ac000063 
Eurolife Assurance Company Limited ac001217 
Fidelity Life Assurance Limited ac000953 
FP Life Assurance Limited ac000917 
Forester Life Limited ac000953 
Friends' Provident Life Office ac000417 
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation PLC sa000256 
General Accident Life Assurance Limited ac000074 
Gisborne Life Assurance Company Limited ac000862 
Guardian Assurance PLC ac000057 
Halifax Life ac001725 
Hambro Assured PLC ac001633 
Hamilton Life Assurance Company Limited ac001547 
Hill Samuel Life Assurance Limited ac001196 
Legal & General Assurance Society Limited ac000013 
Legal & General Assurance (Pensions Management) Ltd. ac000830 
London Aberdeen & Northern Mutual Assurance Society Limited ac001386 
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Table A. 2.2... Continued 
INSURANCE COMPANY NAME COMPANY NUMBER 
London and Manchester Assurance Company Limited ac000111 
London and Manchester (Managed Funds) Limited ac001537 
London Life Linked Assurances Limited ac001477 
London Life Managed Funds ac001352 
M&G Life Assurance Company Limited ac000830 
Medical Sickness Annuity and Life Assurance Society Limited ac000494 
Merchant Investors Assurance Company Limited ac001211 
Midland Life Limited ac000964 
National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Limited ac000426 
National Provident Institution Limited ac001303 
National Mutual Life Assurance Society (The) ac000177 
The Northern Assurance Company Limited ac000233 
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society ac000088 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Limited ac001159 
Pearl Assurance PLC ac000105 
Permanent Insurance Company Limited ac000792 
Pinnacle Insurance Company PLC ac001264 
Pheonix Assurance PLC ac001119 
Premium Life Assurance Company Limited ac000112 
The Prudential Assurance Company Limited ac000016 
Reliance Mutual Insurance Society Limited ac000696 
J. Rothschild Assurance PLC ac001669 
Royal Heritage Life Assurance Limited ac001114 
Royal Life Insurance Limited ac001508 
Royal Life (unit linked Pension funds) limited ac001307 
Royal London Mutual Insurance Society ac000246 
Royal National Pension Fund for Nurses ac000165 
Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society sa047842 
Scottish Life Assurance Company Limited sa000151 
Scottish Equitable PLC sa144517 
The Scottish Provident Institution sa000045 
Scottish Widows Fund and Life Assurance Society sa000594 
Scottish Widows Unit Funds Limited sa074809 
Skandia Life Assurance Company Limited ac001439 
Stalwart Assurance Company Limited ac000900 
Standard Life Assurance Company sa000038 
Sterling Life Limited ac000966 
Sun Alliance & London Assurance Company Limited ac001587 
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (UK) Limited ac001187 
Sun Life Assurance of Canada ac000174 
Sun Life Assurance Society PLC ac000049 
Swiss Life (UK) PLC ac001661 
Teachers Assurance Company Limited ac001772 
Transatlantic Life Assurance Company Limied ac001336 
TSB Life Limited ac000971 
United Friendly Insurance PLC ac000133 
Unum Limited ac001231 
Virgin Direct Life Limited ac002452 
Wesleyan Assurance Society ac000062 
Windsor Life Assurance Company Limited ac000125 
Winterthur Life UK Limited ac000285 
Woolwich Life Assurance Company Limited ac000465 
Yorkshire Insurance Company Limited ac000245 
Zurich Life Assurance Company Limited ac000840 
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A. 2.3 Estimation Residuals: Residual Plot for Profitability (Table 9.1) 
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A. 2.4. Estimation Residuals: Residual Plot for Solvency (Table 9.1) 
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APPENDIX 3: SIMULATION OUTPUT FOR STOCHASTIC 
ASSET RETURNS 
A. 3.1. Convergence in Wilkie Model Asset Output Distributions 
Name of Output 
Distribution 
(Wilkie Abbreviation) 
% Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Deviation 
Rate of Inflation 0.09 0.06 0.08 
(series I) 
Dividend Yields 0.05 0.06 0.11 
(Series Y) 
Yields on Consols 0.12 0.32 0.27 
(Series C) 
Yield on Cash 0.08 0.13 0.06 
(Series B) 
Yield on Property 0.06 0.10 0.09 
(Series Z) 
Yield on Index-Linked 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Securities 
(Series R) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
A. 3.2. Convergence in Nominal Returns (25 years only) 
Name of Output 
Distribution 
(Wilkie Abbreviation) 
% Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Deviation 
Equities 0.41 0.35 0.41 
(GPR) 
Consols 0.35 0.37 0.29 
(GCR) 
Cash 0.61 0.71 0.68 
(GBR) 
Index-Linked 0.33 0.44 0.59 
(GRR) 
Property 0.37 0.53 0.63 
(GAR) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
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A. 3.3. Convergence in Real Returns (25 years only) 
Name of Output 
Distribution 
(Wilkie Abbreviation) 
% Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Deviation 
Equities 0.34 0.38 0.32 
(JPR) 
Consols 0.41 0.33 0.28 
(JCR) 
Cash 0.56 0.64 0.68 
(JBR) 
Index-Linked 0.02 0.04 0.02 
(JRR) 
Property 0.18 0.16 0.17 
(JAR) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
A. 3.4. Convergence in Variance/Covariances (Nominal Returns) 
Name of Output % Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Distribution Deviation 
Variance (Cash) 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Variance (Consols) 0.06 0.03 0.12 
Variance (Index-linked) 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Variance (Equities) 0.08 0.12 0.09 
Variance (Property) 0.07 0.10 0.08 
Covariance (Cash, 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Consols) 
Covariance (Cash, Index- 0.06 0.08 0.09 
linked) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.08 0.10 0.07 
Equities) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.06 0.09 0.07 
Property) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.11 0.07 0.12 
Index-linked) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Equities) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.04 0.08 0.06 
Property) 
Covariance (Index- 0.09 0.07 0.08 
linked, Equities) 
Covariance (Index- 0.11 0.10 0.10 
linked, Property) 
Covariance (Equities, 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Pronerty) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
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A. 3.5. Convergence in Covariances (Real Returns) 
Name of Output % Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Distribution Deviation 
Variance (Cash) 0.13 0.08 0.11 
Variance (Consols) 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Variance (Index-linked) 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Variance (Equities) 0.09 0.12 0.15 
Variance (Property) 0.12 0.11 0.08 
Covariance (Cash, 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Consols) 
Covariance (Cash, Index- 0.07 0.09 0.10 
linked) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.08 0.11 0.13 
Equities) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.12 0.07 0.09 
Property) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.11 0.09 0.14 
Index-linked) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.17 0.09 0.13 
Equities) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.08 0.12 0.08 
Property) 
Covariance (Index- 0.11 0.13 0.14 
linked, Equities) 
Covariance (Index- 0.12 0.15 0.09 
linked, Property) 
Covariance (Equities, 0.10 0.09 0.13 
Prooerty) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
A. 3.6. Illustration of Real Returns for Equities 
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A. 3.7. Illustration of Real Returns for Consols 
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A. 3.8. Illustration of Real Returns for Cash 
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A. 3.9. Illustration of Real Returns for Index-Linked Government Securities 
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A. 3.10. Illustration of Real Returns for Property 
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APPENDIX 4: OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS AND SOLVENCY 
SIMULATION OUTPUT 
A. 4.1. Guide to Optimal Portfolios (2 Asset Case) 
Ultimate Surplus S (with initial asset funds equal to A): 
S=A(w1R, +w2R2)-L 
S depends on the random rates of return on the two assets R, and R2, and on the liability L. The 
portfolio problem for the insurer is given by: 
max E- exp -S 
11 
subject to w, + w2 =1 (wI, w2t r 
The mean E and variance V of ultimate surplus is given by: 
E= Awl E, + Awz Ez - EL 
V =A2W2VI +Azw2 +VL +2Azw1w2C1z -2AwICIL -2Aw2C2L 
Where E, V, and C denote, the respective expected value, variance and covariance. Assuming 
that S is normally distributed, then using the normal MGF, the problem can be seen as 
maximising the following function: 
Vý z 
E exp{tS} = exp Et +, where t= -(1 / r) 
(Subject to wl+w2=1) 
This is equivalent to minimising the logarithm of the above function handling the constraint by 
substituting, w2=1-w, directly into the objective function. 
Differentiating the objective function with respect to w; and setting the derivative equal to zero, 
yields the optimal asset weights as a function of initial assets. 
__ 
(CIL -C2L)+A(V2 -C, 2)+r(EI -E2) wý 
A(V, -2C1 2 +V2) 
W2 - 
(C2L 
-CIL)+A(V, -C, 2)+r(E2 -E, ) 1-w 2- A(V, +V2 -2C12) 
_' 
460 
A. 4.2. Convergence in Expected Returns and Variances (25 years) 
Name of Output % Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Distribution Deviation 
Expected Return (Cash) 0.06 0.08 0.05 
Expected Return 0.08 0.07 0.09 
(Consols) 
Expected Return (Index- 0.07 0.08 0.10 
linked) 
Expected Return 0.11 0.09 0.12 
(Equities) 
Expected Return 0.07 0.09 0.08 
(Property) 
Expected Return 0.11 0.16 0.14 
(Liability) 
Variance (Cash) 0.07 0.06 0.09 
Variance (Consols) 0.09 0.13 0.11 
Variance (Index-linked) 0.06 0.09 0.10 
Variance (Equities) 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Variance (Property) 0.12 0.09 0.13 
Variance (Liability) 0.16 0.13 0.09 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
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A. 4.3. Convergence in Covariances (25 years) 
Name of Output 
Distribution 
% Change in Percentile % Change in Mean % Change in Standard 
Deviation 
Covariance (Cash, 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Consols) 
Covariance (Cash, Inde x- 0.03 0.03 0.06 
linked) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Equities) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.06 0.08 0.09 
Property) 
Covariance (Cash, 0.03 0.04 0.08 
Liability) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.13 0.06 0.03 
Index-linked) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.03 0.07 0.07 
Equities) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.07 0.05 0.03 
Property) 
Covariance (Consols, 0.09 0.04 0.06 
Liability) 
Covariance (Index- 0.04 0.09 0.07 
linked, Equities) 
Covariance (Index- 0.13 0.11 0.04 
linked, Property) 
Covariance (Index- 0.09 0.04 0.12 
linked, Liability) 
Covariance (Equities, 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Property) 
Covariance (Equities, 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Liability) 
Covariance (Property, 0.04 0.08 0.09 
Liability) 
Note. Results report the percentage change in the summary statistics of the output distribution 
for each simulation using 10000 iterations. 
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A. 4.4. Distribution of Ultimate Surplus (r=5) 
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A. 4.6. Distribution of Ultimate Surplus (r=15) 
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A. 4.7. Distribution of Ultimate Surplus (r=20) 
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A. 4.8. Distribution of Ultimate Surplus (r=25) 
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